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ABSTRACT 
There has been growing interest in enhancing bank transparency, and this thesis starts 
from the premise that bank information is a fundamental tenet of the operations of 
banking. From the banks’ perspective, too much disclosure does not lead to the most 
expedient way of running its business. The duties, obligations or liabilities established for 
a bank matter. These duties or liabilities could either be actualised through regulatory 
obligations, these being securities markets regulation or bank prudential regulation, or 
private law and contractual obligations related to information held by a bank. Such 
obligations cause tension between the authorities that have a vested interest in the 
disclosure or non-disclosure of bank information.   
 
By placing banks at the centre of the arguments, this thesis establishes and analyses the 
informational challenges that banks face by identifying two concepts: The first and main 
one, which is the moot question of this thesis, is the public law challenge, which 
represents the rules and regulation compelling banks to disclose information while 
revealing an inherent tension between bank prudential and securities markets regulators. 
This concerns the natural dialectic between the maximum transparency philosophy of 
securities markets regulation and the need for a certain level of opacity residing in bank 
safety and soundness and financial and systemic stability-motivated prudential regulation. 
The second and auxiliary one is the private law challenge, which represents the tension 
between banks as profit maximisation-oriented commercial firms and banks as public 
interest-spurred financial and social institutions that makes banks essential information 
sources for the state.  
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This study concludes that transparency is not an end itself and it disagrees with the idea 
that the maximum level of bank transparency should be maintained in all circumstances. 
Rather, the protection of public confidence and the prevention of systemic and financial 
instability in banking and financial system, particularly during financial turbulence, 
suggest that a healthy dose of scepticism is necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.   Overview of the Research  
Banks, 1  as informational and financial intermediaries, quasi-public institutions and 
commercial firms, are subject to a web of laws, which require them to disclose 
information to outsiders via variety of channels by virtue of public law requirements. 2  
However, information collected, monitored and produced by banks is important for a 
bank, and in truly rare circumstances such as financial crises, its disclosure can easily 
damage the reputation of such confidence-driven institutions and can lead to information-
based banking panics and runs or eventual loss of confidence to the banks and also the 
state. Considering the profound importance of public confidence in the formation and 
function of financial markets, banks’ roles in the financial system in bridging the trust 
gap by creating an illusion to both borrowers and lenders mean that trust and public 
confidence are underlying constituents in creating liquidity and also destroying it. Even 
though the role of trust and public confidence is not fully reflected in consideration of the 
                                               
1 The term ‘bank’ in this thesis is used to describe financial institutions which accept deposits 
from the public and create credit. However, while the focus is on commercial banks, references 
are occasionally made to investment banks due to organisational structure of banks (i.e. 
universal banking or bank holding company (BHC) models). 
2	  This thesis, while recognising contemporary and comparative analysis and discussion about 
the difficulty of establishing a single, all-inclusive and doctrinally dispositive way to provide a 
clear-cut legal taxonomy and differentiate public and private domains, uses the term ‘public 
law’ as an overarching concept conveying the legal rules which control the relations between 
institutions of state, between the state and individuals and between individuals who are of direct 
concern to the state. It mostly makes references to regulatory law that relies on the command-
and-control system. See Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Claudio Michelon, and Neil Walker, After 
Public Law (OUP 2013) ch 2,4,5; Jonathan Law, A Dictionary of Law (9th edn, OUP 2018). 
Following this simplified line of thought, public agencies/ organs/ bodies are used here to 
describe the organisations dealing with the constitution and the application and enforcement of 
public law provisions. 
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function of law in financial markets and is often neglected; the links between banks and 
the rest of the financial system prove that bank information disclosure plays a vital role 
in the level of trust and confidence that has an impact upon both microstability and 
macrostability. 
 
There is an increasing demand for bank transparency, including both in its relations with 
persons and its information as a firm in financial markets.  Though there is a compelling 
and growing body of studies showing bank disclosures serve to improve market discipline, 
prevent wrongdoings and crimes, and contribute to efficient allocation of resources and 
financial stability and resiliency, which is in accordance with the overarching objectives 
of disclosure regulations in general, this thesis suggests that there is room for further 
discussion about the bank’s position in providing information and the potential drawbacks 
of such disclosures.  It does so by critically appraising the natural dialectic and even 
conflict between bank prudential regulators and securities markets regulators by placing 
banks, as information sources, at the centre of the discussion and exploring the additional 
complications peculiar to bank information disclosure.  
 
So, what refers to bank information? Bank information here is a multidimensional 
concept that is perceived as having a bottom-up structure: i) Banks are producers of non-
aggregated information based on their information collection, monitoring and creation 
functions that are part of their everyday operations, acting as a bridge between lenders 
and borrowers. ii) They are also producers of aggregated information, which refers to 
information about banks themselves and collective understanding about the banking 
system. This type of information is a collective product of banks’ information collection 
and monitoring activities and it is the kind of information that banks’ prudential and 
stability regulators are particularly interested in.   
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There is an ever-increasing call for bank information, which motivates an exploration of 
private and public interests and also two conflicting public interests, one being investor 
protection, market efficiency, integrity and other ensuing positive externalities attached 
to public disclosure, and another being the protection of the safety and soundness of the 
banking system and the prevention of systemic or financial instability, involved in its 
disclosure. This thesis attempts to shed light on different but related aspects of bank 
information disclosure to demonstrate a broader appreciation of whether the optimal level 
of information disclosure is possible for banks.  
 
1.1. Research Background 
It is commonly claimed that banks are special or different than other firms in many ways.3 
This assertion includes the relevance of public confidence that forms one of the most 
important aspects of the operation of the banking sector. Implicit and explicit government 
guarantees, bank safety and soundness regulations and supervision are designed to 
promote confidence and therefore protect the overall stability of the financial system. 
Disclosure of adverse bank information is likely to produce more damaging outcomes 
than a firm operating in another industry due to banks’ social, economic and systemic 
place in the financial system. So that, bank failures and runs on individual banks have the 
power to the trigger systemic instability and contaminate the whole system. 
                                               
3 They serve many functions to the society with their liquidity, maturity and credit 
transformation roles in the financial and social system and their relevance with the monetary 
policy and allocation of resources in the economic system is well acknowledged. R. Levine and 
S. Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’ (1998) 88(3) The American 
Economic Review 537; Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, ‘Liquidity Risk, 
Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking’ (2001) 109(2) Journal of 
Political Economy 287; F. Allen, E. Carletti and X. Gu,’The Role of Banks in Financial 
Systems’ in A. N. Berger, P. Molyneux and J. OS. Wilson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Banking (2nd edn, OUP 2015) ch 2. 
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In the recent literature on financial crises, links between bank information provision and 
transmission, transparency and its effects on systemic and financial stability have come 
to prominence. Increasing recognition of the significance of bank information disclosure 
to the mechanisms that maintain and promote public confidence, welfare and 
development has underpinned transparency-stability view in the way that availability of 
timely, relevant and reliable bank information is deemed necessary for addressing market 
failures (that rationalises the regulation of bank transparency in the economic sphere), 
protecting the systemic and financial stability and depositors, as well as promoting good 
governance and accountability. Transparency is seen as a panacea for deficiencies in 
regulation and for the practices involving market abuse, corruption, abuse of power, 
money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF).4 The links between confidence, 
stability and bank information disclosure highlight the broader concept of the democratic 
setting where the information provision allows the capital to be directed to its most 
productive uses, prevents misconduct, fraud, corruption and other wrongdoings and holds 
those accountable for their actions. So, the meaning of bank transparency has gone 
beyond corporate rhetoric. Yet, a critical reflection on the possible negative and 
unintended effects of bank disclosures and limitations on bank transparency (as 
transparency is bounded to receivers’ end) has been necessary after the reignition of the 
dialectic between the main objectives of bank prudential regulation and capital markets 
regulation.  
 
Bank opacity has been cited as one of the main reasons for the recent global financial 
crisis (GFC). 5  Though the functionality of the market discipline concept which 
                                               
4 Christine Kaufman and Rolf H. Weber, ‘The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation’ 
(2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 779,784. 
5 Gary Gorton,‘The Development of Opacity in US Banking’ (2014) 31(3) Yale Journal on 
Regulation 825.It should be noted that the term GFC encompasses the first phase of the crisis 
	   24	  
establishes that private sector agents monitor the bank and act on the information by 
punishing bad behaviour has been proved to be insufficient and not self-sustaining to 
maintain public confidence and discipline banks for their investment, governance and 
risk-taking behaviours during the GFC,6 the importance of bank transparency has been 
reiterated throughout the post-crisis world by the introduction of disclosure of stress test 
results, renewed capital adequacy and risk disclosures and other disclosure channels such 
as capital markets mandatory transparency rules that mandate banks to share information. 
So, banking disclosure initiatives that emphasise the disciplining effect of public 
disclosures use transparency-stability approach as a base and the rule- and policy-making 
for imposing greater transparency is motivated by the ex ante and ex post contribution of 
bank opacity to the GFC: ex ante by lack of market discipline and ex post by uncertainty 
about risk-taking behaviours, corporate governance practices, solvency and liquidity of 
banks.7 While doing that, the new regulatory order highlights the importance of financial 
stability, contagion channels between financial institutions (FI) and potential for systemic 
risk. It also identifies bank information disclosure to be vital for macroprudential and 
microprudential objectives.8   
                                               
(2007-9) not sovereign debt, fiscal or currency crises that occurred later on as the emphasis will 
be on the underpinning factors of the GFC that triggered the tension in the first place.  
6 There have been several reasons asserted for that, namely because market participants could 
not monitor and use information efficiently and the methods used to provide information lacked 
the ability to reflect risks so that adequacy of transparency was itself in doubt.Benton E. Gup, 
‘Market Discipline: Is it Fact or Fiction? (2003) SSRN WP (accessed May 13, 2016) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=449841. Application of market discipline 
is generally tied to several factors: information provision to the market and the regulators; and 
credit ratings and accounting standards that deliver more accurate and transparent information.  
7 Joachim Jungherr, ‘Bank Opacity and Financial Crises’ (2016) Barcelona GSE Working Paper 
Series No: 882(accessed May 20,2017)https://www.barcelonagse.eu/research/working-
papers/bank-opacity-and-financial-crises.  
8 Bank prudential regulators also use disclosure as a regulatory tool.  
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There is a long-standing discussion across law, finance and economics about the best 
regulatory technique for handling information and its provision to markets. Disclosure 
theories explain the philosophy and objectives of the dissemination of information on the 
marketplace with the resulting externalities and benefits, costs and restrictions of 
transparency via disclosure regimes.9 Although different conclusions accrue from these 
different perspectives, there is a general consensus on the benefits of public disclosures, 
such as increased competition, investor protection, price accuracy, reduced transaction 
costs, increased public confidence, deterrence of fraudulent practices and other 
interlinked advantages and positive externalities emanating from disclosure. Setting aside 
the classic questions about whether markets provide incentives for voluntary disclosure 
of socially and economically efficient levels of information in the absence of disclosure 
regulations or not;10 or whether market discipline of firms underpinned by contracts and 
courts is efficacious enough to accomplish optimal level of disclosure;11 or what is the 
balance between the level of government interference and the severity of market failures 
that require regulatory intervention, the merits of a mandatory disclosure (MD) regime 
are well-accepted and often-praised. Yet, the common argument against disclosure is 
                                               
9 For example, see George J. Stigler, ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’ (1964) 37(2) 
The Journal of Business 117;John C Coffee, ‘Market Failure and Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System’ (1984) 70(4) Virginia Law Review 717;Roberto Romano, 
‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’ (1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal 2359;Merritt B. Fox, ‘Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure’ (1999) 85(7) Virginia 
Law Review 1335.  
10 This idea is based on the view that financial markets collect the private information and 
assumptions and therefore information production and aggregation help to foresee future events 
and market prices reveal essential and useful information about firms. F. A. Hayek, ‘The Use of 
Knowledge in Society’ (1945) 35(4) American Economic Review 519. 
11  Robert Bushman and Wayne R. Landsman, ‘The Pros and Cons of Regulating Corporate 
Reporting: A Critical Review of the Arguments’ (2011) 40(3) Accounting and Business 
Research 259. 
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proprietary costs12 and the value attributed to information in general. This is because 
information is costly to produce, and its disclosure might damage the reputation or 
competitive position of firms.13 This applies to banks as the public good character of 
disclosed information and the costs attached to disclosures place a question mark over the 
economics of disclosure. Yet, the regulator, focused on social welfare and economic 
efficiency, operates on public interest considerations where individual interests are 
subordinated and a level playing field established by MD of information rule cuts these 
concerns to a certain extent. So, one common argument about banks’ incentives to be 
more opaque is associated with the general arguments applicable to all firms.  
 
A more specific one is associated with the sui generis characteristic and place of banks in 
the financial system, which underlies the links between financial stability and banking 
business. The theory, known as the Hirshleifer effect, establishes that greater disclosure 
might lessen welfare because it decreases risk-sharing opportunities for economic 
agents.14 This means that bank transparency might increase or intensify the potential for 
bank runs: If the realization of shocks is undiscovered in the marketplace, short-term 
creditors – who are the major contributors for the maturity transformation function of 
banks – may roll over their contracts with the bank, thus engaging in risk-sharing 
                                               
12 Ronal A. Dye, ‘Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosures’ (1986) 59(2) The Journal of 
Business 331. 
13 These costs are not just related to production. There are other important costs related to 
disclosure. Public disclosure might cause public participants to disregard private information 
and lessen their private incentives to acquire information. It can also decrease the government’s 
ability to learn from market prices. Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin, ‘Social Value of 
Public Information’ (2002) 92(5) American Economic Review 1521;Philip Bond, Itay 
Goldstein, Edward C. Prescott, ‘Market-Based Corrective Actions’ (2010) 23(2) Review of 
Financial Studies 781. 
14 J. Hirshleifer, ‘The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive 
Activity’ (1971) 61 American Economic Review 561. 
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arrangements.15 Transparency, in this respect, removes the banks’ insurance against the 
risks. As such, ex ante deliberation about the welfare reducing results of bank 
transparency is recommended and the result of greater transparency is seen as a lose-lose 
situation where the bank and all bank stakeholders end up with less. When the shocks are 
known in the marketplace, the willingness of peer banks or other markets to provide 
support decreases due to lack of confidence and liquidity hoarding behaviour. When this 
happens, interconnectedness and the self-protective behaviour of agents activate a 
spillover and freeze in a way that propagates deterioration, particularly money and 
interbank markets, with the potential to endanger financial stability.  
 
Some studies have discussed the role of public disclosures in lessening the possibility of 
banking crises when banks have control over their risk exposure.16 This view suggests 
that when the risk is exogenous, public disclosure is not beneficial ex ante as it does not 
change the bank’s risk-taking behaviour but rather triggers bank runs. 17  This 
transparency-instability view sees some level of opacity as an insurance device against 
bank runs and the GFC represented an opportunity to revisit the pursuit of greater bank 
transparency. This re-discussion was motivated by the disagreements that appeared over 
the disclosure of adverse bank information during a crisis and by the inherent tension 
between regulators that concurrently regulate banks.  
 
                                               
15 Itay Goldstein and Haresh Sapra, ‘Should Banks’ Stress Test Results be Disclosed?’ (2013) 8 
Foundations and Trends in Finance 1,17. 
16 T. Cordella and E.L. Yeyati, ‘Public Disclosures and Bank Failures’ (1998) 45 IMF Staff 
Papers 1. 
17 Wassim Shahin and Elias El-Achkar, Banking and Monetary Policies in a Changing 
Financial Environment (Routledge 2017) 113. 
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The tension and disagreements referred to here start from the general questioning about 
whether the pursuit of greater bank transparency is beneficial and optimal in all 
circumstances. This investigation is about finding how bank disclosures affect the 
markets, the financial system and the bank itself in normal times and during a crisis. Too 
frequent disclosure of the liquidity position of banks or disclosure without an adequate 
time-lag might aggravate the bank’s short-term and temporary liquidity problems; 
especially the information revealing that a bank needs central bank (CB) support has the 
potential to weaken public confidence and cause market overreaction, information 
spillovers and contagion during periods of stress.18 This concerns the natural dialectic 
between the maximum transparency philosophy of securities markets regulation  and the 
need for a certain level of opacity residing in bank safety and soundness, and financial 
stability-motivated prudential regulation .  
 
Disclosure provisions of the securities regulation were discussed in terms of whether they 
would impede the intended secrecy of government interventions that necessitate covert 
action in order to protect financial stability. In the United Kingdom (UK), the run on 
Northern Rock (NR) happened right after its need for emergency funds from the Bank of 
England (BoE) was disclosed. On 13 September 2007, the evening news revealed that the 
BoE, in its capacity as lender of last resort (LoLR), was to give emergency funding 
support to troubled NR and the next day depositors began a traditional, panic-based run 
on the bank as they took this news as a confession of the bank’s poor financial standing.  
A post-mortem examination of the collapse of NR reignited the discussion about an 
omnipresent element of the banking business, i.e. a lack of confidence on the part of 
depositors in fractional reserve banking and collective behaviour and the effects of this 
                                               
18 Patrick Calver and Jennifer Owladi, ‘Pillar 3 Disclosures: Looking Back and Looking 
Forward’ (2017) Q3 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 190,191-92. 
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lack of confidence in both the interbank market and on the public, which are manifested 
in the form of a bank run and paralysis in the interbank market. 
 
Even if the information was released by the media, not by the regulator or the bank itself, 
an interesting question arises related to the impact of laws in terms of whether MD of 
information as a cardinal part of capital markets regulation prevents the government’s 
financial stability-focused measures to forestall runs and panics.  
 
It was art 6 of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)19 which requires the public disclosure 
of inside information as soon as possible. The functionality of existing delay provisions 
and safe harbours in the law vis-à-vis the most efficient use of stability protective 
measures, such as receiving emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), in the face of the 
obligation to disclose inside information that directly concerns the issuer is questioned.20  
 
In France, the French authorities opined that the same law, MAD, did not require 
immediate disclosure of the rogue trading scandal at Societe Generale (SG) due to the 
highly volatile market conditions emanating from the crisis. This meant that disclosure 
of information about the discovery of fraudulent positions was delayed.21 
                                               
19 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (repealed). For the new legislation see 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), art 17. Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and 
repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission 
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. 
20 See MAD, art 6; MAR, art 17(4) and (5). Competent authorities were in a situation to decide 
whether delaying information about the ELA was possible in examining if confidentiality of 
inside information could be guaranteed and whether such delay would not mislead the public. 
21 European Commission(EC),‘Call for Evidence: Review of Directive 2003/6/EC on insider 
dealing and market manipulation’ (2009)(accessed May 23,2016) 
	   30	  
In the United States (US), the acquisition of Merrill Lynch (ML) by Bank of America 
(BoA) brought to the fore important and novel questions about whether the deal in the 
epic acquisition was made as a result of government assistance in order to avert a further 
meltdown of the capital markets at the expense of not disclosing the severity of problems 
to shareholders.22 As such, an investigation into the difficulty in pursuing transparency in 
the middle of a crisis, taking rapid decisions or withholding behind the scene 
arrangements to prevent the loss of public confidence and to guard the system against 
financial instability, systemic risk or a possible contagion vis-à-vis securities disclosure 
requirements might be necessary to understand how the current laws respond to this 
problem after the fundamental changes that were applied to the post-crisis regulatory 
systems.   
 
A meaningful discussion should start with the GFC. The GFC was mostly caused by the 
tremendous expansion in the scale and complexity of financial instruments that are 
commonly circulated within the financial industry, augmentation of shadow banking 
activities in a way that solvency and liquidity of commercial banks were under the threat 
beyond what conventional approach to commercial bank solvency and liquidity had 
centred on; and the contagion risk and links between the different financial markets, 
proving the global and transmissible character of the risks across the borders and implying 
that the focus on microprudential regulation falls short of the expectations.23 
 
                                               
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/market_abuse/call_for_evidence.pd
f.  
22 Robert J. Rhee, ‘Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, 
and the Hobson’s Choice during a National Crisis’ (2010) 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev 661. 
23 Anita Anand, Michael Trebilcock, and Michael Rosenstock, Systemic Risk, Institutional 
Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets (OUP 2016) ch 1. 
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The resurgence of financial stability as a public good and its dominance over market-
based governance has been one of the lessons learnt.24 However, in the examination of 
the desired level of bank transparency, what continues to be debated is how the market 
was unable to address the serious externalities and how the bailouts or emergency 
liquidity supports have become the response of the state authorities to the troubled banks.  
 
As the post-crisis agenda reveals, transparency has been the key term for spotting a lack 
of regulatory discernment about unregulated areas of the financial industry or complex 
and highly linked transactions of regulated parts of the system. 25  That is to say, 
derivatives transactions on the over-the-counter (OTC) markets have been under the 
spotlight since the GFC, and the opacity of these private contractual transactions and 
obscurity of the risks involved throughout the transactions have required transparency 
and other supportive measures.26 This is one aspect of transparency in which banks’ 
involvement in the securitisation process as originators of tradable loans and their 
transferral of risks onto the balance sheets is part of this discussion. This is because 
originated contracts are in circulation in the market and underlying risks are not known 
due to the opaque nature of the contracting process and the quality of loans.27 Banks are 
deemed inherently opaque institutions as they are informational intermediaries, and 
                                               
24 George Soros’s speech on the GFC has summarised this approach and become a slogan: ‘The 
prevailing misconception was the belief that financial markets are self-correcting and should be 
left to their own devices.’(accessed May 17,2017) 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/the-full-soros-speech-on-act-ii-of-the-crisis/.   
25 Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation 
(Routledge 2014) 418. 
26 Such as creation of central counterparty clearing houses and reporting obligations.  
27 From the banks’ point of view, securitisation has been a lucrative way of raising funds and 
their aggression to increase liquidity by providing subprime loans or by concentrating on some 
particular loans, and therefore making themselves vulnerable to risks concentrated in specific 
products, sectors or counterparties, was a contributing factor to the GFC. 
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higher transparency requirements in regulated areas partly motivated banks to shift their 
business to shadow banks.  
 
This discussion represents the lack of effective oversight, regulation or powers of the 
responsible authorities to foresee and respond to bank behaviours and their concomitant 
negative results on the system. The GFC revealed that fundamental weaknesses, gaps and 
misconceptions both in the regulation and the structure of the system (that banks are 
subject to) and superfluous market confidence caused banks to engage in opportunistic 
behaviours to access funds; and that this is an issue that needs to be addressed with 
prudential regulation and supervision.  
 
The other side of the transparency is about revelation of such information via other 
channels such as MD of information under securities laws. A recurrent theme of this 
research is that public disclosure is an important tool for the well functioning of capital 
markets. Exemptions or safe harbours provided for specific circumstances in securities 
disclosure regulations might not be responsive for banks when higher public goods like 
long-term financial and systemic stability outweigh the goals pursued for transparency in 
capital markets.  
 
The lesson taken from the bank disclosure-specific cases is that it is crucial to have a clear 
and pre-determined legal framework to manage potential downturns of FIs during times 
of financial crisis so that financial stability can be protected.28 This view is based on the 
idea that banks are special, and they have particular asset profiles, which differentiates 
                                               
28 Rosa M. Lastra, ‘Northern Rock and Banking Law Reform in the UK’ in Franco Bruni and 
David T. Llewellyn(eds), The Failure of Northern Rock: A Multi-Dimensional Case Study 
(SUERF Studies 2009) 132. 
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banking from other sectors. The information disclosed to the market as a result of MD 
requirements is distinctive in that a decision to invest in bank-issued securities requires 
an investor to seek out bank information. As such, timely disclosure on the strength and 
solidity of balance sheets, risk levels and future performance of banks to investors is 
important in giving them fair warning before the transaction. On the other hand, efficient 
application of prudential goals might necessitate a degree of confidentiality over bank 
information at a time of difficulty.29  
 
The core of the problem can be explained by the substantial differences between the 
vested interests of regulators. While the safety and soundness of the banks, as an objective 
of bank prudential regulation, is guaranteed by pre-emptive regulatory intervention via 
monitoring and supervision, securities regulation is based on public disclosure and ex-
post enforcement. In this sense, they have the characteristics of a police officer who spots 
regulatory breaches and enforces the laws without considering the potential drawbacks, 
whereas another can be comparable to the doctor in his capacity to find and cure a 
problem in order to prevent any possible difficulty in the future.30  
 
While the concurrent application of securities regulation and prudential regulation 
presents a potential clash, there is another secondary and maybe a subordinated issue that 
arises as to the bank disclosure of information. This is the status of banks in submitting 
themselves to public/regulatory authorities on disclosure of information they collected 
and produced. This represents the tension between private law and public law institutions. 
                                               
29 The new MAR in the EU is the official acceptance of the fact that potential adverse outcomes 
emanating from a temporary reduction in the level of transparency are more manageable 
compared to a bank that causes systemic stability. Yet, as it will be discussed, there is still room 
for further improvement. 
30 Howard Davies and David Green, Global Financial Regulation (Polity Press 2008) 192. 
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Regulators act on behalf of the public and they are not completely independent from 
global and political pressures. This assertion is especially true with regard to transparency 
initiatives and share of bank information. So, another potential clash triggering the 
optimal level of disclosure debate is the banks’ position against regulatory authorities 
such that their private relationship with persons can be affected by too much public law 
intervention and even banks can be the back-doors of the state whenever they need 
information. Their position as a private firm consisting of private contractual and 
fiduciary relationships on the face of too much regulatory intervention on the information, 
which forms the relationship in the first place, should be addressed as a side exploration 
in addition to any potential side effects of such disclosures on financial and systemic 
stability.  
 
After all, different sets of laws established on banks, as securities regulation consists of 
one them, require them to disclose information to the outside, and it raises the optimality 
problem on two different levels: As one is being the main theme in this thesis, MD of 
bank information under securities regulation  does not always produce the most efficient 
result for the markets and the economy as whole (as there is mega regulatory objective 
under which both stability and disclosure of information have to be taken together, not 
separately); and the second and auxiliary one is that, the other optimality issue emanating 
from the bank’s private law duty of holding information and public law measures asking 
for the disclosure of bank information. Banks are no longer confidants of their customers 
but instead are called on to be more transparent in all respects via ever-narrowing 
boundaries of their private cells. As such, the overall picture illustrates that there is a 
growing demand for bank information and the autonomy of banks is limited by public 
policy considerations. 
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In relation to bank information disclosure, one of the questions is whether there is a trade-
off between financial stability and bank transparency during financial distress. In case 
there is, whether it can be regulated under the present legal environment underpinned by 
transparency-focused view and in case it cannot, how regulation and transparency 
policies cooperate and how banking industry should have more prominence in maximum 
transparency-based capital markets disclosure regulations. The tension highlighted here 
is based on the dialectic between two regulatory zones with different objectives. Banks’ 
position as a vital information resources both for markets and the state itself to achieve 
public policy goals generates the question whether bank disclosures are optimal vis-à-vis 
increasing demand for bank transparency. To answer this question, it is first necessary to 
address why banks are different from other firms and why the information they collect 
and produce has specific value for bank stakeholders by linking bank information with 
interconnectedness and the potential for systemic risk. Bank information, here, means the 
information that banks collect, monitor and produce, which ultimately becomes 
information about the bank itself. How can customer information or information about 
projects be translated into bank information? Bank information is a result of financial 
decisions that are made based on customer- and project-related information, and therefore 
bank information is characterised as having a bottom-up structure. Then, with reference 
to GFC cases and financial and legal reforms, a broader view on the matter is considered 
with the latest developments in order to find a new balance – which is the balance between 
private and public law elements of bank information and its disclosure. 
 
Therefore, this thesis examines the application of paradoxical regulatory rationales on 
banks by investigating the motivations that led to the tension in the first place and by 
questioning whether there is a functional and ideational solution. It draws attention to  
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post-crisis revisions in financial regulatory thinking and practices in three different 
jurisdictions:  the US, the UK and the European Union (EU). In doing so, it shifts the 
focus from regulators, policy-makers and supervisors, whose motivations are different 
from banks, to banks which are the main source of the information in question. It 
illustrates the arguments not only by questioning the institutional characteristics of banks 
and their relevance to the negative effects of information disclosure as a result of capital 
markets transparency requirements, but also by providing a more comprehensive picture 
of changes in banks’ position in terms of sharing information.  
 
1.2.  Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This thesis establishes that bank information disclosure leads to tensions on both the 
public law-public law and private law-public law levels. It discusses this from two 
different positions. The first is that there might be a conflict between regulatory objectives 
of bank prudential and capital markets regulators over bank information disclosure, and 
a key challenge this conflict poses is that simultaneous application of these two different 
regulatory regimes on banks might be inimical to public confidence with effects on 
financial stability and economic activity. Second, the legal construction embodied in the 
banker’s private law duty of confidentiality is subject to an on-going change due to the 
shifting balance between private and public interests. The discussion of this initial 
position motivates several interrelated research questions: 
 
In thinking about the overall goals and strategies of financial regulation, is there a 
conflict between the maximum transparency-seeking philosophy of capital markets 
regulation and protecting the safety and soundness and stability of banks and the banking 
and financial system’s philosophy-based prudential regulation? 
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i)   If conflict exists, does it call for a revision in policy and regulatory thinking 
so as to prioritise one regulatory goal over another, or to reconcile or 
combine divergent objectives without undercutting others?  
ii)   Is there a regulatory turf war between bodies simultaneously regulating banks 
that have distinct regulatory objectives?  
iii)   Do these different goals co-exist, complement or defeat each other? If they 
cannot co-exist, which of these objectives should have priority over the 
others? 
iv)   As	  financial	  and	  systemic	  stability	  has	  become	  the	  overarching	  objective	  of	  post-­‐‑
crisis	  regulation,	  is	  there	  a	  case	  for	  less	  bank	  transparency	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  it?	  
 
Second, the legal construction embodied in the banker’s private law duty of 
confidentiality is subject to an on-going change due to the shifting balance between 
private and public interests. The discussion of this second position will address the 
following question:  
 
Do realities of modern banking and financial environment create a challenge for banks 
in their disclosures and are there conflicting public and private law requirements that 
require the optimal level of disclosure of information by banks to be revisited? 
 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that bank disclosure requirements should not be absolute 
and unlimited and that is difficult to set down a clear-cut and straightforward level of 
disclosure that can be called optimal due to conflicting divergent regulatory objectives 
and philosophies between bank prudential regulation and capital markets regulation; and  
conflicting public and private interests in regulating bank information disclosure.  
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In order to substantiate the above hypothesis, this thesis values long-term financial 
stability over the immediate transparency. Financial regulation should not be perceived 
in isolation but must be recognised in the context of the broader policy objectives, the 
system of institutions and long-term efficiency and sustainability which should be 
grounded upon the understanding of how the wider economy runs and interacts with the 
financial system. Using a macro framework in cultivating a system for reconciliation of 
competing regulatory objectives and for the accommodation of pluralistic interests, rather 
than embracing a clear division between regulatory agencies to perform in their technical 
capacity within its narrowed and pre-defined objectives, responds what the broader 
purpose of financial regulation is. The tension highlights the need for acknowledgement 
of normative objective and reasoning of financial regulation, as co-existence of 
conservative and progressive policy approaches adopted by different bodies has shown 
the need for ideational shift to reconcile or at least align diversified regulatory objectives 
in order to provide a diagnostic, expedient and mediating response to this institutional 
and somewhat political tension. So, if the reconciliation could not be achieved, 
prioritisation of goals and strategic transparency might be a solution to the conflict. 
 
Rather than setting an exact level that can be termed optimal, this thesis provides valid 
grounds proving that the application of some regulatory standards to banks should be 
relaxed and regulators should be given the discretion to adopt a flexible approach to 
protect systemic and financial stability.  
 
2.   Organization of Thesis and Chapter Synopsis 
This thesis is organised as follows.  
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In Chapter 1, a brief introduction to banking is made with regard to why banks are 
different than other FIs by establishing the nature of banks and their socio-economic place 
in the financial system. To do that, it explains why banks are regulated and protected and 
why the information collected and produced in the process of intermediation is important. 
It submits that, by their very nature, banks have always been susceptible to panic and runs 
or other strains of systemic risks simply by the fact that they issue liquid liabilities while 
investing in illiquid assets. It establishes that information is an economic asset of a bank 
and banks create value by provision of safe and liquid liabilities to depositors, which is 
possible with their ability to screen and monitor information-intensive loans and to 
produce information that is unknown to third parties.  
 
This chapter sets the scene for subsequent chapters by linking elements of the banking 
business with the place and nature of information they produce. It emphasizes the 
importance of banks, their role in the supply of and demand for credit by asserting that 
there is a public assumption (not knowledge) about the continuity of the credit extension 
role of banks. This describes public confidence. Therefore, Chapter 1 answers which 
information is bank information with an eye to the nature of information banks hold and 
produce by establishing the initial link between bank information and public confidence. 
By these observations, it concludes that banks are informational intermediaries and they 
are still special.  
 
In Chapter 2, two main discussions regarding regulation of the banking sector will be 
conducted simultaneously: the role of regulators and supervisors in crisis prevention and 
mitigation; and the concept and the effect of bank transparency within the frame of 
financial stability and systemic crises. This will be done by explaining why public 
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 confidence is a constructing element of the banking business and why the combination 
of the abstract and impersonal concept of public confidence and the unpredictable, self-
interest- and future-oriented, sometimes irrational emotions of certain bank stakeholders 
is of relevance to the relationship between bank information disclosures and stability. 
Financial stability is a relatively ambiguous concept and therefore owing to the 
comprehensive relationships between financial stability elements, bank transparency and 
its impact on confidence production will be assessed from the systemic perspective. 
Connectedness, contagion and correlation will be the focus in terms of exploring systemic 
risk, which is likely to appear after the disclosure of adverse information about the bank.  
 
This chapter submits that instability might come in many shapes and forms and one of 
the lessons taken from the GFC should be that proactive approach to prudential regulation 
should seek to solve the bank problem without causing disturbance within the market and 
the financial system. It submits three conclusions with reference bank disclosure of 
information: First, financial stability is a vague concept (since it has no clear-cut set of 
variables to access financial stability as opposed to the price stability) and it encompasses 
monetary and financial activities, which banks are important players in both of the 
domains and external changes in these areas are likely to affect the banking sector. Second, 
owing to the bank’s societal role and the mismatch between its assets and liabilities, lack 
of creditor confidence and the very basic fact of interconnectedness can create bank runs 
and failures and systemic crises. Third, financial regulation should not only aim to 
minimise the risk of occurrence of crises, but also it should absorb and deal with the 
shocks emanating from bank-related problems at the early stages to prevent contagion 
and the likelihood of systemic effects and it should protect general public confidence.  
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Chapter 3 starts with the discussion about the place and function of disclosures in capital 
markets and explores the theoretical foundations of disclosure-based transparency. MD 
requirement on banks is explained with reference to other disclosure channels to the 
extent that it is relevant to bank disclosures in capital markets. It submits that the GFC 
has led to greater expectations from banks in terms of providing more information to the 
markets and market discipline has become a determinant goal for bank regulation. While 
the application of market discipline is compatible with the goals of securities markets 
regulation, inherent obstacles residing in prudential regulation limit the efficient 
operation of the market discipline. Government safety nets or deposit insurance schemes 
are prophylactic measures that ultimately undermine market discipline. Having said that, 
prevalent use of disclosure as a regulatory tool by bank regulators/supervisors has 
highlighted that bank disclosures have also become the fundamental tenets of bank 
regulation and imposed transparency within capital markets is complementary to 
regulatory disclosure/reporting requirements for supervisory purposes established on 
banks. The premise that ‘the more the market is informed, the more financial and 
securities markets are stable and efficient’ is, therefore, underpinned by MD requirements. 
However, as Chapter 4 discusses, application of mandated transparency residing in capital 
markets regulation does not always produce the anticipated results that bank or stability 
regulators expect. The inherent conflict between securities markets regulators and 
prudential regulators manifests itself during a time of crisis, and therefore Chapter 3, after 
discussing the theoretical foundations and merits of bank disclosures, carries this 
theoretical investigation forward to the real-life experiences in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4 is about the application of MD requirements on banks mainly in the US and 
UK due to the fact that these two important financial centres experienced the dilemma 
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regarding full and timely disclosure of bank information in capital markets and its 
potential outcomes on the financial stability of the state.  
 
The US part explains that US securities markets regulation is mainly based on enacting 
stringent laws and having a powerful administrative body.  Banks register with their 
applicable regulatory agencies and the administration of disclosure-related provisions are 
also transferred to those agencies. From a theoretical approach, the delegation of authority 
to bank regulatory agencies (BRAs) seems like a preventive measure for a possible 
instability. In practice, incorporation by reference is used by those agencies in 
administering the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) disclosure requirements 
for banks and the federal system of on-going disclosure still applies to banks. Yet, even 
the changes implemented as a result of the GFC have not modified such different 
treatment provided to banks, and it can be explained by the same post-depression logic, 
which is that BRAs would like to have authority over the bank information and they 
would like to control the flow of bank information to securities markets.  
 
Having said that, BHCs dominate the US banking sector today and they are directly 
subject to Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) jurisdiction regarding disclosure. 
These companies are generally systemically important FIs, and during the crisis, they 
were considered too big to fail (TBTF). The optimal level of bank disclosure for banks 
came into question in the US by the conflict between the Fed and the SEC during the 
GFC (the case related to the merger of BoA and ML) and the same conflict involving the 
SEC’s maximum information disclosure objective and the stability regulator’s minimum 
disclosure goal was seen in a different case involving a systemically important FI (SIFI).31 
                                               
31 American International Group (AIG). 
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Investor protection and market efficiency is paramount for the US financial markets and 
confidential treatment orders (CTOs) given by the SEC and the exemption provided for 
bank reports at the  Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  is interpreted by courts.32  
 
The US part in Chapter 4 concludes that the experience from the GFC shows that the 
absence of a clear measure for such tensions takes the discussion to the political level. 
The pressure of the Fed on BoA not to disclose adverse information can be taken as the 
inability of regulators/ government to foresee the situation before the situation comes to 
that stage by the public. It can undermine the reliability of the state in managing crises. 
Post-crisis measures do not allow delay or reduction of the bank information to be 
disclosed in securities markets.  
 
The UK part of the chapter identifies the problem by the EU-specific characteristics of 
the disclosure requirements that created the tension in the first place. The run on NR and 
concomitant concerns about the mismatch between law and policy is studied in a way that 
questions whether policy interventions that the government needed to use, and the 
immediate and full disclosure philosophy of MAD is reconcilable. This is done by 
focusing on banks’ position in this tension as being subject to two different regulatory 
zones. The interplay of action and interpretation of laws is discussed with the examples 
of the run on NR, non-disclosure of the fraud in SG and the merger of Halifax Bank of 
Scotland (HBOS) and Lloyds TSB which indicate that disclosure does not automatically 
lead to more stability and resiliency. The capital markets disclosure regime applicable to 
the EU did not particularly distinguish banks from other firms, unlike the US securities 
                                               
32 The wording of exemption 8 under FOIA is not clear and it provides an overly broad 
interpretation if banks can approach to the SEC for a CTO for financial stability purposes. 
Courts have interpreted it with reference to stability. 
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laws. This part first identifies obstacles in the law that caused the tension in the first place, 
not only by analysing the resulting discourse from NR but also from other cases and 
practices such as SG. In doing so, the considerations of the various interests in bank 
transparency, such as the CB, the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (now 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)), bank stakeholders (including the general public) 
and the bank itself are discussed. Then, the new MAR and its responsiveness to a potential 
crisis with a new exception for delaying disclosure is investigated in terms of whether it 
has been adequately formulated to protect public and peer confidence and provide 
assurance to markets without placing the banks in a dubious position about their 
disclosures to markets. It submits that structural changes in the financial regulation and 
the rise of macroprudential regulation for financial and systemic stability reasons across 
the EU is designed to address critical gaps and weaknesses, yet the pertinent provision 
introduced by the MAR, which was primarily designed to serve transparency, 
accountability and visibility purposes, does not seem well drafted enough as it brings 
about several legal and political questions even if it serves for macroprudential policies.  
 
Therefore, Chapter 4 illustrates the case for a transparency-fragility view for banks by 
using different jurisdictions that experienced the GFC based on MD of information under 
capital markets rules. It presents a discussion about different approaches pursued in 
jurisdictions which have a similar tension and how banks’ situation in being subject to 
two regulatory zones run by different motives would be affected by the tension.  
 
In Chapter 5, the private law framework of bank transparency will be investigated with 
intent to explore the limits of bank information disclosures to see if there is a tension on 
the private law-public law level. From the theoretical angle, legal nature of bank  
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confidentiality can be understood as a legal construction directed at striking the necessary 
balance between private and public interests situated within the bank-customer 
relationship and increasing inroads made to the private relationship33 of a bank and its 
customers show that banks are ready information sources for the states; yet the interests 
of the bank might imply a degree of confidentiality over the information produced. One-
sided approach to bank confidentiality sees this legal construction in the general 
discussion about the right to privacy, a basic right of customers or it takes it from the 
public law’s protection of public interest standpoint; but it does not answer in what sense 
bank confidentiality should be grasped as satisfying both private and public interests. 
 
It addresses that prevention and control of crimes may create concerns over turning the 
financial infrastructure of banks into police reporting networks by turning bankers into 
fiscal spies. The duty of confidentiality in its more traditional style is in jeopardy, to the 
extent that it is seen as opposing public interests. Besides, there is a further consideration 
regarding whether such disclosures have an effect on systemic and financial stability 
similar to the case investigated in Chapter 4. It concludes that changing boundaries of 
bank confidentiality has been narrowed by public law interferences and it is doubtful 
whether bank secrecy will be able to survive as a sustainable legal concept in the future.  
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion chapter. As previous chapters establish the theoretical base 
for the understanding of bank transparency, a central issue to examine is that to what 
extent protection of financial stability and prevention of systemic crisis residing in 
prudential regulation should interact with laws imposing full and timely bank 
                                               
33 All relations that banks have are private, but here it means the relations that are subject to 
private law obligations. 
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transparency in the face of problems appeared about the information disclosure of 
troubled banks.   
 
It holds that the traditional approach to bank regulation was protective by nature, but 
restrictions on bank information disclosure are not compatible with the present market 
conditions that are founded on transparency.  Fragmented regulatory approach is the 
prevalent one such that the securities activities of a bank and safety and soundness of a 
bank is regulated by different bodies based on their functions. Simultaneous application 
of different regulatory objectives on banks has proved that macro approach to regulatory 
regimes is necessary and regulation should be seen in context, not in isolation. 
Understanding the corpus of financial regulation in the round is needed, and this approach 
requires protection of stability to be an encompassing goal. 
 
Therefore, it submits that reconciliation should be based on interactive cooperation 
between the two regulatory zones regardless of the regulatory structure or disclosure 
methods. MAR responds to this need by an overarching provision, though it needs further 
changes, and therefore it is ready to accommodate the opacity needs of banks in times of 
difficulty. 
 
3.   Methodology   
This research is mainly analytical. The majority of the arguments used here are derived 
from the critical use of relevant literature, case law and findings of finance and economics. 
The research methodology employed is founded in a doctrinal literature survey and on 
legal analysis from two fields of laws: Banking and securities markets regulation. It seeks 
to establish a theoretical framework applicable to jurisdictions with democratic and 
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accountable state organizations. To do that, it uses mainly the UK and the US laws as the 
sources. It makes references to the EU laws to underpin the theoretical discussion.  
   
The analysis presented in this thesis comes from a wide range of sources, including 
primary and secondary sources, such as laws and regulations, cases, and academic 
literature. Not only legal literature is considered but reports and studies from supervisory 
and regulatory institutions of the EU, UK and the US, international or inter-governmental 
bodies. Legal literature includes EU securities and banking laws as applicable to the UK, 
directives and regulations, US banking and securities regulation, e-mails used as evidence 
before courts, expert reports, working papers from different authorities and second-order 
institutions, communiqués and declarations of regulatory and supervisory institutions.  
 
This research is based on both library-based information and case studies based on the 
UK and the US laws. Library–based information includes books, articles and online 
sources. By employing qualitative modes of enquiry, it seeks to point out the function and 
place of high level of transparency in the banking sector with reference to its private 
integrity with private contractual dealings as a firm and its role in maintaining the stability 
in the economic and financial system. In order to highlight the main arguments in the 
theoretical framework, it takes transparency as a collective output of disclosed 
information by banks in an interdisciplinary framework. The interdisciplinary approach 
is used as a contributive, auxiliary method with reference to empirical evidences that are 
based on the results of researches in finance, economics and accounting and also other 
fields such as politics. 
 
Additionally, case studies were used for an in-depth analysis of the application of full  
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transparency on banks. In order to clarify the UK (which is based on EU regulations and 
directives) and the US capital markets transparency requirements, a comparative 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF BANKS AND THEIR 
ROLE IN INFORMATION PRODUCTION 
 
1.   The Nature and Specialness of Banks  
Banks are a type of financial intermediaries which require implementation of specific 
rules and particular protective actions by regulatory agencies to ensure competition and 
minimise their risk of failure. Opponents of this view assert that separation of banks from 
other financial entities does not bring benefits but inconvenience, and therefore financial 
services industry should be treated as a single entity which implies that banks are not 
special.34 In contrast, those who believe in the special status of banks give various reasons 
for this, starting from the doctrine of separation, which basically requires the 
concentration and specialization of FIs, to their ability to offer better services and 
products. Thus, these two opposing perspectives converge on this simple question: Are 
banks really special? 
 
Banks can be considered special either because they are subjected to special regulations 
or simply because regulators have made them so.35 The difference should lie somewhere 
else because regulation is subordinate to the special nature of bank, not other way around.  
The theories arguing that banks are special in a sense such that they serve the public 
                                               
34 E. Gerald Corrigan,‘Are Banks Special?’(1982) Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1982 
Annual Report (accessed May 17, 2014)https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-
reports/ar/annual-report-1982-complete-text.  
35 J. Tobin, ‘Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” ’in Deane Carson(ed), Banking and 
Monetary Studies (Irwin 1963) 408-19. 
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interest by their importance in the financial system suggest that the state intervention in 
the forms of regulations imposed on banks might be justified on their quasi-public and 
socio-economic nature. Considering the application of the theories arguing the nature of 
the firms to the banks, the origin and the nature of the banking business has developed in 
a way that positive authority or permission of the state has been necessary, which exercise 
of the state power in allowing banks to operate in a specific jurisdiction within the 
determined limits or enabling bank operations with direct state sponsorship stand as 
external factors that implies a contradiction to traditional form of contract theory where 
individuals are free to do business without state intervention.36 The argument which 
claims that it is the regulation that makes banks unique is based on the idea that rules of 
reserve requirements and interest rates make them different and thereby restrict the level 
playing field.37 Such views leave a question mark over whether this special treatment is 
justified by the sui generis nature of banks which makes them irreplaceable by different 
institutions or is grounded in their historical evolution which led them to be differentiated 
at an early stage.  
 
Various commentators have presented views about what typifies banks in this context. 
Fama concludes that the divergence of banks can be seen in their roles as suppliers of 
transaction and portfolio management services.38 He continues that economies of scope39 
among deposit-taking and lending provide banks with superior ‘information’ power over 
                                               
36 William W. Bratton,‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from the 
History’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471,1989. 
37 Richard A. Werner,‘Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing? The Theories and 
the Empirical Evidence’ (2014) 36 International Review of Financial Analysis 1,6. 
38 Eugene Fama,‘Banking in the Theory of Finance’ (1980) 6 Journal of Monetary Economics 
39. 
39 Section 2.3. 
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both other intermediaries and finance firms as it furnishes banks with a borrower’s very 
detailed deposit history and credit risk.40 Goodfriend underlines the unique role of banks 
in harmonizing information driven lending and payment services.41  From Corrigan’s 
viewpoint, the economic performance of banks makes them special owing to their standby 
or back up source of liquidity power in the economy and their pivotal role in the 
conduction of monetary policy.42 However, such mentioned characteristics of banks can 
be considered insufficient to call them special because clearing and settlement services 
can be substituted by some other FIs in today’s world. Moreover, it has been argued that 
the role of banks in conducting monetary policy is achieved in other ways, such as through 
security dealers. Such views attempt to show that the historical evolution of banks makes 
them unique, not their functions. However, today, banks are one of the most heavily 
regulated sectors and such detailed regulatory interventions must come from a rational 
basis, which is difficult to explain simply by considering the historical background of 
banks.  
 
Yet, the arguments about bank specialness are generally classified under three groups. 
Firstly, banks are susceptible to runs and panics, which shows their relative systemic 
importance and their fragile relation with trust. 43 Banks are the subject of risk since they 
provide credit and therefore liquidity for the economy via loans, receive deposits from 
the public and are closely interconnected with each other which increases the contagion 
                                               
40 Eugene Fama,‘What’s Different About Banks?’ (1985) 15 Journal of Monetary Economics 
29. 
41 M. S. Goodfriend,‘Money, Credit, Banking, and Payments System Policy’ (1991) 77(1) 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s Electronic Review (accessed Dec 16, 2014) 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/frbrichreview/rev_frbrich199101.pdf#page=5.  
42 Corrigan (n 34).  
43 Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig,‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity’ 
(1983) 91(3) The Journal of Political Economy 401. 
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effect and thereby the furtherance of financial crisis. A high level of interdependence in 
the finance and banking industry emanating from the continuous flow of capital among 
banks can easily disrupt the rest of the industry and cause financial as well as social 
turmoil.44 The fragile capital structure of banks as a result of their services might lay them 
open to illiquidity and credit risks. Banks as special intermediaries in bridging the trust 
gap between savers and borrowers could indicate that trust constitutes the most important 
part of the relationship. If the public loses confidence in the liability side of the banks, 
this can create a maturity mismatch between short-term liability and medium or long term 
assets which might ultimately cause a confidence crisis. Lack of confidence emanating 
from a specific bank can result in endangering the liquidity reserves of safe and sound 
banks in a self-fulfilling prophecy.45 Banks are generally at the centre of financial crises 
in which financial distress in one bank or in the banking industry has the ability to 
contaminate other banks or sectors and it is explained by the phenomenon of contagion.46 
Small shocks can have a large impact on the financial system and economy as a whole47 
and therefore, a stable banking system is a crucial pillar of a stable, sound and integrated 
financial system. 48  As Thornton addressed, back in the 19th century, confidence 
production and maintenance is the real business of a bank: 
 
Commercial credit may be defined to be that confidence which subsists among 
commercial men in respect to their mercantile affairs. This confidence operates in several 
ways. It disposes them to lend money to each other, to bring themselves under various 
pecuniary engagements by the acceptance and indorsement of bills, and also to sell and 
                                               
44 Andreas Busch, Banking Regulation and Globalization (OUP 2009) 23-28. 
45 Diamond and Dybvig (n 43); Prasad Krishnamurthy,‘Regulating Capital’ (2014) 4(1) Harvard 
Business Law Review 1,14. 
46 Chapter 2, Section 3.1.2. 
47 Allen, Carletti and Gu (n 3) 42. 
48 See Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, (1984) Blueprint for Reform at 18 
(accessed Dec 23, 2015)https://archive.org/details/blueprintforrefo01unit.  
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deliver goods in consideration of an equivalent promised to be given at a subsequent 
period.49 
 
When banks extend credit and continue their business as usual, they perform as guardians 
of trust. As subsequent parts of this chapter explore, financial intermediation is a product 
of the replacement of a lack of interpersonal trust with impersonal trust.50 Yet, as Chapter 
2 details, trust has behavioural, cognitive and social aspects and it is a portrayal of shared 
expectations and interpretations regarding future events.51 It means that the very nature 
of banking is strongly tied to the confidence produced, as theories explaining bank runs 
see trust and confidence as pillars of a well-functioning financial system: Banks’ role in 
extending credit, and therefore in providing liquidity to the market with real economic 
consequences for overall economic activity, is a product of trust generated by indigenous 
and exogenous factors.52 It is indigenous to the extent that banks themselves engender 
trust by protecting their reputation, establishing efficient risk management and corporate 
governance policies or effective compliance systems. So, a bank can offer its services 
without disruption and continue to engender trust among the public.  Yet, as Seybolds 
observes: ‘The financial world is a theatrical production, abundantly lubricated by that 
magical elixir of illusionists: Confidence.’53 This assertion indicates a wider depiction of 
                                               
49 Henry Thornton, An Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain 
(1802) at 75(accessed Dec 24, 2015) 
https://mises.org/sites/default/files/An%20Enquiry%20into%20the%20Nature%20and%20Effec
ts%20of%20the%20Paper%20Credit%20of%20Great%20Britain_3.pdf.  
50 Oliver Butzbach,‘Trust in Banks:A Tentative Conceptual Framework’(2014) MPRA Paper at 
5(accessed March 13,2015) https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/53587/1/MPRA_paper_53587.pdf.  
51 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly (Princeton University Press 2009) xlii.  
52 Chapter 2,Section 3. 
53 Matt Seybold,‘Confidence Tricks’ (19 Feb, 2018) Aeon Article (accessed March 
19,2018)https://aeon.co/essays/the-financial-world-and-the-magical-elixir-of-confidence. 	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confidence, where banks form a part of it. It is the extrinsic confidence provided by the 
banking or financial system or the state as a whole. It means that a bank run occurs not 
only as a response to the deteriorating reputation of a single bank, but also because of a 
general lack of confidence in the system. It links banks’ maturity transformation role with 
the effect of bank-specific and market-specific information on bank runs.  
 
Secondly, banks are said to be unique because of their role in the supply of money, in 
creating and destroying money and in their custodianship of the payments system. Banks 
loan withdrawable deposits to borrowers without passing on any cash or third party 
liabilities very easily simply by intensifying their liabilities via deposit creation.54 As such, 
the special power of banks to produce money and to enhance it by charging interest 
enables them to control the resource allocation system of an economy. In a similar vein, 
it makes them decisive actors in both inflation and production. Money creation by banks 
thus creates a circular flow and new purchasing power and thereby makes entrepreneurs 
follow new resources irrespective of the changing form of money today. However, this 
central distinguishing element of banks has been subject to strong objections regarding 
its financial intermediary function.55 
 
In addition to this classic characteristic of banks, the close connection between banks and 
the CB is said to prove banks’ ‘transmission belt’ role in monetary policy.56 CBs and 
other bank regulators can remodel the transmission belt by changing interest rates or the 
amount of money that banks are required to keep in their reserves, and such changes can 
be reflected through the bank lending practices in a way that adjustments in lending and 
                                               
54 J. Hicks, A Market Theory of Money (Clarendon Press 1989) 58. 
55 Section 3. 
56 Corrigan (n 34).  
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pricing of loans are made. Banks borrowing money from the CB are required to follow 
the changes in interest rates which are designated by the CB and reflect those changes to 
its counterparties due to the increase in their cost of capital. The role of bank reserves in 
operating as a catalyzer in lending, providing security and confidence to the market is 
important given the link between monetary policy and banks.57 The traditional interest 
rate view is grounded upon the capital requirements where any changes in the monetary 
policy may culminate in changes in the quantity of money held and produced by the bank. 
The CB can reduce the supply of money available for investment by raising the amount 
established as a reserve requirement for banks.58 Also, it is asserted that shifts in the 
monetary policy has influence over the supply of bank loans such that decrease in bank 
loans might disturb economic activity.59 This argument is produced based on the premise 
that bank deposits and loans are special in a sense that these features are difficult to be 
replaced properly by other institutions and therefore it emphasizes the bank-funding as a 
main source of capital as being a driving power on the overall economy.60  Overall, 
interest rate and credit channels of banks apply CB orders to the market in their own 
particular way. 
 
                                               
57 Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat,‘Unconventional Monetary Policies: An Appraisal’ (2009) 
BIS Working Paper No:292 at 16 (accessed Nov 18,2015) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work292.pdf.  
58 Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation (Routledge 2014) 369. 
59 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren,‘The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy’ 
(2013) Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Papers No: 13-5 (accessed 
Feb 24, 2015)https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/public-policy-discussion-paper/2013/the-
role-of-banks-in-the-transmission-of-monetary-policy.aspx.  
60 ECB,‘The Role of Banks in the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism’ (2008) European 
Central Bank Monthly Bulletin (accessed Aug 1,2015) 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb200808en.pdf.  
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Financial theory has approached the subject of the specialness of banks with caution by 
examining whether improvements in technology or a large financial liberalization process 
can be pursued that may form different financial structures as well as different financial 
devices to challenge banks.61 Another aspect is the role of banks in the process of putting 
savings into beneficial activities which is significant for growth and welfare.62 Economic 
development and entrepreneurship is strengthened when banks steer the flow of capital 
through firms which provide the highest probability of social returns and closely observe 
them in case of default.  
 
In terms of income distribution and poverty, the distinction between well and poorly 
functioning is made since states with better banks show reductions in poverty whilst 
poorly functioning banks allocate scarce capital to bad projects, mostly to those with the 
most wealth or power.63  Ultimately, this has a negative impact on the poor and on 
economic improvement. These studies prove the place of banks in the economy, but their 
specialness can basically be examined according to their role between borrowers and 
lenders.  
                                               
61 Biagio Bosone,‘What Makes Bank Special? A Study of Banking, Finance and Economic 
Development’(2000) The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2408 at 4 (accessed Oct 
21, 2015)http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/348281468739569626/What-makes-
banks-special-a-study-of-banking-finance-and-economic-development.  
62 Ross Levine,‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’ (1997) 
XXXV Journal of Economic Literature 688. 
63 Thornsten Beck and others,‘Finance, Firm Size and Growth’(2004) National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No:10983 (accessed Nov 15, 
2015)http://www.nber.org/papers/w10983.  
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2.   Banks within the Context of Financial Intermediation 
2.1.   Case for Financial Intermediation 
As the name suggests, financial intermediaries might be thought of as a channel between 
providers and users of capital64 due to their roles in mobilizing financial assets from 
savers and issuing a liability through them and then originating their own assets and 
liabilities towards borrowers. Their main functions in liquidity and information provision, 
risk sharing and transformation, lessening the transaction costs and debt renegotiation 
have made them special in contrast to other firms and have gained them attention in the 
literature.  
 
The theory of financial intermediation is founded on the issues of transaction costs and 
asymmetric information which are seen as the basis of market imperfections. 65 
Imperfections necessitating the foundation of intermediaries consist of inaccurate 
severability of financial claims and transaction costs stemming from acquirement, 
diversification and transformation of the information.66 Intermediaries enable lenders to 
obtain higher returns while providing lower costs to borrowers compared to direct finance, 
and by doing so they provide a ground for savings and investments to deal at the highest 
optimal level. 67  Thus, the emphasis in the literature on the subject of financial 
intermediaries has revolved around how intermediaries reduce the transaction costs and 
                                               
64 P. Bolton and X. Frexias,‘Equity, Bonds and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial 
Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information’ (2000) 108 Journal of Political Economy 
324. 
65 M. Dewatripont and J. Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks (The MIT Press 1994) ch 
5. 
66 John J. Pringle,‘Bank Capital and the Performance of Banks as Financial Intermediaries: 
Comment’ (1974) 7(4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 545,546. 
67 Ibid. 
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how information asymmetry is ameliorated via the intermediary channel.  
 
‘The perfect market’ idea which explains why financial intermediaries remain and which 
forces preserve them in the system has been asserted by Marshall68 and Walras.69 Thus, 
in a perfect market there is no need of intermediaries since all market parties can reach 
each other directly without any costs and obtain ex ante and ex post information about the 
value of the financial instruments by negotiating at the most optimal prices.70 In Diamond 
and Dybvig’s model, financial intermediaries are seen as key providers of insurance 
against liquidity shocks through the transformation of illiquid assets into liquid 
liabilities.71 Here, ex ante identical depositors are inclined to avoid risks and they cannot 
guarantee the timing and amount of their future consumptions. Thus, in a world without 
an intermediary, investors without early liquidity needs are the only ones who obtain high 
returns in the provided illiquid long-term investments world. However, Leland and Pyle’s 
approach highlights the information sharing coalitions by focusing on ex ante information 
asymmetry in which businesses floating shares to the market are aware of anticipated 
yields of their own investment yet it is costly to acquire and monitor this information for 
                                               
68 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th edn, London Macmillan and Co., 1920). 
69 Their approach reflects the neo-classical market theory which claims that the establishment of 
intermediaries is simply an outcome of market imperfections. For the discussion about 
Walrasian equilibrium see Donald W. Katzner, An Introduction to the Economic Theory of 
Market Behavior (Edward Elgar 2006). 
70 This is the general equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu.K.J. Arrow and G.  
Debreu,‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’ (1954) 22(3) Econometrica 
265. 
71 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale,‘Financial Intermediaries and Markets’ (2004) 72(4) 
Econometrica 1023.Also see Diamond and Dybvig (n 43) where banks originate liquid claims 
on illiquid assets via demand-deposit contracts and even though it provides risk-sharing 
between the agents which timing of their consumption is not certain, it also makes banks 
vulnerable to panic-based bank runs.  
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other agents.72 Hence, businesses foreseeing low yields from their investments have an 
incentive to declare high expected returns in an effort to raise their market evaluation, 
which simply illustrates the moral hazard problem in financial markets.73 Here, Leland 
and Pyle’s approach takes intermediaries as monitors of the businesses which can help to 
ameliorate the moral hazard problem that borrower-firms create.74  
 
Another view on the existence of intermediaries can be found in the costly task of 
monitoring loan contracts. Diamond sees financial intermediaries as a result of the 
technological restrictions on the formation of information that obstructs the 
accomplishment of contractual contingencies; this asserts that the function of 
intermediaries is as a delegated monitor for issuing low-risk claims against a diversified 
portfolio of assets. 75  His view of financial intermediaries as delegated monitors is 
grounded on the agency problems in financial contracting which might be lessened via 
monitoring.76 Here, the financial intermediary needs to find an incentive contract which 
provides an incentive to acquire and monitor the information, its appropriate use, and 
provide satisfactory payments to investors to encourage more capital.77  All of these 
                                               
72 H.E. Leland and D.H. Pyle,‘Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation’ (1977) 32 The Journal of Finance 371. 
73 Iris Claus and Arthur Grimes,‘Asymmetric Information, Financial Intermediation and the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism: A Critical Review’ (2003) New Zealand Treasury 
Working Paper 03/19 at 10 (accessed May 2, 2015) 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2003/03-19.  
74 Borrowers do not necessarily follow their business plans once they borrow from a bank and 
they might engage in inefficient behaviour or hidden actions.  
75 D. Diamond,‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’ (1984) 51 Review of 
Economic Studies 728. 
76 Martin Hellwig,‘Banks, Markets and Allocation of Risks in an Economy’(1998) 154 Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 328,334. 
77 Claus and Grimes (n 73) 11. 
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incentives are costly; diversification within intermediaries may lessen such costs. Other 
approaches generally examine the foundation of intermediaries through three major 
points which are high transaction costs, lack of full and complete information in useful 
time and regulatory factors.  
 
So, a large array of costs of direct finance has led to the formation of centralised agents, 
so-called intermediaries, engaging under a single roof in activities of monitoring, 
selection and diversification of risk by supplying credit and liquidity services to the 
market. 78  The very nature of intermediaries, shaped by the opaque character of 
investments and their credit, maturity and liquidity transformation roles, reflects the 
fragility of their operations which make them vulnerable to potential runs, thereby placing 
them in a socially important place. 
 
2.2.   Are Banks Mere Financial Intermediaries?   
Chartering restrictions and credit and liquidity warrants by the state create the idea that 
the classical system of financial intermediation is bank-centred, and risks carried by banks 
underpin the rationalization of why regulatory and supervisory authorities centre upon 
banks.79 
 
Much has been discussed on the function of banks in the economy but one of the 
differentiating roles of banks, money creation, has led to new doubts as to banks’ ability 
to satisfy the conditions of financial intermediaries. The debate on the nature of banking 
                                               
78 Nicola Cetorelli, Benjamin H. Mandel, and Lindsay Mollineaux,‘The Evolution of Banks and 
Financial Intermediation’ (2012) 18(2) FRBYN Economic Policy Review at 3 (accessed Jun 6, 
2015) https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2012/EPRvol18n2.pdf.  
 79 Ibid 4. 
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can be seen as the consequence of an absence of explicit rules and regulations providing 
banks with rights and power to create and destroy money.80 There is much debate about 
the reason why other FIs cannot display the same functions as outlined by Minsky81 and 
why there are no specific limits or rules drawing a line between the powers of banks and 
non-bank institutions. As far back as 1889 Macleod observed that: 
 
It is commonly supposed that bankers act only as agents or intermediaries between 
persons who want to lend and those who want to borrow. Bankers never act as agents 
between those who want to lend and those who want to borrow. Bankers buy money from 
some persons: and Rights of action from others: exclusively with their own Credit.82    
 
In the 1950s, on the matter of the money creation role of banks in the act of lending, 
Gurley and Shaw offered a new way of thinking about the difference between banks and 
non-bank intermediaries in that non-banking financial intermediaries also exert major 
influence on the money supply in the economy.83 The literature then began to produce 
counterarguments as to why banks do not need to borrow loanable funds from spending 
units with surpluses to extend credit. 84  Thus, whether banks are money-creating 
                                               
80 Richard A. Werner,‘How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms not Do the 
Same? An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-taking’ (2014) 36 
International Review of Financial Analysis 71,72. 
81 Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilising an Unstable Economy (Yale University Press 1986) cited from 
Wallace C. Peterson,‘Reviewed Work:Stabilizing an Unstable Economy by Hyman P. Minsky’ 
(1987) 21(1) Journal of Economic Issues 502. 
82 H.D. Macleod, The Theory of Credit Vol.2 (Longmans and Green Co 1890) 1889:375 cited 
from Butzbach (n 50) 3. 
83 J. Gurley and E. Shaw, ‘Financial Intermediaries and the Saving-Investment Process’ (1956) 
11 Journal of Finance 257. Gurley and Shaw’s thesis highlights non-bank FIs by acknowledging 
their ability to generate new assets and liabilities that might influence the money supply due to a 
decrease of share of banks in the total financial assets. E. Narayanan Nadar, Money and Banking 
(PHI Learning Private Limited 2013) 96. 
84 J. Culbertson,‘Intermediaries and Monetary Theory: A Criticism of the Gurley-Shaw Theory’ 
(1958) 48(1) American Economic Review 119,121.  
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intermediaries consequently leaves a question mark over the relationship among the 
money and intermediation. Yet, according to Butzbach, if banks are creators of money, 
‘a single banking transaction implies the very social acceptance of an economy-wide unit 
of account’ and it directly indicates the social dimension of trust – which is also systemic 
trust. 85 
 
The literature gives three conventional doctrines to identify the nature of banking business. 
Fractional reserve theory holds that banks keep only a small percentage of their deposits 
by reserving part of the money with the CB and loaning the rest to borrowers.86 Here, the 
idea of collecting deposits first and investing that money later implies that money is 
endogenous and deposited money is aggregately provided by the financial system where 
each bank holds partial control of it. Banks as surplus or excess reserve pools, therefore, 
act as mere intermediaries. The most prevalent approach to the nature of banks, financial 
intermediation theory,87 is based on the rejection of previous theories by asserting that 
banks neither collectively nor individually create and destroy money. 88  As Tobin 
observes, banks are not granted ‘widow’s cruse’89 power; their ability to expand their 
liabilities are limited as it is only given to modern CBs.90 Thus, banks are furnished with 
the power of intermediation by rendering customer deposits into loans which infers that 
                                               
85 Butzbach (n 50) 15. 
86 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money Vol:2 (Macmillan 1930) 218. 
87 Diamond,‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’ (n 75); Franklin Allen and 
Anthony M. Santomero,‘The Theory of Financial Intermediation’ (1998) 21 Journal of Banking 
and Finance 1461.  
88 Werner,‘How do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms not Do the Same? An 
Explanation for the Co-existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking’ (n 80) 71. 
89 The term is defined as ‘an inexhaustible supply of something’.Collins English Dictionary 
(HarperCollins Publishers,12th edn 2012).  
90 Tobin (n 35) 412. 
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banks have to borrow from individual investors to finance such loans even though they 
have the power to obtain more from the ultimate borrower.91 Banks, with their distinctive 
role as middlemen, focus on consolidating and transforming risks and act as brokers in 
the credit markets by creating inter-temporal exchange transactions between past, present 
and future and lessening the costs of transactions between two parties. 
 
However, the debate about banks not being pure intermediaries has become more popular 
within the context of the credit creation theory. It is grounded upon the idea that banks 
individually create credit and money out of nothing and this is not limited to any capital, 
implying that each individual bank is not an intermediary reliant upon deposits or reserves 
from the CB. Rather, they are the manufacturers of the money.92 It is asserted that banks, 
without reducing the amount of money in any other internal or external accounts and 
sources via transfer or withdrawal, are able to create new money independently.93 Banks, 
therefore, are seen as capable of crediting the borrower’s account without any reduction 
in their accounts which implies that there is no need for pre-reserved funds or savings to 
be able to loan. Proponents of this view assert that modern economies are grounded upon 
CB money in the form of cash and the bank account money within their balance sheets 
and double entry bookkeeping.94 Commercial banks, as the producers of account money, 
do not redistribute the existing money as other intermediation theories suggest. Rather, 
                                               
91 S.C. Myers&R.G. Rajan,‘The Paradox of Liquidity’ (1998) 113(3) The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 733,755. 
92 Morgan Ricks,‘Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis’ (2011) 1 Harvard Business Law 
Review 75. 
93 Werner,‘Can Banks Individually Create Money out of Nothing? The Theories and the 
Empirical Evidence’ (n 37) 16.  
94 Joseph Huber,‘Modern Money Theory and New Currency Theory:A Comparative Discussion, 
Including an Assessment of Their Relevance to Monetary Reform’ (2014) 66 Real-World 
Economics Review 38. 
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as suggested, they add new money to the market through a double-entry accounting 
process.  
 
Modern theory of banking considers banks as neutral players and facilitators of the 
smooth transition between consumption, saving and production in the financial system.95 
It should be said that regardless of what banks are called or how they are identified, they 
have been functioning in a very special way by holding a socially and economically 
important place in the financial system. Their contracts with depositors together with their 
role in reducing transaction costs, information gathering, and monitoring functions 
require particular attention in the mechanics of lending.  
 
In relation to bank information, there are three points should be made regarding to 
informational asymmetry problems.96 First, there is an information asymmetry problem 
between the bank and its investors, lenders and customers. The second one is between the 
bank and its borrowers or others such as the government or peer banks or those have the 
counterparty risk in case of bank failure due to its long-term relationship with the bank. 
The last information asymmetry problem is the one between the bank and all other 
persons that have connection with the bank. If bank borrowers default, depositors’ 
interests are affected and the borrowers’ welfare is disturbed when there is a disruption 
in bank funding emanating from bank runs or the bank’s orderly resolution by the relevant 
authority.  Therefore, this signals a link between information disclosure, confidence and 
bank runs.   
 
                                               
95 J.R. Collins and others, Where Does Money Come from? (2nd edn,Nef 2012) 13. 
96 Manuel A. Utset,‘Rational Financial Meltdowns’ (2014) 10(2) Hastings Business Law 
Journal 407,418. 
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2.3.   Transaction Costs Reduced by the Emergence of Banks 
Coase’s article, The Nature of the Firm, was the first to provide insights into the costs of 
making exchanges in defining the structure of market and non-market economic 
organizations, and into the question of which factors make markets so expensive that spot 
exchanges had to be abandoned and had to be substituted by some other institutions.97 He 
asserted that the visible hand of the law, in other words, governance mechanisms such as 
public laws, regulations or business associations, advance economic activities as long as 
those mechanisms lessen the transaction costs in the system and facilitate trading. As 
discussed in the literature for many years, transaction costs can be grouped under the costs 
of search and information, costs of bargaining and decision, costs of policing and 
enforcement. As a specific type of firm, difference of intermediaries from other firms can 
be found in their transaction services. 98  Furthermore, costs stemming from such 
transaction services have been seen as the raison d’etre of intermediaries.99 Transaction 
costs as a reflection of market imperfections are expected to reduce via some market 
makers based upon the consumers’ interest in maximising the level of utility on their 
savings and consumptions.100 
  
As financial intermediation theory suggests, banks produce new financial commodities 
by combining two distinct services of receiving funds and granting loans which simply 
reduces transaction costs to a minimum. Although there are other financing channels as 
alternatives to banks, bank financing is one of the most common and historical sources 
                                               
97 R.H. Coase,‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica, New Series 386. 
98 Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking (MIT Press 1997) 15.  
99 George J. Benston and Clifford W. Smith,‘A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of 
Financial Intermediation’ (1976) 31(2) The Journal of Finance 215.  
100 Ibid 216.  
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of external capital, especially for small and medium size enterprises, offering lower costs 
of exchange for both lenders and borrowers.  
 
Banks achieve economies of scale and economies of scope and these have their roots in 
transaction costs. Different from individual lenders, banks have the privileges of 
economies of scope in lending decisions based on their contractual relationships with 
current and potential customers and this relationship’s natural outcome of access to 
relevant and necessary information.101 Banks enjoy economies of scope based on their 
variety of related services through a single infrastructure. The costs of providing each 
service separately would be much greater than the costs of using a single infrastructure to 
provide multiple services. Though the extent of scale of economies remains unclear, 
banks can benefit from economies of scale (meaning reducing the cost by increasing 
efficiency), for example, by processing customer information to lower credit losses.102  
 
To grasp how transaction costs are reduced by banks, it is necessary to conceptualize a 
world without them. In brief, banks take deposits and grant loans. By doing that, banks 
place one standard contract to extend loans to various customers and establish standard 
measures to assess its present and potential customers, helping them to conduct the 
operations quickly. This means that the relationship with the firms previously contracted 
                                               
101 Munehisa Kasuya,‘Economies of Scope: Theory and Application to Banking’ (1986) 4 
Monetary and Economic Studies 59. 
102 Swedish Competition Authority,‘Do Swedish Banks Enjoy Economies of Scale or 
Economies of Scope?’ at 43 (accessed Dec 29, 
2016)http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/forskning/projekt/do-swedish-banks-enjoy-
economies-of-scale-or-economies-of-scope.pdf. 
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in the same line of business may lessen the transaction costs as well as adverse selection103 
and moral hazard problems of the banks.104 
 
In the absence of banks, agents have to bear the costly transaction costs by discovering 
the real prices, and negotiating and concluding contracts with borrowers, in other words, 
bearing the costs of running the economic system.105 The transformation of information 
as a pertinent part of transaction costs imposes a burden on lenders to process, transmit 
and accommodate the collected information, deal with legal issues as well as selling and 
supervising.106 After drafting loan terms and handling other external arrangements like 
courts and legal issues, agents need to be sure that another party is following the contract 
terms and agreements. This necessitates monitoring and enforcement measures, in other 
words, extra labour. Thus, ex ante and ex post costs of negotiating and enforcing a 
contract and by doing so trying to protect rights in an exchange economy places great 
costs on both borrowers and lenders.  
 
                                               
103 The classic example of adverse selection is the lemons problem depicted by Akerlof. George 
A. Akerlof,‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 
84(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. 
104 Laurence M. Ball, Money, Banking and Financial Markets (2nd edn,Worth Publishers 2012) 
216. 
105 Kenneth J. Arrow,‘The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of 
Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation’(1969)The Analysis and Evaluation of Public 
Expenditure:The PPB -System, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress,1st Session at 59 




106 J. Joseph Wallis and Douglass C. North,‘Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American 
Economy, 1870-1970’ in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (eds), Longterm Factors 
in American Economic Growth (University of Chicago Press 1986) 97. 
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However, banks enable agents to deal with only two acts, which are ‘depositing the funds’ 
and ‘withdrawing it when needed’, without giving them the burden of finding the optimal 
deal for their investment decisions.107 Banks with specialized labour employment and 
expertise make transaction services cheaper and more credible for the agents.  
 
Transactions costs are closely intertwined with information asymmetries. In Thakor and 
Bhattacharya’s words, ‘information asymmetries are the most basic form of transaction 
costs’.108 Similarly, lack of necessary information related to activities of agents in the 
financial markets has been seen as the key origin of transaction costs.109 Banks exist to 
diminish transaction costs related to search. 110  Banks, in this context, remove the 
transaction costs and replace ignorance by information, replace distrust by trust and 
confidence.  
 
Standardized products and services together with expertise through the use of already 
tested procedures provided by banks relieve individuals and firms from the burden of 
conducting costly searches about the each other’s borrowing/lending behaviours, past and 
present financial condition and other such detailed information which is very difficult to 
acquire individually. The informational superiority of banks, therefore, helps to 
ameliorate the information asymmetry, allowing banks to request a fee for their services 
in handling risks and asymmetric information, which is the difference between the interest 
                                               
107 Augusto Hasman,Margarita Samartin, Jos van Bommel,‘Financial Intermediaries and 
Transaction Costs’(2010)Documents de Travail de l'OFCE No: 2010-02 at 3 (accessed Dec 17, 
2015)https://ideas.repec.org/p/fce/doctra/1002.html.  
108 S. Bhattacharya and A.W. Thakor,‘Contemporary Banking Theory’ (1993) 3(1) Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 2,8. 
109 J. Stiglitz and A. Weis,‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’ (1981) 
71(3) American Economic Review 393. 
110 Benston and Smith (n 99) 223. 
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charged to borrowers and paid to lenders, ie the transaction fee. 
 
In the case of banks, transaction costs consist of both direct and indirect financial costs 
that emanate from the costs of searching and gathering the relevant information about 
agents, and costs of monitoring risk-averse and opportunistic behaviours in order to 
understand whether they follow the terms and conditions of the contract with the bank. 
This view suggests that an efficient balance can be achieved by reducing such indirect 
costs based on frictions both in the flow of information and funds.111 Banks, therefore, 
reduce transaction costs first, as a firm, by reducing the costs of many unnecessary 
transactions, and second by producing information and confidence.  
 
3.   Relevance of Information in the Banking Sector 
3.1.   Implications for Information 
The literature has indicated that ‘information’ is the key component of efficient allocation 
of lending. Thus, information, as the main pillar of the working mechanism of 
intermediaries, has formed the substantial part of transaction costs. Having said that, 
common vocabulary for informational efficiency provides an overarching framework in 
order to understand how information has implications on regulation and specifically in its 
role in price discovery and market efficiency.  
 
                                               
111 R. Coase,‘The Institutional Structure of Production’ Nobel Prize Lecture  (Dec 9,1991) 
(accessed 13 Nov,2015)http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html.  
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Information is the basic ingredient of making economic choices and it is ‘literally 
everyone’s business and expresses each individual’s autonomy’.112 It is a foundation of 
the market process where transaction costs and uncertainty decrease through availability 
of better information. Information is not only related to a specific market and its laws, but 
it is also related to the actions of others. So, everyone has a substantial level of 
information about his personal life, and economic decisions made on the individual level 
have implications on the collective level in a way that information produced is an 
important factor for efficient allocation of resources either via the government or markets. 
Resource allocation is traditionally discussed within the realm of whether it is appropriate 
to let the market find its own solutions both during normal times and stressed times and 
the debate on this continues.113  
 
Information is both a product and process. Liberal and economic views make assumptions 
about the public domain for information, its use and dissemination.114 Basic assumptions 
regarding politics, market, property and privacy generally provide a basis for 
classification of information. Categorization of information as public or private and the 
boundaries of designing the information public or private change depending on how one 
approaches information.115   
                                               
112 Ejan Mackaay,‘Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation’ (1990) 13 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 867,891. 
113 Helmut Willke,‘Transparency after the Financial Crisis’ in S. Jansen, E. Schroter and N. 
Stehr(eds), Transparenz (2010 VS Verlag) 67;Gerald P. O’Driscoll,‘Hayek and Keynes:What 
Have We Learnt?’ (2011) 27(1) The Journal of Private Enterprise 29. 
114 Steven J. Horowitz,‘Designing the Public Domain’ (2009) 122(5) Harvard Law Review 
1489. 
115 Full ramifications of the economic thoughts’ and law’ approach in separating public and 
private are not the main argument here. Duncan Kennedy,‘The Stages of the Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349. 
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Information, in the liberal vision, creates a tension between public and private spheres 
because it takes free access to information as the main base and therefore state restriction 
on information disclosure is a limitation on freedoms. 116  The notion of private is 
described with the general perception about the ‘justified ability to withhold 
information’,117 for example, via a right to privacy. The private sphere of information 
here covers markets vis-à-vis the state, and individuals (both legal and real persons) vis-
à-vis markets or the state.118 So, the level of state intervention to increase production and 
dissemination of information brings about questions on different levels. Application of 
this rhetoric to banks provides that collected information by banks create this public and 
private tension on a customer vis-à-vis bank level, and bank vis-à-vis markets (ie capital 
markets) and the state (ie exceptions to duty of confidentiality) level.  
 
The economic approach to information emphasizes that information is key for allocation 
of scarce and rival resources,119 and price discovery, which is the process by which 
market traders interact, is possible with information. Information, in its capacity to reduce 
uncertainty, allows economic agents either to determine the current state of the world or 
anticipate the future state of the world, and therefore decisions made affect prices and 
allocations on the aggregate level.120 
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117 James Boyle,‘A Theory of Law and Information: Copyrights, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider 
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The financial industry depends on collecting information regarding different units of the 
economy and acting on that information. This action is not limited to capital markets 
where securities are purchased and sold but also includes any type of markets where a 
service or product is priced. For example, the extension of a loan to a firm or an individual 
is based on information as a result of a two-party contract between the lender and 
borrower. More information means better pricing of the service.  
 
Effectiveness of price discovery is known as market efficiency or informational 
efficiency. Informational and market efficiency, therefore, are mutually complementary 
terms and if mechanisms of a particular market function well, then there is no need of 
regulatory intervention in order to ensure the availability of information for preventing a 
market failure.121 Hayek, in this respect, addresses price mechanism as a setting, which 
the extent of production, aggregation and transmission of information designates the 
extent of allocation of resources, and therefore impacts the whole economic system.122 
According to Schmidt and Tyrell, information revelation through prices based on Hayek’s 
approach is information externalisation that is best addressed by Fama.123 Fama’s famous 
typology of market efficiency (efficient market hypothesis (EMH)) provides that prices 
in the market rapidly and accurately incorporate and reflect all available information and 
so that in strong and semi-strong versions of the efficient markets it is argued that there 
is no need of regulation ensuring information provision under MD regimes since the 
process of information discovery and information incorporation into prices would remove 
the need for regulatory arrangements.124 So, in this setting, market prices are themselves 
                                               
121 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Chasing the Tape (MIT Press 2015) ch 2. 
122 Hayek (n 10). 
123 Schmidt and Tyrell (n 120) 487-88. 
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information. There have been other arguments such as chaos and noise theories to develop 
arguments for an EMH-based approach to markets and its understanding of price 
discovery.125 Yet, disclosure of information is an important facilitating factor for price 
formation and it brings about new discussions as to the terms, level and incentives of 
disclosures. 
 
Information is intangible and therefore difficult to handle, govern and restrict the access 
of others. Information is generally characterised as a public good, which means that it can 
be used by different persons at the same time without depletion. Public goods have two 
features: non-rivalry in use or consumption and non-excludability. Its non-rivalrous 
feature means that use and transmission of information by one agent does not prevent 
others using it and it does not eliminate the benefits of information for the party that 
transmits or uses it. The non-exclusive feature of information means that once the good 
is produced it is difficult to prevent others from having access to it.	  Because of these 
characteristics of information, an agent that produces or buys information is unable to get 
the full benefits of that information and it creates an incentive problem. The free-rider, 
who enjoys the benefit but does not share in the cost, weakens the incentives for 
production of information. This has forced policymakers to establish a legal or regulatory 
mechanism to ensure a minimum level of information is available.126 This brings about a 
question over the optimal level of information production and the rationale of MD of 
information and other variations of disclosure theories. 
 
                                               
125 Chapter 3. 
126 Dombalagian (n 121) 28. 
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3.2.   Banks as Producers of Information 
The discussion about the importance of information is a continuing one in the literature. 
The place of information in banking is mostly about banks’ roles in collecting and 
producing information, which is about their intermediary function. Another one is the 
information about banks themselves, which is built upon banks’ financial decisions made 
pursuant to information collected and produced. It is the information that is reflected in 
bank balance sheets or other statements, and it is information that forms a collective 
output based on banks’ intermediation function. So, this section approaches bank 
information both as an indispensable part of running their business (first phase: collection, 
monitoring and production of information to make and extend loans) and as a value-
providing continuance for banks in terms of producing confidence (second phase: 
information about banks’ overall financial standing).  
 
The historical debate related to superiority of banks over market financing implies that 
financial systems are institutions which lessen the level of information asymmetry and 
moral hazard among financiers and borrowers.127 A banking relationship occurs when 
lenders and borrowers share information with the bank not available to other parties, 
which matches the financial needs of investors and savers through banks by mitigating 
asymmetries.128 Within this framework, banks as the unique source of information help 
to distinguish between good and bad firms as through the credit relationship or 
relationship lending, they collect, monitor and produce a great deal of information about 
the borrower firm’s financial prospects and bank lending system collectively eliminates 
                                               
127 Elizabeth Paulet, The Role of Banks in Monitoring Firms:The Case of the Credit Mobilier 
(Routledge 1999) 19. 
128 Alfred M.H. Slager,Banking Across Borders (ERIM 2004) 40. 
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bad firms from reaching bank credit services due to this aggregated data.129 So, they 
basically use ‘data to create new efficiencies, stimulate demand, build relationships and 
generate revenue and profit from their services.’130 
 
Banks enjoy the reduced costs of information production depending on its brokerage 
services which necessitates specialist expertise to collect the required information and 
translate and digest it to make a profit. By finding and interpreting such clues banks re-
use the relevant information about customers and enjoy the benefits of temporary re-
usability of information.131  
 
Since the produced information by market has the features of public good, the first 
producer of information enjoys the benefits of specializing in the production and 
distribution of the information which puts banks in a special place given the nature of the 
information they collect. Banks communicate proprietary information about borrowers 
and thereby provide re-usability of it through screening 132  and then monitoring133 . 
Diversification and specialization of banks requires them to collect some substantial 
                                               
129 However, depending on market specifics, banks might also provide transaction-based loans 
which are guaranteed by good collaterals and with short maturities and they make these loans 
decisions based on hard information, rather than soft information. Franklin Allen and Douglas 
Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (MIT Press 2000) ch 1.  
130 World Economic Forum,‘Personal Data:The Emergence of a New Asset Class’ (Jan 2011) at 
8 (accessed March 
4,2016)http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf.  
131 Y. Chan, S.I. Greenbaum and A.V. Thakor,‘Information Reusability, Competition and Bank 
Asset Quality (1986) 10 Journal of Banking and Finance 243. 
132 D. Diamond,‘Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly 
Placed Debt’ (1991) 99 Journal of Political Economy 689. 
133 Raghuram G. Rajan and Andrew Winton,‘Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor’ 
(1995) 50 Journal of Finance 1113. 
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information such as specific information about a borrower’s financial condition including 
very detailed personal and financial information. This is why banks can get involved in 
both payment services and information-intensive lending.  
 
The lending mechanism in the banking industry requires information related to a 
borrower’s business and his borrowing behaviours in order to evaluate credit standing 
and remunerativeness of firms. In a world where the investor/lender seeks full and 
credible information about a borrower, fragmented or missing information on the side of 
the borrower may result in a mismatch of economic interests between borrowers and 
lenders, suggesting that this disparity induces credit limitations and deficiency in funds 
allocated for loans.134  
 
Banks gather and preserve the information that is not available to others, only for their 
own private use. They accumulate and use the information by spreading the cost of 
collecting it over a number of loans which is in parallel with their confidentiality concerns 
over that data. 
 
Namely, banks are also special due to their ability to produce soft, private information on 
their borrowers. While soft information is the qualitative and non-verifiable information 
acquired by the bank through the credit relationship over time and it cannot be credibly 
transferred to others since it is not verifiable by anyone other than the one who produced 
it, hard information is the one contained in balance sheet data and it is quantitative and 
                                               
134 I. Kibirige Nalukenge,‘Impact of Lending Relationships on Transaction Costs Incurred by 
Financial Intermediaries: Case Study in Central Ohio’ (2003) ETD (accessed Dec 
15,2015)http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1068473959.  
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verifiable, which means others can obtain and produce it.135 This means that bank opacity 
in the first place comes from soft, private information, and hard information is an output 
derived from soft information. A delegated monitoring function, therefore, means that 
banks produce information about the debtor’s quality and this information is inherently 
opaque to outsiders. Here, it is possible to mention internalised information where the 
opaque, granular and soft nature of information that banks possess (in the absence of a 
specific regulation, a public law compulsion, or of a private law duty requiring banks to 
disclose information) is shared with only limited recipients such as regulators or 
supervisors. This aspect addresses the first dimension of bank information. 
 
The second dimension of bank information is the information they produce about 
themselves and it is the information that has overtones for financial stability and 
economic activity. It is related to the negative impact of bank information disclosure in 
such a way that it does not only swipe confidence away and set it to the state of zero; but 
in fact, bank information can place confidence in a state of sub-zero. So, the literature on 
banking panics and runs puts emphasis on the nature of information and its negative, 
reflexive and coordinative effects on individual and collective decision-making. 136 
Mainstream theories about the banking crisis distinguish information-based bank runs 
and panics by emphasizing the cognitive, behavioural and social aspect of bank 
stakeholder behaviours and they value confidence as a constructing factor in shaping bank 
stakeholders’ decision-making processes. The literature on bank runs addresses random 
                                               
135 Masaji Kano, Hirofumi Uchida, Gregory Udell and Wako Watanabe,‘Information 
Verifiability, Bank Organisation, Bank Competition and Bank-Borrower Relationships’(2011) 
35 Journal of Banking&Finance  935. 
136 Chapter 2,Section 3.1.1. 
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events (sunspot explanations), 137  information asymmetries, 138  coordination problems 
between depositors139 and a combination of all of these as a general group of reasons for 
runs. In all of these scenarios, bank-specific information plays a great role in creating or 
aggravating a banking crisis by spillovers or panics, and this is addressed in the next 
chapter. 
 
As it will be discussed in Chapter 2, why bank information is of importance can be 
answered from different angles, but information asymmetry and concomitant problems 
stand as one of the notable reasons. So, why bank information matters? First, there must 
be a sufficient level of information to regulate the financial system, and there is an 
information asymmetry between the regulator and the bank. Second, there must be a 
sufficient level of information for the protection of customers and investors, which 
implies that there are information gaps between the bank and its consumers. Third, the 
market itself needs information for its smooth functioning. Fourth, information 
asymmetries between FIs themselves have an impact on the smooth functioning of the 
financial system. Fifth, large FIs that are considered systemically important have internal 
information asymmetries.140 
 
                                               
137 Diamond and Dybvig (n 43). 
138 C. Jacklin&S. Bhattacharya, ‘Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: 
Welfare and Policy Implications’(1988) 96 Journal of Political Economy 568. 
139 J.C. Rochet & X. Vives,‘Coordination Failure and the Lender of Last Resort’ (2004) 2 
Journal of the European Economic Association 1116.  
140 Helmut Willke and Eva Becker,‘“A Demonstrably Fragile Financial System”- Information 
and Knowledge Asymmetries in the Global Financial Crisis’ in S.A. Jansen, E. Schroter, N. 
Stehr(eds), Fragile Stabilitat –Stabile Fragilitat (Springer VS 2013) 219-42. 
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4.   Concluding Remarks 
Historical evolution of banks vis-a-vis other FIs has shown the relative superiority of 
banks’ special functions in both financial markets and the economy. Markets are not static 
and linear organisations. They change, adjust and transform over time and banks as 
substantial elements of this living organism should be understood in terms of their social 
foundations and evolving nature.141 Markets work in a system where participants from 
households to large-scale firms have confidence in engaging in financial transactions. The 
social foundation of banks is based on trust where it is not cheap and easy to reach 
information about others, as in a real-world situation. Under this evolving non-linear 
financial system driven by information, banks are of importance to establish the needed 
trust for market participants. 
 
The existence of banks, as debated within the context of financial intermediation, was 
rooted in information deficits and hazards. Banks hold assets and liabilities with different 
risks and to a different extent which consist of banks’ intermediary side. This 
intermediary effect can be seen in their asset-liability, capital or risk management skills. 
However, the arguments that banks are not deposit-taking institutions due to their legal 
ownership of the deposited money and that they do not lend money but rather purchase a 
loan contract in the form of a promissory note and therefore invent their own money has 
gained attraction in order to underpin the idea that banks are not intermediaries as modern 
theory suggests.142 However, regardless of how banks are classified, there are some facts 
that should not be ignored. Banks collect funds from depositors or in the words of credit 
                                               
141 Lena Rethel and Timothy J. Sinclair, The Problem with Banks (Zed 2012) 36. 
142 Z. Jakab and M. Kumhof,‘Banks are not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds-and Why This 
Matters’ (2015) Bank of England Working Paper No: 529 (accessed Dec 4, 
2015)http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/workingpapers/2015/wp529.aspx. 
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creation theory adherents ‘unsecured creditors’ and offer services to deal with certain 
typical informational and liquidity frictions as centralised agents. These roles in financial 
exchange and contracting provide important implications for a large spectrum of costs 
connected with direct financing. Although these roles run the risk of being inherently 
fragile given that they do not keep enough balances in their reserves to ensure all sudden 
withdrawals will be satisfied, the deposit and loan cycle of banks simply describes the 
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CHAPTER 2 
BANK INSTABILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK AND ITS 
RELEVANCE TO CONFIDENCE PRODUCTION AND 
PROTECTION 
 
1.   Protection of Financial Stability as an Overarching Objective 
Financial markets are similar to roads, where their maintenance and safety are controlled 
by governments for the concurrent access of persons and businesses with the aim of 
establishing the best protection for all participants using those roads and directing them 
to behave safely. 143  Furthering the analogy, the underlying reasons for regulations 
imposed on banks have similar characteristics to traffic, based on its intermediating role 
and accordingly its impact on the aggregate amount and allocation of wealth in society, 
which also comes with socio-economic effects at the individual and corporate level. 
However, regulation of FIs, including banks, is explained via uncontrolled private 
behaviours and their consequences on individual and social levels, where regulation is 
justified when the social marginal cost of unregulated actions exceeds their private 
marginal cost.144 To apply this to banks, the magnitude of the outcomes arising out of 
bank failures and crises can be indicative of such social costs.  
 
                                               
143 Edward J. Kane,‘Perspectives on Banking and Banking Crises’ (2015) Boston College 
(accessed Feb 25,2016) 
https://www2.bc.edu/edwardkane/Perspectives%20on%20Banking%20and%20Banking%20Cri
ses.pdf.  
144 R.H. Coase, The Firm, The Market and The Law (University of Chicago Press 1988). 
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Banks, being one of the most vulnerable institutions of the modern economic system, 
have the capacity to endanger the whole financial system due to the high degree of 
interdependence between banking and the rest of the financial industry as well as the 
whole economy.145 The extent and commonness of banking crises and bank failures, 
irrespective of the sophistication of banking systems or the economic and financial 
development level of the country, have motivated lawmakers to exert more monitoring 
and supervising measures over banks.146 Determined, extensive and heavy agendas of 
regulators in order to prevent bank runs and failures have headed towards identification 
and mitigation of risks in a holistic manner. This means that prevention of systemic risk, 
a focus on the whole financial system rather than its individual components, and new 
prudential tools and associated governance, have been the elements of the new financial 
regulatory approach since the GFC.147  
 
The GFC introduced a series of new terms into financial and regulatory terminology and 
macroprudential regulation. Systemic shock and contagion have become well-known and 
perhaps over-used terms of post-crisis regulatory agendas.148 The methods of ensuring 
the safety and soundness of the financial system and its relevance to the systemic risk 
have come to the fore and previous concepts, such as the fallacy of composition,149 have 
                                               
145 Busch (n 44) 24. 
146 Kent Matthews & John Thompson, The Economics of Banking (John Wiley&Sons 2005) 
161. 
147 The Common Report of IMF-FSB-BIS,‘Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies’ 
(2016)(accessed Sep 1,2017) http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2016/083116.pdf.  
148 Behzad Gohari and Karen E. Woody,‘The New Financial Regulatory Order:Can 
Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster’(2014) 40(2) The 
Journal of Corporation Law 403,404. 
149 The fallacy of composition is a concept which contends that the individual parts of the 
system represent the whole system so that safety and soundness of the whole banking and 
financial system is the accumulated robustness of all its participating entities. J. Osinski, K. 
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been re-discussed as the suspicion has been that micro reasoning might not provide true 
conclusions at the macro level even if that argument might be sound for purposes at the 
micro level. The asserted idea here is that mere microprudential regulation, while 
attempting to make each participating institution safe and prudent, might in fact 
destabilise the whole financial system. Goodhart states this in the following terms:  
 
… [T]he deeper problem has been that controls and reactions that seem appropriate at the 
level of the individual financial institution may become seriously damaging at the level 
of the system as a whole. Thus, faced with adverse financial conditions, the reaction of 
the individual bank or other financial intermediary is to retrench, to hoard liquidity, to 
sell assets while the opportunity to do so remains open, and to become far more restrictive 
in extending credit. Microstructural regulation often reinforces such tendencies, in part 
by encouraging all the regulated to act in the same way at the same time, as a herd.150 
 
As such, since the crisis, a system-wide perspective that considers the interactions within 
the system has been employed alongside microprudential policies in order to achieve 
resilience and soundness across the entire system. Correspondingly, new organisations to 
control systemic risk have appeared and the discussions related to optimal regulatory 
structure have intensified. In the UK, a shift from the tripartite system to a twin peaks 
system has been a significant change. The FPC of the BoE (Bank of England) is the new 
dedicated macroprudential body responsible for identifying, monitoring and responding 
to risks to the financial system, plus the goal of supporting the economic policy of the 
government, including its objectives for growth and employment. 151  The FPC 
                                               
Seal, and L. Hoogduin,‘Macroprudential and Microprudential Policies:Toward Cohabitation’ 
(2013) IMF Staff Discussion Paper SDN:13/05(accessed Nov 14,2016) 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1305.pdf.   
150 Charles E. Goodhart,‘The Macro-Prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability’ 
(2011) 2 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 1,5. 
151 The FPC was established by the Financial Services Act 2012 as a Committee of Court and 
became a statutory committee of the BoE under the BoE and Financial Services Act 2016. 
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accomplishes these goals by detecting risks and stresses in its Financial Stability Reports, 
making recommendations to the Treasury, other regulators and within the BoE, and 
directing the FCA and PRA on a comply or explain basis in order to calibrate particular 
macroprudential tools. 152   The establishment of the FPC was particularly important 
because the new twin peaks system does not provide a single coordinated regulatory 
structure for financial services, and therefore coordination among the authorities to 
deliver their statutory objectives for the regulatory structure to work has become 
paramount. 153 
 
In the US, the establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)154 and 
re-discussion of duties and powers of financial regulatory bodies under the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) have been the results of 
this new financial ordering.  
 
The GFC mainly took the form of a banking crisis, although it also included non-bank 
FIs and shadow banks, which developed out of the traditional banking system.155 This 
means that institutions operating outside of the government safety nets or regulatory 
measures tailored to banks also posed a great danger to the systemic and financial stability. 
Further developments since the GFC proved that the use of public funds to reinforce the 
capital status of TBTF banks, both in the US and the EU, was not a sustainable solution 
to mitigate concerns about banks. The continuous use of public debts for banks triggered 
a banking crisis that turned into a public debt crisis in the second phase of the GFC. It is 
                                               
152 BoE Act,s 9H-R. 
153 MoUs will be discussed at Section 3.1.3.  
154 FSOC is established by the Dodd-Frank Act in order to identify risks and respond threats to 
the financial stability.12 USC§5322. 
155 Anthony Elson, The Global Financial Crisis in Retrospect (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 21. 
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therefore possible to say that banks and financial stability have always been closely 
intertwined.  
 
During the GFC, it was apparent that large commercial banks were very active in the 
securities markets and shadow banking activities were dependent on the funding in the 
capital markets. As such, banking activities, in a traditional and non-traditional way, were 
greatly affecting the liquidity and the amount of money in the system while the CB(s) 
could intervene with the bank credits. In other words, they were providing funds to the 
system by making changes in short-term interest rates in the interbank market for 
reserves.156 The timeline of the crises proved that CBs had to step into the complexity 
more than before through injections of funds into banks, nationalisations, arranged 
mergers, lowering interest rates, undertaking a series of auctions against a range of 
collaterals and purchasing toxic assets of the FIs and so on. Unprecedented government 
support or, under the laissez-faire approach to financial regulation, massive intervention 
in the markets during and after the GFC highlighted the contours of stability measures in 
a way that both old-fashioned bank runs (eg NR) and the new type of scenery appeared 
in the form of withdrawals by interbank market participants (not depositors) are 
experienced.157 So, it is possible to mention two kinds of crises where banks were the 
major actors and CBs and governments were the decision makers on whether to save the 
institutions or let them fail.  
 
                                               
156 Ibid 23. 
157 Xavier Vives,‘Bagehot, Central Banking and the Financial Crisis’ in Andrew Felton and 
Carmen Reinhart (eds), The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century Part I (CEPR 
2008) 99-101. 
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The traditional form of prudential supervision158 was designed to respond to system-wide 
concerns. Stress tests, new capital adequacy, leverage levels and disclosure requirements 
for banks reflect the post-GFC approach. Ex ante policies to prevent contagion and 
spillovers proved that systemic risk is still in the financial system and information 
disclosure is an important element of public confidence. Protection of overall financial 
stability has become the prominent goal and the importance of CBs has increased under 
the macroprudential regulatory approach. While stability has become the overarching 
objective, the contours of bank transparency and its relation to overall financial stability 
have been revisited in different ways in different jurisdictions. The importance of market 
discipline has increased yet capital markets mandated-transparency of banks created 
question marks about the way that prioritisation of objectives between the financial 
stability of the state in the long run and investor protection and market integrity in the 
short term has occurred.159  
 
All of these were experienced during the GFC, so the focus will be on the financial 
environment during the crisis and understanding how the law and theory approached bank 
regulation and financial stability in terms of disclosure of bank information. Firstly, 
sources of the GFC that led to a paradigm shift in financial regulation will be explored 
and then subsequent parts will question the multifaceted relationship between public 
confidence, bank information and financial stability with an eye to recent regulatory 
changes in bank regulation.  
                                               
158 These can be grouped as capital, liquidity and disclosure requirements, bank chartering, bank 
examination, restrictions on asset holdings and activities, risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums, separation of the banking and other financial service industries, restrictions on 
competition. Frederic S. Mishkin,Prudential Supervision: Why is it Important and What Are the 
Issues? (University of Chicago Press 2001) 9. 
159 Chapter 5. 
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2.   Brief Summary of the Global Financial Crisis and Its Implications for the 
Banking Sector160 
The financial commentators have analysed the underlying reasons for the GFC in 
different contexts. There have been many interlinked factors given for the GFC which 
began in the US when various mortgage banks went bankrupt: low interest rates in the 
early 2000s (easy monetary policy of the Fed)161 and accordingly acquisition of low-
interest-rate mortgages by the American public (housing boom and then housing 
bubble); 162  complex products circulated in the markets as a result of excessive 
securitisation and too much reliance on securitisation to reach funds; difficulty of 
addressing risks underlying the balance sheets of FIs (opacity); reliance on non-updated 
bank risk models;163 lax regulations that were not designed for new financial transactions 
of FIs; absence of regulations for shadow banking activities; greed and opportunistic 
behaviour of FIs; and supervisors’ inability (or rationally bounded regulators) to foresee 
the risky activities of regulated institutions or to take necessary actions in time to prevent 
further deterioration of them; structure of the financial regulators;164 too much emphasis 
                                               
160 Since the tension discussed in this research appeared during the GFC, underlying reasons of 
the crisis will be succinctly considered in as much as it is relevant to main theme of the thesis. 
161 C.A.E. Goodhart,‘The Background of the 2007 Financial Crisis’ (2008) 4(4) International 
Economics and Economic Policy 331,334. 
162 Padma Desai, From Financial Crisis to Global Recovery (Columbia University Press 2011) 
1-20. 
163 Together with Basel II bank capital rules, which allowed banks to replace tangible common 
equity with subordinated debt and convertible preferred stock, bank risk models came under 
severe criticisms. The concern about it was that subordinated debt did not hinder failure and it 
solely absorbed loss after failure. Avinash Persaud,‘Why Bank Risk Models Failed’ in Felton 
and Reinhart (n 157) 11-12.  
164 In the US, it was the problem of too much fragmentation at which agencies have separate and 
also overlapping jurisdictions. In the UK, it was the tripartite model of the UK structure where 
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on microprudential regulation; existence of a variety of arguments about the FIs that can 
be abbreviated as  too big to fail (TBTF), too many to fail, too important to fail or too 
linked to fail institutions; 165  flawed investment grade ratings given by credit rating 
agencies (CRAs);166 and economic ideologies supporting deregulation, in other words, 
unrestricted free markets167. As Mayntz thinks, financial crises are an aggregate of many 
events, filtered into a single event as a cognitive construct and all of these factors 
abovementioned are the causes and effects of each other sequenced in a chain.168 These 
components which undergirded the GFC present the most pronounced headings regarding 
to the underlying reasons of the GFC.  
 
In an environment with generous supplies of credit and with false confidence, bankers 
developed innovative ways of convincing creditors to make them invest in novel financial 
instruments such as ABS, MBS, CDS, CDO and other structured instruments that are the 
                                               
the BoE, the FSA and the Treasury were blamed not to provide an effective, timely 
communication and coordination to response to the crisis.  
165 Johan A. Lybeck, A Global History of the Financial Crash of 2007-10 (CUP 2011) 14-29. 
166 Aline Darbellay, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Edward Elgar 2013) 93-144. 
167 According to Palley, small government policies in order to liberalise markets spurred 
privatization, deregulation and light touch regulation, which means detrimental government 
interference was limited and such policies undermined the rationality of the state. Thomas I. 
Palley,‘America’s Exhausted Paradigm’ (2009) Institute for International Political Economy 
Berlin Working Paper No: 02/2009 at 8 (accessed Apr 26, 2015)http://www.ipe-
berlin.org/fileadmin/downloads/working_paper/ipe_working_paper_02.pdf. According to 
Williamson and Mahar, countries that experienced the financial crisis are the ones with high 
level of financial liberalization.John Williamson and Molly Mahar,‘A Survey of Financial 
Liberalisation’ (1998) Princeton University, Essays in International Finance No: 211(accessed 
Feb 26, 2016)https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Essays/E211.pdf.See Stuart P.M. 
Mackintosh,‘Crisis and Paradigm Shift’(2014) 85(4) The Political Quarterly 406. 
168 Renate Mayntz,‘Crisis and Control: Institutional Change in Financial Market Regulation’ 
(2012) Publication Series of the Max Planck Institute for Study of Societies Vol:75 at 12 
(accessed Dec 6,2017) http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_book/mpifg_bd_75.pdf.  
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products of the new model of lending. This model, which can be described as 
securitisation, indicates the changing nature of bank lending from the traditional 
‘originate to hold’ model to ‘originate to distribute’.  
 
The change in business model led banks to aggressively issue loans and sell them in the 
secondary loan market, which ultimately turned their main business of accepting deposits 
and issuing loans into issuing loans to access funds without waiting for the maturity date 
for the loan and transferring the risk to the ultimate investors.169 The new model, which 
allowed banks to trade their securitized assets via off balance sheet investment vehicles 
(known as special purpose vehicles), could not produce the anticipated positive outcomes 
in the financial system of dispersing the credit risk across different asset classes, regions 
and industries, thus increasing the resilience, efficiency and stability of the financial 
system. 170  In fact, it has been associated with opacity since it was very difficult to 
determine where the credit risk related to likely-to-default subprime mortgages or other 
low quality assets resided. The expected result from securitisation of transferring risks to 
those investors who were willing to take it or who could bear it was actually not possible 
as banks were traders themselves and they were holding securitized assets and derivatives. 
This meant that that the risk never left the banking system as was imagined.171 The growth 
of FIs and the rise of their overall riskiness are seen to be closely related to each other 
and during the GFC banks’ funding structure that is in compliance with the pertinent 
                                               
169 Variety of asset classes could be packaged via securitisation such as residential or 
commercial mortgages, auto loans, corporate loans, credit card debts and trade receivables. 
Kevin Ingram,‘If Securitization is Dead, Why Do So Many Government Schemes Use It?’ 
(2009) 4(4) Capital Markets Law Journal 462, 463. 
170 Hyun Song Shin,‘Securitization and Financial Stability’ [2009] 119 The Economic Journal 
309. 
171 J. Goddard, P. Molyneux and J.O.S. Wilson,‘The Crisis in UK Banking’ (2009) 29(5) Public 
Money & Management 277,278. 
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capital adequacy rules has allowed banks to grow soundly without disturbing 
depositors.172  
 
Given this framework, banks have applied low due diligence standards to issue loans and 
cut down their monitoring efforts before and during the loan agreement with the borrower. 
This situation exemplifies the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in banking 
where banks relied on the idea that they were transferring the risks to ultimate investors 
in the securitisation chain. As Gabilondo puts it, ‘a value chain had emerged that 
connected the bank’s internal liquidity with trading conditions in secondary markets for 
securitized credit’.173 As such, the chain producing value in a systematic way through 
upstream suppliers to downstream clients linked those participants in several contracts 
and when the crisis manifested itself, governments had to face it with their outdated credit 
markets approach.  
 
There has been consensus on the significant role of the shadow banking system in the 
subprime crisis. Extension of credit to the global financial markets via uncontrolled 
channels by regulated institutions or from outside the regulated banking sector was the 
starting point for interbank liquidity seizure which turned into a global credit crunch. The 
ultimate implication for banks is that banks’ production of tradable loans led them to 
aggressively issue loans to those likely to default. Further, there was another argument 
                                               
172 Simon Sinclair and Michele Crisostomo, ‘Tier one Hybrids for Credit Institutions-Is 
Convergence in Regulation Possible?’(2008) 3(4) Capital Markets Law Journal 458,459. Basel 
minimum capital rules could not respond to banks’ securitisation activities within its capital 
requirements rules and bank balance sheets expanded greatly while they were allowed to 
operate with little capital. Frank J. Fabozzi,Henry A. Davis and Moorad Choudhry, Introduction 
to Structured Finance (John Wiley&Sons 2006) 287-90. 
173 Jose Gabilondo, Bank Funding, Liquidity and Capital Adequacy (Edward Elgar 2016) 16. 
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about bank balance sheets; banks sold the good quality loans to SPVs and kept low quality 
loans on their balance sheets or vice versa. Also, the transfer of risks from banks to 
ultimate security holders has undermined the banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers and 
caused moral hazard on the part of banks. Banks’ dependence on securitisation for raising 
funds, which was described as ‘liquidity through marketability’174 by Turner, has caused 
distortions in their main business by leading them to concentrate on specific loans to 
securitize and transfer the risk to the ultimate ABS purchaser. The shift in traditional bank 
behaviour from loan and service providers to underlying originators of those securities 
undergirded greedy and opportunistic behaviours of bankers to lower the standards for 
the loans and the use of securitisation as one of the main funding sources of the bank. 
When lack of attention and of allocation of responsibility to non-monetary issues such as 
systemic risk, contagion, connectedness and public confidence blend in with such a 
banking environment, changes in prudential and conduct of business regulation and 
institutional structures were inevitable.  
 
Not all banks became heavily involved in securitisation or invested their sources in 
derivatives. However, the banking system is closely inter-linked so when a part of it 
suffers, the whole of it cannot be healthy and the healthy parts are under the threat of 
infection in different forms. This can be translated to the banking system in the way that 
transmission of problems is possible via spillover, contagion or collective creditor 
response to the banks. The link between banks is important for systemic risk in the 
financial system. This link is not solely limited to the domestic financial system but the 
connection between banks is related to increasingly global, volatile and integrated 
                                               
174 Adair Turner’s speech at the Economist’s Inaugural City Lecture on Jan 21,2009 (accessed 
May 11,2017) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0121_at.shtml.  
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financial markets.175 As will be discussed later in this chapter, macroprudential regulation 
has been the rising concept in the post-GFC world as a means to oversee the whole system 
and detect and react to problems in specific parts of the whole before they begin to affect 
the other parts. 
 
Bank prudential and stability regulators were also the ones to blame for not being able to 
fully understand, foresee or respond in a timely manner to the risks inherent in the 
financial system. In a similar way, neither were bankers well-informed about the 
securitisation and the transfer of risks.176 The new model left most of the risk somewhere 
on the balance sheets of banks and bank-like institutions but in a much more complex and 
less transparent fashion.177  Opportunistic behaviour was the driving-force as long as 
continuing liquidity was ensured. CRAs and other securities analysts were also blamed 
for being part of this illusory confidence production.178  
                                               
175 Douglas W. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law (CUP 2007) 
63. 
176 ‘After Lehman’s collapse, no one could understand any particular bank’s risks from 
derivative trading and so no bank wanted to lend to or trade with any other bank…[N]o one 
could tell whether any particular financial institution might suddenly implode.’Steve Denning, 
‘Big Banks and Derivatives:Why Another Financial Crisis is Inevitable’, Forbes, (Jan 8,2013) 
(accessed on May 13,2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/08/five-years-
after-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks/#65935dd13a41.  
177 FSA,‘The Turner Review:A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis’(March 
2009) at 16 (accessed Oct 21, 2015)http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
178 Harry McVea,‘Credit Rating Agencies, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global 
Governance: The EU Strikes Back’ (2010) 59(3) The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 701. 
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The confidence created was not just related to the investment-grade, money safe ratings 
given by the big three CRAs179 but also to the size and interconnectedness of the banks. 
This also means that both the public and the banks believe that the state will prop up 
individual banks and also the system if something goes wrong. They were right in their 
belief to some extent because beginning from 2008, governments hurriedly started to 
announce the measures established to ensure financial stability. This included 
recapitalization of banks via governmental equity injections, nationalization, heightened 
deposit insurance schemes, guarantee systems for debt instruments and the extension of 
CB credit facilities.180  
 
The use of new LoLR facilities from CBs (particularly in the US and the UK) proved that 
significant extension of CB powers in providing liquidity was necessary to deal with the 
crisis.181 Liquidity and insolvency of banks, therefore, were crucial elements for the states 
to decide on whether to follow private, liquidity or capital solutions for those banks. 
Banks commonly rely on liquidity coming from interbank lending, collateralized by a 
claim on their financial assets. This means that in case of a liquidity-related problem in 
the inter-bank markets, valuable assets of banks help to weather the storm. Yet, once the 
lack of confidence and concomitant general panic materializes, the value of those assets 
responds to the new panic environment and fire sales are observed. The difficulty of 
accurate assessment of the real value of toxic assets (such as CDOs or ABSs) created 
uncertainty in the market to the extent that investors could not distinguish different classes 
                                               
179 Conflict of interest problem that CRAs had by receiving agency fees from issuers to rate for 
their securities was seen as one of the reasons of those overvalued ratings given to structured 
products. These ratings created overconfidence in the market.  
180 Boyan Wells and Theo Trayhurn,‘The Credit Crisis: How Government Sought to Reopen the 
Wholesale Markets to Financial Institutions’ (2009) 5(1) Capital Markets Law Journal 43,44. 
181 J. Armour and others, Principles of Financial Regulation (OUP 2016) 326. 
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of assets and the likelihood of defaults and recoveries. Ratings provided by CRAs became 
dubious statements in the eyes of the market.182 Such an uncertain financial environment 
has made the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency more vague.183 So, banks 
experiencing dramatic decreases in the value of their collateral assets (asset portfolios in 
general) were on the edge of illiquidity which could turn into insolvency later on. The 
result was that many banks were either nationalized, rescued, bailed out or at least enjoyed 
liquidity support from the state.184  
 
Overall, the real economy was severely affected starting with the increasing uncertainty 
of the valuation of structured products and then the sequence of developments filtered 
into a systemic crisis. Beginning from the birthplace of securitisation, the US financial 
markets, to the other developed markets involved in the process and policies of 
governments in interfering in markets, these proved that insulation of SIFIs from the 
destructive effects of the crisis was necessary.  
 
Pre-crisis political, economic and regulatory ideology did not support the assertion of 
state powers over financial markets, firms, actors and investors.185 Yet, neither was the 
post-crisis approach based on the complete rejection of market forces. Instead, it was 
                                               
182 Carlo Gola and Alessandro Roselli,The UK Banking System and Its Regulatory and 
Supervisory Framework (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 122. 
183 Christopher Mitchell, Saving the Market from Itself: The Politics of Financial Intervention 
(CUP 2016) 4. 
184 Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity 2010) 84. 
185 As mainly influenced by Hayek, the UK and US pursued market freedom and limitation of 
the authority of the state in the management of the economy in the form of privatization in the 
UK and deregulation in the US starting in the 1980s. The state’s role has been seen to regulate 
economic activity, not interfere with it as an economic actor itself. Sue Konzelmann and Marc 
Fovargue-Davies,‘Varieties of Liberalism: Anglo-Saxon Capitalism in Crisis?’(2010) 
University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No: 403 at 11-12. 
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based on the identification of the dangerous elements that underpinned the GFC.186 In this 
respect, private solutions residing in market forces were not possible. Instead, regulatory 
favouritism,187 private rescue arrangements by the state and the use of public money in 
the form of liquidity and solvency support were considered the way to protect the 
financial stability.  
 
While the crisis is largely considered to have been centred around US bank failures, the 
UK also had a number of banks fail and the factors leading to these bank failures were 
not exactly the same as in the US. When delinquencies in the sub-prime market started, 
the cross-border dimension of poorly structured instruments appeared, and both the FSA 
and the BoE had flagged fragility problems and potential risks. However, they were late 
in doing so.188  
 
In conclusion, the external contours of the crisis, though the causes still remain contested 
and so unclear, have been well-examined. Recent years have witnessed the rise of 
financial stability as a global goal and the dangers of a systemic crisis expedited by lack 
of confidence and lack of liquidity have been well understood. What these experiences 
mean for banks and their relevance to information disclosure will be explored in the next 
section.  
 
                                               
186 It means state should engage in the markets more to protect the market. Mackintosh (n 167) 
408. 
187 For example, in the US, legal status of investment banks could change to BHCs (as Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs did). This means that they could reach the Federal Reserve 
assistance. 
188 Gola and Roselli (n 182) 121. 
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3.   Relevance of Information to the Stability of the Financial System: 
Production and Protection of Public Confidence 
3.1.   Financial Stability and Banks as One Generic Source of Instability 
The stability of the financial system is a common global goal, especially after the GFC, 
in order to diminish and prevent the adverse consequences and negative externalities 
arising from the failures of institutions or markets.189  Even though the term is used 
frequently, there is no definite description of it.190 However, its opposite, instability, 
provides a general framework for what stability means. Financial instability might be 
linked with (i) bank failures (or the monetarist approach);191 (ii) inherent fragility of the 
                                               
189 Chris Brummer,‘How International Financial Law Works?’ (2011) 99 Georgetown Law 
Journal 257, 265-68. 
190 Multidimensional characteristics of financial stability entail diversified standpoints such as 
for some it might be a concern of developed countries whereas others might take it as a 
universal problem due to spillover risks; or one might see the notion of financial stability as 
something that should be discussed with TBTF banks and systemic risk; or individual states 
might assign different meanings to financial stability simply based on cultural variations or 
different national interests. For example, while the European understanding of financial 
instability can be explained with a single failure of a FI, the US understanding of financial 
stability accommodates a more tolerant approach to such failures. Hillary J. Allen,‘What is 
“Financial Stability”?The Need for Some Common Language in International Financial 
Regulation’ (2014) 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 929,930-31. 
191 One school economic thought, called monetarism is mainly associated with Cagan, Friedman 
and Schwartz who characterize instability with banking panics that cause or worsen monetary 
contraction in the end. They characterize banking panics with the loss of public confidence in 
banks’ ability to convert deposits into currency that any collective behaviour towards converting 
deposits into currency requires, due to fractional reserve banking, which might reduce the stock 
of money available and cause failures of sound banks.Michael D. Bordo and David C. 
Wheelock,‘Price Stability and Financial Stability: The Historical Record’ (1998) 80(5) Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis Review 41,44.   
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financial system that is affected by any exogenous factors;192 (iii) asymmetric information 
and agency costs;193 (iv) uncertainty; (v) inadequacies in the regulation (such as safety 
nets that create moral hazard, incentives given to bankers, lack of monitoring of FIs, lack 
of regulation of CRAs, over-reliance on self-regulation and so on); and (vi) general short-
sightedness for the crisis (which means too much confidence or lack of knowledge leads 
FIs and regulators to underestimate the risks).194    
 
Therefore, instability can find its roots in monetary or non-monetary causes, and it might 
be a purely domestic phenomenon or be spread across states.  Some academics such as 
Mishkin describe financial stability with its opposite: ‘Financial instability occurs when 
the shocks of the financial system interfere with the flow of information, so that the 
financial system can no longer fulfil its duties to channel the funds to opportunities of 
productive investments.’ 195  This approach to instability is related to information 
asymmetry and its concomitant outcomes on the intermediation role of the financial 
system where providing credits to the real economy is severely damaged. As Chapter 1 
                                               
192 The hypothesis of financial instability (known as the Minksy Moment) is expounded by 
Hyman Minsky where over-indebtedness of borrowers causes them to sell their assets in order 
to fulfil their other repayment demands. In return, a fall in asset prices and loss of confidence in 
the financial system occurs and FIs, such as banks, go illiquid due to bank runs. So, the Minsky 
moment depicts the time when debt levels and lending become unsustainable and after this 
moment government intervention is required to stabilise it. Overall, it is a theory of the effects 
of debts on system behaviour and it takes banks as active financial intermediaries bridging 
surplus funds with deficit agents and they underpin the economy by making loans. Therefore, 
government interference is needed when necessary. Kim De Glossop,‘The Inherent Instability 
of the Financial System’ (2011) 4 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship &L.483,488-92. 
193 Allen and Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (n 129) ch 4. 
194 E. Philip Davis,‘Towards a Typology for Systemic Financial Instability’ (2003) Brunel 
University and NIESR at 3-4 (accessed Sep 6, 2016)http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/916. 
195 Frederic S. Mishkin,‘Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues’ (1999) 13(4) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 3,6. 
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revealed, information is valuable in terms of avoiding adverse selection, information 
asymmetry and moral hazard but instability is not solely the result of information 
deficiencies and the harm this does to total economic activity.   
 
A sharp rise in the number of defaults and bank failures can be given as explanation for 
a systemic banking crisis. It generally starts with an initial failure that sets off subsequent 
reactions in the banking system through negative externalities and spillover impacts. It is 
not restricted to geographic borders as the bank contagion can be a global phenomenon.  
 
As such, by placing banks at the heart of the intermediated financial system, Mishkin’s 
definition provides several aspects of banks’ role in information-driven markets and their 
relevance to financial stability:  
 
(i)   If banks experience a sudden deterioration in their balance sheets, they need 
to choose between raising new capital and reducing their lending activity. 
Raising new capital is costly and especially under stressed economic 
environment or tightened liquidity conditions of the markets, the expected 
funds to recover the balance sheets might not always be available. The 
straightforward choice for a bank is, therefore, to decrease its lending activity 
which in turn can damage real economic activity. The magnitude of bank 
balance sheet deterioration has direct links to contagion, systemic risk and 
panic situations, which explains sudden downturns in bank balance sheets. Its 
disclosure should therefore be handled with care by the regulators. 
(ii)   Increase in interest rates might cause adverse selection as the borrowers with 
the highest default risks will be willing to apply for the credit rather than the 
prudent borrowers. Bank lending activity will therefore service the riskiest 
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investment projects. Additionally, a rise in interest rates means that the asset-
liability ratio of banks will be affected because it decreases the value of bank 
assets with their longer duration and increases the value of liability with their 
shorter duration. 
(iii)   Uncertainty in the political and economic environment can lead to instability. 
This is directly linked to the term ‘confidence’. Uncertainty stands as a 
psychological, economic and political element and leads to the authorities 
responsible for the financial stability of the state and large-sized or small-sized 
creditors to behave in opposing ways. While the public policy goal of financial 
stability means that the authorities try to ensure that contractual obligations 
will be met without disruption, creditors will pursue their interests in saving 
their funds from a potentially unsound bank. These represent the regulator and 
consumer approaches. Banks, as lenders to the real economy, are also affected 
by the uncertainty surrounding the markets. They will be less willing to lend 
to their peers and borrowers due to an inability to distinguish between good 
and bad credit risks. Information asymmetry occurring through uncertainty 
therefore leads to financial instability. Bankruptcies, stock exchange crashes 
and political instability are causes and effects on each other in the great 
scheme of uncertainty that causes financial instability. Uncertainty also affects 
financial innovation where the results of new transactions or behaviours are 
not seen yet. Hence, uncertainty is closely related to confidence and 
maintenance of confidence serves the public interest. 196 
 
                                               
196 Ibid 6-10. 
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Such an economic approach to financial stability addresses the relationship between 
financial stability and banks from an information-centric point of view. Having said that, 
there are other factors used in defining financial stability: monetary or macroeconomic 
stability;197 no sudden and fallacious movements in prices of real and financial assets; a 
high degree of confidence in the financial and political system so that economic actors 
can fulfil their contractual obligations without outside interference;198 the state’s and FI’s 
ability to absorb or resist shocks, stress situations or periods of important structural 
changes;199 stability of the key FIs and key markets;200 and obviation of systemic risk in 
the financial system201. This indicates that there are many elements that form the causes 
and effects of financial instability. Financial stability is therefore a dynamic phenomenon.  
 
Financial stability is a public good whose use by consumers does not prevent others 
benefiting from it and it is in the interests of the state authorities to ensure that an adequate 
quantity of stability is supplied.202 Bank instability, within this context, raises public 
policy concerns as they are either sources or facilitators of financial instability. They can 
be sources of instability because they deal with the two-sided problem of information 
                                               
197 Claudio Borio,‘Monetary and Financial Stability: Here to Stay?’ (2006) 30(12) Journal of 
Banking & Finance 3407. 
198 Aerdt Houben, Jan Kakesn and Garry Schinasi,‘Toward a Framework for Safeguarding 
Financial Stability’ (2004) IMF Working Paper 04/101 (accessed Sep 
5,2016)http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Toward-a-Framework-for-
Safeguarding-Financial-Stability-17446.  
199 Deutsche Bundesbank’s Monthly Report (Dec 2003)(accessed Sep 
4,2016)https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Financial_Stability
_Review/2003_financial_stability_review.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.  
200 Andrew Crockett,‘Why Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy?’(1997) 82(4) Economic 
Review of Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 4th Quarter 5,6-9. 
201 Davis (n 194). 
202 Crockett (n 200) 14. 
	   101	  
inefficiency: banks face difficulties in assessing the default risks of their borrowers 
(which causes adverse selection) and depositors find it difficult to assess the financial 
condition of their bank. Information asymmetry transforms into financial instability in 
the form of bank panics or runs. Therefore, temporal mismatch between loans and 
deposits can create the grounds for illiquidity problems which is a key component of the 
first step of a systemic crisis. 
 
In normal conditions, liabilities redeemable on demand at par are not a problem for a bank 
as it is not usual or expected that all creditors will attempt to withdraw their funds at once. 
Such en masse withdrawals in a short space of time force banks to liquidate their long-
term investments at a loss and ultimately leads to a failure. Bank capital, in this respect, 
serves as a cushion to maintain confidence in the bank by providing liquidity to the bank 
to cover the risk of loan defaults and to meet withdrawals. Yet, a fractional reserve system 
does not help when an exceptional situation that disturbs the confidence occurs. Creditors’ 
behaviours can be best explained by the ‘first come, first served’ logic which puts banks 
in a more difficult situation than a forced liquidation because fire sales initiated or 
expedited by creditor behaviour lead to the rapid deterioration of bank assets.  
 
Information asymmetry in such situations means that depositors cannot evaluate the real 
value of individual bank assets at no cost to themselves and are unable to monitor the 
performance of banks.203 Any new information that surfaces, regardless of whether it is 
incomplete or negative information, inhibits depositors from differentiating healthy banks 
                                               
203 Chapter 3,Section 4. 
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from potentially insolvent ones.204 The source of new information is not necessarily the 
bank. It can stem from disinflation, political movements within the state, sudden declines 
in asset values in another market or some other triggering element that interferes with the 
behavioural settings of depositors. Overall, irrational and herd behaviour of creditors 
poses a great danger to the financial system as it encourages a systemic crisis via 
contagion. This is still related to the maturity transformation function of banks. In 
addition to the liquidity-confidence link perpetuated through the bank’s maturity 
transformation function, there is a solvency dimension that provides implications for 
financial stability. Banks can also incur losses through their loans, not just because of 
liquidity-specific troubles. There is a positive correlation between the lending and 
vulnerability of a bank because losses must be offset against bank capital. If the default 
rates of bank borrowers increase, bank losses in turn seriously raise the bank leverage 
ratio.205 
 
Confidence therefore stands as a main theme that affects liquidity and solvency of a bank 
in different ways. As Bagehot puts it:  
 
The peculiar essence of our banking system is an unprecedented trust between man and 
man; and when that trust is much weakened by hidden causes, a small accident may 
                                               
204 Charles W. Calomiris and Gary Gorton,‘The Origins of Banking Panics:Models, Facts and 
Bank Regulation’ in R. Glenn Hubbard(ed), Financial Markets and Financial Crises 
(University of Chicago Press 1991) 109-70. 
205 However, there are opposing views supporting high leverage levels of banks based on 
fostering banks’ liquidity provision to markets and allowing them to compete with unregulated 
shadow banks. Harry DeAngelo and Rene M. Stulz,‘Liquid-Claim Production, Risk 
Management, and Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage is Optimal for Banks’ (2014) 
Dice Center WP:2013-8 (accessed Oct 
14,2017)https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254998.  
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greatly hurt it, and a great accident for a moment may almost destroy it.206  
 
So, anything that suddenly reveals the real financial condition of a bank can contaminate 
the whole banking system. However, apart from the issue of addressing how a solvent 
bank turns into an insolvent one due to rumours and accompanying loss of confidence, 
there is another problem when some banks are insolvent, but this fact is not known due 
to the general economic deterioration. This is the case when there is lack of trust in the 
interbank market, which was experienced in the form of a credit freeze during the GFC. 
Yet, a self-fulfilling prophecy, which is one of the sources of a bank run, translates a false 
conception into a new behaviour. It means that, even if all banks in the system are solvent, 
once the insolvency of a bank is questioned by a considerable number of persons, then 
regardless of the objective situation, the subjective meaning attributed to the bank’s 
financial standing has the potential to create a collective damaging outcome for the 
banking system.207   
 
Although the transparency-stability view today dominates the transparency-fragility view, 
there is still room for a discussion about how financial panics, as products of loss of 
confidence, develop out of information disclosure.  
 
3.1.1.   Understanding the Role of Confidence and Trust in the Banking 
Industry 
‘Trust and confidence’ stand as common social norms that link social arrangements with 
economic outcomes. Their ends are not limited to particular exchanges, entities or persons 
                                               
206 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (RD Irwin reprinted 
1962) 78. 
207 Robert Merton,‘The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy’ (1948) 8(2) Antioch Review 193,194-95. 
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and it is a general encompassing element of social organisation of economic life where 
shared expectations about the economic conduct affect the aggregate behaviour of the 
public.208 Financial markets reflect this element in a way that particular exchanges create 
externalities for the whole economic system, ie financial instability or financial crisis.    
 
Trust and confidence are generally used as synonyms, or they at least share common 
elements yet from an analytical perspective they tend to represent different sides.209 
Confidence operates based on objective and reliable information, external and 
independent rules over the conduct and contractual agreements and, therefore, the supply 
of information and necessary regulations that underpin the provision of information lead 
to rational and informed decisions. As such, confidence here can be seen as a property 
fortified or protected by external sources like public or private agents of market 
governance and is instrumental and calculative. It is the belief founded on experience or 
evidence (ie information) that particular events will take place as expected. Information 
and regulatory and supervisory institutions or mechanisms established ex ante serve to 
instil this confidence.210  
 
Trust, on the other hand, stands as a subjective concept that is associated with the 
perception of a person or a collective unit (for example, bank depositors) about the 
potential risks and doubts and is associated with irrational decisions.211 Therefore, trust 
                                               
208 Fran Tonkiss,‘Trust, Confidence and Economic Crisis’ (2009) 44(4) Intereconomics 196. 
209 For more explanation see Richard Swedberg,‘The Role of Confidence in Finance’ in Karin 
Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance (OUP 
2012) 529-46. 
210 Timothy C. Earle,‘Trust, Confidence and the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 29(6) Risk 
Analysis 785,786. 
211 J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert,‘Trust as a Social Reality’ (1985) 63(4) Social Forces 
967, 968-72. 
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is associated with endogenous and behavioural content. Lack of information, absence of 
contractual mechanisms and regulatory sanctions are important sources of lack of trust. 
However, as trust is a subjective and maybe an animal-spirit driven concept, it might 
bridge independent behavioural choices with fears on a systemic level. This means that 
even if there is no lack of information or no regulatory gap in the protection of 
transactions, contractual obligations etc – namely even if there are external powers to 
supply and promote confidence – lack of trust on the individual level can affect collective 
trust. This dimension of trust is a behavioural interpretation of the concept where 
cooperation and competition between the persons might drive them to behave irrationally. 
It means that trust is social and relational and is based on shared expectations and 
knowledge.212  
 
How does this differentiation apply to banks? This question addresses banks’ specialness 
and contagion links that banks produce. As such, the answer is related to the importance 
of trust in the financial services sector in general. Promises or products are generally 
intangible and therefore evaluation of financial services is difficult before purchase or 
consumption. As Stiglitz states ‘financial markets hinge on trust’213  and participants 
allow transactions to take place depending on their perception about actualisation of 
commitments or promised transactions given by the service provider. In the context of 
banking, trust stands as a positive feeling that the bank will keep its promises or act 
accordingly to protect the interests of those that get a service from the bank. So, from this 
point of view, trust is attributable to consumers and it is not something that banks can 
                                               
212 Ann-Marie Nienaber, Marcel Hofeditz, Rosalind H. Searle,‘Do We Bank on Regulation or 
Reputation?’(2014) 32(5) The International Journal of Bank Marketing 407. 
213 He uses the term similar to confidence. Joseph Stiglitz,‘The Fruit of Hypocrisy’ Guardian 
(16 Sep 2008)(accessed Oct 26, 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/sep/16/economics.wallstreet.   
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directly control and manage.214 In this setting, confidence also includes the institutions, 
markets or regulatory and supervisory agencies themselves where they can affect the level 
of public trust. Trust is, therefore, part of confidence and confidence represents the larger 
framework. Confidence is a precondition of functioning markets and bank stability is 
linked to market confidence. As such, a socially efficient level of confidence is one that 
protects the market in general. Prudential regulation and supervision, CB back-up and 
insurance protection schemes are confidence production measures to preserve public trust 
in banks and overall confidence within the financial system. It should be noted that not 
all the trust and confidence come from disclosed information or regulations, policies, 
supervisory and measures adopted by the state. It can also be based on positive 
assumptions about the future events. One can describe it as ‘ignorance in the market might 
also mean trust in a way.’ 
 
Banks bridge the trust gap between lenders and borrowers by producing an illusion about 
its liquidity provision and maturity transformation role and therefore provide public 
confidence. As mentioned in the previous section, financial systems are inherently 
unstable, and the equilibrium in financial markets is a product of collective trust (public 
confidence) to the system and its constituencies. This inherent instability means that 
regulation should support maintenance of confidence. 
 
Disclosure rules on banks, in this respect, fulfil an important role in correcting 
asymmetrical information flows. Yet, as it will be discussed in the market discipline part, 
the effect of disclosures is limited to information-receivers’ capacity and their exposure 
                                               
214 C. Annew and H. Sekhon,‘Measuring Trust in Financial Services:The Trust Index’ (2007) 
17(2) Consumer Policy Review 62. 
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to losses emanating from the bank’s failure.215 Large depositors and small depositors have 
different incentives in their own cost-efficient decisions. Large depositors, those with 
some part of their funds not protected by deposit insurance, are likely to follow a 
monitoring strategy than small depositors who enjoy insurance protection. Yet, the result 
of their response to a downturn in confidence in the bank will be the same. Small 
depositors’ strategy is to withdraw funds immediately when rumours spread about the 
bank’s financial standing, thus actualising what the literature calls a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This can also be explained by the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma: 
‘Depositors will be better off individually if they could beat their fellow depositors to the 
bank and reclaim their deposits whenever there is the slightest uncertainty about the value 
of a bank’s assets.’216 Large depositors, even if they monitor bank information and know 
that rumours do not signal a probable downturn in the bank, will also join such a 
withdrawal move due to a combination of negative information with lack of grounds and 
general loss of confidence. Therefore, market discipline exerted by large depositors does 
not help to prevent a depositor-based bank run. In a sequence, security holders and other 
FIs holding assets in each others’ accounts join the movement and help the liquidity crisis.  
 
Confidence is therefore an intangible good that bank stakeholders need; and banks, 
banking and financial system, markets and the government supply. The type of 
confidence supplied by an individual bank is intrinsic confidence and the one except 
individual banks produces is extrinsic. While intrinsic confidence is about capital and 
liquidity reserves and bank information, extrinsic confidence is de jure and de facto 
                                               
215 Chapter 3,Section 4. 
216 Jonathan R. Macey,‘The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley’ 
(2000) 25 J. Corp. L. 691,696-97. For the opposite view see Richard H. McAdams,‘Beyond the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (2008) 82 Southern California Law Review 209,216-17. 
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deposit insurance system, LoLR and other government support provisions, prudential 
regulation and supervision of banks.217 Unless all of the depositors adopt the monitoring 
approach instead of withdrawal strategy at the first sign of bank difficulty, intrinsic 
confidence alone does not prevent a bank run and the promotion of intrinsic and extrinsic 
confidence should be supported by regulation. Collective intrinsic confidence produced 
by banks completes extrinsic confidence as long as individual banks do not undersupply 
confidence based on positive externalities emanating from peer banks or based on the 
classic moral hazard rationale where banks rely on the belief that the government will not 
let them fail so that they can be risk averse and produce less intrinsic confidence 
depending on extrinsic confidence. This is one of the arguments used against voluntary 
disclosure by banks as banks are not willing to disclose information unless they have 
good news to share.   
 
The MD system, on the other hand, is provided as a remedy for the market’s inability to 
produce adequate levels of confidence on the aggregate. Economic agents should not 
necessarily fully trust the extrinsic confidence and they need reliable and constant 
information flow from banks even if they do not absorb and digest the information 
disclosed. In this sense, the MD system means that agents trust in markets rather than 
state or state-centric organizations to examine and supervise banks. This suggests that 
measures that shape the extrinsic confidence are effective as long as there is public trust 
in regulators and regulations enforced by them and the private law contracting 
arrangements that ensures adequate stability and certainty in financial transactions during 
financial turbulence. Another dimension of extrinsic confidence provided by the state is 
the paradox of the use of those confidence-supporting measures to bolster confidence. 
                                               
217 Albert J. Boro,‘Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behaviour’(1986) 
74(2)  Cal. L. Rev. 431,452-53. 
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Government intervention in banks, for example, through capital injections, the use of 
LoLR facility or discount windows, decrease public confidence in making new financial 
commitments or investments, or the readiness of the public to spend in general because it 
is taken as a signal of the seriousness of the liquidity problem rather than restoring 
confidence.218  
 
As such, the public needs information to trust yet the provision of information and thus 
the provided intrinsic confidence do not necessarily change their response to a potential 
downturn in the bank, which is withdrawal. This approach also has implications for state 
accountability, which means bank regulation and supervision, or state back-up provisions 
are not enough to give confidence to the public as the public wants to know that the 
information is already in the public domain.   
 
It is part of the informed citizenry ideal that the new transparency and accountability 
focused approach is said to represent values of democratic societies.219 Such a heavy 
attribution to bank transparency as a precondition or a significant part of democratic 
values does not provide space and toleration for an opposite view. It is clear that 
transparency has merits, especially in terms of confidence production. However, 
information disclosure as a way to ensure intrinsic confidence does not completely refute 
                                               
218 It might also give the impression that the state has been captured by banks themselves.  
219 ‘Accountability broadly denotes to the duty of an individual and or organisation to answer in 
some way about how they have conducted their affairs. Transparency broadly means the 
conduct of business in a fashion that makes decisions, rules and other information visible from 
outside.’  … ‘The word transparency started to become a central doctrine of good governance 
for both firms and states from the 1990s, and indeed seemed to be reaching saturation coverage 
by the 2000s.’ Christopher Hood,‘Accountability and Transparency:Siamese Twins, Matching 
Parts or Awkward Couple?’ (2010) 33(5) W. Eur. Pol. 989, 989-90. See Dennis Thompson, 
Restoring Responsibility (CUP 2004) ch 6. 
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arguments about the relationship between adverse information disclosure during the time 
of financial turbulence and the safety and soundness of banks and their privacy 
expectations vis-à-vis the state’s treatment of banks as a quasi-state agency in terms of 
expecting share of information for its pursuance of wrongdoings or crimes.220  
 
Therefore, MD as a tool to exert market discipline on banks is the rising dominant concept 
supported by global standard-setters such as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) as it ensures that the market will eliminate unsound and 
ill-managed banks and disturbance created by banks will be alleviated by resolution 
regimes. Again, regulation about the orderly dissolution of banks is part of extrinsic 
confidence. 
 
As also mentioned in Chapter 1, the relation between banking panics, runs and bank 
information disclosure is addressed with the notion of trust and confidence. Theories of 
banking crises provide several models that have implications for bank information 
disclosure and its inherent links with trust and confidence. In this respect, Breuer 
addresses four generation of models for banking crises:221 Banking crises can be related 
to poor macroeconomic conditions regardless of banks’ weak performance, management 
or risk-taking and this reflects itself consumer defaults and business breakdowns. Such a 
situation leads to a speculative attack on bank deposits and potentially heralds a system-
wide move due to lack of confidence. Another model of the banking crisis is built on the 
                                               
220 There are also other views about the drawbacks of bank disclosures including the traditional 
discussion about losing the competitive advantages or taking public disclosure as an 
impediment to effective bank regulation. Boro (n 217) 482. 
221 Janice Boucher Breuer,‘An Exegesis on Currency and Banking Crisis’ (2004) 18(3) Journal 
of Economic Surveys 293, 299-305. 
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self-fulfilling expectations of bank stakeholders. It means that in addition to 
macroeconomic fundamentals, cognitive, behavioural and relational aspects of trust play 
a role in escalating a potential downturn. This model puts emphasis on contagion risk and 
systemic trust in banks. So, a combination of exogenous factors paves the way for bank 
panics or runs and an endogenous process of trust disruption leads to banking crises.222 
The third model considers banking and currency crises as twins, as they develop 
simultaneously and hit the monetary and financial system. Finally, the fourth generation 
model, perhaps similar to Fukuyama’s approach,223 highlights institutional factors, such 
as private rights, politics, rule of law, enforcement, level of protection of creditors and 
shareholders and other variables, that might affect the functioning of the banking system 
and overall macroeconomic performance. This one is related to both extrinsic and 
intrinsic confidence.  
 
So, the wider picture of banking crises establishes that there are many factors affecting 
the banking and financial system, with stability implications and confidence always 
playing a part in it, as either trigger or facilitator.  It captures the link between banks and 
the larger economic system. The dissemination of several kinds of information during 
financial turbulence, as the asymmetric information theory of bank runs asserts, activates 
possibilities in the interpretation given to existing information and links individual 
choices with collective behaviours. Again, it means that depositor confidence is fragile 
when the reputation of a bank is damaged or when there is so much uncertainty in the 
                                               
222 Such as Washington Mutual and Wachovia in the US. They experienced heavy deposit 
outflows during the GFC despite the presence of deposit insurance schemes and it was because 
of deteriorated market conditions and loss of confidence. Jonathan D. Rose,‘Old-Fashioned 
Deposit Runs’ (2015) Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-111 (accessed May 26, 
2017) https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015111pap.pdf.  
223 Francis Fukuyama, Trust (Free Press Paperbacks 1996). 
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market that there are no indications of capital flight to better quality peer banks. So, 
extrinsic confidence production by the market and state becomes more important to fill 
this confidence gap.  
 
There is a delicate balance in interpreting the information in relation to individual banks 
or the banking system. As mentioned in this section, lack of aggregate information can 
be translated as bad signals and, in that case, there is a transformation from available 
public information to individually generated perception-based private information from 
depositors. Once again, it is one of the main reasons for keeping the market informed. 
However, a lack of common information might also provide a sense of security to the 
public and other bank stakeholders because sometimes ignorance is bliss for the market, 
and this protects the public confidence in another way. Here, public confidence is 
protected through prevention of the transformation of individual choices into collective 
market behaviour. Yet again, it is a difficult task to manage.224  
 
Collective action has a systemic dimension. It emphasizes a wider portrayal of 
connections between economic agents: Systemic trust applies to the entire banking 
system and sees confidence as a product of interwoven links between economic actors 
that trust each other in their transactions/ interactions. A change in shared expectations 
about the future, therefore, reflects itself on the systemic level and can be characterised 
as ‘trusting trust’.225 It connotes an interconnected network of relationships whereby 
economic agents trust one another’s trust. So, the protection of overall confidence is very 
                                               
224 Chapter 4,Section 3. 
225 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (John Wiley 1979) 42-62.   
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important and systemic trust should be supported by an external anchor (extrinsic 
confidence).226 
 
Multifaceted elements of trust and confidence, therefore, suggest that ignorance might be 
optimal in certain situations. It is reminiscent of Hirshleifer who submits that information 
disclosure destroys risk-sharing opportunities for weak banks. 227  Dang, Gorton and 
Holmstrom explain it thus: ‘One form of symmetric information is symmetric 
ignorance.’228 So, they assert that symmetric ignorance can help to protect liquidity in the 
markets, and in that sense, it is welfare enhancing.  
 
The moot point for confidence production and maintenance is to strike a balance on bank 
regulation so that less intrinsic confidence in a bank does not initiate a systemic crisis via 
contagion or spillover channels and trigger irrational economic behaviour on the 
collective level. This brings the discussion to the interbank links and the risk of contagion 
in the financial system.  
 
3.1.2.   Contagion Links: One Source of Systemic Risk  
Liquidity and insolvency risk of banks, as the two main risks triggered by lack of 
confidence, can be transmitted from one bank to another bank or FI and this is the basic 
definition of financial contagion. Financial contagion is a main source of systemic risk, 
which is the first step towards a financial crisis.  
                                               
226 Butzbach (n 50) 20.See Section 3.1.3.1. 
227 Hirshleifer (n 14).  
228 Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton and Bengt Holmstrom,‘Financial Crises and Optimality of Debt 
for Liquidity Provision’ (2010) University of Chicago Working Paper at 2 (accessed May 
16,2017) https://econresearch.uchicago.edu/sites/econresearch.uchicago.edu/files/ignorance-
crisis-and-the-optimality-of-debt-for-liquidity-provision.pdf.   
	   114	  
After the GFC, the rhetoric of systemic risk has been the most prevailing and frequent 
concept to interpret financial stability and also instability. The historical approach to 
systemic risk accepted that systemic risk was the paradigmatic source of the banking 
crisis, and the regulation of systemic risk, as part of microprudential thinking, was based 
on limiting the distress of, and preventing the failures of, individual banks, whereas the 
modern approach expects non-banks and the market itself to capture systemic risk. Its 
regulation is not solely based on establishing capital requirements so high in order to 
forestall the likelihood of bank failures, but instead systemic risk regulation today is about 
striking a balance between countervailing interests of the social cost of regulation and the 
prevention of bank failures.229  
 
Although the term carries a lot of weight in post-GFC scholarship, systemic risk is not a 
term of art with a certain and universally accepted description. While one addresses it on 
the macro-level via exogenous shocks or events that affect most of or the whole economy 
or a system, and therefore macro-shock hits most or all individual units, 230  other 
approaches consider it on the micro-level in a way that a single bank is exposed to an 
initial shock and then the risk is transferred through the bank to another, thus initiating a 
chain reaction that causes broader financial difficulties.231 Having said that, there are 
different viewpoints on this. For example, while it is possible to view the systemic risk 
as a result of the interconnectedness of claims, assets and liabilities of the banks,232 it is 
                                               
229 Assumption of non-financial firms do not engender systemic risk is no longer valid and the 
concept looks beyond FIs. Steven L. Schwarcz,‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97(113) The 
Georgetown Law Journal 193, 210. 
230 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale,‘Optimal Financial Crises’ (1998) 53(4) Journal of Finance 
1245. 
231 George G. Kaufman and Kenneth E. Scott,‘What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators 
Retard or Contribute to It?’ (2003) VII (3) The Independent Review 371,372-73. 
232 It will be further detailed in this part.  
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also possible to view the interconnectedness from a capital markets perspective in a way 
that the price of bank stocks are accepted as relative indicators of a bank’s real financial 
status and therefore it is believed that market prices of a bank show a bank’s capital 
shortfall.233 Perhaps an overarching and general description of systemic risk can be the 
one that Scott puts forward: ‘It is the risk that a national, or the global, financial system 
will break down.’234  
 
This short description does not deal with how systemic risk occurs, how it is spread 
through units or what level of breakdown connotes systemic risk. Instead, this definition 
is results-focused, stating that systemic risk is not geographically restrained and thus it 
addresses contagion links as a source of systemic risk in the interconnected financial 
environment. Application of this rationale to banking has already proved that banks are 
directly and indirectly connected with each other, other financial and non-financial firms 
and with the public as well. 
 
Similar to the case of financial stability and systemic risk, there is also no generally agreed 
definition of financial contagion. In broad terms, contagion in banking can be defined as 
the risk that financial difficulties or idiosyncratic shocks at one or more banks spillover 
to a large number of other banks, FIs or the financial system as a whole.235 Contagion is 
differentiated from common shocks that impact all banks simultaneously.  
                                               
233 V. Acharya, L. Pedersen, T. Philippon and M. Richardson,‘Measuring Systemic Risk’ (2010) 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland WP 10-02 (accessed Jan 4,2017) 
https://clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/working-papers/working-papers-
archives/2010-working-papers/wp-1002-measuring-systemic-risk.aspx.  
234 Hal S. Scott,‘Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation’ (2010) 
13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 763. 
235 Dirk Schoenmaker, Contagion Risk in Banking (LSE Financial Markets Group 1996) 88. 
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Dissemination of bank contagion occurs through information and credit channels in broad 
strokes. According to Lastra, at least four (perhaps overlapping) categories detail these 
channels: (i) inter-bank, inter-institution and inter-instrument channels; (ii) the payment 
system channel; (iii) information channel; and (iv) psychological channel.236 The last one 
is complementary to the information channel.  
 
The credit channel dimension of contagion infers the web of links between banks in the 
interbank funding market, payment system and OTC derivatives market. As such, this 
dimension actually represents the connectedness where FIs are directly overexposed to 
each other and cross-exposures allow the sound ones to become vulnerable to a chain of 
failures if one of them fails. Direct interconnection between banks occurs through 
bilateral transactions or relations between banks, with greater interconnection infers 
greater probability of risk of contagion emanating from a default by one bank.237  
 
Credit exposure between banks is the most straightforward one. A bank which lends 
money to its peer has a direct exposure to that bank and the given amount is listed as an 
asset on the lender bank’s balance sheet. A different scenario might be for the borrowing 
bank that relies on short-term funds or services provided by another bank in order to 
continue its daily operations. In case of failure of the lending bank, even if the 
creditworthiness of the borrowing bank remains unchanged, it will have to seek 
alternative sources of funding in interbank banking or reduce lending and sell its assets.238   
                                               
236 Rosa Maria Lastra,‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (2011) 6(2) Capital 
Markets Law Journal 197,202. 
237 Zijun Liu, Stephanie Quiet and Benedict Roth,‘Banking Sector Interconnectedness’ [2015] 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q2 130. 
238 Stephen Valdez & Philip Molyneux, An Introduction to Global Financial Markets (8th edn, 
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Apart from interbank lending, credit exposures between banks can also be related to 
activities like securities financing transactions, derivatives or holdings of securities issued 
by peers whose defaults can have negative effects on the lender bank. 239  Interbank 
deposits and loans are common in daily operations, while involvement of banks in 
derivatives provide another systemic risk-related dimension, which was the case during 
the GFC. The amounts involved in the OTC markets are high and counterparty exposures 
centre on a few global firms, which makes the rest of the engaging banks fragile if the 
major counterparty defaults.240 It is also known as the phenomenon ‘too interlinked to 
fail’. As Chapter 4 shows, the case of AIG exemplifies this concern.241  
 
The payment system channel, on the other hand, is more about the clearing and settlement 
system in which banks transfer funds. A disruption in these transactions is related to 
operational, legal or liquidity risks that can be transmitted through banks. As such, due to 
interbank linkages, there can be a domino effect that disseminates systemic risk 
throughout the banking system.  
 
An indirect means of contagion generally occurs via an information channel. Contagion 
here is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of FIs. Fire sales by a troubled bank 
can bring about a reduction in asset prices and associated value losses on the balance 
sheets of other banks since the market will adapt itself to changes and reflect them.242 
                                               
239 Sam Langfield, Zijun Liu and Tomohiro Ota,‘Mapping the UK Interbank System’ (2014) 
BoE Working Paper No.516 (accessed Dec 27, 2016) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2014/wp516.pdf.  
240 Lastra,‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (n 236) 202. 
241 Chapter 4,Section 2.2.1. 
242 Mark-to-market (fair value accounting (FVA)) system means that asset prices are changed 
regularly to reflect market prices. It is severely criticized as in adverse market conditions market 
prices are difficult to determine due to lack of confidence between FIs; and between FIs and 
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This pecuniary externality will be more obvious for banks that have similar asset holdings 
or common exposures to an asset class such as risky sovereign debt or mortgage-based 
securities243 or it occurs because banks tend to give loans to similar industries like housing 
loans. This means that if an exogenous shock hits, for example, the housing market, in 
which banks are commonly involved in providing loans or it decreases the value of their 
assets, it is likely that all banks will suffer from losses and it will be a systemic event.244  
 
Information spillover is more obvious when financial market investors interpret a 
problem in a bank as a negative signal about other banks and it provokes a loss of 
confidence in others. As such, an information channel includes psychological 
connotations in terms of affecting public perception and triggering panics, which is 
directly related to market confidence. In a similar way, liquidity hoarding is also a result 
of a lack of confidence in the system where a default by a bank warns other banks to 
protect their liquidity. This type of liquidity contagion arises when there is a common fear 
of liquidity squeeze. The role of disclosure here is a double-edged sword: if the market 
knows that a bank or some banks have liquidity problems, market participants (including 
peer banks) might change their behaviour in a self-protective way but not in a way that 
protects the system.245 If the market does not know which banks have liquidity problems, 
                                               
other market players. Volatility concerns attached to FVA’s crisis-neutral system in allowing 
full revelation of ‘large fluctuations in investment values and irregular patterns of loan losses 
disproportionate to profits’ is seen as a catalyzer of loss of public confidence in banks. Mark 
Billings, ‘Financial Reporting, Banking and Financial Crisis:Past, Present and Future’ in M. 
Hollow, F. Akinbami and R. Michie(eds), Complexity and Crisis in the Financial System 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 295. 
243 Inaki Aldasoro, Domenico Delli Gatti and Ester Faia,‘Bank Networks: Contagion, Systemic 
Risk and Prudential Policy’ (2017) 142 Journal of Economic Behaviour&Organisation 164,166. 
244 Andreas Krause,‘Systemic Risk’ in H. Kent Baker and Greg Filbeck (eds), Investment Risk 
Management (OUP 2015) 181. 
245 This behaviour might be individually rational, but not socially optimal. 
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then it will reflect a lack of confidence and uncertainty in the same way which is, once 
again, self-protective.246 If the hoarding behaviour becomes a system-wide behaviour, a 
liquidity freeze occurs. Contagion therefore spreads through common self-protective 
behaviours of banks and in turn such collective activities initiate a systemic crisis. As 
such, contagion hits not just the banks with weaker financial standing but also those in ex 
ante healthy condition that are disturbed through the second-round domino effect and 
accompanying deteriorated market conditions emanating from banks’ capacity to spread 
panic beyond the banking industry.  
 
So, systemic risk can materialise via bilateral transactions, 247  information and 
information-related factors, 248  structural commonness, 249  the payment system and 
reliance on international markets250. 251 Therefore, contagion as a source of systemic risk 
has wider implications for the whole economy either starting from exogenous or 
endogenous causes. As such, considering how the banking system works, it is realistic to 
                                               
246 This behaviour might also be related to imperfect competition where banks purposely restrict 
liquidity to their peers in order to exploit their failure. V. Acharya, D. Gromb and T. 
Yorulmazer,‘Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for 
Central Banking' (2012) 4(2) American Economic Journal 184. 
247 Such as interbank market transactions or derivative and securitisation-based relationships 
(off-balance sheet exposures). 
248 It encompasses confidence and behaviour-related factors where information is the key. 
Herding or irrational behaviour, moral hazard or asymmetric information can lead to fire sales, 
bank runs and collapse of the whole market.  
249 The situation where asset-liability and funding structure or risk management models of banks 
are similar to each other. 
250 It highlights the parent-subsidiary relationship or financing from a foreign market in 
transferring the risks. Financing from a foreign financial market might leave the subsidiary bank 
fragile when, for example, a crisis hits the market borrowed from. 
251 Pawel Smaga,‘The Concept of Systemic Risk’ (2014) SRC Special Paper No:5 at 14-15 
(accessed May 17,2017) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61214/1/sp-5.pdf.  
	   120	  
say that systemic risk is inherent in the banking system and this means spotting systemic 
risk ex ante is a difficult task. There have always been measures to control bank risks in 
addition to those ex ante pre-emptive measures (those that aim to contain systemic risk 
before it materialises as instability, ie such as capital and liquidity regulations and 
restrictions on short-term funding). Now, revised and augmented ex ante measures that 
are supported by post hoc reactive measures (those with the purpose to manage the crisis 
after the instability occurs, ie resolution policies), forward-looking or early-warning 
mechanisms such as sress tests in order to spot the level of systemic risk before it breaks 
out have come under the spotlight.252 The result has been that overseeing the whole 
financial system and understanding the links between banks and other economic actors to 
protect financial stability has led to ample discussions about optimum regulatory and 
institutional structure to handle systemic risk. In consideration of the foregoing, a specific 
approach to regulation under which financial markets are regulated based on a higher 
regulatory objective (ie financial stability) is justified to the extent that it serves the long-
term interests of others. In this respect, regulatory objectives of macroprudential and 
microprudential regulation and conduct of business regulation should be coordinative 
rather than sharply differentiating themselves based on their main objectives. Thus, it is 
important how institutional structure responds this need. 
 
3.1.3.   Institutional Structure Matters 
It is argued that an efficient institutional architecture should establish a collaborative 
environment and ensure that major conflicts between bodies are resolved in an orderly 
                                               
252 Kathryn Judge,‘Fragmentation Nodes’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review 657,665. 
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and transparent manner.253 However, distinct policies of bodies bring about inherent 
conflicts due to the cross-effects of their objectives. The first group is the monetary and 
macroprudential policies whose ultimate objective is a stable economic system. The 
second group is the microprudential and the conduct of business/investor protection 
policies whose concerns do not extend to the stability of the whole financial system. Their 
goals are distinctive yet microprudential regulation is complementary to macroprudential 
and policies seeking to establish transparent and competitive markets do not necessarily 
serve the microprudential and macroprudential policy goals. In this setting, how one 
manages the demarcation of objectives is a matter of culture, historical development of 
the financial system, the features of the economic system and the nature of the legal and 
governmental system.254  
 
Much of the potential for managing systemic risk and protecting the stability of the whole 
system is based on the ability of bodies to cooperate. There have been different 
approaches to the institutional structure of financial regulation such as integrated, 
institutional, functional and objectives-based. They all have merits and drawbacks and 
their merits and demerits are part of an ongoing discussion. Structure matters because 
each regulatory body’s own substantive policy decisions have implications for the 
banking sector. Whether there is a regulatory framework following the objectives of a 
                                               
253 Dirk Schoenmaker and Jeroen Kremers,‘Financial Stability and Proper Business Conduct’ in 
Robin Hui Huang and Dirk Schoenmaker(eds), Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation 
(Routledge 2015) 30. 
254 Ellis Ferran,‘Institutional Design for Financial Market Supervision: The Choice for National 
Systems’ in Niamh Moloney, Ellis Ferran and Jennifer Payne(eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Financial Regulation (OUP 2015) 101. Also, the interplay between environmental factors such 
as legislation, colonialism, political systems, the sophistication of management, kind and 
characteristics of business firms and effects of international organisations might play a role in 
shaping the goals.  
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hierarchy approach or whether bank regulation is fragmented depending on objectives 
rather than labels are essential matters concerning the approaches to bank regulation and 
the weight attributed to specific regulatory turfs such as prudential regulation and conduct 
of business regulation.  
 
As this thesis approaches bank regulation and stability from an information-centric point 
of view, it is necessary to provide background information about how the stability 
concerns have penetrated into the regulatory structures and how these changes have had 
repercussions in the banking industry by introducing new information disclosure channels 
or by setting out greater information sharing between different regulatory authorities 
having a saying in banks and even prioritising one’s own goal on the other. Institutional 
reforms in the UK and the US vary but increased attention to macroprudential regulation 
to protect stability is common between them. 
 
New or replaced authorities within the EU’s institutional architecture epitomise the 
significant shift in designing institutional architecture. Lamfalussy Level 3 regulatory and 
supervisory committees have been replaced by the ESMA 255 , European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority. Also, 
new bodies have emerged such as the ESRB256 and European Banking Union. The two 
pillars of the banking union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single 
                                               
255 ESMA also contributes to financial stability of the EU through sharing information with the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and coordinating actions of capital markets supervisors 
or adopting emergency measures when a threat to financial markets arises. ESMA (accessed 
June 22,2017) https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-esma/who-we-are.  
256 The ESRB is responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the EU financial system and 
the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk. ESRB (accessed May 12, 2016) 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/about/background/html/index.en.html.  
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Resolution Mechanism, provide more profound integration of the euro banking system 
by establishing initiatives for stronger prudential requirements for banks, improved 
protection for customers and rules for managing failing banks. 257  The SSM allows 
national authorities to retain macroprudential powers while empowering the European 
Central Bank (ECB) to top up national macroprudential measures and act on its own 
initiative at the request of national authorities.    
 
In the UK, the financial framework consisting of a tripartite system failed and major 
structural changes were made. In 1997, responsibility for regulation of banks was 
transferred from the BoE to a new and unified financial regulator, the FSA. While the 
BoE was the macroprudential regulator, FSA acted as a conduct of business and 
microprudential regulator with bank supervisory powers, and the Treasury was 
responsible for legislation. The run on NR made it clear that the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) between the organs was lacking necessary arrangements about 
when and how the LoLR function should be used and thus a coordination problem 
occurred during the GFC. 258  This problem was also addressed by the FSA’s over-
emphasis on conduct-on-business regulation rather than prudential concerns that banks 
posed to the financial system.259 The Turner Review also acknowledged the FSA focused 
too much on supervision of individual institutions and the BoE concentrated on the 
monetary policy of the state, overlooking the responses to the risks identified.260 
 
                                               
257 EC (accessed May 12, 2016) https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-
finance/banking-union/what-banking-union_en. 	  
258 Paras 14–18 of the MoU (accessed Sep 12, 2016) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_hmt_boe.pdf. See Chapter 4,Section 3.2. 
259 Alison Lui, Financial Stability and Prudential Regulation (Routledge 2017) 25. 
260 The Turner Review (n 177). 
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The regulatory objective of financial stability was given to the BoE261 and the FSA262 and, 
after that, in 2013, a twin peaks regulatory system of the FCA263 and PRA264 was set up.  
Within this regulatory setting, the FPC, with support from the PRA and FCA, is the key 
macroprudential body responsible for considering all components of the financial 
system.265 So, the function of the FPC is a pivotal complement to, but distinct from, other 
regulators. 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) also reflected such changes to be 
that financial stability has become part of the FCA’s integrity objective rather than being 
a specific duty.266 The soundness, stability and resilience of the system was not one of the 
regulatory objectives of the FSA and the new regulatory order now makes them part of 
the operational objective of the FCA. It is surely a big step as it gives a statutory objective 
to the FCA to advance its integrity mission.  
 
The above indicates that the BoE has had a clear responsibility for the protection and 
improvement of the overall financial stability and resilience of the financial system with 
its microprudential (PRA) and macroprudential (FPC)267 authorities.268 From a stability 
                                               
261 Banking Act 2009 added financial stability objective (s 2A) to the BoE Act.  
262 Financial Services Act 2010 introduced a financial stability objective to the FSMA (s 3A). 
263 Section 1B of the FSMA sets out that FCA has strategic and operational objectives. Its 
strategic objective is to ensure that relevant markets function well. Its operational objectives are 
grouped under consumer protection objective (s 1C), integrity objective (s 1D) and the 
competition objective (s 1E).  
264 Microprudential regulator and supervisor for banks. 
265 BoE Act, s 9G. 
266 FSMA,s 1D(2)(a). 
267 BoE Act,Part 1A. 
268 A recent change proving the BoE’s amplified role in maintaining financial stability is the 
new Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC), which ends the PRA’s subsidiary status; yet there 
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point of view, the PRA, FPC and Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) act together to 
remove or lessen the systemic risks and support the state’s economy policy. Therefore, 
the new regulatory framework in the UK brings bank prudential regulation directly under 
the BoE and presents an integrated system operated through committees under the BoE.         
 
The demarcation of consumer protection and prudential regulation thus allows them to 
fulfil their distinctive regulatory objectives as their philosophies differ by nature.269 
However, this new stability-centric and functional regulatory approach accommodates 
another reform as it gives the FPC powers to make recommendations270 and directions271 
to the PRA and the FCA in relation to macroprudential measures and instruments. Given 
the previous experience of regulators operating within an MoU, the relationship among 
the FPC, PRA and FCA has become particularly important, and the powers given to the 
FPC reveal that the protection of financial stability is placed at the apex of the regulatory 
hierarchy.  
 
The balance between macroprudential regulation, microprudential regulation, market 
conduct and consumer protection is also considered in the face of the predominant role 
of the FPC. Both the FCA and PRC are members of the FPC board, and this means that 
the FPC takes these bodies’ views into account as regards financial stability. 272 
Additionally, the FPC, while accomplishing its overarching goals addressed at s 9C(1), 
                                               
are no changes to the PRA’s objectives or functions. PRC takes control of the PRA’s most 
important financial stability supervision and policy decisions. See Bank of England and 
Financial Services Act 2016,s 13. 
269 Chapter 3,Section 5. 
270 BoE Act,s 9O-R. 
271 Ibid,s 9H-N. 
272 Ibid,s 9B. 
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‘must seek to avoid exercising its functions in a way that would prejudice the 
advancement by the FCA of any of its operational objectives, or the advancement by the 
PRA of any of its objectives’.273 From a stability point of view, the UK’s regulatory 
system is highly concentrated, with a stability-oriented (though not clearly established) 
hierarchical approach being adopted. 
 
 The PRA is empowered to restrain the FCA from taking any action against a PRA-
authorised firm such as a bank if it thinks that such action can cause a bank’s failure, if 
the adverse consequences may have an impact on the overall financial system or if it 
considers that such action can threaten financial stability. 274  The new system is 
established based on cooperation and coordination.275 A MoU between the PRA and the 
FCA demonstrates information sharing and consultation between authorities with a view 
to solving potential conflicts.276 As different bodies oversee different aspects of the same 
bank, it makes coordination more important and objectives-based. The so-called twin 
peaks structure in the UK responds to this cooperation need and takes banks within its 
sphere of influence.   
 
Considering the significant powers granted to the FPC and the value attached to the 
protection of financial stability, the new regulatory structure in the UK, with the 
considerable powers given to the FPC (including the power to give directions to the FCA 
and PRA requiring macroprudential measures that might contravene specific aims that 
                                               
273 Ibid,s 9F(2). 
274 FSMA,s 3I.  
275 Ibid,s 3D-E. 
276 The MoU between the FCA and the BoE, including the PRA (accessed Oct 20, 2016) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/mou-bank-pra.pdf.  
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these regulators are entrusted to promote), appears to constitute a coordinative system 
that addresses financial stability as its main goal.277 
 
In the US, no single authority has sole responsibility for ensuring and protecting financial 
stability and therefore no stability mandate is particularly given to the Fed. However, the 
pursuit of financial stability, along with price stability and maximum employment 
mandates of the Fed, can be traced to its establishment as a result of the Panic of 1907. 
As such, it is an implicit and more like a traditional duty of the Fed to undertake the 
promotion, protection and support of financial stability.278 This was proved during the 
GFC when the Fed met with some systemically important investment banks even if their 
primary regulator was the SEC and the Fed assumed responsibility to supervise them and 
ameliorate their financial standing. The Fed’s considerable amount of emergency support 
provided to FIs became a byword during the GFC.279 The problem with the US system 
was that no regulator assumed responsibility for the protection of the whole economic 
system. While banks operating under BHC structure were the main focus for regulators, 
the whole firm was neglected. The fragmented regulatory structure continues to be 
another area of discussion. 
 
Efforts at financial stability embodied in the Dodd-Frank, which enhanced the Fed’s 
surveillance powers, established new restrictions on risk-taking of FIs and changed the 
                                               
277 A. Godwin, S. Kourabas and I. Ramsay,‘Financial Stability Authorities and Macroprudential 
Regulation’ (2017) 32 Banking and Financial Law Review 223. 
278 Renee Haltom and John A. Weinberg,‘Does the Fed Have a Financial Stability Mandate?’ 
[2017] FDBR Economic Brief No:17-06 at 4-5(accessed Aug 4,2017) 
https://www.richmondfed.org/-
/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_brief/2017/pdf/eb_17-06.pdf.   
279 Federal Reserve Act 1913,s 13(3). 
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regulatory model by creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau280 and the FSOC. 
From a stability point of view, establishment of the FSOC is proof of the change in 
regulatory philosophy. FSOC was set up as a limited-purpose macroprudential body, 
which was superimposed on the overall US financial system with an overarching goal of 
identifying the risks and responding to emerging threats to financial stability. Its duties 
also include other stability-related tasks such as collecting information from other 
agencies, facilitating information-sharing and coordination between authorities, and 
working in harmony with the Office of Financial Research.281  
 
FSOC is a collaborative body whose members include federal financial regulators 
including the SEC and bank regulators. On the face of it, FSOC appears similar to the 
FPC. One of the similarities is FSOC’s power to make recommendations to regulators. 
282  Yet, in contrast to the FPC, these recommendations can only be made for limited 
issues and are designated in the statute.283  
 
However, compared to the FPC’s power to give directions, the FSOC is a coordination 
and cooperation forum to strike a balance between microprudential regulators that form 
the fragmented regulatory system so that the FSOC provides a sense of consolidation in 
terms of gathering stability-relevant agencies. In this way, it eases the concerns of those 
who think the Fed should not be the supreme regulator of financial stability.284 As such, 
                                               
280 It works as a kind of limited-purpose market conduct regulator for most credit, savings and 
payment functions in the US and it works with bank prudential regulators.  
281 12 USC§5322. 
282 If the FSOC recommends more rigid regulation or safeguards to regulatory agencies, it is 
made on a comply or explain basis like the FPC’s scenario. It can also make recommendations 
to Congress about a particular regulation.  
283 12 USC§5322,s 2F.Also see Financial Choice Act of 2017,s 2. 
284 Godwin,Kourabas and Ramsay (n 277) 243-44. 
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the post-GFC financial infrastructure of the US does not underpin a regulatory hierarchy 
that places financial stability at the top. Instead, macroprudential regulation is designed 
to support microprudential regulation. Though the FSOC collaborates with 
microprudential regulators, the main responsibility of developing and implementing 
regulations is still borne by microprudential regulators. The FSOC therefore does not 
have the power to act on its own; the decentralised regulatory structure of the US has not 
changed with the establishment of the FSOC, compared to the more concentrated 
regulatory structure in the UK.  
 
This also means that agencies whose goals are different by nature, like the SEC and bank 
regulators, will be engaged in the joint exercise of maintaining the nation’s financial 
stability under the FSOC. The legislation for each independent agency restricts its 
objectives and the reach of its regulations. So, for example, in the case of the SEC which 
is the agency charged with protection of investors and maintaining transparent and 
efficient securities markets, how these objectives can be fully compatible with the goals 
of financial stability is questionable as there is no clear mandate on the SEC to fulfil a 
financial stability objective. As this change is a post-GFC product, the future will perhaps 
show how legal and practical challenges of acting in harmony will be handled when a 
superimposed financial stability goal arises. 
 
Post-GFC US changes, therefore, do not make a striking change in terms of lessening the 
fragmentation and complexity of the regulatory structure in order to ensure financial 
stability of the state. Instead, it reinforces the view that its system is like a patchwork that 
the FSOC has become one of the add-ons in it with its debatable influence on 
microprudential regulators and lack of authority to deal with jurisdictional disputes.  
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Both the UK and the US have, therefore, witnessed major changes driven by stability 
concerns. While the UK established a formal hierarchy by designating financial stability 
as the overarching goal under the BoE, the US changes do not seem aligned with the calls 
for a superior mandate of stability. However, this can be explained by cultural differences.  
 
3.1.3.1.   Microprudential Regulation of Banks and the Role of 
Central Banks: Implications for Transparency 
Traditionally, financial stability is linked to CBs even if there are other institutions 
besides the CB.285 The reason for this is the distinctness of achieving financial stability 
compared to other regulatory tasks which do not necessitate urgent government 
intervention as a counterparty to the market transactions.286 CBs, in this sense, act as a 
LoLR and they are the source of liquidity and sponsor of financial obligations. This shows 
that they are naturally and inevitably involved in maintaining the health of banks and 
safeguarding depositor assets. As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, CB policies are designed 
to provide extrinsic confidence. CBs inherently assume the role of stabilising 
expectations about the future and protecting general confidence.  
 
In this setting, microprudential regulation and supervision of banks is necessary to 
prevent banks from relying on CB assistance. Prudential regulation and supervision is 
explained by their diversified objectives: regulation is used for policies to protect 
                                               
285 Designation of CBs with macro and microprudential powers is not a must for financial 
stability since, as Swedish system shows, those responsibilities can also be provided to a 
separate organization, which is solely established for financial stability objectives. Charles 
Goodhart,‘Linkages between Macro-prudential and Micro-prudential Supervision’ (2015) 
30(10) JIBFL 607,609. 
286 Eric J. Pan,‘Organizing Regional Systems’ in Moloney, Ferran and Payne (n 254) 192. 
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financial stability or prevent systemic risks287  and supervision is used analogous to 
regular observation and examination of banks by regulators that are authorised with 
disciplining powers; or prudential regulation simply can be taken as the bank regulation 
employed by prudential regulators. As such, it is both preventive and protective regulation 
and therefore prudential regulation allows the regulator to perform a detailed analysis of 
each bank and thereby thwarting the possibility of single bank failure affecting the whole 
system. The basic logic argued by Bagehot in explaining why banks should be subject to 
periodic surveillance in return for access to an LoLR facility and such back-ups is still 
valid since the contagion risk and concomitant systemic volatility emanating from a 
failure of a bank might contaminate the whole financial system; but the prudential tools 
used have changed ever since.288 Now, banks are subject to a variety of requirements 
including but not limited to capital adequacy, record-keeping, capital buffers, investment 
limits or risk-assessments. In simple terms, it is the practice of ‘government regulation 
and monitoring of the banking system to ensure its safety and soundness’.289 
 
One of the characteristics of bank prudential regulation can be described by the saying 
that rules follow the facts. This means rules are designed post hoc, after the event occurs 
and based on the financial reality of yesterday. However, they are intended to have ex 
ante effect, ie to prevent future crises. Regulation, by nature, is an ex ante preventive 
measure compared to private law remedies which are retrospective and ex post. Detection 
                                               
287 IMF,‘Central Banking Lessons from the Crisis’ (2010) at 13 (accessed Nov 28, 2016) 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/052710.pdf.  
288 Bagehot argues that CBs should step in as LoLR as long as banks in distress have sufficient 
high quality collaterals like performing loans or government securities; so that such an 
exchange between the CB and the distressed bank does not place the loss on the taxpayers and 
other banks lacking collaterals of an adequate quality should be doomed to failed.Bagehot (n 
206) ch 7. 
289 Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why is it Important and What are the Issues (n 158) 1. 
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of causes and results of bank instability and contagion or spillover channels has developed 
a mechanism within the dynamics and nature of the financial system. This mechanism 
accepts that the banking system is built on confidence and therefore it implies that it is 
the confidence that needs to be protected, not the banks. Confidence protection for 
stability reasons, however, comes with specialties such as deposit insurance schemes, 
access to the discount window or government guarantees provided to banks and ex ante 
preventive policies (such as capital and liquidity requirements, on-site examinations, 
stress tests, regulatory reporting requirements or other supervisory tools). 
 
Therefore, the basic arguments for prudential regulation and CB assistance are 
straightforward. Within this setting, regulatory intervention of banks for higher public 
interest reasons is contentious as government involvement undermines the notion of 
market discipline and creates an expectation among banks that they will be protected or 
saved, thus increasing moral hazard. It also has drawbacks in the competition of the 
banking sector and further creates political and ethical discussions on whether the 
intervention is political-interest motivated or not.290 On the other hand, it is the most basic 
idea of bank regulation that banks are important for financial stability and so prevention 
of economy from further deterioration should be accomplished by the state. Mechanisms 
to control a banking crisis can generally be grouped into (i) blanket guarantees and 
liquidity provisions during the first phase of the crisis, (ii) capital injections, and (iii) debt 
                                               
290 Public interest reasoning to regulate financial markets is criticised by public choice theory 
(which rejects the notion of reified and independent public interest as a regulatory motivation) 
and a revised version of public interest as a result of philosophical change in defining regulatory 
behaviours, approaches regulation of and intervention to financial markets, FIs and transactions 
as a necessity to control systemic risk, maintain financial stability and correct information 
asymmetries in the market. Constantinos Tokatlides, Retail Depositor and Retail Investor 
Protection under EU Law (Routledge 2017) 3. 
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structuring mechanisms like asset management companies. The fourth one that this thesis 
suggests is the information management mechanism. 
 
In this setting, government intervention to prevent a crisis occurs in different ways. It can 
be a group of systemic measures applicable to all banks regardless of their status or it can 
be a single policy instrument to save individual banks.291  Whether CB involvement 
responds to an idiosyncratic or a systemic need, the purpose is not to save all banks from 
failure; but only those that are solvent but illiquid. 
 
Stability measures surely have merits from a stability point of view but in terms of bank 
information disclosure the way measures are applied to banks has implications. Again, 
the argument is about the correlation between the level of public confidence and 
disclosure of government support.  
 
A good example is the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in which the US 
government used its Capital Purchase and Assistance Programs to provide capital and 
ameliorate the financial standings of banks.292 TARP was a voluntary scheme when it 
was first designed. Yet, the fears about negative signalling to the market due to receiving 
liquidity support from the Treasury alerted the Fed about a potential market collapse 
based on loss of public confidence and its corresponding results in withdrawing funds 
from banks. Even if depositors of commercial banks were covered by the FDIC guarantee, 
investment bank counterparts were suffering heavy losses. Once those sophisticated 
                                               
291 Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole,‘Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and 
Systemic Bailouts’ (2012) 102(1) American Economic Review 60.  
292 TARP is a product of Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public Law No. 110-
343).  
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investors who had a relationship with the investment part of the banks became aware of 
the illiquidity problems, the common concern of general depositors, who are not assumed 
to have specialised financial risk management skills, deep understanding of market 
signals or the ability to insulate themselves from bank failures, started to appear and they 
suddenly began to withdraw funds.293 Therefore, the US policymakers decided to make 
TARP funds mandatory for the nine top FIs. This was an acknowledgement of the fact 
that receiving support from the government gave out negative signals to the market. Due 
to this, healthy banks, as well as troubled banks, were also required to get TARP funds to 
provide a common sense of security to the markets.  
 
Information disclosure about government support became an issue when the Fed was 
asked to release the identity of the banks, amount provided, collateral pledged, interest 
rate charged, the terms of the transaction and other relevant information to provide 
transparency about the use of its powers.294 Even though most of the banks repaid TARP 
shares at the first opportunity, some voiced their fears about losing their creditors after 
the Fed disclosure due to being perceived as unsafe by the market.295 Concordantly, cases 
                                               
293 Mitchell (n 183) 140-98. 
294 The Fed had to make unprecedented disclosure about its support facilities with detailed 
information about the identity of the borrowers after losing the FOIA-based lawsuits in 2011. 
Even if the Fed strongly argued that such release undermines the financial stability and creates 
stigma by damaging the very existence of CB support, Dodd-Frank Act s 1103 made it clear 
that the Fed must disclose information on discount window loans, emergency lending facilities 
and open market operations after a 2-year lag. See 12 USC§248(s). See Bloomberg L.P. v 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 601 F.3d 143(2d Cir. 2010), cert denied sub 
nom. Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C. v. Bloomberg L.P.,US(2011). 
295 A historical example during the Great Depression about this concern could be the one 
involving a financial firm that publicly disclosed which banks it had provided loans with. 
Borrowers banks experienced runs after the disclosure. Marc Labonte,‘Federal Reserve: 
Oversight and Disclosure Issues’ (2017) CRS Report R42079 at 13(accessed June 18,2017)	  
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42079.pdf. 
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about the disclosure of federal bailouts noticeably cited exemption 8 of the FOIA and the 
courts were more inclined to withhold such information rather than allow disclosure,296 
and one court even decided to use other exemptions rather than exemption 8 as a basis 
for non-disclosure.297  
 
Disclosure about bank lifelines by CBs has been an ongoing discussion across the EU and 
the UK as well. CB support had been shrouded in secrecy, but transparency initiatives 
after the GFC also bite the ECB and national CBs, as attacks about CBs making political 
or industry-interest decisions damages the reputation and credibility of the state. As such, 
the ECB decided that beginning from 16 September 2015 CBs have the choice to 
communicate publicly regarding the provision of the ELA to banks in their territory, 
which means that disclosure of ELA is optional and not mandatory.298 As the BoE stated, 
‘considerations of policy effectiveness and transparency have the potential to conflict 
with each other … but … with a sufficient lag, disclosure that a firm had received 
temporary liquidity support from the Bank should not undermine confidence in that firm 
or the financial system as a whole’.299  It is therefore possible to say there is more 
                                               
296 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. US Dept. of Treasury, 796 F. Supp.2d 13 (DDC 2011) (where the 
information regarding the receivership of the TARP funds was covered by exemption 8.); 
Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association v. SEC, 771 F.3d 1,3, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) P 
98240 (DC Cir.2014). 
297 McKinley v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 647 F. 3d 331(DC Cir 2011). 
298 ECB,Press Release on Sep 16,2015 (accessed on May 
14,2017)https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150916.en.html.The ECB also 
announced ‘Agreement on Emergency Liquidity Assistance’ (17 May 2017) See part 8 of the 
Agreement (accessed May 19,2017) 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Agreement_on_emergency_liquidity_assistance_2017
0517.en.pdf.  
299 BoE,‘Changes’ to the Bank’s Weekly Reporting Regime’(2014) 54(3) BoE Quarterly 
Bulletin at 2 (accessed Jan 21, 2017) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb300614.pdf.  
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flexibility provided to European CBs compared to their American peer. In the EU, 
especially after the case of NR, national and international liquidity disclosure regimes by 
banks have been under the spotlight in terms of the importance of not risking a state’s 
financial stability policies in supporting banks.300 
 
This means that CB transparency and accountability measures are also linked to bank 
transparency in a way that bank liquidity information might be revealed by the hand of 
CBs. This creates a non-borrowing stigma because, so the classic argument goes, such 
disclosures that signal a potential weakness of a bank might induce reduced lending and 
avoidance of approaching the CB for support.301  If banks believe that disclosure of 
support affects decisions of investors and counterparties, escalates their cost of funding, 
or restricts their ability to borrow from interbank funding, then banks might search for 
another liquidity source or different methods to fulfil short-term liquidity needs, thus 
avoiding the adverse consequences of CB support.  
 
Safety nets provided to banks, either as part of a higher goal of financial stability or in 
the normal course of bank transactions, give rise to arguments about the judicious mixture 
of ambiguity and transparency. Constructive ambiguity exists to the extent that banks do 
not know whether a CB will provide liquidity assistance and therefore it is decided on ad 
hoc basis. Transparency here means a rules-based system in which the conditions and 
responses are designed by the law and pre-commitment to support is made.  
 
                                               
300 BoE,PRA’s Supervisory Statement,‘Compliance with the EBA’s Guidelines On Disclosure’ 
(Sep 2017) SS6/17 at 6 (accessed Oct 21, 2017) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2017/ss617.pdf. See Chapter 4, 
Section 1.6.  
301 Hal S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion (MIT Press 2016) 106.  
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Constructive ambiguity is about policy choices of CBs in applying some sort of discipline 
to banks by leaving them in uncertainty or providing them with ex ante information about 
the terms so that banks can discipline themselves. Yet, the existence of TBTF banks 
proved that if a bank perceives itself as systemically important – not just because of the 
magnitude of its asset and liabilities but also its connections with other economic agents 
– it will have the belief that CB assistance will be available for them to protect the system. 
This is one of the classic examples of moral hazard by banks and in both of the systems 
it addresses the importance of efficient microprudential regulation and supervision to 
minimise the likelihood of accessing CB assistance. Though regulatory scholarship 
typically values transparency and accountability, conditions of how these goals are 
satisfied need to be considered as well. For example, constructive ambiguity is consistent 
with the idea that CB operations should be outside the public gaze and ex post 
transparency is more preferable. 302  So, stability concerns are ranked higher than 
immediate transparency needs.  
 
Disclosure of bank support is generally supported because extra information regarding 
banks’ asset quality and liquidity positions are consistent with the goal of market 
discipline. It also leads to a change in ex ante behaviour by banks in a way that banks will 
be more prudent in their borrowing and lending behaviours and their liquidity positions 
as it is the public authority making the public announcement about a bank. Yet, even if 
disclosure by the CB or prudential regulator is prima facie beneficial to markets as it 
supports further transparency, this straightforward thinking ignores the irrational 
                                               
302 Charles Enoch, Peter Stella and May Khamis,‘Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank 
Safety Net Operations’ (1997) IMF Working Paper WP/97/138 at 10 (accessed Oct 24, 2016) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=882699&rec=1&srcabs=227474&alg=7&p
os=5.   
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behaviour-driven aspect of public confidence and bank interconnectedness which 
ultimately engenders suboptimal ex post market externalities during financial turbulence.  
However, considering that such disclosure is not done immediately after the support is 
granted, it is evident that there is still a strong case for upholding a transparency-fragility 
view. This indicates that, stability policy effectiveness is based on some level of opacity 
and it creates a question mark over whether banks should be allowed to disclose similar 
information by other disclosure channels established by law.303  
 
4.   Concluding Observations 
Overall, the shift in financial regulation reflects the systemic focus as the correlations and 
interdependencies in asset holdings and funding of both bank and non-bank organizations 
have encouraged a holistic view of the entire system. The discussions about 
microprudential regulation and supervision to minimise the likelihood of receiving 
government support and key challenges that CBs face in order to design a financially and 
socially optimal response to idiosyncratic or systemic bank problem are ongoing. Banks, 
in this scheme, are passive quasi-public institutions in their capacity to follow 




                                               
303 Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
BY BANKS 
 
1.   General Remarks  
As discussed in the previous chapters, banks are inherently opaque organisations and 
public confidence element residing in the banking business has long been asserted as a 
reason for underpinning bank opacity. Both banks and prudential regulators have sound 
reasons to keep bank information away from the public sight; yet, concerns emanating 
from bank disclosures have not been effective enough to prevent legislators from 
subjecting banks to disclosure requirement for, for example, company law, conduct of 
business or BCBS disclosure guidance reasons.304 
 
Considering banks as publicly traded companies requires one to analyse the legal 
framework established consisting of both the securities regulation and company law, and 
then reach a conclusion as to whether banks should be considered without the exertion of 
authority within the financial and economic system in general. However, as previously 
stated, the quasi-public nature of banks distinguishes them from other publicly traded 
companies and, historically, they are heavily regulated and are subjected to supervisory 
and prudential control. As discussed in Chapter 2, these controls are intended to prevent 
banks from destroying the confidence they created, and the disclosure of information, 
whether voluntarily, recklessly or due to mandatory regulation, could contribute to the 
destruction of this confidence which is a public good and also the backbone of the banking 
                                               
304 Roel Theissen, EU Banking Supervision (Eleven Publishing 2014) 677.  
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system. So, the links between transparency and bank riskiness and disclosure of such risks 
to the market present an important question to explore.  
 
Substantive regulation is paternalistic in nature, and it might be contradictory to investor 
autonomy, in the sense that investors’ choices are limited in terms of allowing them to 
assess the risks and benefits of the transaction before deciding to proceed with their 
individual choice.305 However, securities markets are the output of private ordering, and 
they are also the exchange grounds with greater public interest; in this respect, banks, 
already subject to governmental intervention in their economic activities, are subjected to 
both a public-oriented and private-ordering view of capital markets like any other public 
company.  
 
Public-oriented regulation, with its aim to protect actual and potential investors and public 
confidence and prevent fraud in the markets, underlies the disclosure philosophy. The 
conventional laws and economic models of disclosure have gradually moved towards 
greater transparency and assumptions about the reasons behind corporate failures have 
pointed to inefficient markets in different forms; disclosure regulations have been the 
traditional panacea for accurate price formation of shares, reflecting all available 
information.306  
 
Regulatory developments on the global and national levels have mentioned that the 
regulations were weak before the crisis, particularly in banks, whose increased exposure 
                                               
305 Susanna K. Ripken,‘The Dangers and the Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a 
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58(1) Baylor Law Review 
139,190. 
306 Jonathan R. Macey,‘Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron’(2004) 
89(2) Cornell Law Review 394,418. 
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to securitisation and credit derivative activities, together with the increasing intricacy of 
ABSs and the surrounding complexity, have been the primary concern for regulators in 
terms of foreseeing and gauging the level of risk taking by banks.307 When the complexity 
of the new financial environment and investor protection and the difficulty of monitoring 
such activities are considered, both securities and banking regulations are seen to rely on 
the concept of enhanced transparency to evaluate banks. However, the question of 
whether enhanced bank transparency via MDs makes banks more vulnerable to systemic 
shocks might not be answered in all respects, and it is yet an open question after the GFC. 
 
Traditionally, there has been much debate about bank disclosures in terms of the premise 
that banks should be immune from the market discipline compared to other companies, 
which means that banks should not be subject to the same disclosure requirements as 
other firms. Over-protective bank regulations, together with depositor protection and 
safety net schemes, have created question marks in people’s minds as to why taxpayers 
have to bear the loss emanating from bank failures and why the state fails to monitor and 
foresee such failures in the first place. Therefore, an examination of the role of disclosure 
in present-day regulations and its relationship with market discipline and efficient 
markets is necessary. In an attempt to present the general picture pertaining to bank 
disclosures, it is useful to set out the interest groups in establishing applicable disclosure 
policy. The broad array of public disclosures is mandated by the coercive power of the 
state and there are always some interest groups affected by those disclosures. Therefore, 
the rest of the thesis will make references to those interest groups. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the years 2007-9 are characterized as one of the worst periods 
experienced both in the US and the UK. Application of securities laws MD requirements 
on FIs with systemic importance during the GFC and the government’s need for certain 
level of opacity to maintain or protect financial stability of the state brought about 
different cases in these two financial centres. As next chapter will examine in details, 
while the epic acquisition of the ML by the BoA and the AIG bailout led to discussions 
about the political calculus due to CB support and its role in the non-disclosure; in the 
UK disclosure dilemma was more severe as the run on the NR directly established a 
strong case for the transparency-fragility view.308 The cases implied that content and 
timing of bank disclosures are still capable of facilitating negative externalities opposed 
to new world’s mainstream and maybe enshrined transparency-stability view. 
 
The purpose here is not to resubmit the classic arguments related to the pros and cons of 
disclosure regulations in the context of criticism of MD but rather to try to bring out the 
questioning of the disclosure requirements which are relevant to banks as issuing their 
own securities in the capital markets.  
 
2.   Banks Revisited: Banks as Publicly Traded Firms 
2.1.Presence of Banks in the Capital Markets309 
Capital markets are an important source of funding and banks, as other firms, can finance 
their activity by raising capital in capital markets as issuers of their own securities. For a 
                                               
308 Chapter 4. 
309 The relationship between the capital markets and banks can be discussed under various 
headings, as banks actively issue shares and debts to finance themselves; they hold shares in 
other publicly traded companies; and they underwrite, trade and sell securities (depending on 
the regulatory concept). The separation of investment and commercial bank activities for the 
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long time, in many jurisdictions, most banks were not affected by securities regulation 
because banks’ activities vis-à-vis depositors and other creditors were not subject to 
disclosure rules or rules of conduct designed for investor protection.310 The new approach 
of seeing banks as any other company developed quite late and security supervisors now 
treat banks as any other listed or limited company.311 
 
It is mentioned that the issuance of securities depends on the prospects of the firm, which 
means that a firm with poor prospects will be expected to issue stocks to split its 
disadvantageous circumstance to new claimants, while a firm with good prospects will 
be expected to issue debt securities with the intention to keep the upside for itself rather 
than sharing it with new claimants.312 The application of this approach to banks suggests 
that capital adequacy requirements established for banks might refute such assumption 
because banks might simply issue securities to satisfy the regulatory capital requirements 
and such an involuntary issuance might give negative signals to the market with 
concomitant low bank-share prices.313  
 
Though the reasons make banks issue securities differ, banks go public like other 
companies and it has been found that banks that go public become larger within a short 
period of time, employ higher leverage, derive more profits, and increase the assets by 
                                               
protection of private capital and public interest after the GFC is another discussion and it is not 
the main focus. So, this chapter will not discuss banks’ involvement in securities activities other 
than when issuing their own securities.  
310 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance (OUP 2004) 35. 
311 Ibid.	  
312 Stephan A. Ross, ‘The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling 
Approach’ (1977) 8 Bell Journal of Economics 23. 
313 Marcia M. Cornett and Hassan Tehranian, ‘An Examination of Voluntary versus Involuntary 
Security Issuances by Commercial Banks’ (1994) 35 Journal of Financial Economics 99,100. 
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investing in more loans.314 However, this brings risks and, of course, less managerial 
autonomy described as an exchange among the liquidity and corporate control.315  
 
Issuing equities provides a more permanent type of financing compared to liability 
funding. Equity shares provide confidence to creditors who understand ordinary stocks 
and retained earnings as a financial buffer against loss.316 Since the stockholders come 
after other creditors on the list of those whose claims will be honoured, it might be said 
that bank stock is the proxy for its ability to absorb losses. Dynamics in bank funding are 
of great importance to the state to ensure the stability of the bank. As governments 
become actively involved in increasing the bank’s capacity to absorb losses via deposit 
insurance schemes, they also force banks to comply with capital cushion rules and provide 
rules regarding bank equity capital.317  
 
It is true that the banking business has been subject to considerable transformation within 
the time, but one of the core questions about whether banks are shielded from market 
discipline has remained as a theoretical one. The ability of market forces in assessing and 
pricing the bank’s riskiness forms one pillar of disclosure-based problems in the banking 
sector. Debates on the reasons for bank failures have addressed two issues in particular. 
First, market discipline does not work because of the inability of stakeholders to 
sufficiently screen the bank’s activities; and this means enhanced disclosures by banks is 
necessary for the prevention of rumour or imperfect information causing the failure in the 
                                               
314 Richard J. Rosen, Scott B. Smart and Chad J. Zutter,‘Why do Firms Go Public? Evidence 
from the Banking Industry’ (2005) Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper No:2005-
17 1,2. 
315 Ernst Maug, ‘Large Shareholders as Monitors’ (1998) 53 Journal of Finance 65. 
316 Gabilondo (n 173) 13. 
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first place. Second, inadequate market discipline is asserted because banks are provided 
with safety net protections, which encourage them to take higher risks. Therefore, the 
principle of disclosure and its application in the banking sector will be addressed first, 
and then its relevance to market discipline will be discussed. 
 
2.2.The Application of Mandatory Disclosure of Information in Securities 
Regulation 
2.2.1.   Objectives of Disclosure Regulations 
The mainstream company law is generally private law surrounded with various 
contractual relationships with the aim of ensuring that business can be created and can 
function conveniently. The goal of securities laws can be explained in the same way as 
other financial regulations and from this respect they show the prevalent presence of the 
state within the appearance of regulations as they facilitate the productive running of the 
capital markets and provide the necessary degree of investor (including unsophisticated 
ones) protection for promoting confidence and economic growth and for facilitating 
capital raising.318 These goals are possible with smooth transfer and exchange of property 
rights across demographic cycles, which means the rules of the game should be set on the 
grounds of optimality.  
 
The premise that investors of public companies are subject to a more severe information 
asymmetry problem throughout the manager–investor relationship than the investors of a 
private company might be true because private firms have fewer shareholders than a 
public one and therefore shareholders of a private firm might exert more power and 
                                               
318 J. Lowry and A. Reisberg, Pettet’s Company Law:Company Law and Corporate Finance (4th 
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control on the controller/managerial team of the company.319 Further, a necessity of a 
certain degree of investor protection is related to the interconnectedness of the companies 
traded in the stock exchanges where a fraud in a firm might have spillover effects over 
the other firms.  
 
Therefore, the endogenous differences between public and private companies establish 
that outside investors need information about the product they might want to invest in and 
the state becomes involved at this stage to ensure such protection. For that reason, 
securities law comprises the policies that facilitate private contracting and then assure the 
enforcement of such contracts by establishing the most productive grounds for efficient 
and competitive markets designed for specific consumer protection and market 
stability.320 Disclosure regulations, in this context, are one of the principal instruments in 
terms of providing protection for shareholders and creditors, decreasing the opportunistic 
behaviour within the agent–principal relation and supporting market efficiency by 
reducing information costs for investors and accommodating market participants with 
information about the firms and the market itself.321  
 
The philosophy of disclosure is generally described as a system intended to distribute 
material information to investors, who in turn will be in a position to make an informed 
and prudent judgment whether or not to buy the security. Regulatory schemes take 
disclosure as a way to achieve their goals since disclosure-based regulations are alleged 
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to provide practical and political satisfaction. The basis of this view is twofold. First, to 
issue substantive rules has been seen as more difficult than to just impose some disclosure 
requirements. Conventional types of government response by regulating substantive rules 
might be out of keeping with future risks and actions and also carries the risk of being out 
of date in a short period of time in changing public demands or in an innovative 
environment. Second, the concept of command and control regulation might not work 
properly and extra information from the market can show what and how to regulate.322 
Apart from these views, it is said that disclosure-based systems have brought a shift of 
roles from the governments to businesses and individuals in the decision-making 
process323 and therefore direct intervention of government is covered by this soft touch 
by allowing market participants to decide on what is more efficient for them. In other 
words, disclosure is offered as a civil regulatory system shaped by society with its 
developing economical dynamics, rather than a government-made system, and thereby 
citizen-regulators are expected to be more successful than the government by demanding 
the necessary degree of qualitative and quantitative information via disclosure.324 Thus, 
disclosure as a tool of targeted transparency is rooted in individual choices by disclosers 
and users who interact to organize risk levels as well as developing the organizational 
performance. 
 
On the one hand, this view can be justified by asserting that individuals or businesses can 
see the whole big picture depending on the released information without a direct 
                                               
322 Paula J. Dalley, ‘The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System’ (2007) 34 
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government intervention and therefore may follow their best interest freely. On the other 
hand, it carries the danger of regulatory failure in drawing an optimum level of disclosure 
regulation which not only changes the entire free-decision-making process of 
individuals/businesses; but also undermines the system which it is based on. Further, to 
take disclosure as a civil-based system may generate new arguments related to the non-
necessity of substantive regulation since market participants will be armed with 
information and they will protect themselves against any misconducts or misuses, which 
essentially means that the government does not need to take part in more substantive 
regulation.325 Yet, as Posner addresses, the choice is rarely between a free market and 
public regulation.326 
 
Disclosure as a policy tool has become highly prevalent together with its relatively 
demanding regulatory aims but concerns about how individuals or firms process the 
released information have been raised in the context of both economics and 
psychology.327 There have been various behavioural approaches asserted in an effort to 
mitigate such concerns including heuristic bias concept, rational choice, bounded 
rationality, and herd behavioural theories. Those financial behaviour propositions 
reflected different aspects of the behaviours of individuals or firms in the face of disclosed 
information and show that when investors or other market actors meet with complicated 
disclosed data, they choose to ‘satisfy’ instead of to ‘optimize’.328 In other words, with 
reference to Brandeis’s terminology, publicity may not be just one of the best 
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disinfectants; it may also cause blindness to market participants by exposing them to too 
much information. 
 
Such behavioural researches offer that an increase in the quality and quantity of disclosed 
information does not necessarily lead individuals or firms to make more rational choices. 
Thus, researches call the question of whether disclosure-oriented regulation, which is 
mostly motivated by the acceptance of ‘more information is better than less’, is 
sufficiently useful.329 Today’s disclosure laws necessitate two things to be effectual: 
information has to be released, and receivers of the information have to make rational 
choices by using that disclosed information. One expects a regulation to have substantial 
goals and to succeed in satisfying a need by performing such aims. However, disclosure-
oriented regulatory concepts use ‘enhancing transparency and protecting individuals or 
firms’ as a goal, but they fail to clarify the answers of ‘why extra information is of value 
or why increased information is supposed to lead effectual changes in information 
receivers’ actions’.330 Those questions under the heading of overload information and 
market responses in behavioural finance still await answers because rapidly changing 
financial environment, technology, and financial innovation may also affect the 
behavioural responses of market participants. 
 
It is also noteworthy that legislated transparency in the form of disclosure in a market-
based economy is still debatable in economic theory. The debate revolves around 
‘information asymmetries’, which come with both moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. The overall view of such problems is that information is likely to be in 
underproduction in markets and that operations in real-world markets are very different 
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from the world in which the access to information imposes no cost. Furthermore, it might 
be important to approach the problem from the standpoint that individuals and firms have 
distinctive and idiosyncratic incentives to come up with a solution for information 
asymmetries. 
 
No markets are perfect. In fact, they are subject to severe information asymmetries with 
a low level of transparency. Positive theories based on the main objectives of financial 
regulation in protecting the integrity, resiliency and stability of the market, approach 
disclosure from both price and trade transparency and several trade-offs coming with it. 
The literature, therefore, provides a consistent and cohesive framework to address 
information-specific problems and the role of disclosure. Provision of information in the 
markets through disclosure has intrinsically engendered several problems regarding the 
cost of such disclosures, issues related to conflict of interests, and promotion of 
information to stakeholders.331  
 
A firm, or in Jensen and Meckling’s term, a nexus for contracting relationships, 
accommodates several relationships where each contracting party pursues the 
maximisation of its own interests and these interests do not necessarily match with those 
of others.332 As such, the agency problem embodied as the conflict of interest between 
stakeholders (principal) and the management (agent) could be ameliorated by 
disclosures.333 Further, other stakeholders such as employees, the general public, peers 
and other interest groups such as governments have an interest in the firm and stakeholder 
                                               
331 P. Latimer and P. Maume, Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services 
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theory, thus highlighting a conceptual framework for information disclosure that is not 
solely directed to investors but to a broader group.334 However, as will be discussed in 
the market discipline section, the motivations of each stakeholder are different and a firm 
might be required to prioritise stakeholders and strike a balance between stakeholders’ 
interests as not all disclosures are beneficial to shareholders.  
 
Returning to Chapter 1, ‘the lemons problem’ arises due to the very existence of 
information asymmetries between the firm and markets, ie adverse selection, where the 
seller knows more than the buyer. Signalling theory posits that firms that believe they are 
more profitable and better than other firms signal this to markets in order to distinguish 
themselves from the weak ones and attract investment.335 Signalling here implies the 
incentives of the firm to voluntarily disclose positive information while staying quiet is 
understood as bad news by the public. 
 
The proprietary cost approach to disclosure employs a broad definition of costs. Cost can 
be related to collection, production or provision of information or can be about proprietary 
costs, those related to costs occurring after disclosure, such as loss of competitive position 
after disclosure.336 The political cost approach to disclosure, on the other hand, focuses 
on the level of disclosure desired by political groups, such as governments, and consumer 
or environmental groups. According to this perspective, firms with a high political profile, 
such as banks or large corporations, tend to disclose more information voluntarily to 
escape from government scrutiny and extra regulations or lobbies establishing 
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pressure.337 Legitimacy theory approaches disclosures from a management and ethical 
point of view. It sees legitimacy as ‘a process by which a firm seeks approval or avoidance 
of sanction from groups in society’.338 The firm, in this respect, cannot survive if its 
values are not perceived as matching the norms of acceptable behaviour at large and 
therefore transparency is key for firms to keep their social license to operate.339 As such, 
this theory postulates that expectation of society and political approval needs of firms 
stimulate firms to voluntarily disclose information or follow MD regulations so as not to 
be discredited in front of the public.  
 
The above indicates that theories related to disclosure provide different determinants that 
arise from different motivations and constraints. As Chapter 1 mentioned, information is 
produced privately and therefore there is a cost to produce it. The difference between the 
cost of creation of information by the issuer and the benefits that the stakeholders get 
from the disclosure is a determinant of supply of information. Market failures based on 
underproduction of information is therefore addressed with MD regulations, which also 
help to weaken the self-interests of the management in not releasing adverse information 
to the markets.  
 
MD of information is generally addressed as the necessity of market discipline and as a 
reaction to market failures emanating from lack of production of information that people 
are ready to buy. The discussion includes its advantages over the potential drawbacks of 
its absence, and the benefits and costs analysis of MD regimes has produced other 
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arguments such as non-disclosure, voluntary disclosure, and selective or one-on-one 
disclosure.340 As discussed in Chapter 1, public-goods nature of disclosed information 
cuts down private incentives to produce it and therefore available information is assumed 
to be less than socially optimal. One of the justifications of the MD regime includes 
positive externalities produced via individual firms’ information provision to capital 
markets such that disclosure gives signals about other firms’ securities and gives other 
firms incentives to disclose and enhance the competition.341 Other justifications are about 
agency problems342 and the need for standardization.343 These discussions about limits, 
pros and cons of MD regimes are indeed to be continued. 
 
The conceptualisation of transparency via the MD regime therefore requires different 
arguments to be considered. The first is that there is a cost to transparency. This includes 
direct costs such as production, storing, certifying or authorisation of information. 
Moreover, some activities in finance might require opacity rather than transparency 
because the expectation of greater transparency might reduce the willingness of financial 
intermediaries to produce information. 344  A further argument is that, as Chapter 2 
established the base, transparency can be disruptive to financial stability. First, this 
happens when the economic agents who process the information do not have the same 
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level of sophistication to grasp it. This means there is a negative correlation between the 
complexity of the released information and the level of information asymmetry between 
the agents. Second, public disclosure can create coordination failures, such as in the case 
of bank runs. Agents collectively become more susceptible to common noise. Its relation 
to financial stability can be seen in their coordinated response to certain information.345 
Third, regardless of the underlying reasons for the fire sales, disclosure of holdings of 
distressed firms might exacerbate fire sales and predatory trading which can end up 
producing systemic disruption of the whole financial system. The final one is on 
disclosure by confidence-driven firms, ie banks, and agents’ reaction to adverse 
information on which is scattered across different parts of this thesis. 
 
Academic literature has adopted the philosophy of MD regime as it facilitates informed 
investment decisions, prevents fraud, lessens information asymmetry and boosts 
confidence in the capital markets. Investor protection, market fairness, allocational-, 
institutional- and operational- efficiency and transparency in market operations are 
therefore ensured via MDs. Yet, lengthy and complex disclosures, investors’ inability to 
understand disclosed information, and reliance on flawed assumptions of investors’ 
rational behaviour have been general criticisms by those stating MD does not efficiently 
deliver anticipated results.346  
 
3.   Implementation of Disclosure Policies in the Banking Industry 
Bank disclosures as means of providing transparency have gained more importance in the 
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world since the late 1990s347 and a large number of studies have focused on different 
aspects of information disclosure in the market.348  Whether the market remunerates 
disclosures of banks has been set out since the BCBS made public disclosure 
requirements an inbuilt part of the capital adequacy system.349  
 
Lack of transparency of banks has been seen as one of the reasons of financial crises350 
and transparency is largely taken as the main component of an efficient and stable banking 
and financial system.351  According to this view, the underlying reason for the non-
performance of financial markets is bank stakeholders’ (including the government) lack 
of information to gauge the bank’s financial situation during financial stress. The main 
cause of the collapse of interbank markets during the subprime crisis was defined as the 
asymmetric information, which rationalizes the prolonged nature of interbank market 
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tensions.352 In the same vein, most of the bank runs in the US starting from the 19th 
century were accepted as the outcomes of insufficient depositors’ information about the 
solvency of the banks.353 
 
Here, disclosure and transparency may be thought as synonymous or interchangeable 
terms, but actually there are some subtle differences between them.354 For instance, there 
is no direct guarantee that released information is received and comprehended in the 
correct way by the market.355 As O’Neill states: ‘Transparency counters secrecy, but it 
does not ensure communication.’ 356  Disclosure might therefore provide higher 
information but not automatically higher transparency because transparency should be 
supported by analytical placing of information into useful and purposeful contexts.357 
Further, considering the intricate transactions and high-risk exposures of banks, the mere 
provision requiring extra information might not necessarily lead the bank to be more 
transparent.358  
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Policy proposals such as Basel Accord III have offered new disclosure rules and increased 
quantity of information given by the banks for several purposes such as preventing a 
possible crisis based on a contagion effect, protecting depositors and shareholders of the 
bank, increasing market discipline in the market, and so on. Though the aim of disclosure 
regulations can be justified on those grounds, there remains the question whether these 
initiatives have been useful, since a variety of causes can be asserted to approach overly 
detailed bank disclosures with suspicion.359 Greater transparency in banking may not be 
as apparent as seen in other sectors.  
 
The availability of all information does not necessarily mean transparency, because 
parameters designing the efficiency of transparency are also related to content, timing, 
accessibility, and the perception of market participations to see that information. 
Disclosure is not an end itself to provide transparency, which suggests that the quality of 
the information disclosed is also relevant such that it must conform with economic reality, 
be comprehensible, be explanatory about the risk profiles and risk management, and 
follow the high accounting standards.360 Further, such meaningful disclosures must be 
supported by statutory liabilities with credible sanctions. Therefore, the premise 
summarized as ‘if it is disclosed, it is transparent’ might oversimplify the meaning of 
transparency. 
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According to Baumann and Nier, bank transparency can be measured by three indexes.361 
First, a publicly traded bank has to comply with the stock exchange’s binding rules on 
transparency, so transparency here is warranted by such binding rules based on maximum 
transparency. Second, bank ratings are important indicators of transparency. It is 
suggested that if a bank is estimated by a well-known CRA, then this can be taken as a 
credible indicator of transparency as there is a constant information flow from bank to 
the CRA. Last, financial statements related to the bank’s risk analysis (including interest 
rate risk, market risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk) in the bank’s annual reports show the 
level of transparency. 362 It is interesting that the last measure does not regard the non-
financial information of banks as criteria of transparency and ignore other factors such as 
periodicity, accessibility, and completeness of information as in the case of disclosures 
directed to investors. If one accepts that any piece information of FIs is classified as 
financial information, then all kinds of information of banks must be considered as 
financial by nature. In the same work of Baumann and Nier, financial information is 
accepted as the mere information in the bank’s annual reports and therefore the rest of the 
information, which is non-financial in nature, is not taken as a factor which may affect 
transparency of a bank.  
 
Moreover, other researchers have formed different factors to evaluate the transparency of 
a bank. For instance, Tadesse suggests different variables to measure bank transparency: 
the quality of disclosure, disclosure of private information, and director liability (strong 
auditing measures).363 The frequency, lag and granularity of disclosures might also be 
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indicators of transparency. As seen from those empirical studies in finance, there can be 
various criteria to measure transparency of banks and disclosure itself is not the only 
criteria for transparency.  
 
The support of disclosure is fed by a very straightforward view, which is based upon the 
idea that more disclosure provides more information regarding to the bank’s risk 
exposures and liquidity position (which is taken as one of the most important disclosure 
items for a bank to reveal its true financial standing) and therefore the market price of the 
bank reflects its true value in the market. In terms of price efficiency, bank disclosure is 
said to help allocate the resources more wisely and correspondingly discipline insiders of 
the bank. To give an example, in the case of risky operations, such risks would be 
impounded in the bank’s debt and equity claims and market prices of the bank would be 
automatically oriented into the new information and this is a desirable feature of efficient 
markets. Thus, under these conditions, price formation of a bank share will depend on the 
nature of the news, which means that any information that can be considered bad by the 
market will cause the bank to raise fewer funds and behave more prudently, as well as 
make less risky decisions. In the same vein, it has been asserted that the absence of 
information will cause depositors/lenders to require higher deposit rates on their 
agreements with the bank.364 This is the very basic idea of market discipline. 
 
It has been found that disclosure practices affect both the capacity of the financial system 
to absorb shocks and the bank structure so that in cases where there is information 
asymmetry between the investors or where bank managers keep more information 
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compared to outsiders, the rise in the cost of issuing equity becomes more apparent.365 
The increase in the cost of issuance of equity suggests a more leveraged bank, which is 
associated with a less robust financial system. So, disclosure appears to be a necessity 
from this angle.   
 
On the other hand, the problem of excessive risk taking of the bank, which is – as widely 
accepted – suppressed by disclosure regulations, is still of importance even though the 
sufficient information related to the financial situation of the bank is released to the 
market, since the existence of deposit insurance schemes or other such guarantees 
provided by the state creates a moral hazard problem. 
 
Thus, from the positive side, disclosure practices in banking are seen as a tool to reduce 
agency problems occurring among bankers and creditors and thereby lessening the threat 
of expropriation, strengthening the confidence of market participants in the banking 
sector, and providing stability and competition to the financial community. So, provision 
of information is well acknowledged and the rationales underpinning MD as opposed 
other disclosure regimes are manifold.  
 
Specific to bank MDs, two observations should be made based on the very nature of the 
banking business. First, banks – as public companies – issue securities and invest in assets 
with values generally unknown to outside investors.366 This is one of the features that 
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makes banks different from other publicly traded companies because bank assets are 
financial assets (mostly loans) and therefore banks might quiescently shift risk to the 
investors. Second, the inherent nature of bank assets provides that bank assets 
informationally opaque. Bank loans are privately negotiated and borrower-tailored 
agreements in spite of the increasing prosperousness in the quality and quantity of the 
information about the price and trading activity and the risks residing in bank loans, 
therefore, are difficult to be captured and managed.367  
 
Commercial banks provide loans to borrowers of a publicly unknown quality and, in the 
case of non-tradable loans, the quality of the loans is only available to the lender bank 
due the fact that collection, monitoring, and production of borrower information is 
performed by the bank. Consequently, one might think that a bank with assets which are 
centred upon loans might be riskier due to the opaque nature of the assets.368  
 
MD of bank information might therefore be more important under inherent opacity that 
the functioning of the bank offers in the first place. On the other hand, there is one more 
argument should be pointed out. As discussed, credit decisions of banks are accomplished 
through the use of private information that is not accessible by the general public. So, 
financial contracts and other loan information cannot be interpreted properly with the 
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information disclosed on public statements.369  Accentuated point here is that greater 
emphasis should be given to reliability and accountability of bank supervisory agencies 
so that private information utilised for loans might truly be represented on bank 
disclosures. Regardless of the disclosure regimes, mandatory, voluntary or selective, as 
long as it is not supported by the supervisory agencies, the core information about the 
main artery of the banking business might remain opaque. 
 
It can be said that the main business of commercial banking might be interrupted to the 
extent that MD regulations apply to information that causes such opacity in the first place 
because the information of loans is a product of private collection, screening, and other 
such efforts associated with large costs. The costs argument is not bank-specific, but the 
content of the information and the time and sources spent on acquisition and production 
of such information might be significant simply because it is the main job of a commercial 
bank. Accordingly, removing the lending incentives of the bank via MDs is not just 
related to private costs; the nature and type of the information that the bank keeps is of 
importance.   
 
MD regulations, in this respect, might serve as a minimum ground for the effective flow 
of information between market participants. The costs and benefits of mandated 
disclosure are complex, and they involve the classic argument between scholars and 
regulators as to efficiency or legitimacy and also whether they are a central doctrine of 
ensuring transparency in the market. That is, current regulations suggest that the language 
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of transparency is communicated through MD regulations and in this respect the rationale 
of MDs should be revisited prior to the examination of such rules for the banking industry. 
 
4.   The Relation between Bank Disclosures and Market Discipline 
As a desirable and necessary part of the today’s regulatory disciplines, the term market 
discipline generally describes a situation where the stakeholders of the firm who are at 
risk of financial loss as a result of the firm’s decisions can discipline the firm by the 
application of their market monitoring and influence functions.370   
 
Market monitoring means that bank stakeholders monitor changes within the bank and, 
more specifically, those changes related to the riskiness of their claims and then proceed 
with their transactions depending on the information collected via monitoring. Market 
influence, in this respect, means that firm’s risk taking is affected and consequently is 
changed based on the investor’s behaviours and choices so that investors bring about risk 
management motives.371 Depositors are not investors in a sense that they have no voting 
power to change the management of the bank and therefore to change the bank’s 
behaviour towards its risk taking. Depositor reaction to bank management might be 
withdrawing the funds from the bank. Depending on the circumstances, and as it will be 
discussed in detail here; the magnitude of the result of such depositor reaction differs. For 
example, the risk of moving funds might be unrealistic in a market with weak competition 
because in such an environment, withdrawing funds from one bank and placing in another 
might not mean that depositors might effectively control the risky activities of banks; and 
rather, in these cases it is the regulators to control and prevent exposures to risky activities 
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of banks. The circumstances of the market, that banks operate in, might be relevant to the 
level of regulatory discipline exerted by regulators and capital standards or safety and 
soundness regulations are just part of the variables affecting the bank’s risk taking. 
 
The public interest in maintaining a stable banking system has offered different views 
such that incompetency of regulatory discipline in exercising regulatory good than public 
good has highlighted the market discipline both as complementary and as individual 
regulatory tool.372 
 
The confidence of depositors is of importance for the market so that depositors can act in 
the way that the exercise of market discipline requires: to control the risk taking of the 
bank and therefore discipline them into operating with the optimal risk. Here, regulation 
plays an important role to establish the optimal grounds for depositors to apply 
disciplining effect. 
 
It has been stated that depositors and uninsured debt-holders in particular have a large 
impact on such risk management motives: a bank’s riskiness is highly influenced by 
depositors because of the potential bank runs that may emanate from sudden and frequent 
withdrawals or other behaviour affecting the bank’s risk-taking behaviour such as 
depositors refusing to rollover funds or asking for higher-risk premiums or collateral.  
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A bank’s level of risk is also affected by debt-holders holding large debt claims because 
they have the capacity to worsen the bank’s refinancing ability and terms.373 Those groups 
with a high degree of monitoring incentives resulting from a fear of bank failures and the 
existence of deposit protection schemes do not help subordinated debt-holders and 
shareholders whose claims are not subject to state-backed protection schemes. Therefore, 
both private sector agents and regulatory authorities that monitor banks are the main 
pillars of market discipline. Particularly after the GFC, market discipline has been the hot 
topic based on the premise that state intervention in banks could be experienced by way 
of the government’s backup of banks in the form of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, 
or other such failure-prevention devices, and the application of such bank-protection 
measures has weakened the market discipline.374 
 
The application of the modern theory of corporate finance on banks reveals the 
contradictory interests of depositors and shareholders.375 Shareholders of a bank have one 
main aim, which is to boost the value of the firm reflected in the market share, stock price, 
or profitability of the bank. For this reason, they tend to support high-variance (and 
necessarily risky) activities that are essentially funded by the depositors’ money. 
Depositors, on the other hand, are not residual claimants and their incentive in monitoring 
the bank’s activities is to protect the money credited to the bank and to ensure the 
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performance of fixed claims.376 Thus, contradictory approaches desired by depositors and 
shareholders at some point merge on the need to monitor the bank’s final disposition in 
the event of failure.  
 
Borrowers, as one of the stakeholders, also have interests in the general healthiness of the 
bank with which they have a relationship. One may therefore say that they might have a 
portion in disciplining banks. Borrower-related data, which covers a variety of items such 
as past borrowing experiences, deposit flows, repayment habits, or information pertaining 
to management, control, or quality/quantity of products, is held by the bank to assess risks 
and to decide whether to extend or renew a loan. Therefore, durability of the 
communication patterns and experience evolved through the course of the lending 
relationship will be interrupted if a bank fails and the borrower will ultimately be affected 
by such losses.377 Considering the firms without having access to public debt markets, 
borrowing from banks stands as an important source of funding and, for those firms, the 
soundness of the bank is of great significance since any failure of the bank might place 
the company at risk of bankruptcy by cutting the main artery of its liquidity.378  
 
In consideration of attracting funds from depositors, bank management might voluntarily 
limit its risk taking and this might suggest that market discipline is sufficiently competent 
to be an alternative to bank regulation.379  Advocators of a system based on market 
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discipline exerted by depositors highlight the importance of bank disclosures to enable 
depositors to act upon the risk level of the bank and therefore they disregard the 
overreaction and possible irrational behaviours of depositors.  
 
The possibility that the government covers the loss incurred by the depositor in the event 
of bank failure is an incentive for banks to invest in risky projects, which serves the 
purposes of bank shareholders, and this situation is described with the famous 
phenomenon of the problem of moral hazard. Intervention by the use of regulatory 
devices such as deposit protection measures appears to be an impeding factor in terms of 
achievement of market discipline; but even in the absence of such state backups, 
depositors might not in practice provide the disciplining effect on the bank's riskiness.380 
According to Garten, in a world without deposit protection or other safety net systems, 
depositors still do not provide a disciplining influence over banks because depositors do 
not consider risks in the same way as investors do because they are more interested in 
factors whereas depositors concerned about risks are the ones with large sums of 
capital.381  
 
Further, the disciplining influence that depositors provide would be generally so severe 
that catastrophic consequences such as bank runs are highly possible and therefore market 
discipline exerted by depositors is negative and disadvantageous.382 This view suggests 
that the responsiveness of depositors towards bank risks does not necessarily mean that 
market discipline exerted by such sensitive depositors will provide positive influence in 
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controlling the riskiness of the bank because the pure idea of market discipline emanates 
from the premise that depositors are sensitive to bank risks and a high level of riskiness 
will lead to them demanding a risk premium and a necessary degree of compensation in 
proportion to risks involved.  
 
The depositor-based capital of a bank comes from the depositors with short-term deposit 
accounts or with small amounts of money who are under the protection of deposit 
insurance schemes. Those holding large amounts of money in the bank accounts tend to 
be sophisticated depositors and can be considered as depositor-investors. However, 
deposit size, as a criterion of market discipline might also be illusory because those 
depositors might simply be unconcerned about the bank’s riskiness and might view the 
bank as a substitute safe box. Yet, deposit size might be relevant if adverse information 
of the bank is released and depositors holding funds under the specified limit of the 
deposit insurance react to such information by immediately withdrawing their funds 
without notice, particularly where they are unsophisticated and cannot tell the difference 
between true information and market rumour. This supports the premise that those 
depositors are highly likely to exert market discipline ex post, which means market 
discipline would be experienced in the form of bank runs. On the other hand, depositor-
investors, who are supposed to exercise market discipline ex ante, consider the risk and 
the return as deciding factors to deposit money in a bank and in this sense; deposit 
accounts might be investments for them.383  It means bank information disclosure is 
important for these groups.  
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Depositors with credits exceeding the maximum specified amount for the deposit 
insurance divide their deposits into smaller (and therefore insured) amounts so that there 
is an application of market discipline by those uninsured depositors, but this type of 
market discipline does not serve the expected purpose of market discipline.384 Therefore, 
the funding of the bank is important here because if the size of the retail deposits is larger 
than wholesale deposits, holders of small deposits will be the driving force in stressful 
times. So, when investor-depositors are relatively less in number and amount, it might 
mean it does not provide as much as disciplining effect as one thinks.  
 
It should also be noted that their behavioural reflections to the negative news about the 
bank might be exactly the same as other depositors in removing their money from the 
bank or banking system or in liquidating their investments instantly. However, it should 
be borne in mind that demand accounts generally consist of the initial, and maybe the 
only, source of liquidity for the depositors and the assertion that depositors protected by 
a deposit insurance system are not concerned with the financial healthiness of the bank 
during the relationship might be unsound. The assertion that those small holders of the 
bank’s liabilities lack resources, technical skills and incentives in monitoring is one of 
the on-going debates; but the effect of the adverse information in the market shows itself 
in sudden withdrawals by depositors and the risk of systemic risk and bank runs. 
Empirical studies on the private agent monitoring of bank riskiness are dissenting, but the 
negative effect associated with ‘first come, first served’ is obvious when adverse 
information is released during stressful times.385  
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Investors, on the other hand, would like to control the management to assure the well-
being of their shares and bonds, and this causes inevitable agency costs, which can be 
mitigated by disclosures, and therefore investors can influence the management in taking 
decisions. The premise establishes that investors are more detailed-oriented since they 
are expected to interpret the bad loans and low earnings of the bank compared to 
depositors that only responds to institutionally life-threatening information might be 
useful for designing the appropriate extent of public disclosures.386 As a distinction made 
between the depositors and shareholders, another division between shareholders and debt-
holders should be set out in terms of understanding the source of market discipline coming 
from different motives. Based on the nature of risk linked to their investments, 
stockholders and debt-holders might expect different perspectives from the bank 
management as a consequence of inherent conflict of interests among the residual and 
fixed claimants.387   
 
The contract between the bondholder and the bank is not formed depending on the level 
of risk per se; rather, it is made by using the overall view of transparent and foreseeable 
information related to the risks that the debt-holder takes as base.388 A bondholder’s 
position as a fixed claimant means that they supply capital to bank capital for a fixed term 
at a fixed rate or at a rate subjected to short-term market interest rates. Because the rate 
of return is already designated, there are no further advantages; but depending on the 
decisions taken by the bank, there are always potential downsides associated with the risk 
because there is always a possibility that the bank can invest in riskier projects compared 
the time that the bondholder had invested in. Therefore, a debt contract does not involve 
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benefits depending on the bank’s financial success but rather it might cause the 
bondholder to bear the risks in case of loss, and this situation highlights the importance 
of risk transparency so that bondholders can see the risks and price them accurately using 
coupon rates before investing. Following changes in the credit and market risk of the bank 
is reflected in the coupon and increases in the level of risk disturb the value of the 
bondholder’s claim. Accordingly, there is a connection between the information and the 
cost of a debt since bondholders look upon the accounting information in pricing the bond. 
 
Conventional corporate finance theory also applies to banks where both shareholders and 
bondholders expect contradictory investments from the bank. The assumptions made for 
the firms such as ‘… a production plan that maximizes shareholder wealth does not 
maximize bondholder wealth, or vice versa’389 or the premise that shareholders do not 
consent to lucrative investments if the return only satisfies bondholders, might be 
applicable for the banking industry with one exception –its financial soundness is 
generally a matter of the financial healthiness of the whole system. 
 
While shareholders, as previously mentioned for the case of depositors, aim for high-risk 
investments, which present high returns above the fixed debt charges,390 bondholders 
demand the promised return, and therefore low-level riskiness is desired. This situation 
represents the incompatible investment strategies by investors such that shareholders 
pursue a pushing and dynamic way of influencing the bank management and bondholders 
search for the optimal degree of riskiness, which seems more compatible with the goals 
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of market discipline. The existence of debt-holders in the first place might be the reason 
for the aggressive approach of shareholders towards high risk taking based on the fact 
that shareholders are paid depending on the profits after debt charges paid. They are also 
different in terms of the management of assets of the bank, so that in the event of a 
bankruptcy, bondholders have priority over shareholders and this means that, 
bondholders’ interests in the bank’s assets maintenance and dividend policy might be 
higher than shareholders.  
 
The legal obligation putting debt-holders above shareholders in bankruptcy might also 
suggest that the burden of market discipline is on the shoulders of the shareholders as 
well. Further, another conflicting interest could be seen in the divergent approaches 
concerning leverage because the issuance of new additional debts by the bank suggests 
the dilution of the position of the present debt-holders. An increased number of payments 
made to the new debt-holders are also undesirable for shareholders, but the capital gained 
from new debt-holders means greater financial power for risk taking and therefore 
shareholders may take advantage of the leverage, particularly if the newly issued debts 
consist of inexpensive financing.391 
 
Bank exposures in the interbank market lead to another type of discipline exerted by peer 
banks. This type of interbank discipline is part of market discipline that implies banks 
have strong economic incentives to monitor their counterparties because they have 
myriad links with other banks that expose them to credit risks. As such, banks themselves 
are disciplinarians in the sense that they react to other banks’ risk profiles and respond 
accordingly.392 However, the response of peers to adverse market conditions (liquidity 
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scarcity or unwillingness of government to support weak FIs during difficult times) does 
not necessarily serve the goals of discipline because, as discussed in Chapter 2, liquidity 
hoarding and interbank freezes are a commonality of distressed markets with a lack of 
confidence. 
 
4.1.Relationship between Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance 
In the light of this information presenting the inherently contradictory interests of 
shareholders and debt-holders and different motives of other bank stakeholders such as 
depositors, borrowers or peer banks in monitoring banks’ standing, one can see how 
information regarding the bank’s risk exposure is important, even if they pursue 
conflicting strategies for their own interests. However, as mentioned, the presence of 
deposit insurance schemes is a distortion on the incentives of monitoring and therefore it 
cuts down the need of information for those. The deposit insurance system, as a safety 
net element, is a part of the social mechanism concerned with distressed banks and 
accompanying social costs emanated from bank failures and as a matter of principle it is 
designed to prevent spillover effects and systemic risk by accommodating a degree of risk 
sharing in the financial system.393 Safety nets are augmented or extended specifically 
during a period of banking instability394 to make depositors respond to a ‘wake-up call’ 
in a less vigilant and more unruffled manner.   
 
The numbing effect of explicit deposit insurance schemes or de facto government backups 
implies a trade-off between market discipline and the protection of public confidence via 
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depositor protection schemes, because measures taken to mitigate bank failures and runs 
actually weaken other forces supporting the stability of the banking system.395 As the 
theory of market discipline allows some bank failures based on the elimination of badly 
managed and unsound banks from the financial system, the augmentation effect of 
systemic failures on the bank crisis has created such safety net provisions. The 
conventional discussion about the deposit insurance systems, namely the problem of 
moral hazard, has been addressed with strengthened monitoring of banks by the 
regulatory authorities in order to prevent excessive risk taking disadvantageous to 
interests of depositors and investors.396 Accordingly, prudential initiatives of regulators 
to monitor banks and implement enhanced disclosure standards have made it possible to 
mention the disciplinary role of the supervision. Greater transparency in risk taking and 
financial reporting has therefore been one of the main pillars of BRAs. 
 
Existence of deposit insurance schemes allows banks to raise capital from persons who 
have lack of monitoring incentives, and as a classic argument to safety net arrangements, 
deposit insurance systems not only cause moral hazard by encouraging banks to take more 
risks than optimal (based on the view that while they can enjoy the benefits from risky 
activities since the government will cover the failures) but also might create a TBTF 
problem because the bank’s ability to lower the cost of funding based on safety nets might 
incentivize banks to become larger and maybe more systemically important.397 Therefore, 
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the successful application of market discipline is discussed with the elimination of the 
TBTF problem and lack of transparency. A global regulatory agenda has provided some 
solutions to limit moral hazard including risk-adjusted deposit insurance systems, rules 
requiring banks to issue certain numbers of subordinated debt,398  or more intensive 
monitoring by the prudential and supervisory agencies.399 
 
Managers, in this scheme, have to deal with such contradictory interests including their 
self-interests. Both bondholders’ and shareholders’ interests accord with bank 
profitability, and poor management and poor investments are the reason for the need of 
information about the management and its activities. Regulators, on the other hand, also 
have incentives in the application of market discipline as agents of the public interest, 
such that the raison d’être of supervisory mechanisms is to ensure the stability and 
soundness of the banks and financial system. Regulatory monitoring and examining form 
an important part of prevention of bank failures or systemic risk; in this respect, collection 
and verification of the screened information by the regulators is a part of regulatory 
discipline. 
 
The combination of regulatory discipline and increased transparency, therefore, can be 
seen as the combination of market monitoring and supervisory monitoring which might 
relieve the regulator’s burden in monitoring if market discipline is effectively exercised. 
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Ex ante market discipline is curtailed by elements such as bailouts or deposit insurance 
schemes, which are the products applied as a result of regulatory discipline. Coexistence 
of ex ante and ex post market discipline is therefore an arduous task for regulators, and 
disclosure is taken and enforced as a complementary and viable solution to the application 
of market discipline.  
 
As it is also highly supported by the BCBS, basic idea of market discipline asserts that 
surveillance of banks is deemed a mechanism to encourage banks to behave prudently. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the BCBS concept of market discipline is different than the 
conventional thinking as perceived in securities law, which takes the market discipline as 
a pressure to change the management behaviour for the benefit of shareholders and rather, 
the BCBS has used the term market discipline for highlighting the well-being of the bank 
itself and stability of the financial system as being different from conventional 
understanding.400 Though underlying philosophies differ, application of market discipline 
is generally seen useful overall. So, the idea of confidential supervision is outdated as 
disclosure is supported both by bank supervisors and securities markets regulators. 
 
The bank’s risk profile can be affected by the screening activities of its market signals. 
By way of example, disclosure of a high level of counterparty risk by the bank might 
cause its counterparties to limit or stop their transactions with the bank, and in a similar 
vein, bank supervisors might urge the bank to lessen its risk taking based on such 
information.401  Updated bank information, in this context, has the power to change 
market prices of bank-issued securities by creating both market and regulatory pressure 
                                               
400 Henry T.C. Hu,‘Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation and 
Divergent Regulatory Quests’ (2014) 31(3) Yale Journal on Regulation 565,606. 
401 Ibid. 
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on bank management. However, it is still a debatable issue whether the theory of market 
discipline satisfies real-life practices.402 It has been asserted that the securities issued by 
banks reveal the bank risk taking precisely, but this sort of market discipline is not seen 
as being sufficient to have effect on the whole risk taking of banks because the bank might 
still have a high level of risk as long as the bank and its depositors are accordingly 
compensated for bearing those risks. 
 
Overall, market discipline in the banking industry has a prominent place and, as the BCBS 
highlights, ‘the provision of meaningful information about common risk metrics to 
market participants is a fundamental tenet of a sound banking system. It reduces 
information asymmetry and helps promote comparability of banks’ risk profiles.’403 The 
modern regulation of banks is therefore supported by the link among the disclosure and 
bank’s risk taking and the subsequent risk-adjusted performance of banks, which is also 
beneficial to regulatory agencies so that they can reduce the costs of bank monitoring in 
the increasing complexity of large banking firms.  
 
Application of effective market discipline depends on the fulfilment of three conditions. 
First, banks must be obligated to perform prompt and full disclosure of material 
information regardless of its adverse effects. Second, elimination of weak banks from the 
market should be allowed and therefore banks should know the potential danger(s) of 
failure. Last, stakeholders including depositors must bear the loss emanating from bank 
                                               
402 For example,Bliss and Flannery investigated the real effect of market forces over bank 
decisions and they asserted that stock or bond investors do not have strong effect on the bank 
managerial behaviour. Bliss and Flannery (n 370). 
403 Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements (Jan 2015)(Accessed July 18, 2016) 
 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d309.pdf. 
	   178	  
operations.404 Though the proposals suggesting the change for the deposit insurance and 
safety net schemes (such as risk-based insurance system) have been contentious areas of 
discussion, bank information disclosure as a pillar of market discipline is globally given 
overriding support. Therefore, the argument pertaining to those enumerated three 
conditions is closely tied to the deposit insurance system and a drastic way to accomplish 
market discipline is the removal of such system which allows banks to operate on equal 
grounds as other public companies. Yet, as next chapter will further discuss, the GFC 
revealed that there are subtle concerns about the efficiency of market discipline.  
 
5.   Regulatory Battle between the Capital Markets Regulators and the Bank 
Prudential Regulators in terms of Bank Information Disclosures  
A specific challenge facing the architects of market discipline and disclosure lies in the 
different motivations of regulators that concurrently regulate banks. A meaningful 
discussion about the different objectives of bank regulatory and prudential agencies and 
the capital markets regulator should start from the general understanding of the overall 
design of the financial regulatory system such that the traditional prudential regulation 
(protecting the safety and soundness of banks and financial stability in general) and the 
regulation related to goals of ‘investor protection, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient 
markets and facilitating capital formation’405 present a bifurcation in terms of objectives 
pursued and utilised techniques to discharge these aims. 
 
                                               
404 James C. Treadway,‘A Seamless Web: Banks, New Activities and Disclosure’ (1983) 
Keynote Speech, Third Annual Seminar on Securities Activities of Banks at 11(accessed Aug 
5,2016)https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1983/092983treadway.pdf.  
405 See the SEC’s website regarding its objectives (accessed June 
1,2015)https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.  
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Financial stability regulator406 and the securities regulator, in this respect, might represent 
the two sides of this distinction. Here, such a segregation of bodies is an abstraction and 
even though they share common elements such as market integrity, share of 
responsibilities and their different main goals under the traditional regulatory paradigm 
might still accommodate such bifurcation.407  
 
Maintaining the soundness of the financial system in general and safeguarding consumers 
and investors from imprudent operators, as common goals of financial regulation, require 
input from other special agencies empowered with supervision or rule-making authority. 
The efficient operation of the whole mechanism involving the CB and other institutions 
necessitates coordination in such a way that regulations created based on the objectives 
of each regulatory or supervisory organisation should not lead to major conflicts between 
the organisations that cause uncertainty, confusion and concerns about the enforcement 
of laws.408 Instead, the structure of the system should accommodate the deliberation or 
cooperation grounds for the application of public interests which allows taking the right 
actions at the right time. Accountability and transparency might be associated with clear 
lines of responsibility of each regulatory and supervisory body. Though clear-cut and 
certain designation of responsibilities between the bodies is desirable, depending on the 
facts of the case, it might cause exertion of pressure by one body over another whose 
                                               
406 Here the term financial stability regulator is used as a generic term implying that both micro 
and macro prudential regulation also serves for the financial stability especially on the face of 
redefinition of prudential regulation. Daniel K. Tarullo,‘Rethinking the Aims of Prudential 
Regulation’ (2014)(accessed June 11, 2016) 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140508a.pdf.   
407 Chester S. Spatt,‘Regulatory Conflict: Market Integrity vs. Financial Stability’ (2010) 71 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 625. 
408 Chapter 2,Section 3.1.3. 
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established rules might be temporarily and underhandedly suspended for higher public 
interest reasons.409  
 
The debate regarding designing optimal supervision and regulation is a well-known one 
but the mere focus on the structure itself might be mistaken since there are also other 
factors that form the regulatory concept. According to Taylor, organizational structure is 
also relevant to other factors:410 the first one is public policy goals that designate the 
extent of the trade-off between financial stability and consumer protection; the second is 
the administration of regulatory rules emanating from those public policy goals, which 
means the basis, kind and nature of the powers provided to regulatory bodies; the final 
one is related to the particular methods that each agency uses to conform to their duties. 
The financial stability regulator and conduct of business and consumer protection 
regulator follow those three patterns in discharging their duties.  
 
Regulatory goals in providing safety and soundness of the financial system mostly 
subsume three main headings as financial stability, prudential regulation and market 
conduct regulation.411 Thus, efficient banking regulation connotes the simultaneous 
guarantee of protection of depositors and investors, as well as maintenance of financial 
stability and the payment mechanism.412 Within this context, approaches of the bank and 
securities regulation might stand in stark contrast to each other during times of crisis. As 
will shortly be discussed, the fundamental divergence might lie in the level of exposure 
to risk that they put the state generally in if they do not function properly.  
                                               
409 Chapter 4. 
410 Michael Taylor,‘The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm’ (1998) 49 Mercer L. Rev. 
793,794. 
411 Pan (n 286) 190. 
412 Chapter 2. 
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Pre-emptive regulatory intervention is a feature of prudential regulation of banks such 
that banks are monitored and supervised, which is ex ante by nature. Securities regulation, 
on the other hand, is based on general rulemaking and ex post enforcement. It is also 
propounded that, banks have necessary incentives in operating in due care to lessen the 
possibility of borrower-related credit risk for their commercial interests;413 while on the 
other hand, the securities regulation is directed at buyers or customers who are exposed 
the risks (as different from bank customers) due to their disadvantageous position in 
reaching information or in asking for more information.414 So, the consumer/investor 
protection approach residing in the securities regulation is premised on disclosure in a 
way that what information, to whom, in which ways and in which format are all regulated 
rather than controlling each members one by one, as it is the case of bank regulation. This 
divergence is illustrated by Davies and Green as:  
 
(T)his is sometimes characterised as the difference between the “doctor” role of the 
prudential regulator- temperamentally inclined to seek to cure a problem when he finds 
it, rather than to discipline those who might have been responsible for it- and the “cop” 
characteristics of the traditional securities regulator, inclined to reach for the enforcement 
tool whenever a regulatory breach is seen.415 
 
Having said that, such bifurcation between the prudential regulation and securities 
regulation might also be seen as something hypothetical and artificial which can be 
                                               
413 Michael T. Cappucci,‘Prudential Regulation and the Knowledge Problem’ (2014) 9(1) 
Virginia Law & Business Review 1,8. 
414 Langevoort asserts that the capital market regulator’s focus and capabilities are based on the 
concept of average investors, not the institutionalised investors as the marketplace witness 
today.Donald C. Langevoort,‘The SEC, Retail Investors and the Institutionalisation of the 
Securities Markets’ (2008) Georgetown Law Working Papers No: 80 (accessed Nov 21, 2015) 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&context=fwps_papers.  
415 Davies and Green (n 30) 192. 
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explained better in theory rather than in practice due to the fact that both prudential and 
securities regulators keep rule-making and supervision powers to some extent.416 So, the 
difference between these two can be found in their primary purposes rather than their 
application. Also, it is noted that such apartness presented for those two regulatory fields 
might be exaggerated due to the fact that over the long haul, they are compatible with 
each other in terms of production and protection of confidence in the system. One of the 
eventual results based on healthy and prudentially well-structured and disciplined FIs is 
a well and fair functioning of the system which in turn those FIs can provide services and 
opportunities to persons that can use them with confidence.417 This ultimate goal-based 
approach therefore takes the mentioned bifurcation as a short run thing.  
 
Capital markets regulator is more interested in the protection of investors and in 
preserving fair, transparent and organized markets.418  By Hu’s words, it can be addressed 
as:  
The SEC’s primary goal is more long-term and diffuse in nature: ensuring efficient, fully-
informed financial markets driven by decision makers in the private sphere. The dynamic 
nature of such markets may well cause short-term pain, but that may be the price one has 
to pay for efficient markets and efficient allocation of resources.419 
 
On the contrary, bank regulators are concerned with spotting unsafe and unsound bank 
practices for potential failures, which has been made possible by the provided authority 
to intervene and limit banks from taking excessive risks. Safety and soundness of the 
                                               
416 For instance, the SEC rules a net capital requirement on registered broker-dealers. Cappucci 
(n 413) 9. 
417 Davies and Green (n 30) 192. 
418 M. Jickling and E.V. Murphy,‘Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of US Financial 
Supervision’[2010] Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress No:R40249 1,18. 
419 Henry T.C. Hu,‘Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm’ (2012) 90(7) Texas Law Review 1601,1699. 
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banks and the whole system have been supported by measures such as extensive 
supervisory powers with regular on- and off-site examinations to solve such problems in 
private, without disturbing the market. Bank agencies have therefore historically believed 
in non-public regulatory procedures. Banking regulation, in this context, supports a 
coordinated and advisory relation between the banks and the regulators; the securities 
regulation, on the other hand, builds upon the warning impact of capital markets 
regulator’s enforcement actions.420  
 
Therefore, in plain terms, the capital markets regulator does not provide anything related 
to quality of the security, whether it is good or bad; it simply asks for registered and listed 
firms to disclose necessary information to investors in the belief that capital formation 
and investment will be promoted and expedited via disclosure. Both the capital markets 
and bank regulators seek to protect investors, but in paradoxical ways. The contradiction 
relies on the philosophical differences between them since the former aims for investor 
protection (establishing minimum grounds of disclosure by considering particularly small 
and unsophisticated investors) and market efficiency, while the latter aims for soundness 
of the banks themselves and the system in which they operate. Disclosures demanded by 
those two divergent universes are related to the well-being of investors for the one, and 
the well-being of the banks and financial system for the other.421  
 
As Chapter 2 discussed, institutional models, supervisory performance and financial 
stability link with each other, but issues related to regulation should not be oversimplified 
by mere organizational-based approach. There is an inherent conflict between the 
                                               
420 Eugene F. Maloney,‘Banks and the SEC’ (2006) 25(1) Annual Review of Banking & 
Financial Law 443,455. 
421 Hu,‘Disclosure Universes and the Mode of Information’ (n 400) 574. 
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prudential regulator and securities markets regulator and institutional organisational 
divergence is a result of this. At the heart of the debate, there might lie a political decision-
making process that blurs the lines of the jurisdiction of each regulatory and supervisory 
body. So, accountability, legitimacy and independence are important factors for a 
regulatory system so that bodies do not exercise influence over each other based on 
political decisions. It is very relevant to production and protection of public confidence 
such that political moves towards obscuring or delaying the disclosure of real loss of 
banks might undermine transparency and accountability of the organisations.422  
 
In this sense, the GFC provided a fertile ground to discuss the inevitable or natural 
dialectic between these two regulatory zones by revealing the cases about MD of bank 
information as a result of securities markets transparency regulations and the stability-
driven concerns attached to those disclosures during a crisis time. The conflict 
summarised here was experienced in leading financial centres with different cultures: 
While the pre-emptive and public interest-based regulation in protection of systemic 
financial stability has been the result, both the US and the UK had provided substantial 
case studies that show the need of subordination of market efficiency-investor protection 
(and other attendant benefits of public disclosure) in favour of financial stability. MD of 
information as the traditional aspect of capital markets has brought new challenges about 
the intersection of market efficiency, systemic risk and government. It was the cases 
related to the merger of BoA and ML and the bail-out of the AIG in the US. In the EU, it 
                                               
422 For example, in the 1990s, Japan’s policy of regulatory forbearance towards banks in not 
forcing them to disclose their losses can be seen as a political decision made for the overall 
financial stability which later on it turned out to be the loss of confidence of market participants 
in Japanese markets. Benjamin Nelson and Misa Tanaka,‘Dealing with a Banking Crisis: What 
Lessons Can Be Learned from Japan’s Experience? (2014)(Accessed Dec 1, 2016) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q104.pdf.  
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was epitomised in the infamous case of NR, rogue-trading scandal at SG and the merger 
of HBOS and Lloyds TSB. The animating regulatory philosophy of capital markets 
regulators such the SEC and the FSA has always been pure and rich informational 
environment based on disclosure and not the correction of market decisions.423  
 
So, experiences regarding to the SEC and the FSA (now FCA) vis-à-vis financial stability 
and their treatment to banks as a listed company under national laws should be discussed.  
Therefore, without drawing a short conclusion here, this chapter directly links to the 

















                                               
423 Henry T.C. Hu,‘Efficient Markets and the Law:A Predictable Past and An Uncertain Future’ 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXAMINING DISCLOSURE OF BANK INFORMATION 
UNDER NATIONAL SECURITIES LAWS 
 
1.   Regulatory Landscape of US Bank Securities Disclosure Regime 
1.1.The Synopsis of US Securities Disclosure Regulations 
Federal securities laws have traditionally been based upon the principle of disclosure 
instead of direct regulation and despite the extensive generation of experience with the 
merit-based approach.424 Since 1933, companies going public for the first time have been 
asked to furnish investors with specific information regarding the company’s assets, risks, 
funding, past performance, management compensation, and transactions among the 
company and its insiders; and since 1934, disclosures made in the primary markets must 
be renewed both quarterly and annually and also those results must be audited by 
independent accounting organizations.425  
 
One of the purposes of the 1933 Act was therefore to reveal the truth in securities in 
relation to public offerings. The Act is applicable to any company on the mere purpose 
of offering and selling securities. The second purpose was to provide rules against 
misrepresentation and fraud in the securities markets. Before the 1933 Act, the sale of 
securities was generally a matter of state laws and, as the first leading piece of federal 
                                               
424  Jickling and Murphy (n 418) 6. 
425 R. Daines and C.M. Jones,‘Truth or Consequences:Mandatory Disclosure and the Impact of 
the 1934 Act’(2012) Stanford Law School Working Paper at 3(accessed Nov 16, 2017) 
https://law.stanford.edu/publications/truth-or-consequences-mandatory-disclosure-and-the-
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regulation on the sale of securities, the 1933 Act highlighted the disclosure philosophy 
such that the sale of bad securities is not illegal as long as the investors are fully and fairly 
informed about the character of the security.426 It therefore accommodates the disclosure 
of both positive and negative information.  
 
The 1933 Act provides exemptions from the registration for certain types of securities; 
but it does not mean that they are also exempted from the anti-fraud provisions, and those 
exempted securities might be treated as security in the 1934 Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) and Dodd-Frank established a significant shift from the 1933 Act’s 
disclosure standards since the role of the SEC was changed through the established trust 
on the fields of corporate governance which were previously under the liability of the 
states and the self-regulatory organizations like FINRA and, further, the SOX placed the 
SEC into the accounting profession based on its oversight authority over the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board.427   
 
The 1934 Act was established for the securities dealers and brokers and for the market 
they transact, and it set out comprehensive disclosures about the securities traded in the 
market. The 1934 Act therefore applies to the issuers whose securities are listed and 
traded in the stock exchanges.428 It establishes that those issuers named s 12 issuers and 
the issuers offer and sell securities by virtue of the 1933 Act named s 15(d) firms are 
                                               
426 C.J. Johnson, J. McLaughlin and E.S. Haueter, Corporate Finance and the Securities Law 
(5th edn,Wolter Kluwer 2015) 1-17. 
427 Ibid. 
428 It also applies the issuers having active investor interest in the OTC market by satisfying the 
threshold levels as holding minimum 500 holders of a class of equities and minimum $10 
million in assets. 
	   188	  
required to file periodic, quarterly, and annual reports, and other documents to the SEC 
in accordance with the relevant accounting standards.429  
 
Together with the integrated disclosure system, combination of the disclosure regimes in 
order to eliminate duplicative disclosures by decreasing the burden of issuers has been 
possible. 430  Regulation S-K for non-financial information and Regulation S-X for 
financial information, therefore, reflect the harmonized regulatory disclosure system, 
which applies to filings by issuers in both respects. Different from the European approach, 
general principles of disclosure do not impose an affirmative duty to disclose all material 
information except when it is required by registration statement, periodic reports and 
other filings, when the company is required to correct inaccurate disclosure or to avoid 
insider trading and when the company purchases its own securities. Yet, such an 
affirmative duty to promptly disclose any material information is rather imposed by 
securities exchanges themselves (such as the New York Stock Exchanges and 
NASDAQ).431    
 
Under this concept, the materiality principle embedded in federal securities regulation, as 
a fundamental tenet of the federal securities laws, has always been argued as being a 
subjective and vague standard.432 Application of materiality is relevant to the facts and 
circumstances of each public company and in each case the assessment as to materiality 
                                               
429 15 USC§78m(a),(b) and 78o. 
430 SEC Release No. AS-306. 
431 Regulation FD and Regulation G.  
432 Standard of materiality that is generally used today was designated at TSC Indus. Inv. v. 
Northway, Inc. 426 US 438 (1976). Here, the materiality standard is articulated as ‘… there 
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of omitted fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information available.’ at 
449. For the legal definition of the term material see 17 CFR§230.405.  
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might require an investigation of the public company's sector, products, services, 
structure, size, and other such information.  
 
The law provides SEC registrants with the opportunity to ask for a CTO if specified 
conditions are met. They need to support their requests with an applicable FOIA 
exemption. 433  Most common ground for a CTO is exemption 4, which protects 
information that is a trade secret or business or commercial information that is obtained 
from a person and is confidential.434 Yet, if the information is required under the 1933 
and 1934 Acts and other related rules and regulations or if it is material information, then 
it has to be disclosed.    
 
SEC, as the principal authority to oversee and regulate the US securities markets, 
interprets and enforces these disclosure laws and regulations in order to pursue its 
objectives of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets and 
facilitating capital formation. Yet, the GFC proved that the SEC was involved in stability-
related measures under the wider rhetoric of protection efficient markets in the long term. 
  
1.1.1.   Securities Exchange Commission and Financial Stability: Restrictions 
on Short Sales of Financial Stocks 
The SEC’s traditional identity is based on protection of investor and facilitation of capital 
formation, which MD of information forms the main tenet of these objectives. So, ‘the 
                                               
433 There are nine exemptions provided under the FOIA.5 USC§552(b). 
434 Kara Karlson,‘Check and Balances: Using the FOIA to Evaluate the Federal Reserve Banks’ 
(2010) 60 American University Law Review 213,250. 
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SEC is first and foremost a disclosure agency.’435 Yet, the SEC intervened in the market 
place at the height of the crisis by banning short sales of bank stocks for market 
confidence and financial stability purposes.  
 
The SEC chairman Christopher Cox claimed that the order was issued as a result of 
intensive pressure coming from the Fed and the Treasury in order to mute or prevent 
market declines and so, it was a move towards the protection of FIs and overall financial 
stability.436 So, governmental price neutrality, as rooted in securities laws, was therefore 
temporarily suspended via government intervention in increasing securities prices for 
overall financial stability of the state.437 Here, market confidence was the determinant for 
the stability because sudden price declines in bank securities would urge the market to 
examine the underlying financial standing of the issuer and the result of such questioning 
would cause a crisis of confidence with potential severe outcomes.438 Considering the 
previous approach of the SEC’s on short sales (relaxing short sale restrictions and its 
established stance regarding to less restricted markets for setting the prices)439; such a 
move might be addressed with the conflicting regulatory interests or the domination of 
the more powerful government actor over the less powerful one; or it might be related to 
superiority of the objectives in the specific point in time where assuring the short-term 
stability overrides the maintenance of longer-term and more nuanced goal of market 
                                               





(accessed March 26,2015).  
437 Hu,‘Too Complex to Depict? (n 419) 1688-1701. 
438 SEC,(accessed Dec 11,2016)https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58591a.pdf.  
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efficiency which the SEC pursues for. 440  This emergency SEC intervention in the 
securities markets proves that severe market distress can lead SEC to prioritise financial 
stability over market efficiency.441  
 
It is true that SEC’s restriction on short selling financial stocks is not directly related to 
the potential battle among bank prudential supervisor or the Fed and the SEC, but it shows 
that the SEC might act as a stability determinant agency in a non-prudential sense. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the SEC has no explicit legal duty to go after financial stability 
or lessen the probability of future crises.  
 
Yet, the establishment of the FSOC, a council of regulators created for financial stability 
purposes, has introduced new mandates to its members.442  Post-crisis agenda tacitly 
assigns the SEC the responsibility about financial stability as being one of the members 
of the FSOC. This indirect responsibility includes production of necessary annual reports 
about the risks and threats that the SEC considers important for the financial stability443 
or it can be the FSOC’s power to advise increased standards or protections for activities 
or practices that endangers the financial stability and in return this advice might require 
the SEC to oversee the financial industry from stability point of view444. So, even if the 
legal boundaries of the SEC in financial stability are still not clearly defined even after 
the Dodd-Frank, one can say that the SEC can find this responsibility per se. According 
to Allen, s 2 of the 1934 Act, which establishes the grounds for securities regulation, 
provides a legislative direction for the SEC and it compasses a general responsibility for 
                                               
440 Hu,‘Efficient Markets and the Law:A Predictable Past and Uncertain Future’ (n 423) 193. 
441 Or it can be prioritizing the political over the important. 
442 Chapter 2,Section 3.1.3. 
443 12 USC§5322(b). 
444 12 USC§5330. 
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the SEC to regulate and behave in way that economic outcomes of securities markets 
failures on the financial system should be at a minimum.445 Further, she thinks that the 
SEC has indirect liability of pursuance of financial stability based on its investor 
protection mandate. Investors with diversified stock portfolios are the ones that most 
likely to be affected by the instability or crisis in the aggregate compared to individual 
cases of fraud or misconduct.446 For this reason, which is simply based on collective harm 
that the investors face, prevention of market failures is part of the duty of the SEC as part 
of its investor protection objective. Yet, this approach takes financial stability as an 
overarching objective for agencies regulating the financial markets and it accepts that 
protection of financial stability (although not in a prudential regulation sense) can be 
conceptualised as part of investor protection. So, financial stability regulation here does 
not only encompass prudential regulation, it also includes investor and consumer 
protection regulation tacitly.  
 
The Treasury and the Fed are strong governmental actors in terms of having bargaining 
powers regarding economic issues (compared to the SEC), and the concern here is the 
potential clash between the ideas of unruly but efficient capital markets in short-term and 
safe-and-sound financial system in the long term. Yet, the political economy of the SEC’s 
administrative powers and its independence should not be overshadowed by uncertainty 
about the extent to which market efficiency and investor protection are required to be 
renounced for financial stability. So, the law must address the smooth functioning of 
public policy goals in different regulatory ends and means.  
 
                                               
445 Hillary J. Allen,‘Financial Stability Regulation as Indirect Investor/Consumer Protection 
Regulation’(2016) 90 Tulane Law Review 1113. 
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The next section will discuss the legal framework of the US federal securities law in terms 
of the jurisdiction dealing with bank disclosures with reference to disclosure requirements 
established by BRAs.  
 
2.   Bank Disclosure Schemes under the US Securities Laws and Regulations 
Structuring of the banking regulation in the US is based on the intellectual background 
derived from the Great Depression experience and the philosophy of the New Deal.447 
The paternalistic concept of bank regulation has been founded upon the prevention of 
bank failures by reason of greater public interest in maintaining a safe and sound financial 
system. For example, this approach could be experienced in the veiled application of 
confidential supervision as means of achieving regulatory policies.448 The premise that 
depositors cannot be the facilitators of surveillance of banks due to their potential 
negative reaction to any adverse information pertaining to the bank’s financial condition 
or riskiness of banks was the main concern of regulators in not supporting public 
disclosures by banks.449 US legal history pertaining to banks witnessed disclosure-related 
problems during the Great Depression and Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L).450 So, the 
established mechanisms are generally result of such experiences and should therefore be 
                                               
447 Fischer, Rosenfield, Stillman (n 375) 302. 
448 Confidential supervision was not particularly mandated by the regulation, but the practice 
was supporting the non-disclosure of bank information to outsiders and there was no general 
law requiring confidentiality of bank information over public disclosures. Boro (n 217). 
449 Mathewson (n 379). 
450 For example, in a case involving Manufacturers Hanover Bank, the news about the physical 
condition of the bank building turned out to be a market rumour about the shaky financial 
standing of the bank and the stock prices of the bank experienced sudden and sharp declines and 
the bank consequently came close to collapse. Daniel L. Goelzer,‘Current Developments in SEC 
Regulation of Depository Institutions’(1990)(accessed May 
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interpreted in their dynamics. 451  As the discussion concerning market discipline 
addressed, the argument stating that the majority of bank assets is supported by a small 
sized, but great number of depositors and the depositors having particular interest in the 
soundness of the bank consist of the minority with lesser amounts of deposits mean that 
public disclosures are not as necessary as one might think and rather, confidential 
supervision might be complementary. 452  Maybe based on this view, confidential 
supervision was provided as a safeguarding measure to prevent bank runs, and the bank’s 
general immunity from market discipline by the availability of the information to only 
regulators rather than the public has been one of the failures in causing opaque financial 
markets.  
 
Banks subject to securities disclosure regulations had long been linked to the post-Great 
Depression approach of transparency-fragility view and the law still accommodates a 
bifurcated jurisdiction system pertaining to disclosure by banks and BHCs. It means that 
under the present regulatory system, while the SEC regulates BHC disclosures, the 
disclosures made by individual banks are enforced and administered by the relevant bank 
regulators. This bifurcation, as a product of the Great Depression, creates academic 
questions about its necessity, efficiency or bias towards banks; yet the overall disclosure 
regime forming the whole picture provides that bank information disclosure is a tenet of 
bank regulation as it is also a regulatory tool used by bank supervisors/regulators.  
 
                                               
451 Jane W. D’Arista, The Evolution of US Finance Vol II (Routledge 1994) 337. Especially the 
monumental collapse of the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company supported 
the initiatives towards bank transparency in the US. 
452 Chapter 3,Section 4.  
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The development of the parallel disclosure universe for banks as a product of BCBS-
related exercises has been a major step towards bank transparency in the US.453 Further, 
for large and complex banks operating under BHCs, mentioned opacity and its 
concomitant consequences in inaccurate risk pricing in the market have pioneered the 
arguments about the public disclosure of stress-tests information and further risk and 
capital-related information.454 Risk-related provisions of the SEC disclosure system do 
not particularly ask for public disclosure of stress-testing results; but on the regulatory 
side, the discussions related to greater access to regulatory information by the public and 
the use of market information for supervisory purposes is not new 455  and the 
developments on the public disclosure of stress-testing are the products of the GFC and 
its accompanying trend towards more transparency. 
 
Both the domain of BRAs and the SEC disclosure system share common elements related 
to capital adequacy and major risks; but enforcement mechanisms and the amount of 
information required are different. For instance, while BRA disclosure provisions require 
more financially complex and demanding data from banks about risks, the SEC disclosure 
system is not.456 Also, bank regulator disclosure system, as underpinned by the BCBS, 
has developed beyond disclosure of market risks as being supplementary to capital 
adequacy rules.457  The money raised from issuing stocks is not repaid and therefore it 
constitutes a portion of the cushion against potential vicissitudes. Large and complex 
                                               
453 Section 2.1.2. 
454 12 USC§5365(i)(1)(B)(v) and §5365(i)(2)(C)(iv). The relevant provision applies to BHCs 
with total consolidated assets equal to or greater than the amount specified at 12 USC§5365. 
455 Mark J. Flannery,‘The Use of Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review 
of US Empirical Evidence’ (1998) 30(3) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 273. 
456 Hu,‘Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information’ (n 400) 612. 
457 The US Basel III Adopting Release,78 Fed. Reg. 62,018 (Oct 11,2013). 
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banks, which are generally deemed systemically important, in this respect, are required 
to disclose highly detailed information on their capital adequacy.458  BRA disclosure 
requirements, as revised at regular intervals based on the guidance of the BCBS, are 
prospered on the face of negative externalities emanated from bank risks. So, while 
discussing the bank disclosures, one should bear in mind that those mentioned two 
disclosure universes are undergirded by different goals even if they both serve for bank 
transparency and public interest.459  
 
Considering the overall disclosure scheme for bank disclosures, there will be two main 
arguments in the subsequent subsections: The first is one about the impracticability of 
relevant bank-specific provisions in 1933 and 1934 Acts, which stands as an academic 
questioning; and the second one is about the tension emanating from BHC disclosures 
and financial stability concerns occurred during the GFC.  
 
2.1.The Jurisdiction of the SEC and Application of Securities Information 
Regulations Towards Banks 
2.1.1.   Banks as Individual Organizations  
The 1933 Act establishes that securities issued460 by a national bank or any banking 
institution organized in a US jurisdiction are exempted from registration and delivery of 
prospectuses pursuant to s 3(a)(2).461 However, the federal bank agencies462 have the 
                                               
458 Ibid 62,021. 
459 Chapter 3,Section 2.3.1. 
460 ‘or guaranteed’ 
461 15 USC§77c(a)(2),(5) and 15 USC§78c(a)(5)(C).  
462 The OCC is the authority that charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks together 
with federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. The FDIC is the authority for state banks 
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authority to establish disclosure requirements for bank-issued securities under banking 
laws.463    
 
The SEC frequently advised Congress that such an exemption provided to banks should 
be changed with a rule that requires banks to register with the SEC by providing authority 
to the SEC to arrange exemptions for banks.464 While the purpose of such an exemption 
was not clearly described, the underlying reason of the exemption of securities issued by 
banks from registration is the premise that regardless of their charter, either state or 
federal, they are already highly regulated in a sense that even though there is no 
registration requirement, regulations that banks are subjected to require them to disclose 
sufficient information to investors regarding their finances. Another reason for such an 
exemption was the fear of bank runs emanating from the public disclosure of bank 
financial data.  
 
One may think that if a bank has concerns about releasing its financial information to the 
public, which might worsen its financial position, it should not go public in the first place. 
However, this way of thinking also establishes a paradox such that the decision to go 
public is basically made to be able to reach the capital in funding the bank. Therefore, the 
existence of exemption from registration only provides the exemption for new offerings 
                                               
and state-licensed branches of foreign banks with insured deposits. The Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System is the primary regulator of the state-chartered member banks.  
463 For the OCC regulation see 12 CFR§16 and 12 CFR§11.2-3, for the FR Board see 12 
CFR§208.36, for the FDIC see FDIC Statement of Policy regarding Use of Offering Circulars in 
connection with Public Distribution of Bank Securities (1996),12 CFR§335 and 12 CFR§350. 
464 For instance see ‘The Report by the United States SEC on the Financial Guarantee 
Market:The Use of the Exemption in Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Securities 
Guaranteed by Banks and the Use of Insurance Policies to Guarantee Debt 
Securities’(1987)(accessed May 2, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1987.pdf.   
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of bank securities and the discussion related to the spectre of bank runs should also be 
directed towards the bank securities traded in the secondary markets. Also, the capital 
adequacy requirements to which banks are subject suggest that banks have sufficient 
funds for timely principal and interest payments to be given to the holders of their debt 
securities.  
 
The arguments about the exemption should be interpreted vis-à-vis the regulatory 
environment, such that disclosure requirements applicable to banks under federal 
supervision were mainly directed to protection of depositors and other creditors, not 
stockholders.465 This exemption was seen as a reflection of the protectionist approach so 
that bank regulation did not require public disclosure of income statements, earnings 
reports, or dividend information because this information was presumed confidential for 
banks.466 
 
Therefore, the characterization of bank regulation by safety and soundness motives, 
intentionally or inadvertently, presented anti-investor behaviour. The concerns related to 
the protection of the bank investors were addressed within another law, which set out 
public disclosure of some certain information via local newspapers and circulars; but bank 
stockholders still did not have access to the same level of information as other investors 
holding securities under the SEC.467 Consequently, the discussion about bank disclosures 
under the 1933 Act centred on whether the application of anti-fraud and misrepresentation 
provisions provide indirect but sufficient protection to stockholders, whether bank 
supervision on both federal and state levels is adequately and fully accomplished, and 
                                               
465 H.D.M. Jr.,‘Banks and Securities Act of 1933’ (1966) 52(1) Virginia Law Review 117,118. 
466 109 Congressional Record 9312 (1963) cited from Ibid 125. 
467 National Bank Act of 1864,s 34. 
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whether the management of information to protect investors is efficiently handled by 
those agencies which are familiar with bank operations and problems, so that placements 
of banks under the SEC by registration is not essential to protect investors. The existence 
of this exemption today provides that the rationale behind the exemption still survives 
regardless of the post-depression conditions that the acts were passed back then.  
 
In terms of the continuing disclosure requirements, s 12(i) of the 1934 Act establishes 
that the regulatory enforcement of the regulations about bank securities, as specified one 
by one under s 12(i), is under the charge of bank regulators.468 The intention of Congress 
in the 1934 Act was not to exclude banks from the registration reporting rules as it could 
be seen in the original version in the Act and the SEC implemented a provisional 
exception for banks to be excluded from registration of their securities listed on the 
exchange; but such an exception was never invalidated.469 The amendments made in 1964 
established new provisions about disclosures regarding securities in the OTC markets 
including banks which satisfied the specified threshold levels of shareholders and assets; 
but the same amendments also eliminated the jurisdiction of the SEC for the enforcement 
of reporting and disclosure requirements and handed over the administration of such 
provisions to the BRAs.470  
 
The exemption provided by the 1933 Act is therefore not the end for the banks, and bank 
regulators were thought to perform the relevant functions of the SEC under the 1934 Act. 
Even though bank-issued securities are not subject to the 1933 Act, they might be subject 
                                               
468 15 USC§78(l)(i). 
469 Louis Loss&Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (5th edn,Wolters Kluwer 
2004) 483. 
470 D’Arista (n 451) 338. 
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to the 1934 Act if they satisfy the registration requirements such as satisfying the 
threshold limits.471 This means that bank securities issued at initial public offering are 
generally exempted from the federal system of securities regulation472; yet the federal 
system of continuous disclosure applies to those securities as part of the secondary market 
for securities.473 From the beginning of the implementation of the 1934 Act banks were 
subject to the requirements of the 1934 Act simply because trading (and therefore listing) 
on a national securities exchange requires registration of the securities; but the 1934 Act 
had not had a big impact on banks since they had already been delisting their securities 
in practice. 
 
In 1974, as a response to criticisms appearing on the differences between the level of 
disclosures established for public companies and banks, the criterion of ‘substantially 
similar’ to SEC regulations was established and therefore the tendency of the bank 
agencies in providing time and space to banks to deal with their financial problems and 
minimize the content and the number of disclosures rather than reflecting such difficulty 
to the market was hoped to diminish. However, expectation from those bank agencies to 
make public disclosures as being contradictory to their working principles under 
confidentiality has been the matter of debate.  
 
                                               
471 Under the JOBS Act, the threshold limit is specified as minimum $10 million in total assets 
and a class of equity security (other than exempted security) held of record by minimum 2000 
people. 15 USC§78l(g)(1)(B)(as of Nov 2018). 
472 Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law & Regulation (2nd edn,Wolters Kluwer 2016) ch 7.02.  
473 Michael P. Malloy,‘The 12(i)’ed Monster: Administration of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 by the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies’ (1990) 19(2) Hofstra Law Review 1,9. 
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In short, the 1934 Act refers to BRAs as federal authorities to administer and enforce 
specified sections of the 1934 Act and some enumerated sections of the SOX.474 In terms 
of the responsibility of such agencies, it is stated that ‘in carrying out their responsibilities 
under this subsection, the agencies named in the first sentence of this subsection shall 
issue substantially similar regulations and rules issued by the Commission …’ and it 
continues: 
 
… unless they find that implementation of substantially similar regulations with respect 
to insured banks and insured institutions are not necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for protection of investors, and publish such findings, and the detailed reasons 
therefore, in the Federal Register.475 
 
This statement is important because it is the snapshot presenting the philosophy of the 
securities regulation in investor protection and the philosophy of the regulators to 
accommodate safe harbours that provide the cases for non-disclosures with intent to 
prevent bank runs and preserve efficient bank regulation. However, as it will be explored 
later, this discussion now appears academic.  
 
Since 1974 the two values (that are generally declared as opposing each other) of safety 
and soundness and public disclosure have been dealt with by the provision (s 12(i)) in the 
1934 Act ordering BRAs to issue substantially similar regulations to those delivered by 
the SEC as long as it is conforming with the public interest. Yet, most of the banks in the 
US formed under BHC structure and the number of individual banks is low. So, the US 
regulatory architecture for banks is complex with different BRAs and rules and the 
                                               
474 For the OCC see 12 CFR§Part 16.3 and 16.5;for the FDIC see FDIC Final Rule, 59 FR 
67166 (Dec 29,1994);12 CFR§335. 
475 15 USC§78l(i). 
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discussions pertaining to institution-based and functional-based regulations are still 
valid.476 Section 12(i) of the 1934 Act supports the institution-based regulatory approach; 
but there have been disparities between the BRAs in their regulatory philosophies and 
actions in terms of their application of those relevant provisions.477  However, those 
inconsistencies between the BRAs still present a single uniform standing compared to 
their variations from the SEC.  
 
BRAs have the authority over banks, and yet the SEC has not made any particular 
recommendation as to the extent of necessary disclosures for highly regulated 
establishments including banks, and this area is governed by the rules and guidelines 
established by relevant BRAs, not the SEC.     
 
It was experienced that those BRAs at one time had such regulations as can be seen from 
the earlier versions of the OCC disclosure regulations or FDIC disclosure circular; yet, at 
present such regulations require banks to disclose information on the forms required by 
the SEC for other public companies as regulated in the 1934 Act.478 Disclosures about the 
financial condition, loan loss activities, profitability, and lending activities of banks were 
criticized as being not sufficiently detailed compared to the SEC disclosure 
requirements.479 The tendency of those bank agencies to minimize bank disclosures was 
suppressed by the coordinated effort based on the lack of comparability, variations 
between disclosure standards, and potential unfair competitive advantages as a 
consequence of being exempt from the standards and rules enforced on other securities 
                                               
476 The US Government Accountability Office Report GAO-16-175 (Feb 2016). 
477 Stephen K Huber (n 384) 65. 
478 Melanie L. Fein, Securities Activities of Banks (4th edn,Wolters Kluwer 2016) 3-42. 
479 The Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets (1963) HR Document No:95,88th 
Congress,1st Session. 
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players. Those criticisms based on investor protection highlighted the great numbers of 
bank-issued securities trading in the OTC market, and the recommendation of the report 
was responded to with the first appearance of s 12(i) and therefore delegated the BRAs 
for bank-issued securities.  
 
The intention of Congress’ implementation of s 12(i) was discussed at length in terms of 
whether commercial banks were intended to be subject to full disclosure requirements. 
The uncertainty continued even during the 1980s when some banks failed to release 
negative results of bank examinations and claimed confidentiality privileges to avoid 
public disclosures.480 Inconsistent development of US bank disclosure systems has been 
the reason for such ambiguity. For example, call reports to be submitted to the FDIC were 
not publicly available until 1972 for reasons of safety and soundness, and while such 
information was not available from the FDIC, disclosing the same information by reason 
of securities regulation would be inconsistent.481  
 
As addressed in the case of SEC v Youmans,482 information pertaining to bank problems 
is deemed material for the purposes of the securities regulation such that the 
confidentiality of the OCC report with adverse information about the bank should not be 
the reason for omitting the same information from SEC filings. In Youmans, negative 
feedback about the bank’s activities received from the bank examiners was not provided 
in the filings made with the SEC based on the idea that the information was confidential 
as being a part of the examination report.  However, the SEC asserted that, even if the 
                                               
480 Robert P. Bartlett III,‘Making Banks Transparent’(2012) 65(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 
293,308. 
481 See 37 Fed. Reg. 28,607-02(1972). However, the FOIA provides bank regulators power to 
reject the disclose examination reports.5 USC§552(b)(8). 
482 SEC v Youmans,543 Fed. Supp.1292(E.D.Tenn. 1982). 
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information in the examination report might be confidential, bank management was 
aware of the negative condition of the bank ‘simply by virtue of their presence’483 and, 
further, that it did not ask for the full disclosure of the examination report itself, but 
instead the substance of the report was deemed material so that disclosure was required. 
Though the case presented an acceptance of this type of distinction, it did not specifically 
address the issue of the concurrent application of two separate bodies of laws by the same 
agency; rather, the court just presented its decision on the side of disclosure without 
touching upon the core discussion about why the principle of public disclosure is 
preferred over confidentiality in the case.484 Overall, in weighing the interests, the court 
here supported the view that interests emanating from the investors’ capacity to make 
well-informed decisions outweigh the interests based on the bank’s protection-from-
disclosure provisions.   
 
It has been mentioned that the bank regulators, as having discretion to disclose 
information in their examination records, provide a confidentiality cloak to banks in 
avoiding disclosure, which is material for the investors.485 The doctrine of regulatory 
confidentiality is justified on prudential grounds where circumstances might require 
confidential resolution of supervisory and enforcement issues.486 It is true that the running 
of the bank oversight system requires a degree of reticence, but the limits of public 
disclosures by BRAs is also on a constant change in the long run. For example, the 
argument was made for the enforcement actions taken by the BRAs in terms of revealing 
                                               
483 James C. Treadway,‘Deposit Insurance Reform: The Response from the SEC Insuring 
Confidence’ (1986) 5 Ann Rev of Banking L 149,151. 
484 SEC v Youmans (n 482) at 1301. 
485 David G. Oedel,‘Civil Liability for the Concealment of Bank Trouble’ (1987) 6 Ann Rev 
Banking L 443,466. 
486 Chapter 3,Section 5. 
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wrongdoings by banks and by persons associated with them.487 Enforcement actions are 
inherently adverse information, which might leave question marks in people’s minds that 
while the disclosure of formal enforcement actions that threatens bank safety is allowed, 
other examination reports are not.488 Malloy discusses that this complication appeared in 
the past and resulted in favour of disclosure to investors even though such information 
generally falls under the confidential treatment by BRAs.489  
 
Exemption 8 of the FOIA provides that the rule that requires agencies to make public 
disclosures does not apply to matters that are ‘contained in or related to examination, 
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency 
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions’.490 The use of the 
FOIA exemption has developed with court decisions that have utilised broad standards 
including overall security of the financial system or the protection of public confidence 
in banks.491 The broad coverage of this exemption provides flexibility to bank regulators, 
                                               
487 BRAs publish the formal enforcement actions (except sanctions taken against the personnel) 
online. 12 USC§1818(u) stipulates public disclosures of final orders and agreements by BRAs. 
12 USC§1818(u)(4) establishes that BRAs can delay public disclosures of administrative 
enforcement proceedings if such disclosure creates a danger to the safety and soundness of the 
bank and as provided at 12 USC§1818(u)(1)(A). BRAs, as a result of their discretionary 
decision, might decide not to disclose violation-revealing agreements or statements if the public 
interest requires to do so.   
488 See the discussion at Section 2.1.2. 
489 Malloy, Banking Law & Regulation (n 472) ch 8.02. 
490 5 USC§552(b)(8). ‘The extent to which a particular record will be deemed “related to” an 
examination report, however, depends on the individual facts and circumstances, and is subject 
to some litigation risk…’Kevin J. Harnisch, Paul H. Pashkoff and Michael A. 
Umayam,‘Controversial Dodd-Frank FOIA Provision Repealed, Revised’ (2010) Lexology 
Article (Accessed Dec 22,2016)https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cc5a97e3-
4a66-432f-add7-269a5c45d7e5.  
491 Courts have applied exemption 8 to information that could undermine public confidence and 
investment in the regulated institution and in the financial sector. For the elaboration of court 
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as ‘[A]ll records, regardless of the source, of a bank’s financial condition and operations’ 
can fall under exemption, as one court found,492 and additionally the court only needs to 
find that such information is related to matters about reports.493 So, the courts have 
interpreted this exemption in line with the interests of BRAs. Together with the FOIA 
exemption from public disclosure and relevant confidentiality rules of those federal bank 
agencies, the protection of the relationship among the banks and their supervisory 
agencies and ensuring the security of banks have been possible.  
 
In general, the examination and operating reports including supervisory ratings are not 
available to the public. Examiner-related information about banks is surely a great source 
of information in pricing the securities and towards the more transparent financial system; 
one cannot guess whether the same enhanced disclosure trend will change the disclosure 
limits of non-public supervisory information in the future. Basically, the extent that some 
supervisory information is deemed confidential is the key element in differentiating 
securities regulation and bank regulation.494 Under current conditions, bank regulators 
are advised to reach a combination of public and private oversight on the optimal level495 
if they are not willing to fully share the information that they possess with the public.  
 
                                               
decisions about exemption 8 see the Department of Justice Guide to the FOIA(accessed Oct 1, 
2016)https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption8.pdf.   
492 See Judicial Watch (n 296) at 38. 
493 See Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association v. SEC (n 296). 
494 Chapter 3,Section 5. 
495 Flannery (n 455) 299. 
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However, outsiders might acquire substantial bank information through other ways such 
as the bank’s reports of condition and income (known as ‘Call Reports’),496  annual 
disclosure statements,497 the bank’s Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR),498 the 
information provided by CRAs, other reports or ratings about the bank compiled by 
private firms which track the performance of banks, and any information released by 
banks being a registered entity under the SEC. 499  Accordingly, some information 
disclosed based on securities regulation might be already publicly available by way of 
publication of other information by BRAs.  
 
It should be noted that banks have never been exempted from the SEC enforcement of 
anti-fraud regulations500 and general anti-fraud rules501 and they are applicable to banks 
and their enforcement is given to SEC, not to BRAs. The authority granted under s 10(b) 
of the 1934 Act might create some publicity concerns in relation to banks. The particular 
rule states that it is prohibited to ‘… to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary … in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security’.502 It is clear that the rule aims to equalize access to information. Given the 
                                               
496 Call Reports are required by law at each calendar quarter and they must be submitted to 
Federal FIs Examination Council (FFIEC). See12 USC§324 for state member banks;12 
USC§1817 for state non-member banks and 12 USC§161 for national banks.  
497 For OCC regulated banks see 12 CFR§18.3-9. For FDIC regulated banks see 12 CFR§350.3.  
498 The UBPR is a financial analysis of a commercial bank, which files its Call Report to 
FFIEC. See https://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm(accessed July 2, 2016).  
499Also, BCBS disclosure rules reflected in laws ask for information about risk levels and 
capital status of the bank. See 12 CFR§3.61-63;3.212;3.171. Further, information about loan-to-
deposit ratio or lending patterns of banks is required under the Community Reinvestment Act. 
See 12 CFR§Part 25,228,345,195.  
500 15 USC§78(j) and 17 CFR§240.10b-5. 
501 Banks are not subject to the anti-fraud rule established at the 1933 Act,s 12(2).See 15 
USC§771(2). 
502 17 CFR§240.10b-5. 
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indirect enforcement authority of BRAs over the banks’ and bank-associated parties’ 
‘violations of a law, rule or regulation’,503 one might think that BRAs have the authority 
to enforce the general anti-fraud rule for violations pertaining to bank-issued securities 
even if it is not one of the sections numerated under s 12(i) of the 1934 Act. In this sense, 
theoretically, BRAs can find an indirect enforcement authority to take actions for the 
violation of the anti-fraud rule.504 Yet, it is a matter of interpretation.  
 
In conclusion, the SEC has jurisdiction over the application of anti-fraud provisions over 
banks and it creates several policy questions regarding public disclosure of information. 
Assuming that the disclosure of information might be detrimental to the safety and 
soundness of the system, the first question is whether the courts will place as much 
emphasis on the protection of depositors, the banking sector, and the markets in general 
as BRAs do.505 The second (and a hypothetical one) question is, if a BRA decides to take 
action, such as limiting a bank’s operations or recommending the liquidation of assets or 
loans, or organizing the merger or acquisition of the bank, is there a necessity to release 
such information when stability of the banking or financial system is in question?506 
Enforcement and administration of anti-fraud provisions by the SEC is part of the general 
question whether banks really should be subject to securities laws disclosure regimes. 
There is bank information which is non-public and the property of the relevant BRA. In 
a case where the information is not classified as non-public, but its public disclosure is 
                                               
503 12 USC§1818(b)(1). 
504 Malloy, Banking Law&Regulation (n 472) ch 8.02[F]. 
505 Bruce Alan Mann, ‘Securities Disclosure Requirements-Vive La Difference’ (1975) 92 
Banking Law Journal 109,117. 
506 Ibid 118. 
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also not desired by the BRAs, the method of handling concerns about liability based on 
anti-fraud regulations should be addressed.507  
 
The parallel system of disclosure that BRAs establish for the securities of individually 
operating banks is identical to SEC regulations; but other elements that make banks 
different from other public firms (such as the BRA’s authority on the bank capital 
formation (bank capital formation necessitates the chartering BRA to perform a merit 
review on the proposed issuance of preferred stocks))508 or capital adequacy regulations) 
suggest that banks are constrained in various ways in the securities markets. Full 
application of securities regulation to banks has further implications for the division of 
regulatory domain. In the context of functional regulation, where distribution of the duties 
is made based on the nature of the activity performed in each organization, all securities 
activities of banks might be subject to the SEC rather than a BRA based on the premise 
that there is one institutional identity of the bank and it should be regulated under one 
single agency for the overall safety and soundness of the bank. 
 
Codification of the concept of functional regulation under the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 (GLBA) did not disrupt the exemption provided to bank-
issued securities under the 1933 Act. The SEC, as a supporter of the accommodation of 
functional regulation, does not engage in issues about whether disclosure might lead a 
                                               
507 Another question is that, if BRAs change their approach from incorporation by reference to 
issuance of substantially similar provisions to those established for other public companies, can 
the SEC directly compel banks to follow their disclosure regimes by the threat of enforcing 
Rule 10b-5 on banks where it considers the disclosure requirements established by BRAs 
unsatisfactory? However, this question does not go from being a theoretical one. 
508 For example for national banks see 12 USC§51a.Also see 12 CFR§5.46(g) for the cases 
where prior approval of the OCC is seen necessary to increase the bank’s permanent capital. 
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firm to fail or a whole sector to deteriorate; rather, it is the market’s judgment, not the 
SEC’s conclusion to eliminate the firms from the market.509  The main pillar of the 
disclosure system is to provide and maintain a system in which competing private 
institutions operate on fair and equal grounds to serve the public and any differentiated 
treatment of a firm for public policy and interest reasons might result in the distortion of 
competition (for example, such behaviour might lead to changes in the way the weaker 
competitor is treated).510  
 
Accordingly, the SEC supports the adjustments in the capital-raising mechanism being 
made without favouring any parties even if the disclosure standards accepted by BRAs 
are substantially similar to theirs so that equal enforcement is accepted as a necessity of 
equal regulation. However, the SEC’s approach ignores that regulators must establish the 
laws that are tailored to the risk profile of the institution. It might seem a very protective 
approach not to treat banks as any other public companies; yet the disclosure standards 
established by those BRAs generally showed parallelism with SEC disclosures as they 
use incorporation by reference method.  
 
S 12(i) has consistently withstood the structural reform and as interest groups have 
recurrently bring up the this duplicative shadow systems residing in s 12(i) to the agenda 
by recommending that all securities activities should be regulated and enforced by one 
agency under a centralized system of securities regulation which can simply be 
                                               
509 Mathewson (n 379) 158. 
510 John R. Evans,‘Regulation Bank Securities Activities’ (1974) 91(7) Banking Law Journal 
611,614. 
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accomplished by the elimination of s 12(i).511 The existence of s 12(i), therefore, is 
important for the application of systematic disclosure rules to banks; yet the materially 
important underlying information, in theory, might not be fully disclosed if bank 
regulators think that the implementation of such regulation is not necessary or appropriate 
for the public interest or for the protection of investors. It can therefore be said that the 
statutory authority of the SEC in disciplining the banks is less than that of bank regulators. 
The important point is that all BRAs have decided to incorporate by reference to SEC’s 
rules for those given sections. It means that banks are at present following the same rules 
as other public companies. 
 
The fragmented system applicable to banks is only a subject of academic discussion. The 
full application of market discipline is one of the pillars for market confidence and 
investor protection, and the inclusion of banks directly to SEC disclosure requirements 
was seen as necessary for uniform standards, comparability, and consistency for 
shareholders. The split between authorities applicable to banks, as one represents 
substantive regulations and another stands for securities regulation, might be abandoned 
in favour of one uniform regulation. However, the application of the materiality test for 
banks might not produce the same results as other public companies because those firms 
do not have to follow a regulatory authority which might encourage the decision of 
changing the bank management or the date by which the bank must fund itself up to a 
certain amount if the bank is deemed as not well capitalized or not well managed.  
 
                                               
511 For those proposal reforms supporting the repeal of s 12(i) see US Department of the 
Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive 
Banks (1991) and the Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services(1984). 
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The interference by BRAs directly or indirectly influences the bank management and 
operations as well as the bank’s ability to make distributions to its shareholders. First of 
all, the business subject of the banks is different from those non-financial firms in the 
capital markets; and so, apart from banks’ importance in safety and soundness of the 
financial system, direct regulation by the SEC and full application of materiality test 
might not directly provide comparability on a fair and equal ground.512 On the other hand, 
the persistence of keeping s 12(i) rather than placing banks directly under the SEC 
jurisdiction might create doubts because BRAs have embraced that securities regulation 
should be taken care of by the SEC. 
 
2.1.2.   Bank Holding Companies 
Most of the commercial banks in the US are subsidiaries of BHCs and their assets and 
liabilities are therefore part of their holding companies. 513  It means most banks are 
accustomed to SEC regulations.514 
 
A BHC means any company that has control over or ownership of one or more US 
banks.515 They are not banks as they do not comply with the description provided at the 
1934 Act,516 and if they satisfy the 12(g) requirements, they are simply subject to SEC 
jurisdiction. This is important because it means that, in Loss and Seligman’s words, 
                                               
512 D’Arista (n 451) 341. 
513 Nicola Cetorelli,‘How Bank Holding Companies Evolved?’(2015) World Economic Forum 
(accessed July 17, 2016) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/how-have-bank-holding-
companies-evolved/.  
514 Alfred M. Pollard and Joseph P. Daly, Banking Law in the Unites States Vol I (4th edn,Juris 
Publishing 2014) 14-11. 
515 The BHC Act of 1956,12 USC§1841(a)(1). 
516 15 USC§78c(a)(6). 
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‘…inevitably gives the indirect say on the financial and other disclosures acquired with 
respect to the subsidiary banks.’517  
 
BHCs can be considered as financial malls of shops dealing with financial intermediation 
such as brokerage, mutual funds, brokerage, underwriting and a bank and such an 
organizational structure brings several problems, as experienced during the GFC.518 
BHCs have been heavily criticised because they were associated with the TBTF and SIFI 
phenomenon and their size, complexity and its internal connections between shops made 
them black boxes due to the lack of reliable information about their assets, related risks 
and portfolio holdings for each shops they hold.  The regulators of each shop and the 
policies of those regulators are different:  Safety and soundness of a subsidiary bank, 
protection of FDIC funds and depositors and other related prudential concerns are subject 
to bank regulatory system while the SEC sees the whole big organisation from the 
investor protection and abidance to fiduciary duties point of view.519 Yet, as it is discussed 
further under this subsection, the crisis triggered such tension for BHCs.  
 
Even though the bank owned by a holding company is subject to the OCC and FDIC 
regulations, the BHC has to register with the Board of Governors of the FR System. 
Therefore, the FR as a supervisory authority has control over those BHCs regardless of 
whether the bank is a state or national bank so that they are subject to supervisory 
                                               
517 Loss&Seligman (n 469) 485. 
518 Tamar Frankel,‘Why BHCs Need to be Broken Up? (2014)(accessed Jan 
5,2016)https://www.bu.edu/today/2014/why-bank-holding-companies-need-to-be-broken-up/.   
519 As banks have access to the Fed discount window, some investment banks changed their 
charters to BHCs to reach the Fed assistance during the GFC. Eva Becker, Knowledge Capture 
in Financial Regulation (Springer VS 2016) 166. 
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measures such as capital adequacy rules, risk exposures, and their components.520 The 
organizational structure of BHCs require them to deal with reporting to two regulators 
because while their bank subsidiaries have to make disclosures to their primary regulators, 
the BHC itself has to report to the FR. BHCs might therefore make disclosures in more 
than one place, such as the SEC and the FR, and they are required to provide the 
information where such information can be found by the public.521 As mentioned above, 
BHCs with respect to the registration of securities for public sale, periodic and other 
reporting requirements, and tender offers are all subject to regulations of the SEC under 
the 1934 Act, not BRAs. Therefore, as a public company, a BHC’s disclosures of the 
trades to its stockholders are regulated by the SEC. 
 
The traditional services that bank involve have changed in time as they have been heavily 
influenced by the wholesale markets, more specifically derivatives generally at the cost 
of the conventional banking activities.522 Such transformation, as long as it is detectable 
from the balance sheets and from other released information, is addressed under the SEC 
disclosure regime as well as the established parallel bank regulator disclosure system. 
However, the objectives of these disclosures are different, and the SEC addresses it thus:   
We are cognizant of the fact that securities and banking disclosures serve different 
purposes in light of the different missions of their respective regulatory regimes. Where 
our disclosure regime serves our core missions of investor protection, fair, orderly, and 
                                               
520 12 CFR§225. 
521 For example,12 CFR§217.62-63 establishes the public disclosures about the bank capital 
adequacy. 
522 The OECD Report for G20 Leaders (2013)(accessed Sep 2, 
2015)http://www.oecd.org/finance/privatepensions/G20reportLTFinancingForGrowthRussianPr
esidency2013.pdf.  
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efficient markets, and capital formation, the U.S. banking agency regulatory regime is 
premised largely on ensuring safety and soundness of banking organizations.523  
Here, tension over the public interest between the SEC and BRAs should also be 
mentioned because, as examined previously,524  the inherent conflict mentioned also 
appears in the interpretation of public interest. For the SEC, disclosure of material 
information on a rapid and current basis is in the public interest, and so the SEC interprets 
the public interest in the context of the protection of investors, the promotion of efficiency, 
competition and capital formation where public disclosure is a major tool to serve the 
public interest.525 However, in terms of the disclosure of certain items such as material 
compliance violations that require formal enforcement actions, events of default or a 
requirement to disclose material contracts (especially contracts, commitments, demands, 
events or uncertainties that result in, or that are reasonably likely to result in, the firm’s 
liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way526) under Regulation S-K, the 
application of the term ‘public interest’ under banking regulation implies 
‘confidentiality’. 527  According to Miller, classifying some material confidential 
information (that has to be disclosed according to the SEC) for protection of the stability 
of the banking and financial system is an intentional informational asymmetry permitted 
by BRAs. 528  Another discussion is about the disclosure restrictions on confidential 
                                               
523 SEC,‘Request for Comment on Possible Changes to Industry Guide 3’ (Feb 7,2017) at 74 
(accessed April 30, 2017)https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/33-10321.pdf. 
524 Chapter 3,Section 5.  
525 Analysis of Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies for SEC File Number S7-02-17 at 26-
27 (accessed Jan 7,2018)https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-17/s70217-1749647-151707.pdf.  
526 17 CFR§229.303(a)(1). 
527 ‘… unless the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, determines that 
publication would be contrary to public interest.’(emphasis added)12 USC§1818(u)(1)(A). 
528 This treatment applies to large banks whose failure would disrupt the financial system. This 
discussion is not about CSI that BRAs want to remain confidential for efficiency and 
operational purposes, it is about the discretion provided to BRAs to withhold adverse 
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supervisory information (CSI), as securities laws might compel banks to describe the 
impact of any MoU or other non-public enforcement order that is material to investors.529 
Yet, there is no clear-cut answer provided by BRAs about this matter.530 
 
Therefore, designation of materiality in the purposes of securities regulation is a difficult 
task for banks in drawing the limits of what makes information material for investors. 
Changing disclosure standards for public companies remains a perpetual challenge for 
BRAs to endure the disclosure of supervisory information by banks to public since it is 
material for the purposes of the securities regulation.  
 
However, it also should be noted that the materiality standard under securities law is 
parallel to one embraced by bank regulator disclosure universe; but the concept of 
materiality is more compatible with the interests of bank itself rather than being more 
investor-focused.531 Yet, certain points should be pointed out. The materiality standard, 
                                               
information if it is in the public interest. Omission of material information did not apply to 
small depository institution holding companies (those with assets less than 10 billion US 
dollars) because the Federal Reserve itself routinely discloses that information and state bank 
regulators require all enforcement actions to be publicly available. Miller addresses this 
situation as: ‘Apparent market stability, but a fragile stability dependent upon information 
asymmetries that conceal fraud and systemic risks affecting all investors in large depository 
institution holding companies.’Beckwith B. Miller,‘Information Asymmetries Conceal Fraud 
and Systemic Risks in the U.S. Banking Industry’(Aug 19,2017) Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (accessed Jan 
13,2018)https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/19/information-asymmetries-conceal-fraud-
and-systemic-risks-in-the-u-s-banking-industry/. See 12 USC§1818(u)(1)(A) that gives 
appropriate BRA discretion to disclose or withhold formal enforcement actions. See footnote 
477 and 12 CFR§261.2(c)(1)(ii). 	  
529 Clifford S. Stanford,‘Towards a Coherent and Consistent Framework for Treatment of 
Confidential Supervisory Information’ (2018) 22 North Caroline Banking Institute 41,61. 
530	  Section 2.1.1.	  
531 The US Basel III Adopting Release (n 457). 
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as it is applicable in parallel disclosures required by BRAs, might be a weak form of 
materiality. As established at BCBS, there are rooms for banks not to disclose specific 
items of information (ie particular commercial or financial information which might 
deteriorate the bank’s position) and when banks decide not to disclose, they need to work 
with BRAs to make more general disclosures to public as an alternative to prescribed 
disclosure.532 Yet, the SEC system does not allow a company to decide not to make 
disclosures based on its own discretion and rather, a CTO must be requested from the 
SEC by following the relevant procedures.533 Considering the investor-oriented focus of 
the SEC, it might be asserted that it is not easy to have a CTO for information, which is 
deemed material by the Commission.534  
 
The SEC has specifically addressed BHCs’ disclosures under the Statistical Disclosure 
by Bank Holding Companies, known as Guide 3, to help investors in assessing the firm’s 
earnings and exposure to risks in view of the changing activities of banks.535 The focus 
of this specific guide is to provide information about loans that the banks have extended 
and also surrounding risks and uncertainties that the loans offer. Information regarding 
loans includes items such as the type, maturity, interest rate characteristics, loan loss 
                                               
532 BCBS,‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’(2006) at 
228 (accessed Jan 2, 2015)http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.   
533 17 CFR§230.406 and 17 CFR§240.24b-2. 
534 The joint requirement that the information is commercially important but immaterial to 
investors poses an inherent problem in CTO application. P. Cade Newman,‘Requests for 
Confidential Treatment and “Silent Filings”’ (1996) 29(9) Review of Securities&Commodities 
Regulation 99,106. 
535 Guides for Statistical Disclosure by Bank Holding Companies, Securities Act Release No. 
5735, Exchange Act Release No.12,748,41 Fed. Reg. 39,007(September 14, 1976).Recently 
there has been a request by the SEC to make changes on Guide 3.See Request for Comment on 
Possible Changes to Industry Guide 3 (n 523). 
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experience, or breakdowns of loans (whether the loan falls into past due, restructured non-
performing, or non-accrual categories).536  
 
Financial innovation in the banking industry, for example growing use of derivatives by 
banks, might underscore the simplicity and transmissibility of the information pertaining 
to complex financial activities of banks. The catastrophic experience of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and its window-dressing practices to conceal its true financial standing 
(ie short-term borrowing transactions are used to report inaccurate leverage amounts) 
have led to enhancements in the disclosure of management’s discussion and analysis of 
financial condition and results of operations (MD&A). 537  MD&A has gained more 
importance to ensure that information related to banks’ capital resources and liquidity is 
accurately provided with an eye towards used complex and risk sensitive financial 
instruments, loan losses and possible future risks and risk exposures.538 So, with specific 
to banks, MD&A stands as a significant item exposing bank’s riskiness from the eyes of 
the management compared to other general elements of disclosure requirements. In the 
past and during the GFC, MD&A disclosure created stability-related discussions as to 
disclosure of emergency support from the CB at the height of financial crisis. Yet, the 
S&L crisis already produced a result about it.  
 
The S&L crisis ended up with the failure of hundreds of banks and the use of significant 
amount of federal assistance.539 This was the first step for the SEC to acknowledge that 
FIs actually do not publicly disclose information about the financial assistance they 
                                               
536 Ibid. 
537 The Interpretive Release,Securities Act Release No:9144, Exchange Act Release No:62,934, 
75 Fed. Reg. 59(Sep 28, 2010). 
538 17 CFR§229.303. 
539 Carl Felsenfeld, ‘The Savings and Loan Crisis’ (1991) 59 Fordham Law Review 7. 
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receive. In 1989, in the heat of the crisis, the SEC interpretive release provided that FIs 
should disclose any types of federal financial assistance if they ‘have materially affected, 
or are reasonably likely to have a material future effect upon, financial condition or results 
of operations, the MD&A should provide disclosure of the nature, amounts and effects of 
such assistance’. 540  This ruling titled ‘Effects of Federal Financial Assistance upon 
Operations’ is still applicable; but secret borrowings by FIs were not appropriately or 
fully disclosed either because they did not accept that their massive borrowing from the 
Fed was material and available information was satisfying for investors; or it was the 
Fed’s tacit encouragement made for the protection of financial stability.541 So, pursuant 
to the Guide 3, it is expected from reporting BHCs to disclose any type of assistance in 
the MD&A section.  
 
In turbulent times, specific disclosure provisions regarding to liquidity, trends and 
uncertainties become more important and create grounds for political sensitivity. Item 
303(a)(1) of the Reg S-K requires the firm to ‘identify any known trends or any known 
demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in, or that are reasonably likely to 
result in the registrant’s liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way.’542 Further, the 
market risk disclosure rule requires additional statistical and narrative disclosure related 
to derivatives and other financial products, which can be the source of market risk. Item 
                                               
540 SEC Releases Nos.33-6835; 34-26831; IC-16961; FR-36(May 18,1989)(accessed May 11, 
2017) https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm#P295_64970.  
541 ‘I would have expected some discussion in the management discussion and analysis of how 
this has had a positive impact on these banks’ operating results. The borrowings had to have an 
impact on their liquidity and earnings, but I don’t ever recall anybody saying “we borrowed a 
bunch of money from the Fed at zero percent interest.”’ Lynn E. Turner cited from Gretchen 
Morgenson,‘Secrets of the Bailout, Now Told’ NY Times(Dec 3,2011)(accessed Dec 5, 2017) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/business/secrets-of-the-bailout-now-revealed.html.  
542 17 CFR§229.303(a)(1).  
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305 of Regulation S-K543 establishes the ‘… rules that require disclosures about the 
policies used to account for derivatives, and certain quantitative and qualitative 
information about market risk exposures.’544 Also, several items on Form 8-K, for instance, 
item 2.06 requires firms to release information about the date and magnitude of material 
impairments of their assets. Proposed acquisitions, participation in TARP funds, use of discount 
window facility and relevant information can be disclosed on Form 8-K.  
 
The information provided above shows that the SEC has an industry-specific guide for 
BHCs based on idiosyncratic characteristics (engaging in lending, deposit-taking and 
derivative activities) of these banking organizations to make them more open and 
understandable in the market for investors. Recent discussions on BHC disclosures focus 
on enhanced transparency regarding to material effects of prudential regulation (such as 
stress tests and resolution plans) and derivatives positions and incorporation of regulatory 
disclosures in SEC filings.545  
 
Yet, application of the SEC’s maximum transparency approach came into question in 
some cases and revealed that information sharing in pursuant of securities regulation is 
not fully compatible with the bank and financial stability and bank prudential regulators’ 
interests in safe and soundness of top-tier FIs. 
   
2.2.Cases to Explore: American International Group and Bank of America 
The emphasis given for BHCs is generally related to their riskiness due to their size and 
                                               
543 17 CFR§229.305. 
544 Cited from https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/derivfaq.htm (accessed July 18, 
2015) 
545 Request for Comment on Possible Changes to Industry Guide 3 (n 523). 
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complexity in the system. Their controlling power on US bank assets via consolidation 
and the range of activities they engage in the financial system with their subsidiaries 
operating in diversified areas such as brokerage and dealing, commercial banking, 
insurance or asset management emphasize the importance of BHCs and their debts in 
terms of preventing systemic risk and potential failures. Having great influence over the 
financial system as being generally systemically important FIs, disclosure related 
concerns appeared in the case of the AIG in 2008.546  
 
2.2.1.   American International Group Bailout Mystery 
AIG, as a publicly traded insurance company, was required to file current reports in a 
Form 8-K to the SEC within four working days after experiencing certain events and 
those reports are publicly available.547 The event in this case was to contract involving 
Maiden Lane III (MLIII), which is a financing entity (SPV) created by the AIG and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to buy CDOs (on which AIG had written 
credit default swap contracts) from the AIG counterparties at the height of the financial 
crisis, and the MLIII was an important recipient of federal bailout money to lessen the 
impact of the crisis and prevent the balance sheet type-contagion.548 It is also seen as a 
‘backdoor bailout of counterparties’ (especially banks) because the lion’s share of the 
                                               
546 For an extensive examination for the AIG case, see Congressional Oversight Panel,‘The AIG 
Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy’(Jun 10, 2010)(accessed 
Dec 16, 2016) http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/empirical/AIG-rescue-
cop-061010-report.pdf.  
547 15 USC§78(m)(a)(1). 
548 ‘Public Disclosure as a Last Resort:How the Federal Reserve Fought to Cover Up the Details 
of the AIG Counterparties Bailout from the American People’ Special Report of Committee on 
Oversight and Government,111th Congress  (Jan 25, 2010)(accessed March 11, 2015) 
https://oversight.house.gov/report/public-disclosure-as-a-last-resort-how-the-federal-reserve-
fought-to-cover-up-the-details-of-the-aig-counterparties-bailout-from-the-american-people/.   
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assistance provided to AIG channeled to the banks.549 
 
AIG attempted to disclose some information about the names or values of the assets 
bought by MLIII as a result of SEC filings. In a draft of one regulatory filing, AIG 
explained that it had paid banks (including domestic and foreign banks (such as Deutsche 
Bank and SG) and big banking organizations whose public exposures can disturb the 
market and the public confidence) the full value of the CDOs that they had purchased 
from the company. Yet, in the final draft, the FRBNY’s counsellors omitted this 
information. The main discussion was about the attachment to an agreement between AIG 
and MLIII: Schedule A. So, disclosure of Schedule A (including information about 
counterparties’ identities, identification numbers of each transaction and prices that 
MLIII was buying underlying assets at) was bypassed by the recommendation, or pressure, 
of the FRBNY.  
 
When FRBNY officials discovered the SEC’s rejection, they straightaway intervened 
with the SEC to obscure the information held in Schedule A. 550  Due to the high 
governmental interest in withholding such information from public, FRBNY asked for an 
alternative way from the SEC to keep that information secret. 551  The SEC did not 
answerback to the FRBNY’s pressures for absolute non-disclosure; but instead, it 
behaved differently to the situation than it treats to other companies in their confidential 
submissions. Schedule A was delivered by hand to a SEC official and put in a specific 
                                               
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid 7. 
551 E-mail from James Bergin to Thomas Baxter (13 Jan 2009)BATES #FRBNY-TOWNS-R3-
004119.  
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place where national security related files are deposited.552 Ultimately, pressure from the 
SEC for full disclosure was responded to with a partly redacted (names of banks and some 
bank-specific information was redacted) Schedule A and with an application for 
confidential treatment for those censored parts.553 CTO was requested not because the 
overall financial stability of the state would be in danger, at least it was not the reason 
showed on the letter, it was requested based on ‘substantial competitive harm’ that the 
AIG and its counterparty banks would face if Schedule A was publicly available.  As a 
result, the SEC provided the CTO. 
 
This unusual practice was addressed by the Vice Chairman of the Fed by two main 
reasons. The first one is about the stability of the FI itself: ‘… I would be very concerned 
that if we started giving out the name of counterparties here, people would not want to do 
business with AIG.’554 The second one addressed the overall stability and wellness of the 
financial system: ‘…(G)iving the names…could have serious knock-on effects to the rest 
of the financial markets and the government’s efforts to stabilise them.’555 After all, the 
situation gave the view that the Fed was the invisible authority to control the content and 
timing of the AIG’s disclosures and it thwarted the full disclosure attempts of the AIG. 
Yet, the FRBNY later stated that such assertions are incorrect:  
 
…[R]ather than seeking to conceal information, the FRBNY comment was made in an 
                                               
552 E-mail from James Bergin to Thomas Baxter (Jan 13, 2009) BATES #FRBNY-TOWNS-R3-
004119 cited from the Special Report of Jan 25, 2010 (n 548) 7. 
553 William K. Sjostrom Jr.,‘Afterword to AIG Bailout’, (2015) 72(2) Washington and Lee Law 
Review 795,814-19. 
554 Donald L. Kohn’s Statement (2009) Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs US Senate 111th Cong, 1st session at 13(accessed June 6, 2016) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg51303/pdf/CHRG-111shrg51303.pdf.  
555 Ibid. 
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effort to help ensure the accuracy of the disclosures so as to avoid any suggestion that the 
FRBNY had made a commitment that was not made at the time (and in fact was never 
made).556 
 
Taking a step back and looking at the bigger picture of the AIG’s disclosure problem 
provides that, even if Schedule A was amended several times to satisfy the SEC, overall 
impression of the SEC and the Fed was about their partly alliance in withholding 
information from taxpayers.  
 
Apart from the fact that AIG is an insurance company, not a bank, the tension appeared 
here showed that the Federal Reserve could be disturbed by the idea of public disclosure 
of some facts, which are closely associated with its stability mandates.  
 
2.2.2.   Merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch 
Another example of a similar situation involves a bank and it was observed in the epic 
acquisition of the ML by the BoA in 2009. According to a lawsuit brought by state of 
New York, prior to the merger vote, the BoA did not disclose to shareholders that the ML 
suffered substantial losses more than $16 billion and also it refrained from full disclosure 
in its proxy materials related to bonuses paid to the investment bankers who structured 
the deal.557  There were strong arguments about the materiality of the non-disclosed 
                                               
556 The FRBNY’s Statement regarding Public Disclosures of AIG concerning MLIII LLC (Jan 
19, 2010)(accessed Dec 17, 2016) https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/st100119.html. Yet, 
some statements show that the FRBNY has influence on the AIG’s disclosures. ‘It was 
appropriate as a party to the MLIII transactions for the FRBNY to comment on a number of 
issues, including disclosures, with the understanding that the final decision rested with AIG and 
its external securities counsel.’Congressional Oversight Panel, Testimony of Thomas C. Baxter, 
Jr., general counsel and executive vice president of the legal group, FRBNY, COP Hearing on 
TARP and Other Assistance to AIG (May 26, 2010).  
557 BoA was accused of violation of s 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9. 
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information and public outrage related to the non-disclosure has given birth to arguments 
whether the merger and the non-disclosure was made at the behest of the government.  
 
To establish a timeline of important events about the merger, on September 15, 2008, 
BoA entered into a merger agreement with ML. As the Attorney General who investigated 
the merger highlights that the timing of the merger was paramount to save the ML from 
demolition.558 Shareholders accepted the merger on 5 December 2008, and the week after 
the shareholders vote, ML’s quick and quiet process of booking additional losses ended 
up with $7 billion worse than it was supposed to be when the deal was voted. BoA 
executives were aware of some these substantial losses before the shareholder vote; but 
they avoided to disclose this information (which is described as ‘staggering amount of 
deterioration’559 at ML) to shareholders until middle of January 2009. On 17 December 
2008, the CEO of the BoA, Kenneth Lewis, consulted with the Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson about invocation of the Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause, on the grounds 
that BoA had a legal basis to abandon the deal. According to Lewis, federal government 
officials put pressure on BoA to complete the merger deal and not to disclose the 
substantial losses of ML. Further, the Fed chairman and the Treasury secretary informed 
BoA that such a move would highly disturb the market, create systemic risk and cause 
reputation loss for the bank. 
 
On 22 December 2008, the board was advised about not to invoke the MAC clause and 
                                               
558 The letter from Andrew M. Cuomo (Attorney General of the State of NY) to J.Dodd, B. 
Frank, M.L. Schapiro and E. Warren (April 23, 2009)(accessed Jun 11, 
2016)https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/archived/BofAmergLetter.pdf  
559 Ken Lewis’s statement, cited from Cuomo’s letter.Ibid. 
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Lewis accepted that Paulson’s pressure changed his decision about the merger.560 The 
minutes of the meeting revealed that the Treasury and the Fed were in agreement to 
finalize the merger in order to overcome the crisis of confidence.561 The minutes of 
another meeting held on 30 December 2008 was supportive of the view that BoA would 
abandon the merger deal by MAC clause.562  
 
Though ML’s deteriorated operating results and capital position would be a legitimate 
ground to invoke the MAC clause, BoA chose not to make a disclosure about such 
substantial losses or the effect that it would have on the merger. BoA did not disclose that 
there was a real potential to invoke the clause. As Cuomo’s letter shows, Lewis testified 
that the decision to withhold information was based on Paulson’s and Bernanke’s 
instructions. Yet, the merger was completed on 1 January 2009 and on 20 January 2009 
BoA publicly disclosed that (i) it planned to receive additional funds from the government 
and (ii) ML’s losses were around $15.3 billion in 2008.563 The timing of the disclosure 
can be criticized because seemingly there is an effort to lessen the negative effects of 
                                               
560 Paulson did not call his behaviour as threat and instead, he said he mentioned the Fed’s 
powers to Lewis if BoA would pursue the course of invoking the MAC clause. See Paulson’s 
testimony, Bank of America and Merill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turned into a Federal 
Bailout?Part III: Joint Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
111th Cong. 111-46 (July 16,2009)(accessed Jan 1,2017) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg55765/html/CHRG-111hhrg55765.htm.  
561 Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation (Dec 22, 
2008)(accessed Jan 4,2017)https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-
releases/archived/Exhibit%20B%20to%204.23.09%20letter.pdf.  
562 Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation (Dec 30, 
2008)(accessed Jan 4,2017) https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-
releases/archived/Exhibit%20C%20to%204.23.09%20letter.pdf.  
563 Janet E. Kerr,‘The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s Intervention:Much 
Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law’ (2011) 85 (1) St John’s Law 
Review 49,51-53. 
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disclosure of ML’s financial condition by the disclosure of the positive news that the BoA 
will have extra funding from the government.  
  
While the communication and settlement between the SEC and the BoA for the bonuses 
was discussed thoroughly whether the bonus information was material or not, the elephant 
in the room in this case was the government’s actions. As Davidoff has addressed in 2009:  
 
The SEC charged on the bonuses but not on the more flagrant issue of failure to disclose 
the ML losses… This is likely a political calculus due to government support and its role 
in the non-disclosure. Nonetheless, BoA’s lawyers apparently justified this disclosure by 
asserting that it was non-material given the performance of other banks and the economy 
… [M]ateriality should be assessed in light of the environment … The bottom-line is a 
negative lesson: the treatment of materiality in this case is likely to be stretched by both 
the financial crisis and the government’s conduct, and any decision should be taken with 
a grain of salt.564  
 
When the arguments produced for the support of the acquisition as a necessary step to 
protect financial stability and prevent a potential panic after the infamous bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers and the arguments about the attempts of Lewis, to invoke the MAC 
clause are taken together, allegedly there is a general impression about the pressure 
coming from the Treasury and the Fed.565 The SEC brought suit against the BoA to 
explore why it left its stockholders in the dark about the deteriorating financial condition 
of the ML.566 So, this acquisition left questions about stretching the boundaries on behalf 
of the whole economy as articulated by Kerr as:  
 
                                               
564 Steven M. Davidoff,‘Bank of America/Merrill Lynch: Lessons Learned’(2009) Practical Law 
Article 6-500-8385 1,4 
565 Kerr (n 563) 60. 
566 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America Corporation, Civil Action Nos. 09-
6829, 10- 0215(S.D.N.Y) where the BoA agreed to pay $150 million to settle SEC charges.  
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Saving a corporation or multiple corporations from failure is certainly commendable, 
especially when these efforts may significantly help the overall American economy. 
However, is it legal, or at the very least good corporate governance, for boards of directors 
to yield to governmental pressure and consider the welfare of the overall American 
economy, which arguably equates to considering the American public at large, when 
making such decisions?567 
 
The SEC settled its law suits against BoA in two stages: The SEC filed a suit against BoA 
but in August 2009, BoA and the SEC concluded a settlement under which BoA would 
pay $33 million for disclosure violations. Yet, Judge Rakoff rejected the settlement in 
September 2009568 and after the SEC expanded its lawsuit against BoA, Judge Rakoff 
(though the court was not satisfied) approved the settlement of $150 million civil fine.  
 
These incidents should be interpreted with the unprecedented government intervention 
happened in 2008 when numerous systemically important FIs were on the verge of 
collapsing. One of the toolkits to revive those institutions was the creation of the TARP, 
which the government provided billions of US dollars to those corporations to stop further 
deterioration of the economy.569 So, the government simply gave loan to BoA via TARP 
and then provided more to make it acquire about-to-fail ML. 570  Apart from other 
allegations (such as Treasury Secretary Paulson’s threat to BoA to replace their 
management if the MAC clause is invoked), the overall view about the finalisation of the 
                                               
567 Kerr (n 563) 52-53. 
568 C v. Bank of America Corporation (2009) Civ 6829 (SDNY). 
569 Chapter 2,Section 3.1.3.1. 
570 Considering the provided amount of money to the BoA ($45 billion), it seems that 
taxpayers bought ($50 billion) the ML for the BoA. ‘Bank of America and Merrill 
Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout?Part III: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 23-24 (Jun 11, 
2009)(accessed March 23, 2015)https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg54877/html/CHRG-111hhrg54877.htm.   
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merger and related issues such as non-disclosure of information lead to several questions: 
Did the Fed and the Treasury abused of their powers, (or at least presumed that they 
should have superiority over other agencies) in handling with instability by not 
considering the shareholders’ interests of BoA and by –allegedly- keeping the agency 
tasked with investor protection and market efficiency unaware of the potential merger?571 
Was the government’s relations with and authority over the private sector revealing a 
legal problem? To be more precise, was investor protection lost in the powerful rhetoric 
of financial stability?  In Coffee’s words:   
 
This is a longstanding tension. You have to understand the bank regulators and the SEC 
disagree about transparency. Bank regulators are primarily focused on protecting bank 
solvency and a fear a run on the bank. The SEC is primarily focused on transparency and 
aiding shareholders and they want maximum disclosure. Those two agendas conflict and 
this is the classic kind of case before the Federal Reserve did not want shareholders 
knowing that the losses at Merrill Lynch were staggering because the Merrill Lynch Bank 
of America merger was a keystone in their financial plan to prevent a total meltdown. I 
think they were right, there would have been a meltdown had that merger not occurred.572 
 
These cases are important because it is a recent clear example of the controversy between 
a federal regulatory agency and the SEC and it provides a compelling reason to argue that 
BHCs with systemic importance might be under pressure by their federal bank regulators 
at some point to hide various details from investors which means there is a considerable 
tension between handling with systemic risk and the level of corporate disclosures.  
                                               
571 Discussions centre upon the government’s behind-the-close-door activities in their actions 
for the protection of financial stability because neither Fed nor the Treasury informed the OCC 
or the SEC for the merger beforehand. On the other hand, such actions taken by the government 
can also be seen as footsteps of macroprudential regulation where CBs are provided with more 
powers and toolkits to protect the stability. 
572 John Coffee’s speech on Bloomberg News, ‘Columbia Professor John Coffee on Bloomberg 
TV’, CEO Wire (Dec 11,2009) ProQuest. 
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2.3.Overall View of the Information Disclosed by Banks under the US 
Securities Regulation 
This part establishes that even if the BRAs establish substantially similar disclosure 
regulations to those established under securities regulation, institutional bias towards 
BRAs and potential conflicts within the BRAs to administer and enforce disclosure rules 
theoretically stand as a barrier to fulfilling the market’s demands for the information. A 
similar bias might be seen at the side of the banks such that they have developed a strong 
antipathy towards the SEC regulations in consequence of the SEC’s ‘rigorous 
enforcement’ approach in enforcing exposure of misconduct.573 The general composition 
taking BRAs as supervisory agencies and the SEC as an enforcement agency against the 
after-the-fact violations might not describe the rightfulness of claims for jurisdiction over 
banks, and the fact that BRAs use public disclosures as a supplementary tool of 
supervision establishes that the tension between the two regulatory systems is not as high 
as before.  
 
Another concern is about the necessity and functionality of such a dual regulatory system 
in consideration of present market conditions. 574  As can be seen, enforcement and 
administration of those specified disclosure-related sections by the BRAs are 
accomplished through the ignorance of clear statutory instruction stating that those BRAs 
‘… shall issue substantially similar regulations and rules issued by the Commission’.575 
This ignorance is a virtual one, which is simply fulfilled by full incorporation by reference 
to SEC regulations.    
                                               
573 Maloney (n 420) 454-55. 
574 Michael P. Malloy,‘Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation’(1990) 9 Annual 
Review of Banking Law 229,247. 
575 15 USC§78(l)(i). 
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Overall, banks, as issuers of securities, are (virtually via s 12(i) or under the BHC 
structure) subject to the disclosure requirements of federal securities regulation. Anti-
disclosure provisions established in the FOIA or relevant BRA laws make a point related 
to the disclosure of examination, operating, or condition reports produced by and for 
BRAs and take this information as the property of the relevant BRA. However, the view 
based on the view that banks and banking sector are susceptible to adverse information 
and therefore warrant of some degree of secrecy is necessary might be seen as a self-
serving rationale. It was stated that even in the 2008 financial crisis, where the 
information on certain material supervisory determinations by BRAs was publicly 
available, dissemination of negative information did not trigger a bank run. 576 However, 
the cases examined here provide that confidence component of financial markets is a valid 
ground for stability regulators to act upon it.  
 
The general view taken from those cases is that, negative information related to large FIs 
is likely to disturb markets and at the height of the crisis, financial stability regulators 
have interest in non-disclosure of adverse information of such institutions. Concerning to 
banks, the BoA disclosure issue did not directly affect depositors in a sense that 
wrongdoing of the BoA in high-profile merger did not prepare the ground for loss of 
depositors’ confidence. Yet, the general view suggests that financial stability regulators 
need to have a room to resolve bank-related issues secretly. So, rather than having such 
tension with the SEC and interfering with the institution behind the closed doors or at 
least providing such an impression; legal certainty is suggested.  
 
                                               
576 Julie Andersen Hill,‘When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong’(2015) 92(5) Washington 
University Law Review 1101,1182. 
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Overall, perhaps as a result of bank failures in the 1980s where the efforts of withholding 
financial information about banks did not work out as a solution against failures based on 
fraud and bad management, BRAs see public disclosures as being in the public interest, 
and direct application of SEC disclosure requirements on BHCs or indirect application of 
those rules over individual banks underpin the BRAs’ approach in utilizing public 
disclosures as complementary to supervision and protecting and enhancing the public 
confidence. The very broad protective coverage of exemption 8 of the FOIA is also 
relevant here as the heavy criticism of BRAs after the GFC have reignited the discussion 
regarding whether exemption 8 has outlived its usefulness in today’s transparency and 
accountability-driven environment. BRAs often used this exemption during the GFC and 
the court later held that confidentiality under exemption 8 should be granted to BRAs, 
not the bank, which means the exemption served its policy objectives in terms of 
protecting the bank’s security.577 However, as mentioned, there is always room for further 
discussions about the present regulatory framework vis-à-vis prudential concerns.  
 
In accordance with the increasing importance of financial stability, commentaries on the 
changes for Guide 3 address the jurisdictional tension between prudential regulators and 
markets regulators and then advise collaboration and more updated and enhanced 
disclosure for BHCs to prevent systemic risk and market instability.578 This approach 
highlights market-based prudential regulation over prudential market regulation.579 In 
other words, banks complying with the enhanced disclosure-oriented focus of market 
regulation is one of the strongest views recommended for the financial health of the 
                                               
577 McKinley v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (n 297). 
578 Michael S. Piwowar,‘Remarks before the Quadrilateral Meeting of the 
FMLC/FMLG/FLB/EFMLG’(July 20,2016)(accessed May 11,2017) 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-piwowar-2016-07-20.html.	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banking and financial system; yet, it does not response to the dilemma investigated here 
in a problem-solving manner. Transparency as an ex ante mechanism is surely beneficial 
under favourable and good market conditions; yet, forecasting a crisis and preventing its 
occurrence is not always possible, 580  so other mechanisms should offer preventive 
mechanisms to cover future possibilities.  
 
So, BoA and AIG cases revealed two important aspects of this discussion: first, 
authorities found out that ‘they did not have the powers to resolve problems in the way 
they would have liked’;581 second, the law should respond to the need to delay or limit 
disclosure of certain information for systemically important and large FIs for the 
protection of financial stability.  
 
3.   Legal Framework of Disclosure Regulations in the UK Securities Laws 
3.1.Synopsis of UK Capital Markets Regulation 
Legal sources for UK securities regulation cannot be thought of outside the frame of the 
EU. Legislative interference at the EU level has played a large part in UK securities 
regulation as applicable today as a result of the integrated pan-European capital 
markets.582 Directives and regulations are the driving force in establishing the minimum 
                                               
580 Fabio Canova,‘Were Financial Crises Predictable?’(1994) 26(1) Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking 102. 
581 J.R. Barth, D.G. Mayes, M.W. Taylor,‘Safeguarding Global Financial Stability, Overview’ 
in Gerard Caprio Jr.(ed), Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability (Elsevier 2013) 
228. 
582 Ellis Ferran and Look Chan Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2nd edn,OUP 2014) 
360. 
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level of transparency in the markets.583  Implementation of high-level principles can be 
seen in the form of legislation and more detailed principles of FCA regulations.584 In 
terms of disclosure of information, there are a number of pieces of EU law such as the 
Prospectus Regulation (PR),585 the Transparency Directive (TD)586 and the MAD, which 
was repealed. The objective of the PR is to provide necessary materials to the investing 
public in the prospectus so that investors can make informed decisions whether to make 
a financial commitment. The TD’s goal is to specify the information that has to be 
disclosed by the issuer in order to ensure transparency of information for investors via a 
regular flow of disclosure of periodic and ongoing regulated information. The MAD, 
which was replaced by the MAR, aims to increase market integrity and investor protection 
via prevention of market abuse rules, which requires ad hoc disclosures in the capital 
markets.  
 
                                               
583 The EC also establishes technical regulations to provide details about the framework 
principles and securities directives are implemented into UK securities laws through statutes 
and regulations. 
584 Alastair Hudson, Securities Law (2nd edn,Sweet&Maxwell 2013) 1-03. 
585 Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading 
on a regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC. 
586 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 
on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC. TD is amended by the Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information 
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 
2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 
2004/109/EC. 
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The primary act on the regulation of capital markets in particular, and of financial services 
in general, is the FSMA. Other statutory instruments subordinate to the FSMA also 
provide securities regulation in other contexts. Another major source for capital markets 
transparency is the FCA Handbook which establishes Listing Rules (LR), Prospectus 
Rules (PR) and Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR).587 The FCA is the UK’s 
securities regulator simply because it oversees market disclosures, reviews and approves 
prospectuses, and operates the UK listing regimes, acting as the UK listing authority 
(UKLA).  
 
Finally, the interaction between securities laws and general law should not be overlooked 
since general law covers all types of substantive law, excluding FCA-based principles 
and regulatory principles residing in the Directives. This means that other laws (such as 
common law, equity, tort, contract and criminal law) can apply to capital markets 
transactions. Overall, a mixture of EU legislation, domestic legislation and rules 
constructed by the FCA together with other rules developed by the stock exchanges 
themselves regulate transparency.588  
  
The historical evolution of disclosure practices in British capital markets shows that 
information disclosure has always been a primary pillar of the system. The UK, where 
securities regulation began as far back as the 13th century, 589  had formed specific 
disclosure regimes for joint stock firms by the end of the 19th century. This occurred 
through the administration of informal mixed disclosure rules to the market. In addition, 
                                               
587 It also includes guidance notes incorporated into the FCA Handbook.  
588 Gullifer and Payne (n 319) 493. 
589 B. Rider, C. Abrahams and M. Ashe, Guide to Financial Services Regulation (3rd edn,CCH 
1997) 3-4. 
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the London Stock Exchange (LSE) urged joint stock companies to transfer the copy of 
the accounts to the LSE, which had been declared to their stockholders through their 
Annual General Meetings.590 Voluntary public disclosure of annual balance sheets was 
popular among companies that had many shareholders, which showed that regular and 
systematic disclosure of information was possible according to market needs.591  
 
UK securities markets regulation builds upon two principles: (i) members of the public 
must have access to full information prior to making a financial commitment; and (ii) the 
investing public must have efficient remedies for losses emanating from incomplete or 
inaccurate disclosure.592 Following the GFC, safe harbours or exemptions provided to 
issuers relating to public disclosures and delay provisions have been subject to changes 
that reflect the needs of the financial system. More than just laws having changed, 
regulators’ understanding of their approach to public interest and its relevance to financial 
stability has also changed. For example, overarching public interest exemption provided 
in the PD and now in the PR has been interpreted with reference to financial stability.593  
Considering the UK’s position as an important world financial centre, any piece of law 
proposing the opposite of ‘more and more transparency’ would be a courageous step. 
New thinking about delayed but planned disclosure for banks has been the product of 
poor experiences of banks that first occurred in the UK and then in France. Those 
experiences planted the seeds for the new MAR. 
                                               
590 R.A. Bryer,‘The Late Nineteenth-Century Evolution in Financial Reporting: Accounting for 
the Rise of Investor or Managerial Capitalism?’(1993) 18(7) Accounting, Organization and 
Society 649. 
591 Christopher Naphier,‘United Kingdom’ in Gary Previts, Peter Walton & Peter Wolnizer 
(eds), A Global History of Accounting, Financial Reporting and Public Policy (Emerald Group 
2010) 243-73. 
592 Gullifer and Payne (n 319) 521. 
593 PD, art 8(2)(a); PR, art 18(1)(a). 
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To understand the development of changes in transparency laws in the UK together with 
other EU states, it is beneficial to understand how British law has approached bank 
disclosures up to the present. As such, the next part will explain British bank disclosure 
practices from a historical perspective to present day conditions. 
 
3.1.1.   Bank Disclosures in the UK  
The development of bank disclosures in the UK has been largely affected by the fear of 
instability and the concept of non-disclosure has developed based on particular reasons 
such as hiding the true benefits and capital or the utilisation of hidden reserves.594 The 
support towards non-disclosure was seen as a result of the conversion of private banks 
and partnerships to joint-stock banks in an amalgamation process. Their replacement of 
those banks via mergers created a concentrated banking industry in the beginning of the 
1920s which resulted in the control by big five commercial or clearing banks over the 
banking system.595 
 
The environment surrounding non-disclosure was supported both by the government and 
banks. The market structure, with limited numbers of big joint-stock banks and its 
accompanying convenience for the regulators, was seen as preferable for overseeing 
stability through those banks. Banks favoured non-disclosure because the non-disclosure 
was the result of the implicit agreement with the regulators that banks would behave as 
monetary policy mechanisms for the government and in return they could enjoy the 
                                               
594 Billings (n 242) 287-90. 
595 John D. Turner, Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability,1800 to the 
Present (CUP 2014) ch 3. 
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benefits of non-disclosure such as keeping the use of inner reserves,596 the real capital 
and profits earned for themselves.597 The stability argument asserted by banks in favour 
of non-disclosure was underpinned by the premise that incompatibility in bank disclosure 
regimes around the world might place British banks in a disadvantageous position in 
terms of competition. 
 
Exemption of banks from disclosures was justified on grounds of higher public interests. 
Shareholders’ interests in information was valued less than depositors’ simply because 
depositors’ interests represented public interest in the overall stability of the banking 
system.598 Though contrasting views for such an exemption bestowed on banks began to 
appear, and full disclosure of reserves and profits was demanded by the securities 
regulatory community starting in the 1960s,599  the demise of non-disclosure became 
possible in early 1970s.600 It was perhaps because of the informal regulatory contract and 
informal relationship between the government, the regulator and the bank: While banks 
serve government interests by supporting the goal of ensuring the safety and soundness 
of the financial system, the government gave certain privileges to the banks such as 
exemption from disclosure.601 A concentrated banking system, with a lack of competition 
                                               
596 The prohibition of the use of hidden reserves did not apply banks based on the exemption 
provided to them. See Companies Act of 1947, Part III of the First Schedule. 
597 Billings (n 242) 288. 
598 For example see the reference to banks about undisclosed reserves at paragraph 101 of the 
Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cohen Report) (1945) cmnd 6659 
(accessed July 20, 2016) 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/resources/other_resources/cohen_committee.aspx. 
599 For example, the Report of the Company Law Committee (Jensen Report) (1962) cmnd 1749 
paras 399-405. 
600 Raymond J. Chambers, Securities and Obscurities (Sydney University Press 2006) 109.   
601 See Don Cruickshank’s Presentation to the Banking Industry and Analysts, ‘Competition in 
UK Banking: A Report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’ (20 March 2000) (accessed Nov. 
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and preferential treatment, according to Capie and Billings, was the BoE’s long-standing 
approach in allowing a ‘banking status quo in government circles’.602 The exemption was 
justified on two grounds: First, it helped banks to reduce shareholders’ excessive dividend 
expectations. Second, hidden losses formed a cushion against losses during a potential 
crisis and therefore assured the long-term survival of banks.603 The trust in and credibility 
of banks, by not disclosing certain information for individual and collective interests, was, 
therefore, supported in law.604 
 
The amount that shareholders received in their dividends depends on the banks’ profits 
and it is addressed that there was an inherent conflict of interest between the depositors 
and the shareholders since there had been a possibility that banks did not inform their 
shareholders about their undisclosed transfers to secret reserves.605 Depositors, on the 
other hand, might have enjoyed the prolonged durability of banks, even during stressful 
times, owing to that reserve. 
 
British banks gradually became more transparent with the end of the non-disclosure era 
in the 1970s due to the pressure from shareholders and developments in bank 
transparency in other countries. 606  Hence, British banks voluntarily abandoned the 
                                               
22, 2018) https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050301221631/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services/banking/bankreview/fin_bank_reviewfinal.cfm.   
602 Forrest Capie and Mark Billings,‘Evidence on Competition in English Commercial Banking, 
1920-1970’ (2004) 11(1) Financial History Review 69,97. 
603 Alan Ball and Andrew Haldane,‘Does the Usage of Fair Values Increase Systemic Risks?’ in 
G Livne and G Markarian(eds), The Routledge Companion to Fair Value in Accounting 
(Routledge 2018) 8.  
604 Billings (n 242) 292.	  
605 M.Billings and F. Cappie,‘Transparency and Financial Reporting in the Mid-20th Century 
British Banking’(2009) 33 Accounting Forum 38,48. 
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practice of non-disclosure and decided to be more transparent for shareholder protection 
purposes.607 Yet, a legal uncertainty about transparency requirements for banks appeared 
in the UK that heralded shortcomings in the legal framework. This is the infamous case 
of the NR.  
 
3.2.The Run on Northern Rock 
The failure of NR is a good starting point for presenting the case for interaction of laws 
in the way that one prevents another from achieving greater public goals by creating a 
regulator’s dilemma. The collapse of NR was also related to the failure of the mechanisms 
of intervention where functionality of the deposit insurance scheme, LoLR facilities and 
the share of responsibilities among the organizations forming the tripartite system were 
severely criticised.608 Public disclosure of information introduced new dimensions to the 
boundaries of and interrelation between financial stability, public confidence and the 
functionality of laws in resolving problems in times of distress. The theoretical 
questioning of mere or good compliance appeared as a side-product of the crisis. This 
indicates that the interaction between the web of laws609 that the banks operate under 
prevented the efficient operation of the LoLR function of the CB such that the 
investigation of the pertinence of public disclosure of bank information has appeared. 
 
                                               
607 Ibid. 
608 Chapter 2,Section 3.1.3. 
609 Mervyn King(the governor of the BoE)  classified four different laws as a barrier of LoLR 
function of the BoE:The Take Over Code, the rules consisting the deposit insurance system, 
absence of insolvency laws regarding to bank failures and the MAD. 
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3.2.1.   The Background to the Run 
NR, like other smaller British banks, was a mutual bank that changed into a regular 
commercial bank whose stocks were floated on the LSE. When the crisis hit the US, NR 
was the third highest among all European banks in its loan-to-deposit ratio.610 As it was 
highly leveraged, relying on securitisation and increasingly dependent on overnight 
interbank financing to run its daily operations, disruption in the market made NR 
vulnerable, and as it was not successful in accessing private funding from fellow UK 
banks, it turned to the BoE for assistance. 
 
The timeline of events shows that NR’s business model was profitable for some years 
until global financial turbulence exposed NR to a low-probability-high-impact risk 
associated with large-scale liquidity scarcity in British financial markets. 611  In late 
July/early August 2007, banks had already been alerted to the exposure to potential losses 
on high-risk US mortgages and this led them to show liquidity hoarding behaviour and 
reduce interbank lending. On August 14, Mervyn King was alerted to the effects of the 
global liquidity squeeze on the fragile NR in a phone call with officials at the FSA and 
the Treasury. On August 16, the former NR chairman approached Mr King regarding 
potential support and then started to search for a buyer. On September 10, after its failure 
to secure a firm bid, NR stopped its attempts to find a buyer and rescue was inevitable.  
 
Emergency lending granted by the BoE did not prove sufficient to save the bank since on 
13 September 2007 the BBC’s evening news broadcast announced that NR was 
experiencing serious funding problems and had sought assistance from the BoE under its 
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LoLR capacity which set in motion a run on the bank. The next morning, the BoE 
announced the support and NR had to confirm the agreement made with the BoE. In a 
statement, tripartite organs stated that NR was solvent, and a standby funding facility 
would allow NR to ‘fund its operations during the current period of turbulence’.612 
Similarly, the CEO of NR emphasised that it was business as usual for the firm. However, 
these statements were not comforting for analysts and depositors. Support from the BoE 
was not seen as a confidence-bolstering measure, rather, this expression of support 
accelerated a retail run as it was taken as a sign of failure. Announcement of the assistance, 
as discussed in the parts related to public confidence613 and depositor-exerted market 
discipline,614 led depositors to line up all at once to withdraw their funds as soon as 
possible.   
 
3.2.2.   The Role of Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Two main discussions regarding the deposit insurance regime were about coverage (i.e. 
what limit should be applied to the size of deposits insured, or if interbank deposits should 
be covered) and co-insurance (whether protection within the limit should be less than the 
total or not).615 Since the British deposit insurance system was designed to fully insure 
depositors up to £2,000, and then only 90 per cent of deposits up to £35,000, it is not 
                                               
612	  House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 
2007-08 Vol. I: Report, together with Formal Minutes (24 Jan 2008) at para 344 (accessed Nov 
25, 2018) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf.	  
613 Chapter 2,Section 3. 
614 Chapter 3,Section 4. 
615 David T. Llewellyn, ‘The Northern Rock Crisis’ (2008) 16(1) Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance 35, 45-7.  
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surprising that depositors were strongly incentivised to move their funds.616 The regime 
was actually designed to incentivise depositors while disciplining banks. In line with this 
market discipline approach, the British deposit insurance system, by insuring only 90 per 
cent of allowable claims above a £2,000 minimum, was designed to make those insured 
open to some losses so that they could monitor the bank and exert disciplinary power.617 
So, while this co-insurance element of the scheme was preferable on efficiency and long-
term stability grounds, it was disadvantageous for short-term stability. The system meant 
that most depositors had something at risk, and a realistic approach of depositors during 
a crisis was to instantly secure their funds below £2,000. Mervyn King also commented 
that ‘…if you have deposit insurance, there is no point having 90%, because that will not 
stop the bank run, as we saw, it has to be 100% but only up to some limit’.618 
 
Another discussion about the maintenance of co-insurance under the FSMA also 
concerned the general ignorance of depositors about the compensation scheme and their 
                                               
616	  Financial Services Compensation Scheme of 2001. See FSA Handbook Release, 
Compensation Sourcebook Instrument (2001/66) at Ch. 10 (accessed Nov 23, 2018) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2001/2001_66.pdf.  
617 The US system of deposit insurance, being discernibly different than the British co-insurance 
system, provided full coverage for each account at the time for the first US$100,00 without 
subjecting small depositors to a co-insurance system. Dodd-Frank Act increased this amount to 
US$250,000. FDIC, (accessed Nov. 23, 2018) 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html. It should be noted that, together 
with the full coverage up to a certain amount-based deposit insurance scheme, the US also had a 
system of resolving bank failures under FDICIA provisions. FDIC, Resolutions Handbook 
(accessed Nov. 23, 2018) https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/drr_handbook.pdf.  
618 He highlighted the importance of having a special resolution regime in place to prevent 
excessive risk-taking by banks, rather than keeping mechanisms such as coinsurance. House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, Vol. I (n 612) para 224 (accessed May 26, 2017) 
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difficulty in understanding the complexity of the concept of coinsurance.619 Under these 
conditions, the general panic aired on TV and in other media organs reinforced and 
escalated the pressure on depositors to join in the run.620 On September 17, depositors 
were still queuing at NR branches across the UK and Alastair Darling (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer at that time) had to intervene by pledging that the government would guarantee 
all deposits with NR. The protection (which later covered existing and renewed unsecured 
wholesale funding) was designed to continue until the crisis conditions subsided, and it 
was to be applicable to depositors of other banks if necessary.621 First, disclosure of the 
blanket guarantee and, second, the increase in depositor insurance to £35,00 on 1 October 
2007 reassured depositors and was effective in stopping the run. 622  However, the 
disclosure of the support operation was another question.   
 
3.2.3.   Northern Rock’s Disclosure Problem 
Mervyn King later revealed that NR could have been funded without publicising the 
support and that would have prevented the run. The fact is that both the FSA and the BoE 
were informed about the NR’s funding problems and up until the time the BoE confirmed 
                                               
619 Maximilian J.B. Hall, ‘The Sub-Prime Crisis, the Credit Squeeze and Northern Rock’ (2008) 
16(1) Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 19. 	  
620 Hyun Song Shin, ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run Heralded the GFC’ (2009) 
23(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 101. 
621 BoE, Financial Stability Report Issue No.22 (October 2007) at 11(accessed Nov 23, 2018) 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2007/october-
2007.pdf?la=en&hash=4A9894951877F0AA063331C61065E0801F414A6D.   
622 FSA, Compensation Sourcebook Instrument 2007, 2007/57 (28 September 2007) (accessed 
Nov. 23, 2018) http://media.fshandbook.info/Legislation/2007/2007_57.pdf. Insurance was 
increased to £50,000 of full coverage in October 2008; and since December 2010, there is full 
coverage up to £85,000 (as of Dec. 2018). See FSCS (accessed Nov. 23, 2018) 
https://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/banks-building-societies/.  
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the BBC news’s announcement, the FSA and BoE were trying to lighten the effects of 
the crisis behind closed doors by seeking a buyer for NR – which they failed to do.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, en masse depositor withdrawals are largely created by a 
psychology-driven environment. The application of traditional thinking on bank runs is 
based on coordination failures among creditors but this does not fit perfectly well in the 
case of NR. First, coordination failure describes a psychological setting where an 
individual depositor is afraid that if other depositors withdraw their funds there will be 
no funds left for the remaining depositors.623 NR was not purely a depositor-based bank 
run as when the first signs of the credit crunch came to light collective withdrawal of 
credit hit the whole market, not just some institutions including NR.624 Second, the run 
on NR was initiated by sophisticated institutional investors to protect themselves against 
aggravated market conditions, not by individual retail depositors. However, these 
explanations about the run on NR do not mean that negative news from the BBC and 
ensuing statements by the BoE were of no consequence. Rather, the run on NR resulted 
from a combination of loss of public confidence and market-wide elements consisting of 
banking and capital markets conditions. NR making the LoLR facility overt in order to 
provide reassurance to its retail customers did not work as expected. Aside from how the 
run on NR developed, questions appeared on the applicability of the ‘behind closed-doors’ 
approach followed by the BoE and the FSA to rescue NR.  
 
                                               
623 This situation is a portrayal of the prisoners’ dilemma: ‘If bank depositors were able to 
collude they would gain collectively by refraining from precipitating withdrawals.’ Paul M. 
Dickie and Marian Bond, ‘Creation of Market Based Structures and Policy Instruments to 
Facilitate Increased Capital Mobility in APEC Region’ in Douglas H. Brooks and Monika 
Queisser(eds), Financial Liberalisation in Asia(OECD ADB 1999) 121. 
624 Shin,‘Reflections on Northern Rock’ (n 620) 110.  
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The government’s need for room for manoeuvre which would enable the authorities to 
take necessary measures for the protection of stability and confidence discretely was 
expressed by Mr King. The implication here is that too much honesty in a world of fragile 
trust could be and is counterproductive. He stated that he would prefer to grant covert 
help to NR without public awareness of such interference. 
 
There have been other dissenters to the idea that such information be disclosed. For 
example, Buiter asserts that the BoE was hopelessly and unnecessarily confused about its 
legal powers and restrictions while acting as LoLR. He thinks that the assertion that the 
MAD was an impeding factor against the covert support of individual institutions was 
mistaken because neither the MAD nor the UK’s gold-plating of the MAD would prevent 
the covert nature of the transaction.625 Yet, the NR, after taking legal advice, decided that 
this was not possible because art 6 of the MAD established that publicly quoted 
companies must disclose inside information as soon as possible which is deemed 
important for investors, and the emergency liquidity support by the BoE fell into this 
classification. Such support from the BoE or another CB is likely to have a powerful 
effect on the price of bank-issued financial instruments. Additionally, Mervyn King 
appeared to imply that the MAD was an impeding factor here: ‘the ability to conduct 
covert support … is ruled out because of the Market Abuses Directive’,626 and again he 
said that the relevant wording of the MAD was ambiguous.627  
 
                                               
625 Willem H. Buiter,‘Central Banks and Financial Crises’(2008) LSE Discussion Papers 
No:619 at 114 (accessed Dec 26,2017) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24438/.  
626 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, 5th Report of Session 2007-
08 Vol. II: Oral and Written Evidence (24 Jan 2008) at Q14 (accessed May 26, 2017) 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56ii.pdf. 
627 Ibid,Q21-22.	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Yet, the MAD, like other securities laws disclosure requirements, provides flexibility to 
handle exceptional circumstances.628 As such, it can be asserted that there was no such 
contradiction as the governor stated but rather that ‘it was all a matter of interpretation’.629 
The BoE had been engaged in commercially sensitive negotiations with publicly quoted 
companies before 2007 and NR was the first case that triggered such debates in that sense. 
The Directive was unresponsive to this situation because using the legitimate interests of 
the issuer as grounds for the delay was only possible if the public was not misled by the 
omission of information and if that information was kept confidential. So, a possible case 
scenario allowing for the omission of information would be that the liquidity support does 
not conflict with previous statements and reports of the bank, and it does not change the 
public perception about the price of instruments. Rather, government support is expected 
in the nature of the bank’s daily operations. Yet, as the subsequent discussions reveal, 
this approach is again a matter of interpretation.  
 
Therefore, a relevant discussion should start by establishing the reasons that cause such 
tension. The NR disclosure problem requires discussion of several categories of 
behaviour within the purposes of the MAD. These were the behaviour that were likely to 
give a false or misleading impression,630 disseminate false or misleading information,631 
or distort the market.632 However, regardless of these potential behaviours, which might 
be applicable to the case of NR, the FSA had already drafted a provision whose wording 
                                               
628 MAD,art 6. 
 629 Sonia Ondo Ndong and Laurence Scialom,‘Northern Rock:The Anatomy of a Crisis-The 
Prudential Lessons’ in Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman(eds), Financial Institutions and 
Markets (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 59.  
630 FSMA,s 118(5)(a).  
631 FSMA,s 118(7). 
632 FSMA,s 118(8)(a)(b). 
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could have been adapted to a crisis situation.633 Given that provision, the FSA already 
had the necessary power to prevent NR’s disclosures, even if the FSMA’s market abuse 
provisions were still applicable. Namely, the FSA had the authority to suspend its own 
requirements with respect to NR’s disclosures to the extent that it deemed it to be 
appropriate.634 Once again, this can be a matter of interpretation. It is the restrictive 
interpretation of the FSA not to step into this complexity. 
 
There was another thought-provoking provision in the FSA Guidance that could have 
been used for non-disclosure. Given the types of behaviours that fall into market abuse, 
the guidance stated that if a transaction is made in compliance with a prior legal or 
regulatory obligation owed to a third party, then the behaviour is considered as a 
legitimate reason.635 So, technically, while it was not possible for the FSA to remove the 
disclosure obligation of inside information as soon as possible, a broader interpretation 
of the FSA Guidance may have provided room for non-disclosure.  
 
The regulator’s dilemma in this situation was that the FSA, in having the legal 
responsibility to patrol the civil offence of market abuse, was in communication with the 
BoE and the Treasury regarding the private arrangement of the use of the LoLR facility 
for the troubled NR. Any possible support operation would be the result of a concurrent 
resolution within the tripartite system. 
 
                                               
633 DTR 1.2.1(R)(accessed March 11, 2015) http://www.compliance-
exchange.com/governance/library/Listing%20Rules%20April%202010.pdf.  
634 Andrew Haynes, ‘Market Abuse, Northern Rock and Bank Rescues’(2009) 10(4) Journal of 
Banking Regulation 321,324. 
635 FSA 2005/15 at 1.6.6.E(1)(accessed Feb 2,2017) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2005/2005_15.pdf. See Section 3.3. 
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The next section examines the laws applicable during the GFC and presents cases that led 
to substantial changes in the bank disclosure laws in capital markets across the EU, with 
a particular emphasis on British practice after NR and diagnosis of the problem in detail. 
 
3.3.Before/During the Crisis Regulation and Problem Analysis  
Mervyn King identified the MAD as one of the reasons why the BoE could not provide 
covert support to the NR. The MAD and other relevant laws in this context require further 
explanation of capital markets transparency rules as a preventive factor to accomplish 
both bank and state stability goals. 
 
While the MAD’s first judicial test of a bank was the Fortis case where its near collapse 
and dismantling led different states to engage in the case,636 the core discussion about 
bank transparency and financial stability began with NR. The NR case proved that 
disclosure rules were not drafted with a bank crisis in mind. The MAD shows no 
interference with the firm’s business-as-usual approach and it is focused on abuse of 
financial markets. However, there have been dissenters of this view, based on the idea 
that a prudent interpretation of rules would nip disclosure-specific issues in the bud. For 
example, Haynes suggests that if a liberal construction was applied to disclosure rules 
and there had been a deep desire to prevent the downfall of NR, there was a potential for 
that in the DTRs as the ‘FSA may dispense with, or modify, the disclosure rules … as it 
considers appropriate’.637   
                                               
636 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele,‘Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an 
Integrated Model of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the EU?’ (2014) 5(2) 
New Journal of European Criminal Law 192,195-97. 
637 FSA 2005/16,Annex B (Disclosure Rules Sourcebook)1.2.1(R)(1)(accessed Jan 30,2017) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2005/2005_16.pdf. 
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This provision is based on the view that a firm with a disclosure-related concern will 
apply to the FSA for dispensation or modification and then the FSA would be in a position 
to decide on the appropriateness. The FSA could have invoked this provision if it thought 
it was appropriate for NR to withhold information from the public. A technical 
examination, however, reveals that the FSA could not put aside s 118 (regulating market 
abuse) of the FSMA. Instead, it could have used its authority to suspend its own 
requirements with respect to s 118. As such, the FSA applied a restrictive approach 
towards interpreting its own rules on disclosure, which could have helped FSA handle 
NR’s disclosure problem.638 Having said that, the dissenting view argues that the FSA’s 
power to change the disclosure rules in specific cases might be interpreted as the authority 
to grant a short-term dispensation to prevent a run and its adverse repercussions on the 
overall financial system.639  
 
Another relevant compelling provision that could be applied to the case of NR was the 
FSA Guidance on the descriptions of behaviours that amount to market abuse. The FSA 
makes references to behaviours that have ‘other than legitimate reasons’. CoMC 1.6.5(E) 
to 1.6.8 (E) of the Guidance explains the factors to be considered when deciding whether 
the behaviour results from legitimate reasons or not. The first paragraph of 1.6.6(E) 
provides that, ‘if the transaction is pursuant to a prior legal or regulatory obligation owed 
to a third party’, then the behaviour can be considered outside the scope of market abuse. 
What does that mean within the context of the NR’s disclosure problem? Can the support 
                                               
638 Haynes (n 634) 324. 
639 ‘…It is not clear whether this option was considered or could have been used in this 
particular situation.’Charles Proctor, Northern Rock and Market Abuse Directive (Mimeo 
2008).  
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of the BoE be associated with a prior legal or regulatory obligation? Again, this can be a 
matter of interpretation.  
 
The logic behind the CoMC 1.6.6 could have been interpreted with the prior legal or 
regulatory obligation that the tripartite system establishes on the troubled bank by 
allowing the bank to stay quiet on the support. According to Haynes, such a case would 
not call for a revision of the logic lying behind the laws and regulations about market 
abuse.640 Yet, provisions of the CoMC are designated with letter codes that are reflections 
of the weight attributed to them. Evidential provisions describe the behaviours that are 
considered by the FSA (FCA now) to decide whether certain behaviour amounts to 
market abuse. This means that evidential provisions are in a weaker position compared to 
the safe harbour (C), which provides conclusive evidence for the behaviours. 641 
Considering the weight attributed to the given provision, the FSA’s interpretation might 
seem valid. Again, as Haynes argues, the reason of the provision could have offered a 
more broadened sense of understanding than the literal reading of its terms to create a 
solution for NR. 
 
These arguments show that the authorities strictly interpreted the rules perhaps because 
they could not foresee the run. One way or another, the main rule of disclosing inside 
information as soon as possible unless a delay provision applies was applicable and it was 
the heart of the argument.  
 
                                               
640 Haynes (n 634) 324. 
641 Andrew Tuson,‘Market Abuse’ in George Walker, Robert Purves and Michael Blair (eds), 
Financial Services Law (4th edn,OUP 2018) 12.25-26. 
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NR was willing to make a public disclosure not just to portray a positive image to the 
public about receiving funds from the BoE but also as a result of the legal filter it applied: 
(i) the situation of NR had seriously changed since the last time it had provided 
information to the market and for this reason, it wanted to issue profit warnings to the 
market; and (ii) the nature of the information was material enough to disclose.642 NR’s 
readiness to make a public statement was later discussed within the reality of market 
conditions such that Alastair Darling asserted that ‘there was every chance that this was 
going to leak and I was dead right’.643 In other words, the result would not change, 
regardless of whether NR was prepared to publicly disclose. This statement also means 
that it was impossible to avoid transparency as many authorities and people were involved 
in the use of ELA.644  
 
Several points are open to discussion because there have been many different views about 
the application and real effects of the MAD on this case. For example, Buiter states that 
the ECB had undertaken covert lending in the past, which followed the MAD framework 
and it stands against the approach of the BoE in interpreting the MAD.645 
 
In the context of the CB’s LoLR capacity as an immediate response to bank crises, delay 
provisions of MAD and other applicable laws require an examination of the inside 
information within the framework of bank information. For the case of NR, it has also 
been questioned whether the gold-plating in the UK was a determinant of the BoE’s 
hesitation to support NR. For this to be true, it must first be determined if the potential 
                                               
642 House of Commons Treasury Committee,Vol. II (n 626) Q1757-1760. 
643 Alastair Darling’s response to John Thurso, Ibid Q1766. 
644 Ibid Q268,Q373-374 and Q624. 
645 Ibid Q889-Q890. 
	   253	  
support by BoE to NR was inside information in the eyes of MAD and, if it was, whether 
delay provisions provided in art 6 could have been used for NR. It must be borne in mind 
that the MAD is no longer in force and changes made by the MAR are proof that this area 
of law was not well-drafted to respond to situations like NR.  
 
3.3.1.   What is Market Abuse? 
Types of behaviours labelled as market abuse include insider dealing, non-disclosure of 
inside information, failure to observe proper standards of behaviour, giving false or 
misleading impressions, carrying out transactions that employ fictitious devices or 
deception, dissemination of false or misleading information, market distortion and 
encouragement of others to take part in market abuse. Market abuse regulations, therefore, 
aim to maintain integrated and efficient financial markets by taking measures against 
illegal market operations and ensuring full and proper market transparency through ad 
hoc disclosures. 
 
3.3.1.1. Is Emergency Liquidity Assistance Inside Information? 
One of the arguments levelled against MAD was its use of the same definition of inside 
information for both insider dealing cases and disclosure duties.646 The only difference is 
that, under the disclosure regime established under art 6, only the information directly 
related to the issuer must be disclosed. Having said that, the term ‘precise nature’ is 
another part of the jigsaw defining inside information for disclosure purposes.  
 
The precise nature test, in its application to bank information, provides a general 
framework. The information is deemed of a precise nature:  
                                               
646 MAD,art 1(1); MAR,art 7. 
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… if it indicates a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably be expected to 
come into existence or an event which has occurred or may reasonably be expected to do 
so and if it is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect 
of that set of circumstances or event on the prices of financial instruments or related 
derivative financial instruments.647  
 
So, it is unsurprising that, in the NR case, rational investors might believe that the 
information regarding the ELA satisfies the precise nature test. Such information would 
show that the bank is apparently in financial distress and would change the prices of bank-
issued securities.   
 
Therefore, the general rule applied according to art 6 requires issuers to disclose inside 
information as soon as the prohibition to deal arises without undue delay. The NR case 
was about the ELA facility but inside information can capture different scenarios such as 
M&As, sudden deterioration of assets and fraud, and is therefore considered on a case-
by-case basis.  
 
3.3.2.   Would Safe Harbours Have Applied to the Northern Rock? 
After designation of the type of information, the next step is to determine whether a safe 
harbour is provided in the law. For NR, there was no relevant safe harbour exempting 
certain behaviours from liability and tripartite authorities agreed on the identified inside 
information to be disclosed to the market.   
 
                                               
647 Article 1(1) of Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 Implementing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards to Definition and 
Public Disclosure of Inside Information and the Definition of Market Manipulation [2003] OJ 
L339/73. 
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In terms of behaviours falling under the category market abuse, the ones that might be 
applicable to bank failures were (i) to give false and misleading impressions; (ii) to 
disseminate misleading information; and (iii) to distort markets. 648  Safe harbours 
established under the MAD, FSMA and CoMC that designated the behaviours outside the 
scope of the market abuse offences would not help the troubled bank withhold 
information regarding emergency financial support because safe harbours provided 
through MAD included (i) trading in own shares as part of a share buy-back scheme;649 
(ii) price stabilisation activities’650 and (iii) transactions carried out in pursuit of monetary 
policies651. S 118A(5)(a) of the FSMA also provides a statutory exception: ‘[B]ehaviour 
does not amount to market abuse for the purposes of this Act if it conforms with a rule 
which includes a provision to the effect that behaviour conforming with the rule does not 
amount to market abuse.’ These exceptions act together with other safe harbours 
established under the CoMC.  
 
Another safe harbour discussion revolves around art 1(2) of the MAD. Some question 
whether the British authorities would use the exception provided in the definition of 
market manipulation. In short, if transactions were completed except for legitimate 
reasons and if they conformed with acceptable market practices on the regulated market, 
then there was a room for NR to escape the market manipulation coverage of the MAD.652 
Covert support of the BoE could have been taken as an acceptable market practice by the 
                                               
648 Haynes (n 634) 323. 
649 MAD,art 8. 
650 Ibid. 
651 MAD,art 7. 
652 MAD, art 1(2) goes as follows: ‘Market manipulation’ shall mean… unless the person who 
entered into the transactions or issued the orders to trade establishes that his reasons for so 
doing are legitimate and that these transactions or orders to trade conform to accepted market 
practices on the regulated market concerned.’ 
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FSA, which was the authority to designate what was an accepted market practice.653 
Nevertheless, this would be contrary to the spirit of the MAD as the stated safe harbours 
did not include such a case and it would be considered a circumvention of the law. 
 
Overall, safe harbours were not helpful for cases like NR. Given the inapplicability of 
safe harbours to the banks receiving covert or open support, another option was to 
consider whether delay provisions could have been used.  
 
Art 7 of the MAD, which exempts CBs from its provisions, provides that there was no 
obstacle to the BoE’s covert use of the LoLR facility as it only applied to the BoE itself. 
In this respect, the MAD seems to give greater freedom of movement to the BoE in its 
operations. However, there is a dissenting opinion about the BoE’s freedom in acting as 
LoLR as the MAD not only bites on the recipient firm itself but also public institutions 
like BoE.654 As such, the MAD does not directly prevent the BoE in the conduct of its 
LoLR function, but it obliquely created an obstruction for the BoE, which was charged 
with financial stability duties together with the FSA.  
 
Therefore, the question that arises is whether the recipient should be required to make the 
information public. This was discussed broadly in the House of Commons, and it was 
decided that the duty of disclosure was on the shoulders of the board of the NR rather 
than the regulatory authorities or the BoE.655 Furthermore, during the evidence sessions, 
it was argued that, regardless of the MAD’s disclosure provision, the overall set of 
characteristics of the marketplace would not allow withholding an operation of such size 
                                               
653 Haynes (n 634) 326. 
654 House of Commons Treasury Committee,Vol. II (n 626) Q834-Q835.  
655 Ibid Q264-Q272. 
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and complexity.656 Independent of the standing of the MAD alone, the duty to disclose 
information to CRAs was another factor. It is implied that this had nothing to with the 
legislation. Rather, it is today’s transparency-driven market conditions which are not easy 
to bypass or abstain from. 
 
3.3.3.   Delay Mechanism 
With this in mind, continuous disclosure requirements articulated in art 6 of the MAD 
rules that issuers are required to inform the public without delay of any inside information 
that affects the issuer. 657  Article 5(2) of MAD seeks a proper balance between the 
interests of the issuers and of the investors by providing a delay mechanism for issuers658 
and the pertinent section reveals four points to consider: (i) delay occurs under the issuer’s 
own responsibility; (ii) there must be a legitimate reason for the delay; (iii) omission 
would not mislead the public (which is maybe the most elusive criterion for delay); and 
finally (iv) confidentiality of omitted information must be ensured.   
 
So, the MAD framework allows companies to delay disclosure of inside information at 
their own risk, if other conditions are met. Legitimate interest, here, is another point to 
explore. A non-exhaustive list of examples of legitimate interests is provided in the 
Implementing Directive.659  With relation to the case of NR, these examples include: 
 
(a) negotiations in course, or related elements, where the outcome or normal pattern of 
                                               
656 Ibid Q268, Q373-374,Q624. 
657 MAD,art 6. 
658 MAR,art 17(4). 
659 Article 3 of the Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside 
information and the definition of market manipulation(L339/70). 
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those negotiations would be affected by public disclosure. In particular, in the event that 
the financial viability of the issuer is in grave and imminent danger, although not within 
the scope of the applicable insolvency law, public disclosure of information may be 
delayed for a limited period where such a public disclosure would seriously jeopardise 
the interest of existing and potential shareholders by undermining the conclusion of 
specific negotiations designed to ensure the long-term financial recovery of the issuer; … 
660 
 
In the subsection above, financial viability of the issuer is given as a legitimate reason to 
delay disclosure of inside information. Yet, the ability to delay is contingent upon two 
prevailing requirements: (i) the company is required to ensure confidentiality of inside 
information, which means if any leaks occur, delay is no longer possible, and (ii) non-
disclosure should not be likely to mislead the public. Silence can amount to authorization 
of a specific misapprehension by the market due to the company’s latest statements. As 
such, the MAD framework establishes a duty on the company to correct an impression 
stemming from its recent market statements which was now conflicting with the inside 
information which had arisen.661 A wide range of behaviours by the bank, including 
staying quiet on the topic and providing a misleading impression to the market regarding 
the value of a relevant investment, would cause market distortion under the MAD.  
 
The criterion to not mislead the public is difficult to interpret. Considering the nature of 
inside information, any delay in the disclosure of inside information actually has the 
capacity to mislead the public in broad terms. However, this thinking would erase the 
raison d’etre of the delay mechanism provided to issuers. This means it becomes an 
arduous task to delay disclosure while not misleading the public. The Committee of 
                                               
660 Ibid. 
661 ‘Letter from the Governor of BoE to the Chairmen’ in House of Commons Treasury 
Committee,Vol. II (n 626) Evidence:218. 
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European Securities Regulators (now ESMA) directs this with the non-exhaustive 
circumstances that it provides in its guidelines.  
 
In the end, the FSA, as the Listing Authority, made it clear that the ELA could not be 
covert on the basis of the overriding requirement about misleading the public, irrespective 
of the confidentiality condition.662 Even if the issuer is in grave and imminent danger, the 
issuer must follow requirements regarding not misleading the public and assurance of 
confidentiality.  
 
3.3.4.   Gold-Plating  
During evidence sessions of the Treasury Committee, an investigation was conducted 
regarding whether it was the UK’s gold-plating of the MAD or whether it was the 
inaptitude of the tripartite system for deciding on disclosure of inside information about 
troubled FIs.663 HM Treasury’s implementation approach in targeting super-equivalence 
was considered an impeding factor to the covert support. This was part of the discussion 
about the UK’s broader definition of market abuse than in the MAD. While this argument 
was discussed, there was another point to consider – whether the UK was entitled to gold-
plating in the first place. This examination directed the question to another point, which 
was whether the MAD was a maximum harmonization directive or not.664  
                                               
662 House of Commons Treasury Committee Vol. I para 136 (n 612). 
663 House of Commons Treasury Committee,Vol. II (n 626) Q1823-Q1830.  
664 Recent questioning about whether the MAD is a maximum harmonization directive or not 
was the Specter Photo case where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) concluded that 
determination of harmonisation is not relevant to the case. Spector Photo Group and Van 
Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen(ECJ)(Case C- 45/08), 
23 Dec 2009(accessed Sep 23, 2016) 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=77184&doclang=en.  
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The MAD was more ambivalent compared to previous legislative measures in the same 
field665 as it did not directly prohibit member states from accepting stricter rules. So, 
neither court decisions nor the MAD illustrated the level of harmonization, and 
interpretations vary between commentators. For instance, Moloney argues that the MAD 
was a minimum-standards measure.666 Yet, in terms of the overall view of what the MAD 
provides (i.e. emphasis on the establishment of a level playing field, exclusion of the 
adaptation of super-equivalent rules in the MAD compared to the previous directive and 
high level of details provided at the MAD, such as clear definitions and prohibitions), the 
MAD appears to be a maximum harmonization directive, not a minimum one. However, 
this questioning is out-of-date as the MAR came into force to close gaps in regulation.  
 
The UK’s broader definition of market abuse was related to its restrictive implementation 
of legitimate interest, which was articulated in the Implementing Directive. 667 
Additionally, this was about the UK’s decision to keep the legacy offences that predated 
the MAD. The maintenance of such offences in the law ultimately extended the scope of 
market manipulation compared to those established by the MAD. The consequence of 
this was that, according to McCreevy, the MAD itself was not an impeding factor for the 
covert ELA. Instead, it was the additional material kept by the UK, in other words, super-
equivalencies of the UK: 
 
… I have always been of the view that when the stability of a FI is at risk, the situation is best 
resolved behind closed doors. …[G]old-plated transparency rules stood in the way of the quiet 
resolution of a problem before it became a crisis: The result was that transparency rules that were 
intended to underpin investor confidence, when put to the test, actually promoted investor panic. 
                                               
665 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider 
Dealing [1989] OJ L334/30. 
666 Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2nd edn,OUP 2008) 35. 
667 Ibid. 
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Panic that culminated in a bank run - averted only by a central bank lifeboat which in turn spread 
moral hazard throughout the system. It would surely be irresponsible for regulators not to reflect 
on this experience and not to draw the appropriate lessons. Clearly transparency that culminates 
in panic, followed by a rescue, followed by the proliferation of moral hazard is transparency that 
we would be better off without. 668 
 
Gold-plating here meant that silence about the ELA would cause market manipulation 
according to the UK laws, while the MAD itself did not rigorously call for market 
manipulation for the same action. While the MAD required some specified positive 
actions, the FSMA, by including super-equivalent provisions, also covered behaviours 
that did not necessarily require positive action. This means that if an issuer does not 
correct information that provides a false or misleading impression, then it would fall into 
s 118(8) of the FSMA.669 Under these circumstances, the tripartite organs interpreted the 
mere silence as market manipulation.  
 
However, it is again a matter of interpretation, and the assumption that, if NR delayed the 
disclosure, then there was a potential for the NR’s behaviour to be categorized as an 
offence of misleading dissemination under the MAD. As such, gold plating was not the 
problem.  
 
                                               
668 The European Commissioner Charlie McCreevy’s speech in Dublin (26/10/2007)(accessed 
May 17,2016) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-668_en.htm.  
669 Joris Latui,‘Disclosure of Inside Information and Troubled Financial Institutions:A Critical 
Analysis of Member State Practice’ (2011) 5(1) Law and Financial Markets Review 62,73. 
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3.4.Post-Northern Rock Cases 
3.4.1.   Societe Generale: Is it a Political Lesson Learnt from Northern Rock?  
One of the most cited cases in the rogue-trading world is that of SG where weak control 
and lack of management supervision enabled broker Jerome Kerviel to engage in 
fictitious trades and other fraudulent transactions for more than two years.670 Poor internal 
control services in SG ultimately resulted in a fine of four million Euros.671  
 
Detection of the massive fraud occurred on 18 January 2008 by the risk inspectors. 
Consequent examination showed that SG would bear a loss of fifty billion euros, in 
addition to the loss of its stability and reputation. The French securities regulator (AMF) 
and the Bank of France were alerted on 20 January and rescue plans and concerns about 
the stability of both the bank and the state arose. The board of SG asked for a delay of 
public communications and bank results until the end of unwinding.  A crisis committee 
consisting of financial regulators agreed to the concealment of the incident, so the bank 
could unobtrusively resell the products that Kerviel had bought. The timeline of events 
shows that after the discussions about the situation and its potential consequences by the 
relevant authorities, information about the loss of 4.9 billion Euros through market 
activities, the SG’s estimated 2007 results and information regarding capital increase 
which allowed it to increase its solvency ratio (tier 1) were only revealed on 24 January 
2008.672  
                                               
670 Marius-Christian Frunza, Introduction to the Theories and Varieties of Modern Crime in 
Financial Markets (Academic Press 2016) 126. 
671 Paul Constable,‘Combating Stock Market Manipulation in Australia’(2013) 16 International 
Trade and Business Law Review 325,340-41. 
672 ‘The Report to the Prime Minister on Lessons Learned from Recent Events at Société 
Générale’ (Feb 2008) part 1.2 (accessed Dec 22, 
2016)http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/084000062/index.shtml.  
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SG’s position under the MAD was questioned in this case because the authorities were 
inclined to withhold the incident from the public. Therefore, the discussion here was 
whether competent authorities could call for delay provisions of the MAD for withholding 
information about the fraud and the implied increase in capital without misleading the 
public.673 
 
As discussed, the MAD creates questions about delays in cases where banks are in a grave 
condition with implications for systemic risk or for the state’s financial stability. The 
MAD framework requires three conditions to be fulfilled for the delay. After NR, the 
fraud at SG revealed the merit of reconsidering whether failure to satisfy confidentiality 
and not misleading the public should automatically prevent the issuer from using a 
delayed disclosure mechanism. Such an investigation becomes more important when 
there is increased market uncertainty, threats to financial stability, and when the 
magnitude of the event has a negative ripple effect on the bank as well as the European 
and the world’s marketplace.  
 
The information about such an exceptional fraud was accepted as inside information by 
the authorities. Yet, their decision to delay public disclosure perfectly presents the public 
interest approach. First, unwinding the positions was crucial to decrease exposures to the 
risks that were threatening SG and the European financial markets. Second, a capital 
increase to strengthen the SG’s equity was a confident step to prevent a market breakdown. 
An opposite decision would be the immediate disclosure of SG’s actual exposure to risks 
                                               
673 EC,‘Public Consultation on a Revision of the Market Abuse Directive’ (25.06.2010) at 14 
(accessed Dec 26, 2016) 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/mad/docs/consultation_paper_en.pdf.  
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of equity derivatives markets and it would have caused the loss of confidence in the 
market, starting from SG’s counterparties.  
 
A loss of confidence on the side of SG’s counterparties would have not only disturbed 
the French marketplace but also initiated a domino effect in other markets. Michel Prada, 
president of the AMF at the time, believed that ‘it would be dangerous to announce fraud 
without also showing an appropriate response’674 and so the delay was granted to SG by 
way of invoking a new exception that did not exist in the MAD. So, even if the delay was 
also in the best interest of SG, the overriding concern here was the financial stability of 
the state and the markets and this concern was best reflected by the French authorities’ 
decision to keep silent about such a massive fraud. This decision was also a product of 
smooth and good communication and cooperation between SG and the French authorities, 
namely, Banque de France and AMF. The criticisms about the NR case were, inter alia, 
described as a failure of coordination within the tripartite system and the SG case is a 
proof that lesson well-learned after the NR. However, it posed another concern: The 
decision to pursue for mere compliance or good compliance of the law.  
 
The MAD was part of French law, and information about the fraud was of a precise nature 
that would greatly affect the price of SG’s financial instruments. Delay provisions, as 
discussed above in examining the MAD, require three conditions to be fulfilled and SG 
was unable to fulfil the ‘not misleading the public’ condition. This was the biggest 
challenge of AMF assistance to SG. Exploration of fraud revealed that there was a 
discrepancy between SG’s previously posted financial standing and its actual financial 
position. As such, the public was required to know this ‘information of a precise nature’. 
                                               
674 Cited from (accessed Dec 21, 2016)https://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/societe-generale-la-
fed-et-la-bce-prevenues-avant-l-annonce-des-pertes_377502. 
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It should also be noted that art 6(2) of the MAD provides room for the member states to 
establish a rule that requires an issuer to inform the competent authority of the decision 
to delay public disclosure of inside information. This was the case in Spain but not in 
France which means that SG would delay the information without reaching an agreement 
with the AMF.675 This examination rearticulates the main question, which is the extent of 
the role of the AMF in deciding to disclose or delay, and its application of MAD’s delay 
provisions to the SG case. Ex ante consultation with the AMF appears to be inconsistent 
with the level playing field that the EU laws aimed to accomplish, and such a situation 
also brings about legal uncertainty about the banks’ position under the MAR.  
 
The wording of art 6(2) of the MAD states that the issuer decides to delay disclosure 
under its own responsibility, which means that the AMF is the authority that can pursue 
an enforcement action if a violation regarding market abuse rules occurs. However, the 
straightforward cooperation between SG and the AMF obviates discussion about the 
potential imposition of enforcement actions on the SG. However, it directs the question 
to another point: Would the AMF be responsible for breaching EU law?  
The foundational law of the EU in this context is the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).676 If a member state manifestly and gravely disregards the legal 
limits of its political discretion and contradicts with EU law, it runs the risk of being 
pursued by the EC.677 Yet, in the SG case, the French authorities did not prosecute SG 
                                               
675 Latui (n 669) 67. 
676 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/01. 
677 Arts 258 and 259 of the TFEU provide the basis for the Commission and member states to 
bring a violation before the Court of Justice. 
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and the Commission did not pursue the French state for infringement of market abuse 
rules.  
 
This case reveals that, after NR, the EU states were aware that the MAD was not drafted 
with an eye to crisis conditions. Mere compliance with the law would require the 
immediate disclosure of the fraud to the public and in that case, there would be no room 
for the authorities to be involved in the situation and prevent a larger breakdown. 
However, there was also no good compliance with the law. Rather, it appears that the 
prudential-logic-based characteristics of the regulatory and supervisory authorities, 
combined with the political imperative to protect the state against the subprime crisis, led 
them to abandon the strict application of the descriptive framework of the MAD. Once 
again, the MAD was seen as an impediment for the implementation of stability-specific 
solutions and it became well-acknowledged that the MAD was there to protect markets 
and that the delay provisions were unresponsive to the exceptional nature of some 
situations involving FIs. 
 
3.4.2.   Merger of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Lloyds TSB 
Another relevant case in terms of disclosure of bank information is the crisis merger of 
two banks with considerable market overlaps. The precipitous fall in HBOS’s shares was 
the result of the GFC global drama and so a rescue merger was announced. The 
government encouraged the merger between Lloyds and HBOS, as HBOS was a 
systemically important bank.  
 
The merger required both banks to issue prospectuses and although Lloyds shareholders 
did not vote against the proposed merger, there was general negativity about the 
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transaction. Post-merger acts revealed that the financial standing of HBOS was worse 
than expected so that thereafter Lloyds itself had to be rescued by the government. 
Regarding MD of information by banks, the discussion here was twofold: (i) market abuse 
rules and (ii) prospectus requirements. 
 
The deal was concluded in January 2009. However, in November 2009, it emerged that 
the BoE provided a secret lifeline to HBOS during the 2008 crisis even though it had 
agreed to be taken over by Lloyds. The loan was repaid by HBOS before the completion 
of the deal. Yet, neither the takeover prospectuses of Lloyds nor HBOS revealed the fact 
that HBOS was receiving emergency aid from the BoE.  
 
In the light of this background information, the first part of the discussion should be 
examined: market abuse rules. On this, the FSA determined that its own rules about 
market abuse did not require HBOS to disclose that it was receiving emergency funding 
from the BoE. The FSA clarified its position by accepting that non-disclosure of the ELA 
was not a breach of law. On 6 December 2008, DTRs were amended to provide 
clarification for banks: ‘An issuer may have a legitimate interest to delay 
disclosing inside information concerning the provision of liquidity support by the BoE or 
by another CB to it or to a member of the same group as the issuer.’678 
As a lesson taken from the NR case, the FSA concluded that concealing the amount and 
scale of the support from the shareholders and the public was acceptable.679 This explains 
that a stability-embraced approach to bank disclosure was clearly needed.  
                                               
678 DTR 2.5.5AR as of 06.12.2008. 
679 FSA Annual Report 2008-9,Examination of Witnesses(25 Nov 2009) (accessed Jan 
27,2017)https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/35/9112503.
htm. 
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Regarding prospectus requirements, FSMA s 87A provides the criteria for the approval 
of a prospectus. It requires it to include necessary information that enables investors to 
make informed assessments of the investment. 680  In these conditions, while the 
information about ELA was not publicly available because public disclosure would 
damage the financial stability of the markets, it has been questioned why the same 
information was not material enough for Lloyds shareholders who were asked to purchase 
HBOS. The responses regarding prospectus requirements are interesting because the 
continuing banking crisis was the reason for this move and so it was assumed that all 
market participants were already aware of the financial support provided to commercial 
banks.681 Two things can be asserted from this: first, even if shareholders had been aware 
of the situation, their decision would still be in favour of the takeover, which does not 
seem right from a shareholder point of view; second, the same logic of the application of 
market abuse rules also applied here and public disclosure of adverse information would 
be damaging to overall stability. These two assertions seem contradictory. 
 
There is another point to discuss here which proves that the government needed more 
space to respond to the crisis in a way it deemed the most efficient. The law itself provides 
exemptions from disclosure when the disclosure is contrary to public interest. 
Considering that the government encouraged the takeover, it can be questioned why the 
public interest exemption was not used here.682 Maybe the Secretary of the State or the 
                                               
680 FSMA,s 87A; PR,art 6; PD,art 5. 
681 For the debate about non-disclosure of ELA see FSA Annual Report 2008-9, Examination of 
Witnesses at Q21 (accessed Jan 
27,2017)https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/35/9112503.
htm. 	  
682 PD,art 8; PR, art 18(1)(a) and FSMA,s 87B. 
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Treasury did not want to assume responsibility by issuing a certificate for the omission.683 
It is also asserted that the government wanted to demonstrate its support for the defenders 
of the protection of depositors and other creditors while providing covert support to 
HBOS.684  
 
While not using the public interest exemption for disclosure purposes,685 Parliament took 
the first step towards mitigating bank disclosure-related concerns. On 21 February 2009, 
the Banking Act of 2009 came into force. S 252 of the Act provides that registration of 
charges of the Companies Act of 2006 does not apply in respect to charges provided to 
the BoE, other CBs, or the ECB in order to receive emergency liquidity.686 Therefore, 
registration no longer brings about early disclosure of liquidity support. Following the 
amendment made in the DTRs about liquidity assistance, this was another important step 
before the enforcement of the MAR. 
 
One aspect of the merger is related to the limits of the government’s power to protect 
financial stability through rescue operations. The media commonly referred to this merger 
as a shotgun marriage arranged by the British prime minister.687 Discussions about the 
merger were mainly about putting competition concerns aside and focusing solely on 
                                               
683 FSMA, s 87B(2). 
684 Julia Black,‘Managing the Financial Crisis-The Constitutional Dimension’ LSE Working 
Paper 12/2010 at 39 (accessed Feb 19,2017) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32895/1/WPS2010-
12_Black.pdf.  
685 As it will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, a new public interest ground is 
introduced to the competition rules.  
686 Banking Act 2009,s 252(1). 
687 House of Commons Treasury Committee,‘Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of the 
UK Banks’, Seventh Report of Session 2008-9: Report, together with Formal Minutes(21 April 
2009) at 53(accessed Sep 
23,2016)https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/416/416.pdf.  
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financial stability. The tripartite authorities submitted that the successful and precise 
conclusion of the merger was crucial in order to preserve the confidence of HBOS 
creditors (especially after the run on NR) and to prevent a systemic-stability triggering 
incident emanating from a weak and standalone HBOS. 
 
The merger was completed in 2009 in spite of the Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) 
disagreement688 and the government’s reaction (together with the BoE, FSA and the 
Treasury) was to change the law so that the merger could happen without a second phase 
merger investigation.689 The UK merger control rules under the Enterprise Act of 2002 
allowed the Secretary of State to intervene in relation to mergers when the merger raises 
a defined public interest concern.690 Yet, this public interest ground was intended to be 
interpreted narrowly, particularly for issues of national security and quality, plurality and 
standards of media.691 For this reason, in October 2008, the Secretary of State passed a 
new public interest ground for maintaining the stability of the UK financial system to 
tailor the law to the HBOS and Lloyds merger.692  
 
                                               
688 OFT was the agency responsible for the first phase merger decisions. It merged with the 
Competition Commission (CC) in 2014 and formed the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA). It should be noted that the FCA gained concurrent powers with the CMA to enforce 
UK and EU competition law in the financial services sector in 2015.  
689 Bruce Lyons and Mnyan Zhu,‘Compensating Competitors or Restoring Competition? (2013) 
13 J Ind Compet Trade 39,56 
690 Enterprise Act 2002,s 42 and 58.  
691 Louise Smith,‘The Lloyds-TSB and HBOS Merger:Competition Issues’ (2008) Commons 
Briefing Papers SN04907 (accessed May 16, 2017) 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN04907.  
692 Enterprise Act 2002, para 20B of Schedule 8. Also see the ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Enterprise Act 2002’(accessed Jan 14, 2017) 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/2645/pdfs/uksiem_20082645_en.pdf. 
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The merger was completed on the basis of HBOS’s severe financial difficulty along with 
the risk of losing public confidence, and the risk of a systemic crisis if the bank failed.693 
The result here was that, as was apparent in the change of competition rules, there was a 
trade-off or at least a compulsory choice to be made between two interests: ensuring the 
financial stability of state and maintaining competitive and efficient markets. As the case 
reveals, the merger’s benefits for the UK’s financial stability outweighed the potential 
that the merger would result in anticompetitive outcomes.  An additional choice was 
between short-term and immediate reestablishment of stability and long-term 
development of competitive and efficient markets.694 This discussion also recalls the 
discussion in Section 5 of Chapter 3.  
 
This pragmatic approach in pursuance of financial stability poses a view parallel to the 
government’s need to manoeuvre in terms of restoring the financial position in the market 
and it accepts that financial stability entails a higher public interest character in the long-
term than protecting competitive markets in the short-term. Having said that, discussions 
about the place of a standard model of competition in the financial sector is traditionally 
                                               
693 ‘…However, having had regard in particular to the submissions made to the OFT by the 
tripartite authorities (HM Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England), 
the Secretary of State considers that the merger will result in significant benefits to the public 
interest as it relates to ensuring the stability of the UK financial system and that these benefits 
outweigh the potential for the merger to result in the anti-competitive outcomes identified 
by the OFT. As a result of this decision, no reference will be made to the CC.’ (emphasis 
added) See the Decision by Lord Mandelson, The Secretary of the State for Business, not to 
refer to the Competition Commission to Merger between Lloyds TSB Group plc and HBOS plc 
under section 45 of the Enterprise Act 2003, Commons Library Deposited Paper Dep2008-2685 
(31 October 2008) para 12.  
694 Ioannis Kokkoris,‘Competition vs Financial Stability in the Aftermath of the Crisis in the 
UK’ (2014) 59(1) The Antitrust Bulletin 31,34. 
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seen as a facilitator of bank instability,695 and therefore prioritization of financial stability 
over competitive banking industry might seem aligned with this competition-fragility 
approach.696  
 
It should be noted that both prudential regulation and competition policies pursue the 
common goal of sustainable competitive and efficient markets and prudential regulators 
are not necessarily capable of foreseeing long-term repercussions of suspending the 
requirements of competitive markets, as they are not the experts in that field. This 
approach is compatible with the general stability-focused move towards concentration on 
results in preference to the conservation of the rules of the game. 
 
However, this entails a risk as well as prompt authorization of mergers in periods of crisis 
to save banks, or the market might bring about TBTF problems in the financial industry, 
which raise the further examination of this topic. Once again, putting more emphasis on 
financial stability as a post-crisis regulatory objective reiterates the question of whether 
financial regulation can and also should be framed to mainly reflect public interest in 
protecting overall financial stability. 
 
These examples show that the UK experienced uncertainty regarding bank disclosure 
requirements vis-à-vis the need for some secrecy. Unplanned disclosure of adverse 
                                               
695 J. Goddard, P. Molyneux, J.O.S. Wilson and M. Tavakoli,‘European Banking: An Overview’ 
[2007] 31 Journal of Banking&Finance 1911. 
696 However, it should be noted that prudential regulation together with safety nets inherently 
limit the full penetration of competition in the banking industry and as the OECD report puts 
forward, it is the regulation to be blamed for the development of the crisis, not merely 
competition. OECD, ‘Competition and Financial Markets’(2009) at 26 (accessed June 14, 2017) 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43067294.pdf.  
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information and its consequences, such as rapid loss of public confidence, pose greater 
risks than delayed but planned disclosure.697 That is why the FCA revised the FCA 
Handbook and acknowledged that receiving liquidity support from a CB might be a 
legitimate reason to delay disclosure of inside information.698 Yet, the FCA abolished this 
constellation when the MAR came into force.  
 
3.5.The Way Forward: Market Abuse Regulation and A Striking New Ground 
for Delay of Disclosure 
As the cases reveal, the crisis put an emphasis on matters surrounding market abuse and 
financial stability, including short selling699  and public disclosure of information by 
publicly listed banks. The cases experienced in different states have confirmed the 
necessity of a new approach in bank disclosures, proving that timely and full bank 
transparency is not always optimal for the overall stability of financial markets and the 
state.  
 
The MAR replaced the MAD and came into effect across the EU states on 3 July 2016. 
Regulatory arbitrage and the need for strict harmonisation might be the reason for 
choosing a regulation rather than a directive. Overall, at the EU level, listed banks now 
have a new ground for delaying public disclosure of information if conditions are met.  
                                               
697 Tripartite Authorities,Financial Stability and Depositor Protection:Strengthening the 
Framework (Jan 2008) Cm 7308 at 43. 
698 FCA Handbook,DTR 2.5.5A(as of Jun 30,2016)(accessed Jun 19,2017) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR/2/5.html?date=2016-06-30.  
699 Like the SEC, the FSA also use the ban on short selling in certain securities to restore 
investor confidence in securities markets and to safeguard FIs from rapid declines in their 
stocks. FSA,(18 Sept 2018)(accessed Jun 19, 2017) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2008/102.shtml.  
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Art 17(5) of MAR clearly identifies financial stability of the financial system (as long as 
other conditions are also met) as a new basis for delay. The pertinent sections of art 17 
are the following: 
 
5. In order to preserve the stability of the financial system, an issuer that is a credit 
institution or a FI, may, on its own responsibility, delay the public disclosure of inside 
information, including information which is related to a temporary liquidity problem and, 
in particular, the need to receive temporary liquidity assistance from a central bank or 
lender of last resort, provided that all of the following conditions are met:  
(a) the disclosure of the inside information entails a risk of undermining the financial 
stability of the issuer and of the financial system;  
(b) it is in the public interest to delay the disclosure;  
(c) the confidentiality of that information can be ensured; and  
(d) the competent authority specified under paragraph 3 has consented to the delay on the 
basis that the conditions in points (a), (b) and (c) are met.  
 
6. For the purposes of points (a) to (d) of paragraph 5, an issuer shall notify the competent 
authority specified under paragraph 3 of its intention to delay the disclosure of the inside 
information and provide evidence that the conditions set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of 
paragraph 5 are met. The competent authority specified under paragraph 3 shall consult, 
as appropriate, the national central bank or the macro-prudential authority, where 
instituted, or, alternatively, the following authorities:  
(a) where the issuer is a credit institution or an investment firm the authority designated 
in accordance with Article 133(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council;  
 (b) in cases other than those referred to in point (a), any other national authority 
responsible for the supervision of the issuer.  
 
The competent authority specified under paragraph 3 shall ensure that disclosure of the 
inside information is delayed only for a period as is necessary in the public interest. The 
competent authority specified under paragraph 3 shall evaluate at least on a weekly basis 
whether the conditions set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 5 are still met.  
If the competent authority specified under paragraph 3 does not consent to the delay of 
disclosure of the inside information, the issuer shall disclose the inside information 
immediately.  
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This paragraph shall apply to cases where the issuer does not decide to delay the 
disclosure of inside information in accordance with paragraph 4.  
 
Reference in this paragraph to the competent authority specified under paragraph 3 is 
without prejudice to the ability of the competent authority to exercise its functions in any 
of the ways referred to in Article 23(1). 
 
ESMA has made it clear that delay conditions are to be interpreted narrowly.700 However, 
there are several points to be made regarding the above section. As seen at art 17(6), 
responsibility for a decision to delay is given to the issuer rather than the regulator. The 
issuer applies for delay on the basis that public disclosure of inside information poses the 
risk of damaging the financial stability of the issuer as well as the financial system. This 
provision is confusing as it begs the question of how a FI is capable of determining 
whether disclosure can undermine the financial stability of the state.  
 
Art 17(4) of the MAR, similar to the one provided in the MAD, already provides a ground 
for an issuer to delay disclosure of information when immediate disclosure is likely to 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuer, when withholding the information is not 
likely to mislead the public, and when confidentiality is ensured. Under the new law, 
issuers are required to make an ex post notification to the competent authority when 
disclosure of inside information is delayed.701 This notification system requires issuers to 
be prepared to demonstrate the grounds for the delay decision. Overall, the pertinent delay 
provision of the MAR is broadly the same as the MAD and the application of the 
                                               
700 ESMA, Draft Technical Standards on the Market Abuse Regulation (28 Sep 2015)  
ESMA/2015/1455 at para 251(accessed Dec 24,2017) 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-esma-1455_-
_final_report_mar_ts.pdf.  
701 MAR,art 17(4). 
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legitimate interest test is also valid within the context of MAR.702 This means that banks 
can still use usual delay provisions when conditions are met. It is interesting how a listed 
bank can use the usual delay provision when there is also another delay mechanism 
specifically provided to them.  
 
The first question here should be how a bank can determine whether the disclosure has 
the capacity to undermine financial stability or not. As art 17(4) reveals, the issuer has 
the ability to assess its own financial standing and stability and decide to delay (as long 
as other conditions are met). The new provision therefore provides a new dimension of 
this assessment and tasks the banks with determining the financial stability of the state. It 
also requires the banks to provide evidence that the conditions set out in point (a) of 
paragraph 5 are met for the delay.  
 
Even if the ultimate decision maker for the delay provided in art 17(5) is the competent 
authority, banks have a duty to provide evidence about the negative effects of information 
on the financial stability of the state. It seems confusing that banks are bringing the 
stability of the financial system to the attention of the competent authority instead of 
relevant bank supervisors and regulators. Yet, as art 17(6) provides, the competent 
authority, as appropriate, should consult with the CB or macroprudential authority that is 
charged with the protection of financial stability. Here, the term ‘as appropriate’ gives the 
impression that the competent authority reaches stability-focused authorities only if it is 
appropriate, which means it is not an automatic cooperation. In practice, one does not 
                                               
702 ‘Final Report: Guidelines on the MAR-Market Soundings and Delay of Disclosure of Inside 
Information’ (13 July 2016) ESMA /2016/1130 at 13-14(accessed June 21, 2017) 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016-
1130_final_report_on_mar_guidelines.pdf.   
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expect the competent authority to decide on stability-related concerns of FIs and keep a 
FI’s intention to delay disclosure of inside information from stability-regulators. Instead, 
a more sensible approach would be a direct referral to stability-mandated authorities in 
drafting the law. 
 
Another point is related to the public interest condition. Art 17(5)(b) requires ‘public 
interest in delay’ as a condition that has to be proved by the issuer. Similar to the 
discussion about the bank’s determination of the stability of the financial system, it is 
ambiguous how a bank can prove that delay is in the public interest. Public interest itself 
is a difficult concept to address and the discussion about the nature and parameters of the 
investigation continues.703 Public interest often appears to be a wide and vague concept 
that can be described at different times with different perceptions. Different people 
describe it with different values and therefore the public interest test or filter that banks 
apply may differ from what regulators or supervisors use.  Surely, in the current context, 
it must address financial stability.  
 
Additionally, when the first condition is met, namely when the bank decides that the 
public disclosure of some information could undermine the stability of the financial 
system, the question of how the public interest condition is fulfilled should be answered. 
It is sensible to think that concerns for financial stability itself are directly linked to the 
public interest. This means that the fulfilment of the first condition also satisfies the public 
interest condition. The wording of the regulation, therefore, does not establish a clear and 
direct link between financial stability and public interest.  
 
                                               
703 Mike Feintuck,The Public Interest’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) ch 1. 
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So, a literal reading of the provision provides an assumption: When disclosure of 
particular information entails a risk of damaging the financial system, it does not 
necessarily and automatically call for a public interest rationale. This means that, while 
there is a possibility that disclosure is damaging to the financial system, the delay is not 
in the public interest. As set out in art 17(6), the issuer is required to provide evidence 
that the delay meets all of the conditions.   
 
Therefore, it appears that the public interest condition alone does not provide a precise 
and conclusive message about what is expected from banks. Certainly, the purpose of the 
law approaches public interest from a financial stability of the state point of view. 
However, in practice how this provision will be addressed is a concern that requires 
further exploration. There is no doubt that the delay mechanism is reassuring to stressed 
or troubled banks that have an interest in delayed transparency. So, even if the bank’s 
motives for delay are not the same as a financial stability regulator’s or a bank regulator’s, 
if the ultimate result of delay is beneficial to the whole society, then this discussion might 
seem unnecessary. 
 
Nevertheless, banks, as companies pursuing their own welfare maximisation are expected 
to reflect their own economic considerations, not other concerns, ie democratic 
expectations, integrity and competitiveness of the financial markets and so on that 
policymakers seek when deciding public interest. Tasking banks with providing evidence 
regarding the fulfilment of the public interest condition is, in theory, abortive. Instead, a 
provision providing that the stability regulator (with other authorities 
regulating/supervising banks) is required to consider public interest in deciding whether 
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 to delay would be a better approach, which is already the raison d’etre of the financial 
regulation. 
 
Banks, while using art 17(5), explain why delay is in the public interest, provide evidence 
about their financial facts that include their market share, liquidity positions, interbank 
loans, their risk and geographical concentration, and contagion channels. In this context, 
they will provide the same information that bank supervisors/regulators are already 
required to know. After all, it is possible that public interest here provides a constructive 
ambiguity as banks can produce their own arguments about the effects of disclosure and 
its results within the context of public interest. This does not change the fact that a 
competent authority makes the delay decision. Even if the evidence that a bank provides 
is not compelling enough, it is possible that the competent authority (if deemed 
appropriate, after consultation with the CB or macro prudential authority or any other 
national authority charged with bank supervision) grants the delay to the issuer because 
those authorities are better qualified and equipped to gauge the risks emanating from 
public disclosure. Interestingly, this is done at the expense of the issuer’s own 
responsibility. Also, there are extra information costs to banks as they are required to 
provide evidence to the competent authority for delay authorisation.  
 
The last condition is confidentiality. As discussed in the NR case, it is difficult to withhold 
information from the public when the issue is the stability of important FIs. Especially 
when economic recession or tension is in the air and when the public expects government 
interference over the tension, it is not an easy task to keep such information secret.  This 
is even more so when a bank receives emergency support from the government – there 
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are many counterparties involved in the whole process.704 Yet, the new MAR sets out art 
17(5) for a reason and highlights financial stability, and there is no doubt that 
confidentiality is one of the most important pillars of the delay mechanism considering 
the delicacy of the matter. Therefore, while capital markets transparency rules are 
transformed, CB or other relevant transparency and accountability procedures are tailored 
as well. The ECB decided that starting from 16 September 2015 CBs have the choice to 
communicate publicly regarding provision of ELA to the banks in their territory, which 
means that disclosure of ELA is optional.705  
 
There are other arguments to be made for art 17(5) of the MAR. The wording of the 
relevant section reveals that ‘information related to a temporary liquidity problem and in 
particular, the need to receive temporary liquidity assistance from a CB or lender of last 
resort’706 is not the only reason for a bank to delay disclosure of inside information and, 
instead, adverse information about the monetary condition of the bank and the 
information regarding the ELA seems to be given as examples to use the delay mechanism. 
As such, one might think that the relevant provision is badly drafted by not limiting the 
                                               
704 However, it should be remembered that the BoE provided secret loans to the RBS and HBOS 
in 2008 and it was disclosed in November 2009 to avoid a similar case like NR. Black (n 684) 
32-33. As discussed in the US part, secret public lending during the GFC was a common aspect 
of government actions including in the US. Gary Gorton and Guillermo Ordonez,‘Fighting 
Crises with Secrecy’ (2017) NBER Working Paper 22787(accessed June 24, 2017) 
https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~ordonez/pdfs/CB.pdf. See Chapter 2,Section 3.1.3.1. 
705 ECB, Press Release on Sep 16,2015(accessed on May 14,2017) 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150916.en.html.The ECB also announced 
‘Agreement on Emergency Liquidity Assistance’(17 May 2017) Part 8 of the Agreement 
(accessed May 19, 2017) 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Agreement_on_emergency_liquidity_assistance_2017
0517.en.pdf.  
706 MAR,art 17(5). 
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reasons for the delay but, rather, by allowing other grounds for the delay of disclosure as 
long as the disclosure threatens the financial stability of the issuer and the financial system, 
it is in the public interest and the confidentiality of that information is ensured.   
 
Recital 52 of the MAR also supports the view that examples provided in s 17(5) are not 
numerus clausus. The pertinent recital states that: 
 
In order to protect the public interest, to preserve the stability of the financial system and, 
for example, to avoid liquidity crises in FIs from turning into solvency crises due to a 
sudden withdrawal of funds, it may be appropriate to allow, in exceptional circumstances, 
the delay of the disclosure of inside information for credit institutions or financial 
institutions. In particular, this may apply to information pertinent to temporary liquidity 
problems, where they need to receive central banking lending including emergency 
liquidity assistance from a central bank where disclosure of the information would have 
a systemic impact.707 
 
Given the information above, the recital is confusing to the extent that it does not specify 
the grounds for delay with precision. While protection of public interest and preservation 
of stability of the financial system are given as a basis for the delay, it is not certain 
whether avoidance from liquidity crises is provided as a new ground or whether it is 
provided as an example supporting the preceding ‘financial stability’ ground. Even if 
liquidity crisis is given as an example to underpin the financial stability ground, it does 
not change the motivation for delay since liquidity crisis is highly linked to financial 
stability. The argument here, therefore, can be related to the poor drafting of the recital 
or it can be the main purpose of the lawmaker by adopting an indefinite and amorphous 
approach, which is interpreted within the needs of the financial stability. In this sense, 
avoidance of liquidity crises appears to be an example of the financial stability ground. 
                                               
707 MAR,Recital 52. 
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To prevent a potential situation like NR, there is particular emphasis on the disclosure of 
ELA and LoLR facility even if it could have been interpreted in the wider context of 
financial stability.  
 
All things considered, the wording of art 17(5) together with the pertinent recital seems 
to provide a comprehensive ground under the notion of financial stability and, by doing 
so, it ensures that avoidance of liquidity crises via ELA or LoLR facilities are considered 
grounds to evoke a financial stability basis for delay. It is noteworthy that the lawmaker 
has preferred delay mechanism over a safe harbour. It means that rather than defining 
which specific bank behaviour does not amount to market abuse, the delay mechanism is 
favoured.  
 
Maybe another possibility would be either adding a new and separate safe harbour for 
nationalisation, merger, emergency liquidity support or other actions needed for the 
protection of financial stability by the CB/relevant macroprudential authority; or adding 
a new financial stability exemption to article 6 of the MAR in addition to policies 
regarding monetary, exchange rate of public debt management. Maybe it is because the 
lawmaker has considered that not every liquidity support links with potential severe 
threats to financial stability that requires absolute opacity, and banks’ straightforward 
exclusion from disclosure mandates via a possibly broadly drafted safe harbour would 
provide the image of regulatory capture and cause public outcry derived from 
accountability and legitimacy concerns. 
 
Overall, as discussed in this section, such an overarching provision can be criticised on 
many levels. For example, how to decide whether it is in the public interest to delay, or  
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how a bank, of its own responsibility, decides whether the disclosure of information is 
capable of undermining the financial system or not, or how the relationship between 
authorities will be handled in consenting to the delay.  
 
This improvement should be interpreted along with the adoption of the so-called twin 
peaks structure in the UK and the approach to highlighting financial stability in financial 
regulation. As Chapter 2 addresses708, combination of sectoral regulators in a single body 
might reveal the difficulties because monitoring market disclosures and enforcing 
compliance on the one hand and operating as a sectoral microprudential regulatory 
authority with a close relationship to financial stability organs and knowing that issuer 
bank will receive financial support on the other is a difficult task. The MoU between the 
FCA and the PRA establishes active cooperation between agencies such that banks are 
required to disclose to the PRA any piece of information that the PRA would reasonably 
want to know, and this includes the submission of draft prospectuses and other 
disclosures.709  Along similar lines, the FCA (in its capacity as the UKLA) and PRA 
commit to actively sharing information that is of material interest to the other and they 
might ask each other about the details and status of a potential disclosure.710 The PRA’s 
right to veto certain FCA actions for the protection of financial stability711 and greying of 
the lines that strictly separate the objectives of the prudential regulator from capital 
markets regulator via a new regulatory philosophy that enshrines the protection of overall 
systemic and financial stability show that (even if the regulatory system is structured 
around diversified goals of regulation (as the PRA and FCA stand for)) smooth 
                                               
708 Chapter 2,Section 3.1.3. 
709 MoU between the FCA and PRA(accessed March 26,2017) para 38          
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/memoranda-of-understanding/fca-and-pra. 
710 Ibid para 39. 
711 FSMA,s 3I. 
	   284	  
cooperation and active information sharing between agencies, common understanding 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRIVATE LAW FRAMEWORK FOR CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND SECRECY VIS-À-VIS OTHER PUBLIC LAW 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
1.   A Conceptual and Theoretical Overview of Private Law Framework for 
Bank Confidentiality 
Since one of the main components of banking business is ‘information’, the problem 
arises as to the way banks handle this life-time valuable data while protecting their 
reputation and financial position without damaging information-givers’ and their own 
interests within the legal and political framework. In this confidence game, banks are 
under great pressure to deal with contractual and other such obligations to their depositors, 
stakeholders, staff and sometimes the public at large. Banking confidentiality is primarily 
grounded upon the rules of private law, meaning that information collection and its 
preservation is specifically characterized in the contractual relations between the bank 
and customer.712 As a consequence, the nature of the relation between bank and customer 
deserves special attention to see if there is a tension over bank information on the private 
law-public law level.  
 
The public law dimension of information held by banks is underpinned by concerns over 
public interest and public security. Since banks are unique sources as possessors of 
valuable knowledge, the administrative and penal authorities see them as perfect sources 
                                               
712 Mario Giovanoli,‘Switzerland’ in Ross Cranston (ed), European Banking Law: The Banker-
Customer Relationship (LLP 1993) 185. 
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to obtain such information. Together with the internationalization process and possible 
global effects of bank runs and failures, frauds and money transactions falling under 
criminal investigations, the pressures of time may force public authorities to set a global 
level on regulations imposed on banks and require cooperation and collaboration of other 
states on the international level. However, conflicts may still appear when public law 
duties owed to different jurisdictions do not coincide with each other.713 It means there is 
also potential for public law-public law challenges between different jurisdictions.     
 
ML, as one of the main reasons for strong regulations in the banking industry, has made 
banks the centre of attention in terms of money flow. Criminal law-making on ML, 
underpinned by moral panic and a particular group of crimes, such as drugs, terrorism or 
other crimes including organized offences, have been deeply affected by the increasing 
internationalisation of criminal law and economics of laundering in the socio-legal 
framework. 714  As smooth operation of financial markets is highly dependent upon 
reputation and its resultant ‘public confidence’, ML and other related crimes both damage 
the soundness of a state’s financial industry and stability of banks.715 The perception is 
that the efficient functioning of banks and financial markets is profoundly based on the 
belief that banks operate within a structure of high legal, ethical and professional 
standards so that public confidence is protected. Injection of dirty money into the system 
has systemic and macroeconomic implications as it fortifies instability in the liability base 
                                               
713 Colin Bamford,‘Banker-Customer Relationship: Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of Interest’ 
(1997) 25 Int’l Bus Law 74,75. 
714 Peter Allridge,Money Laundering Law (Hart Publishing 2003) 1-43.  
715 Paul Allen Schott,‘Reference Guide to AML and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism’(2006)World Bank 2006/35052 II-4 (accessed March 1,2016) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-
1146581427871/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf. 
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or unsound asset structures that means the in and out flow of money within the system 
contributes to the shadow economy and monetary instability.716 Banks’ involvement in 
ML and related crimes means, inter alia, reputational loss that is transmitted to the sector 
in the form of withdrawal of funds, loss of loans and profitable business, decrease in share 
prices, asset seizures, termination of some banking facilities and other charges that 
damage the safety and soundness of a bank.717 Adverse publicity, in this respect, maybe 
similar to the NR scenario but in a different vein, is translated as loss of confidence 
towards a bank, regulators and also the system in which the bank operates. Social and 
subjective emotions of borrowers, depositors or others such as bank counterparties that 
hold a relationship with a bank therefore generate tangible results on the financial 
standing of the bank as a cause of the loss of an intangible asset, namely confidence. This 
view therefore recognizes a positive link between compliance and public confidence.    
 
Reputational risk is not only limited to fear of being fined but also expenditures on 
compliance.718 From a public/stakeholder perception, disclosure of fines does not deliver 
confidence as it is adverse information and for large banks disclosure of such information 
has systemic ramifications. It can be said that integrity of banks ‘remains of predominant 
importance, not because of the colour of the money, but because the trust bestowed by 
                                               
716 P.J. Quirk,‘Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy’ (1997) 34 IMF Finance and 
Development 1,7-9.  
717 Schott (n 715). 
718 If it is too much compared to peers, rather than providing a sense of security to public, it 
might convey a negative message that the bank needs extra care for compliance or also it might 
give competitive advantage to other banks. Jackie Harvey, ‘How Effective is Money 
Laundering Legislation?’(2008) 21 Security Journal 189,195-96.  
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customers in the promise of a proper handling of their property’.719 
 
So, banks have intrinsic motives for due diligence and necessary economic incentives to 
be a part of this public-private partnership, even if it is a reluctant one. Reputational 
damage and its result in the form of capital flow from a contaminated bank to a non-
contaminated one means that banks de-risk themselves by embracing compliance 
requirements to avoid fines and loss of public confidence.720 It also means that banks with 
better risk management systems have more incentives to provide this information to the 
market.721 This part of the discussion represents the concerns about bank disclosures from 
a financial stability and integrity of the financial system point of view as being different 
from the private law-public law tension. However, it signals another dimension of bank 
information disclosure.  
 
Considering the significance of personal privacy in this age of information and corporate 
privacy in today’s market-oriented economies, the law tackles the issue of secrecy of bank 
data by implementing some specific regulations or providing civil or criminal remedies 
against disclosure of bank information. Confidentiality needs to be seen as the interplay 
between political motives and the changing concept of privacy. The law, by allowing 
interference with bank information in certain cases, such as ML or tax crimes, needs to 
be adjusted in order not to pose a serious threat to the bank’s professionalism. That is to 
                                               
719 Petrus C. Van Duyne, Marc S.Groenhuijsen and A.A.P.Schudelaro,‘Balancing Financial 
Threats and Legal Interests in Money-Laundering Policy’(2005) 43 Crime Law&Social Change 
117,124.  
720 However, Harvey addresses that ML creates public confidence problem only when 
customers lose money. Harvey (n 718).  
721 J. Harvey and S.F. Lau,‘Crime-Money, Reputation and Reporting’(2009) 52 Crime Law Soc 
Change 57,66.  
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say, globalisation of crime, its socio-economic nature together with its legal ramifications 
today has laid the way open for further exceptions to bank secrecy. Therefore, in 
consideration of public interest, the law needs to strike a balance where intervention of 
the state should preponderate over the possibility of severe social detriment.722 
 
Theoretical problems regarding the absence of a clear-cut universal definition of bank 
confidentiality and the overlap between various fields of law as a result of the interplay 
between the interests of the individual and the public have created questions as to how 
the law provides the balance and if it does then how sustainable it is. Historically, 
exceptions to bank secrecy have been grounded on the public interest and such decisions 
by governments have drawn the line between the public and private sphere. There must 
be genuine evidence or very valid reasons to overstep banking confidentiality which also 
means that states as the powerful party of the bank-state relationship can find valid 
grounds for intruding upon banking confidentiality and asking for information based on 
insubstantial suspicions or evidence.723 This part of the issue reflects another dimension 
of transparency724 which should be interpreted together with bank transparency. Thus, 
blurring the distinction between the public and private sphere should only be done in 
extremis. Such justifications for exceptions to bank secrecy bring other legal discussions 
as to why the law of the state, for example the tax law, is superior to the right of privacy.725 
Banks are in a difficult position in handling the information they have, keeping promises 
and the trust of customers and also resigning themselves to public authorities. It also leads 
to significant compliance costs. Thus, an examination in each specific case about the need 
                                               
722 Dennis Campbell, International Bank Secrecy (Sweet&Maxwell 1992) viii. 
723 Peter Koslowski, The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Springer 
2010) 113. 
724 It is government transparency and accountability. 
725 Koslowski (n 723) 113. 
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to lean on the banks could be a more prudent solution to striking a balance between public 
and private law dimension on disclosure of information. 726  The use of laws which 
contravenes bank secrecy might be interpreted by media campaigns and politicians as a 
step forward in preventing crimes committed against banks. 727  Therefore, public 
perception of the increase of state powers in today’s world of civil rights has been possible 
as a result of greater access to financial matters in both the company sector and financial 
industry.728 
 
A discussion about whether a bank’s duty of confidentiality constitutes a part of the 
substantive right of privacy can be a good way to examine how a duty defined under 
contract law can be transformed into a fundamental right.729 Personal information stored 
by banks is of importance for persons beyond its legal identity on both philosophical and 
moral grounds since it may be prejudicial to their private spheres. Customers, by placing 
their faith in banks and the financial community in general, expect a certain level of 
secrecy and do not expect the bank to be working in league with the government in 
providing private and personal information.  
 
Financial privacy as a fundamental right has been subjected to objections as it can be a 
shield for banks to evade public scrutiny. Competing interests of public and private 
spheres, which are surrounded by relevant regulations, are generally investigated through 
human rights jurisprudence and laws, which regulate the balance of the rights of an 
                                               
726 Ibid. 
727 Michael Levi,‘Regulating Money Laundering:The Death of Bank Secrecy in the UK’ (1991) 
31 The British Journal of Criminology 109,125. 
728 Ibid. 
729 R Stokes,‘The Banker's Duty of Confidentiality, Money Laundering and the Human Rights 
Act’ (2007) JBL 502. 
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individual versus his public rights, should consider the right of privacy. This elusive right 
is a two-dimensional phenomenon; it is not only a right granted by a state to members of 
society but taken together with the power bestowed by the society to the state, it is also 
the right to interfere.730  
 
The philosophical origins of privacy within the concept of natural and positive law have 
historically been widely discussed but various legal aspects and questions remain 
unchanged since the private sphere of persons is an evolving phenomenon.731 The extent 
to which public laws may lawfully infringe privacy has been a recurrent theme, and shows 
a well-defined separation among criminal, statutory, regulatory law and the law of private 
operations.732 This discussion about the limits of the public law in enforcing private 
morality has historical roots. Defining privacy in the banking industry is to some extent 
elusive; the status, features and the coherence of the information held by banks play a 
part in this complexity. 733  Such complexity might also require a certain degree of 
separation between confidentiality and privacy, which might be part of an open-ended 
question in terms of bank information in addressing the problem of third parties. It is 
related to the protections bestowed directly on the information that one has, as well as 
other actors such as informational intermediaries which hold the same information. From 
a legal standpoint, the difference between privacy and confidentiality is generally 
addressed with the concepts they surround: while the focal point of confidentiality is the 
relationship of trust not to expose the personal information to third parties regardless of 
                                               
730 Koslowski (n 723) 113. 
731 Alexandra Rengel, Privacy in the 21st Century (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 7. 
732 Morton J Horwitz,‘The History of the Public-Private Distinction’ (1982) 130(6) University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1423,1424. 
733 Raymond Wacks, Personal Information (OUP 1989) 14. 
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which actors possess it,734 the concept of privacy can be explained through descriptive, 
normative or legal standpoints where its scope is addressed with one’s information, acts 
and decisions or one’s special solitude 735  with the aim of preventing undesirable 
interference and circulation of personal information.736 As such, they are related but not 
the same concepts given that one applies to the data and another applies to the person as 
the interrelation between them is summarized as ‘confidentiality requires some privacy, 
but privacy requires no confidentiality’.737 However, as times change, the concepts of 
personality in defining the rights under confidentiality and privacy might be re-formed 
and questions as to the corporate right to privacy such as a corporate borrower’s right to 
financial privacy might require further exploration.738 
 
Human scepticism over the proprietary interests of others together with envy as the source 
of protection in the private sphere can be the basis of banking confidentiality. However, 
full protection of the private sphere casts suspicion on collective badness and justifies a 
certain degree of intervention of the state with the purpose of asserting the common good. 
Problems may arise when the release of financial affairs of a person does more than 
satisfying public interest and rather becomes a political issue. Thus, excessive 
transparency vis-a-vis full secrecy is not optimal. On the contrary, issues of privacy, 
human rights, globalisation, liberalisation and financial innovations together with 
technology have at different point in times filled the conceptual vacuum surrounding bank 
                                               
734 Neil M. Richards,‘The Information Privacy Law Project’ (2006) 94 Georgetown Law Journal 
1087,1137-38. 
735 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life 
(Stanford University Press 2010) 2. 
736 Rosemary Pattenden, The Law of Professional-Client Confidentiality (OUP 2003) 10-13. 
737 Ibid 12.  
738 Elizabeth Pollman,‘A Corporate Right to Privacy’ (2015) 99 Minnesota Law Review 27.  
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secrecy at both international and national levels by producing certain limitations on the 
secrecy of financial data. Information held by banks is the one that the state most 
frequently employs and historically narrows the concept of right to secrecy. The message 
conveyed here is, therefore, that state surveillance through banks may create concerns 
over civil liberties and human rights in which persons may wish for more concrete legal 
principles for authorities to obtain and use their personal information in a more prudent 
manner.739 
 
Increased attention on bank information should not merely be seen in the financial 
services nexus but should also be considered together with the law and practice of 
customer secrecy where liberties and duties clash. As such, the tension between private 
rights and public interest in the context of bank secrecy and confidential banking 
information indicates another paradigm although it is a similar dilemma that banks 
experience in the realm of financial services. 
 
Under these circumstances, prevention and control of crimes may create concerns over 
turning the financial infrastructure of banks into police reporting networks by turning 
bankers into fiscal spies. The duty of confidentiality in its more traditional style is in 
jeopardy to the degree that it is seen as opposing public interests. Furthermore, given the 
fact that commercial interests of banks in conducting their assets and operations 
effectively may call for transfer and release of some customer information, the role of 
credit reference agencies in such information and the possible misuse of confidential bank 
data place the bank at the centre of greatly diverging interests in a complex and over- 
regulated legislative system.  
                                               
739 P.M. Connorton,‘Tracking Terrorist Financing through SWIFT: When US Subpoenas and 
Foreign Privacy Law Collide’ (2008) 76(1) Fordham Law Review 283. 
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While persons and firms in connection with banks might expect a better protection of 
information given to banks, banks have to deal with various dilemmas regarding the 
statutory erosions to duty of confidentiality.740 This erosion is a kind that not only creates 
a tension on the private law-public law level but also has a bearing on the safety and 
soundness of banks and the financial and systemic stability of the state. Under these 
circumstances, changing boundaries of bank confidentiality should be assessed to 
discover whether secrecy will be able to survive as a sustainable legal concept.741  
 
2.   Interplay Between Public Law and Private Law in the Banking Industry 
and Implications for Bank’s Private Duty of Confidentiality  
A common theme running through discussions about the relationship between public and 
private law generally starts with a discussion of individual interests and the coercive 
power of the state as regards safeguarding the public interest.742 The concept of public 
interest may be a matter of political and jurisprudential taxonomy where the limits of the 
state to intrude in the private sphere are specified. 
 
Accordingly, in the battle between the interests of individuals and the interests of the 
public, private law institutions could be seen as barriers to social progress, public security 
or common good as its extreme form was illustrated by Lenin as ‘all law is public law’.743  
 
                                               
740 Gwendoline Godfrey and Simon Elcock,‘England’ in G. Godfrey(ed), Bank Confidentiality 
(5th edn,IBA 2011) 304. 
741 It is possible to say that now it is the banks that override the rights of individuals to de-risk 
themselves.Section 4.1.4. 
742 Amhlaigh, Michelon, and Walker (n 2) Chs 4, 5, 10.	  	  
743 Cited from John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition (3rd 
edn,Stanford University Press 2007) 95. 
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The multiplicity of social, property and economic relations of individuals has been 
interpreted with state policies and sometimes with political interferences due to the 
transformation of socio-economic relations into commercial ones over time, which may 
also be related to advancements in the welfare state.744 For example, it can be said that 
the banker-customer relation as a product of self-contracting and consensus has changed 
from a classical profession with confidentiality responsibilities to a profit-oriented 
economic relationship with the growing commercialization in social settings and 
interactions; and considering the bank-customer relationship established with the people 
from all social strata have created strong commercial incentives for banks such that state 
control and relevant rules can be the reflections of the change of such relationships.745 
The ongoing notion placed on FIs that can be described as (almost) no room to self-
regulate can be considered an outcome of unfortunate economic and social consequences 
of regulatory failures on the global level. However, this is not to go as far as saying that 
responsiveness of private law can be damaged by predomination of state policies vis-à-
vis concomitant laws.  
 
The public and private law dimensions of banks, ie whether banks are seen as mere 
products of private law; whether they are public companies or utilities based on their 
ownership status or benefits to society; 746  or whether they are private enterprises 
promoting useful public purposes or implicit public properties in the form of private firms 
by following the government’s monetary and – supposedly – political decisions, may be 
                                               
744 Gunther Teubner,‘State Policies in Private Law?A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’ (2008) 
56(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 835,837-43. 
745 Ibid 838-40. 
746 Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America:From the Revolution to the Civil War 
(Princeton University Press 1991) 50-78. 
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interpreted as outcomes of the interaction with the state.747   
 
The conventional principle which explains the existence of firms as being for profit 
maximisation for the welfare of shareholders might be inadequate to explain the public 
interest function of firms in that the aim of making profit might also be in the public 
interest based on the social character of companies. 748  As Parkinson suggests, the 
principles that make up company law must be re-analysed to be able to grasp how firms 
work for the interests of the shareholders and by doing that how they are of service to the 
public in general by being a player in the economy.749 Such a communitarian approach 
also supports the social responsibility of firms, which can justify state intervention.750 
Regardless of the underlying rationale of the existence of firms, the historical 
development of the banking sector, from legal and economic contractarian theories751 to 
concession theories,752 indicates that the nature of the work that banks do has precipitated 
the conclusion that banks should not be fully independent of state control. By analogy 
                                               
747 Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking (John Hopkins University Press 2001). 
748 J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (OUP 1994) 24-25. 
749 Ibid. 
750 D. Millon,‘New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis 
in Corporate Law’ [1993] 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1373. 
751 Such theories take firms as a product of nexus of contracts which are formed for the benefit 
of the shareholders’ interests and the status of the firm is gained independently without state 
interference by the formation of a series of private contracts and initiatives. So, the main focus 
of the theory is the contract among the firm and its members, not the outside world and 
therefore the relationship is a matter of private law. Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental 
Regulation Through Financial Organizations (Kluwer Law International 2002) 102. See 
Chapter 1, Section 1. 
752 This is the theory which existence and maintenance of the firm is explained through the 
exercise of state power, which makes the firm a matter of public law. Virginia Harper 
Ho,‘Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived’ (2012) 42 Seton Hall 
Review 879,902. 
	   297	  
with theories beneath the aforementioned principles of company law, the organization of 
banks comprises a series of contracts and a charter to operate in a specific jurisdiction, 
which covers both public and private concerns. As such, banks require another approach 
given their nature as social enterprises with public functions, which could be better 
explained by the private/public dichotomy with an eye to internal and external 
perspectives that banks promote a broad array of social and political values and seek 
wealth maximisation at the same time.753 So, while an external perspective represents the 
relationship between the bank and the public, an internal one tackles the dealings inside 
the bank (such as the ones with shareholders, depositors, staff, borrowers and so on).  
 
By gathering these observations together, banking might mean different things in public 
and private law in the setting that taking public law measures as a result of public interest 
and private law arrangements as products of freedom from the state.  
 
The legal ramifications emanating from public–private law engagement in banking 
appear to be like a three-legged stool typifying various laws regarding criminal, 
regulatory-administrative and other laws falling under private law. Each leg performs 
separately within their main objectives, yet these primary objectives may constitute legal 
difficulties for banks in a way that public law versus private law duties compete with each 
other where the scope of public law intervention for banks might be open-ended due to 
their public interest and safety objectives.754  
 
Thus, private law matters in financial services have, in one form or another, been affected 
                                               
753 David Millon,‘Theories of Corporation’ (1990) 39(2) Duke Law Journal 201. 
754 Chapter 2 and 3.  
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by state policies stimulated by economic, political and social incidents.755 The banking 
sector in particular, as part of everyday life, has been subjected to public law measures 
with ex ante and ex post effects.756 This also means that the law of banking is separate 
from the classical private law concept by being exposed to rules carrying ex ante 
characteristics, namely, regulations aiming to preclude possible unwelcome results for 
the sake of the state, financial markets or customers and investors. The concept of private 
law by its ex post nature, which suggests that private law comes into play after an incident 
occurs,757 cannot be seen in banking law where the state deems it necessary to take 
preventative measures ex ante.  
 
Regardless of the ownership structure of banks, whether they are public or private banks, 
they follow the same standards found in contract law and tort liabilities.758 Thus, on the 
one hand the private law dimension of banks derives from general contract law principles 
with reference to their commercial activities. On the other hand, the private law dealings 
of banks are historically subject to intervention in the realm of public law.  
 
The doctrine of confidentiality in financial transactions is deeply attached to the history 
of banking and it has become controversial to the extent that a state would like to absorb 
the rights of individuals in present-day conditions to detect illicit activities. 759  The 
inherent conflict appears on the side of banks which consider their public duties on the 
                                               
755 O. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker 
Party (Sellier 2007) Ch 2. 
756 Chapter 2. 
757 Hugh Collins,‘The Hybrid Quality of European Private Law’ in Roger Brownword and 
others(eds), Foundations of European Private Law (Hart 2011) 459. 
758 Norbert Horn, Legal Issues in Electronic Banking (Kluwer Law International 2002) 2.  
759 Edouard Chambost, Bank Accounts: A World Guide to Confidentiality (John Wiley&Sons 
1983) 3. 
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one hand and private duties emanating from their contractual relationships on the other,760 
not to mention unsettled conflict of laws problems in the application of rules. All things 
considered, the authorities seek to uphold a high degree of confidence in society and 
exercise some restrictions in the form of public law rules on the private law. Thus, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that bank secrecy has been in limbo. 
 
In an attempt to examine the private law framework of bank secrecy and transparency, 
subsequent sections will discuss the basis and nature of the relationship between the bank 
and the customer. 
 
3.   The Nature of the Relationship between the Bank and the Customer  
Today, almost everything is directed by the law of contract, and as a matter of business, 
banks have to enter into a legal relationship with their customers761 and clients in terms 
of execution of enforceable promises. 762  Furthermore, cases and commentaries 
historically have provided numerous doctrines and theories to establish rights and 
responsibilities developing out of a relation between banks and customers. 763  Such 
theories cover a wide array of views, ranging from the classic debtor-creditor view to the 
fiduciary or confidential nature of the relationship. Under all of these different views 
regarding the definition of this relationship, it is accepted that this relationship is simply 
based on the mutual manifestation of the consent of both parties where one of the parties 
provides services to another and another accepts.  
                                               
760 Bamford (n 713) 75. 
761 The notion of customer used in this thesis is taken in broad terms as covering any persons 
dealing with a bank about a banking service.  
762 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28. 
763 Edward L. Symons, ‘The Bank-Customer Relationship:Part I-The Relevance of Contract 
Doctrine’ (1983) 100 Banking L J 220,221.  
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The relationship has been classified as principal-agent, debtor-creditor, bailor-bailee, 
lessor-lessee, pledger-pledgee, licensor-licensee or trusteeship-executorship together 
with other varieties of miscellaneous and sui generis relationships that produce a 
spectrum of contract doctrines and, therefore, that have resulted in a wide range of rights 
and duties for both contractual sides.764 Banks offer a variety of services to the market 
and, as it can be seen, their positions and names for each financial transaction are subject 
to change based on the different relationships available.  
 
The theory provides a set of assumptions in terms of ascertaining the nature and scope of 
the relationship between banks and customers within the frame of contract law. 
Historically, the development of the contract-based approach evolved out of a tacit 
agreement between the bank and the customer before this relation was formalized in a 
standardized or boilerplate format.765 Banks, by receiving the chattel goods of a customer, 
historically had to stick to the implicit rules that appeared with the exchange of offer and 
acceptance. 766  Together with Foley v Hill,767  Joachim v Swiss Bank Corporation768 
examined the nature of this relationship and held that it was of a contractual nature. 
 
Since the bank mechanism by its very nature requires banks to collect and produce more 
data and monitor it in a continuum, the contractual basis of the relationship establishes 
the needed necessary trust. Accordingly, as both holders and transmitters of funds and a 
special of pool information, banks are under great scrutiny due to their current and 
                                               
764  Maurice Megrah, The Banker’s Customer (2nd edn,Butterworth&Co 1938) 263. 
765 Richard A. Lord,‘The Legal Relationship between the Bank and Its Safe Deposit Customer’ 
(1983) 5(2) Campbell Law Review 263. 
766 Ibid 266. 
767 (1848) 2 HL Cas 28. 
768 (1921) All ER 92.	  
	   301	  
potential liabilities for fraud, ML or other such legal issues inquired by third parties.769 
In the words of Chief Justice Charles Hughes: ‘Freedom of a contract is a qualified, and 
not an absolute right’.770 Banks as commercial enterprises can draw up contracts as a 
matter of course but public policy concerns restrict this freedom at the heart of the 
relationship by imposing a requirement on banks to disclose necessary information that 
is gained during the contractual relationship.771  
 
Banks have always experienced difficulties and challenges based on the conflict between 
customers’ need for secrecy and public policy concerns, especially considering the fact 
that for such a long time banks have been part of internationalization, for example, by 
opening new branches or subsidiaries. This process, however, created a grey zone by 
producing doubts and concerns about the release of information.772 These grey zones can 
be found in differences in law, judicial decisions and divergent approaches to contractual 
duties. While some jurisdictions oblige banks to release or share information on certain 
circumstances, others can be reluctant to respond to demands for information and prefer 
to provide more flexibility.  
 
Contracts, whether in standard forms, drawn up by an association of banks or established 
with the volitional manifestations of parties impliedly or expressly impose one specific 
duty on the bank, the duty of confidentiality. There is a tacit or explicit term of contractual 
relationship; banks owe their customers a quasi-contractual or fiduciary-type of duty, but 
this duty is not absolute and has exceptions. Tournier v National Provincial and Union 
                                               
769 William Blair,‘Secondary Liability of FIs for the Fraud of Third Parties’ (2006) 30 Hong 
Kong L J 74,91.   
770 Burlington & Quincy.R.R. Co. v. McGuire,219 US 549,567 (1911).  
771 Lord (n 765) 303. 
772 Francis Neate,Bank Confidentiality (2nd edn,Butterworths 1997) xix. 
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Bank of England773 is considered to be the locus classicus and it is where the duty of 
confidentiality of a bank developed from being an ethical duty to a legal requirement, 
which allows a claim for damages in the case of a breach of duty.774 According to this 
decision, there is an implied term in the relationship between a bank and a customer that 
any information about a customer must be regarded as confidential to any third person. 
 
3.1.Duty of Confidentiality towards Customers 
Theories regarding the classification of the bank-customer relationship imply a degree of 
confidentiality based on contract, property, agency, tort and evidentiary privilege.775 Duty 
of confidentiality, transpired by courts, generally transcends classical contractual 
obligations that occur between a debtor and creditor.776 It is derived from the requirement 
to prevent violation of personal rights or irruption into the private sphere, which means 
that the duty of confidentiality of a banker originates from the view that a 
customer/consumer should not be disturbed in his private and intimate sphere.777 Thus, 
banking confidentiality consists of protection and the fundamental valuation of 
personality and proprietary rights residing in the things a legal or real person possesses.  
 
The power which strengthens the duty of confidentiality can be found in its economic and 
                                               
773 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
774 Bonita Erbstein, ‘Common Law Bank Secrecy and Its Implications for US Securities Law’ 
(1999) 2(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 331, 335. 
775 Paul Eugene Ridley,‘Confidentiality of FI Account Records under State Law: Substance or 
Illusion?’ (1983) 3(3) Review of Litigation 567,575. 
776 Thomas C. Russler and Steven H. Epstein,‘Disclosure of Customer Information to Third 
Parties: When is the Bank Liable?’(1994) 111 Banking Law Journal 258. 
777 F. Beutter,‘Geheimnischarakter des Geldes und ethische Grundlagen der 
Geheimhaltungspflicht’ (1978) 2 Acta Monetaria 9,15. 
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historical dimensions.778 As in a relationship between a lawyer and a client, a bank-
customer relationship involves confidential business, and the nature of the work 
economically requires a customer to share necessary information freely without hesitation. 
This approach deems banking confidentiality to be a professional duty based upon ground 
of privilege similar to a relationship between doctor-patient or lawyer-client.779  
 
The common law duty of confidentiality of a bank is referred to in the landmark decision 
of Tournier.780 The extensive impact of Tournier has not just been limited to the UK; the 
rest of the common law world has also adopted the principles established by it. Even 
though the development of the final concept of the banker’s duty of confidentiality has 
been different in different jurisdictions, every common law jurisdiction has followed 
Tournier together with equitable, statutory and constitutional principles in establishing 
the limits of secrecy on financial matters.781   
 
                                               
778 E.P. Ellinger,E. Lomnicka  and C.V.M. Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 
2011) 171-79. 
779 The duty of confidentiality appears in different forms in different jurisdictions. While some 
jurisdictions establish statutory or regulatory codifications (for example see Banking Act of 
Singapore of 2003,s 47; Swiss Banking Act of 1934,s 47; Austrian Banking Act of 1993,s 38) 
others may leave it to the implied terms of the bank-customer contract (such as the UK).Hence, 
there are jurisdictions where no particular statutory provisions exist to force banks to keep to a 
duty of confidentiality; rather it is left in the field of contract law based on the principle of good 
faith. Furthermore, there are legal systems where banking confidentiality is assured by 
mandatory provisions under the civil code and contract law as well as protected by criminal law. 
Thus, it is possible to mention public law protection established in the private law.See H. 
Ping,‘Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering’ (2004) 7(4) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 376. 
780 [1924] 1 KB 461. 
781 Peterson v Idaho First National Bank, 367 P2d 284,290(Idaho 1961). See David 
Chaikin,‘Adapting the Qualifications to the Banker’s Common Law Duty of Confidentiality to 
Fight Transnational Crime’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 265. 
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However, this implied duty is subject to a number of qualifications as stated by Bankes 
L.J. under four headings: where disclosure is made under compulsion of law; where there 
is a duty to the public to disclose; where legitimate interests of a bank require disclosure; 
and lastly where disclosure is made with implied or express consent of a customer.782 
Such qualifications were criticized and found insufficient due to the time that the 
exceptions were established.783 The transformation of crimes from a domestic to a more 
international character is seen as the basis for the re-examination of duty of confidentiality 
and its exceptions.784 The precise limits of qualifications established by this famous case 
have been interpreted differently and sometimes contradictorily by different jurisdictions, 
implying that domestic laws have determining roles to identify when compulsion of law 
takes place or what legitimate interest of a bank justifies it to make a disclosure. Likewise, 
exceptions to bank secrecy expanded and more interference was allowed following the 
events of 9/11.785 In the UK, even before 9/11, the Jack Committee declared concerns 
over increasing inroads into common law duty of confidentiality and suggested the 
imposition of statutory requirements of disclosure on banking.786 It was considered that 
these effects on financial privacy contained Orwellian overtones.787 The burden on banks 
gradually heightened due to the nature of obligations given by law. For instance, 
voluntary disclosure of information is imposed on bankers with know-your-customer 
                                               
782 [1924] 1 KB 461,472. Court of Appeal reaffirmed these qualifications at Barclays Bank Plc v 
Taylor [1989] 1 WL6 1066 at 1070. 
783 Chaikin (n 781) 267. 
784 Ibid. 
785 Paul Latimer,‘Bank Secrecy in Australia: Terrorism Legislation as the New Exception to the 
Tournier Rule’ (2005) 8(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 56. 
786 The Report of the Review Committee on Banking Services Law and Practice (Jack 
Committee)(Feb 1989)(Cmnd 622) ch 5.  
787 Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Confidentiality in Offshore Financial Law (2nd edn,OUP 2014) 
87. 
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principles. Accordingly, the general law of confidence, data protection and mistreatment 
of private information should be viewed as complementary parts of established 
qualifications to the doctrine of confidentiality. 
 
The duty of confidentiality of a bank can be discussed in terms of its endemic nature in a 
specific state. However, the topic itself should not be thought of as having no effect on 
the global level. For instance, offshore financial centres with a high degree of financial 
data protection might create inefficient market consequences and breach regulations of 
other jurisdictions.788  In the US, major events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and a 
rapidly changing legal, commercial and political environment – with the growing need 
for memorandums of understanding and multi-lateral and bilateral agreements, 
globalization, technological improvements in the collection and exchange of data, the 
greater mobility of funds, criminalization of money have re-shaped the bank 
confidentiality concept into one that is more aggressive in relation to bank information, 
pushing bank privacy concerns into the background. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, acting as 
a threshold for a new legal framework towards the implementation of the Patriot Act, 
established stricter scrutiny and oversight of banks and introduced new compliance, 
customer due diligence, beneficial ownership checks, record keeping and reporting 
obligations.789 Thus, in this new era, AML compliance measures, customer identification 
                                               
788 Guttorm Schjelderup,‘Secrecy Jurisdictions’ (2015) CESifo Working Paper No:5239 
(accessed May 6,2016) http://www.cesifo-
group.de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-
CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2015/wp-cesifo-2015-03/12012015005239.html.  
789 See the Title III of the Patriot Act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and the GLBA. 
The private law framework of bank confidentiality in the US cannot be thought without the 
importance of the US as being “the hub the global capital with largest financial markets” and 
the 9/11 attacks. Peter J. Manners, Adapt and Thrive: The Sustainable Revolution (Cornwall 
2008) 171. Thus, pressure from the US, which is the largest investment fund centre and has the 
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policies and extra attention on foreign accounts have placed new additional 
[administrative] burdens on banks.790 Such forcefulness towards the laws of other states 
might give the impression of legal imperialism due to its extraterritorial effects, as was 
the case when the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) came into play; 
something which ultimately created tension with states with strong bank secrecy laws.791  
 
The law regarding banking confidentiality has been subject to recent changes due to the 
judicial and statutory admission of the duty in different parts of the globe after discussions 
as to whether bank confidentiality is the exception rather than the rule. Subsequent parts 
will shortly discuss how this duty was transformed with established qualifications and 
limitations and how security, integrity and confidentiality of information kept by banks 
is balanced with the corresponding legislative response within this rapidly changing 
informational environment. 
 
                                               
most traded currency, might be the impetus for a change in the banking traditions of other 
jurisdictions. For example, with the implementation of FATCA in 2014, the arguments about 
FATCA’s impact on offshore financial centres’ banking policies have appeared. Jane G. Song, 
‘The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?’(2015) 35 Northwestern Journal of International 
Law&Business 687. 
790 Martin Carrigan,‘The US Patriot Act, De-construction, Civil Liberties and Patriotism’ (2008) 
6(3) Journal of Business & Economics Research 19,21. 
791 Bruce W. Bean&Abbey L. Wright,‘The US FATCA:The American Legal Imperialism?’ 
(2014) 21 ILSA Journal of International &Comparative Law 333.Further, it is suggested that the 
OECD could find its motivation in establishing the Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account Information after the sweeping compliance to the FATCA. Jay R.Nanavati 
wolf(Accessed April 14, 2016)http://www.globaltaxenforcement.com/tax-controversy/global-
tax-enforcement-in-2016-what-you-need-to-know/. 
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3.2.Qualifications to the Duty of Confidentiality 
In general terms, inroads made into the banker’s duty of confidentiality can be addressed 
under two groups: the first group characterizes the cases that serve for the prevention of 
crimes and maintenance of public order via public law measures; and the second group 
represents the qualifications which aim at economic, commercial and financial 
improvement by allowing a degree of information disclosure to private bodies for the 
healthier assessment of credit risks, ensuring trust in commercial activities or enhancing 
competition. 792  This general classification can also be interpreted with Tournier 
qualifications since the adoption of a common law system and the guidance of Tournier 
qualifications in different countries provide a base to form a legal framework of 
qualifications of the duty.  
 
3.2.1.   In the Bank’s Interest  
Generally, this qualification is exercised when the bank needs to claim a right against its 
customer, guarantor or surety or the bank simply can act as a third-party claimant or 
defendant in a litigation among its customer and a third party.793 There can be many 
circumstances where a bank is required to disclose some facts such as in case of payment 
of an overdraft,794 as happened in Tournier, or the bank can decide to release relevant 
                                               
792 Ruth Pluto-Shinar,‘Cross-Border Banking: Reconceptualising Bank Secrecy’ in Ross P. 
Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner(eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance and 
Its Regulation (CUP 2016)236-50. 
793 Ali Malek and John Odgers, Paget’s Law of Banking (15th edn, LexisNexis 2018) 3.21. 
794 This was the only example given to explain this qualification. Nevertheless, Scrutton LJ 
(together with Atkin LJ) provided a different approach: “The bank may disclose the customer’s 
account and affairs to an extent reasonable and proper for its own protection.”[1924] 1 KB 
461,481.Atkin LJ’s note at 586.  
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information to enforce its rights under a charge.795  
 
As a matter of legal doctrine, the concerns related to what the legitimate interests of the 
bank consist of and how much information is sufficient and necessary to justify disclosure 
of confidential information should be settled by considering the facts and circumstances 
of each specific case. This qualification involves complex issues and introduces vital legal 
policy considerations regarding disclosure made within the bank’s intra-group companies 
and disclosure made to CRAs and credit reference agencies 796 . Also, mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcy, outsourcing operational functions and operations related to 
restructure, transfer or sale of credit facilities of the bank together with cross-marketing 
practices might be used for banks to justify release of confidential information to relevant 
persons or authorities. Lawyers, accountants and auditors of the bank are also allowed to 
access bank information as a matter of course; and CRAs, because they have a big impact 
on banks as they allow assessing their risk portfolio, are also given information due to the 
need for corporate ratings in the private sector including banks.797 
 
3.2.2.   Customer’s Consent 
Since customers are the real owners of the data they provide to banks, they are fully 
entitled to allow banks to disclose their information798 unless public law measures render 
such consent unnecessary. Generally, such consent is asked from a customer as part of 
standard terms and conditions in the contract. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, the 
arguments relating to operability of the categorization of consents, whether explicit or 
                                               
795 Kaupthing singer &Friedlander v Coomber and Burrus [2011] EWCH 3589 (Ch) at 52. 
796	  This issue is now generally addressed with the consent of the customer.	  
797 Darbellay (n 166) 31. 
798 Lorne D. Crerar, The Law of Banking in Scotland (2nd edn,Tottel 2007) 214. 
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implied, or options provided to customers (such as opt out) 799  can show divergent 
approaches to the limits of consent given by the customer on his/her own information. 
Written consent and concomitant questions deriving from broad terms and conditions of 
the contract have been subject to arguments as to whether boilerplate contracts presented 
to customers may include permission for a variety of disclosures by the bank. 
  
3.2.3.   Public Duty/Public Interest 
The classic explanation for this qualification is explained by the following quote: 
‘whenever the state faces any danger, its interests should be superior to the individual’s 
interests’.800 It may also be taken as an allowance to non-statutory inquiries directed at 
banks and represent an opportunity given to authorities with no power to rule the release 
of confidential information based on public interest.  
 
This qualification established by Tournier is explained by making reference to situations 
related to danger to the state or public duty.801 However, at the same time releasing 
information to the police is not guaranteed by pleading a public duty justification.802 As 
mentioned, many examples can be given to justify disclosure on the grounds of public 
duty, which basically aims to protect the persons, the bank or the public in general against 
fraud or crime. This is all to say that this qualification was an outcome of a need for a 
spillover category at the time of Tournier and uncertainty and vagueness in the 
                                               
799 Such as GLBA. 
800 Weld Blundell v Stephens 1920, AC 956 at 965,966 HL. 
801 In Tournier, Bankes LJ quoted Lord Finlay’s words in Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 
956,965-66. 
802 [1924]1KB 461,474.  
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application of public interest qualification to establish great flexibility to interpret the 
public interest differently depending on the facts of each case.803 
 
Involvement of foreign crimes and public duty has also been another argument in relation 
to the dimensions of the qualification in an international setting. Questions regarding 
whether a public duty of another state can lead to a possible dilution of the bank’s duty 
of confidentiality can be partly answered by case law.804 The examples and terminology 
used to explain this qualification may be interpreted in a narrow sense but the elasticity 
of the term public duty and public interest itself provides flexibility to a great extent. 
 
Considering other cases from other common law jurisdictions, the application of public 
interest qualification could not be clearly exemplified by the cases related to actual and 
great danger to the public.805 As such, the question is whether public duty can be the 
subject of broad interpretation which implies that banks can act as whistleblowers of their 
customers in the event of fraud and crime.806 The disclosure of iniquity, which could have 
been used to justify bank disclosures,807 is seen as necessary based on the idea that 
iniquity is wider than a crime or misdemeanor, and therefore from the standpoint of the 
                                               
803 Jack Committee (n 786) para 5.30. 
804 For example see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728;Price 
Waterhouse v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] BCLC 583;Pharaon v BCCI SA [1998]4 
All ER 455. 
805 For example Crisp v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [1994] ATPR 41-
294(Australia); Lesser Antilles Trading Co Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia[1985] 
LRC(Comm)39(Bahamas); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Sayani [1994] 2 WWR 
260(Canada).  
806 Saul Froomkin,‘Secrecy, Confidentiality and Banking’1990 Meeting of Commonwealth Law 
Ministers and Senior Officials cited from Kris Hinterseer,Criminal Finance (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 107. 
807 Allies Mills Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 34 ALR 105 at 141. 
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public interest, banks should decide whether a relevant case consists of iniquity.808 
Although the scope of this qualification is far from clear, its application is already very 
rare. As Donovan puts: ‘It would be inadvisable for a banker to exercise his private 
judgment in such matters at the expense of a customer’.809 In other words, even if the 
public interest is apparent, banks might not have a definite and overriding duty to the 
public, which approves the breach of confidence.810   
 
In practice, this qualification under the common law system would be used very few times 
considering the fact that ever-growing numbers of laws have already imposed a duty on 
banks to disclose in certain situations. Duty to the public itself is vague since there is no 
unified standard in which cases of public duty occur which suggests that it is in courts’ 
power to determine whether public interest occurs depending on the facts of each case.  
 
The rationale for preserving this qualification today can be explained by convenience 
provided by a generalized public duty qualification as a measure to manage more complex 
financial wrongdoings of an international character.811 Nevertheless, considering the fact 
that interpretation of public duty to that extent is not as necessary as it was at the time 
that this qualification was established based on the large spectrum of domestic and 
international statutory obligations imposed on banks to report such international financial 
crimes. Having said that, unexpected situations, which are not included in the law, to 
                                               
808 Initial Services v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396; British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd 
[1982] AC 1096.  
809 James O’Donovan, Lender Liability (Sweet&Maxwell 2005) 146. 
810 Ibid 134-35. 
811 UK Government,‘Banking Services: Law and Practice’(White Paper No Cmnd.1026, March 
1990) para.5.30. 
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allow release of confidential information, might be seen as a ground to keep the public 
duty qualification.812  
 
The difficult judgment regarding whether a strong public duty overrides the private duty 
of confidentiality in the absence of pre-specified legislations may be indicative of why 
this qualification is rarely used. The application of the public interest qualification under 
common law, therefore, can be mentioned with no fewer than two criticisms: the absence 
of a precise threshold outlining the minimum level required to take the interests of the 
public into consideration to override the banker’s duty of confidentiality; and secondly, 
the fact of holding this qualification in reserve for the cases beyond those situations 
compelled by law.813 Despite this, it could be said that the common understanding of a 
bank’s burden under the public interest qualification is a reactive one rather than a 
proactive one.814 
 
Banks informally collaborate in this qualification to facilitate authorities in the aid of 
discovery and inquiries of major crimes, and in general this is done without the 
knowledge of their customers. 815  Today, public law influence over private interests 
embedded in bank confidentiality formalizes a different legal environment with ever-
broadening legislative requirements for disclosure which makes the practice of this 
qualification unclear. 816      
                                               
812 Owen J. Morgan,‘The Public Duty Exception in Tournier-Getting There the Hard Way in 
New Zealand’ (1994) 9(6) Journal of International Banking Law 241,243. 
813 Simon Crawford,‘Bank Privacy towards 2000’ (1997) 29 Ottowa Law Review 425,439. 
814 Tara Walsh,‘The Banker’s Duty of Confidentiality: Dead or Alive?’ (2009)1 Edinburgh 
Student Law Review 1,9. 
815 Evidence to Affairs Committee, The British House of Commons (November 1998) cited 
from Ross Cranston(ed), Legal Issues of Cross-Border Banking (Bankers' Books 1989) 85-86. 
816 Chaikin (n 781) 284. 
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3.2.4.   Compulsion by Law 
This qualification includes disclosure to judicial and supervisory authorities and law 
enforcement agencies. Disclosure orders force banks to release relevant information in 
cases where third-party tracing-claims or specific jurisdictions necessitate this to be 
done817 and a judgment through a court order should be a product of careful thought on 
the clearest grounds.818 
 
The law covers a variety of reasons to ask for information from banks in a large spectrum 
of fields of law. The need for information can derive from investigation or insolvency 
and bankruptcy of companies or it can be related to a failure of a taxpayer or criminal 
activities such as fraud which requires such disclosure. In the same way, bank information 
is of great importance for financial services and compelled disclosure has been a widely 
accepted phenomenon through safety and soundness laws and again through certain 
powers bestowed on financial authorities with the purpose of investigating suspicious 
incidents such as insider trading, fraud or embezzlement. Such powers given to regulatory 
                                               
817 Malek and Odgers (n 793) 3.19.In countries where the mechanism residing in checks and 
balances is corrupted, questions as to the accuracy and legitimacy of court orders might appear 
and courts can be seen as the invisibly operating hand of governments giving rulings and 
making orders for the purpose of fishing expeditions or some other political purposes. 
Accountability and transparency of the public sector has been on the agenda of the national and 
international organizations and bodies since the late 1990s.Laurence Ravillon,‘Transparency in 
International Business Law’ (2015) 5 International Business Law Journal 433. Emotional 
responses emanating from acts related to terrorism, corruption or such other criminal behaviours 
can lead to a degree of public support and sympathy which justify political intrusions made via 
court orders. Thus, banks can be the centre of attacks made against liberties. Eric J. Gouvin,‘Are 
There any Check and Balances on the Government’s Power to Check Our Balances-The Fate of 
Financial Privacy in the War of Terrorism’(2005)14(2) Temple Political&Civil Rights Law 
Review 517.        
818 Lord Widgery’s judgment in Williams v Summerfield [1972] 2 QB 512,518. 
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and investigatory authorities can be found in a variety of laws. 
 
Since Tournier, several statutes requiring or permitting banks to disclose confidential 
information have been introduced in English law. These can be grouped under disclosure 
when banks are parties to civil litigation proceedings, when banks are not parties to civil 
litigation proceedings and disclosure is pursuant to specific statutes.819  
 
As a party to civil litigation, under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), banks disclose 
necessary information under their control. 820  Where banks are not parties to civil 
litigation proceedings, there are various channels requiring disclosure. When disclosure 
is a cost-effective solution, or imperative to fairly dispose of proceedings, the courts, by 
examining if an application for disclosure is necessary for a case, can allow non-party 
disclosure. 821  Under the CPR, courts can issue witness summonses or subpoenas to 
compel banks to give evidence or create documents for the court.822 The courts also have 
the authority to order disclosure to help with tracing claims 823or pursuant to a Norwich 
Pharmacal order.824 This inherently creates a tension between bankers’ private duty of 
                                               
819 Charles Hewetson and Gregory Mitchell, Banking Litigation (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2017) Ch. 10. 
820 CPR, pt 31, r 34.2. 
821 CPR, r 31.17. 
822 CPR, pt 34.  
823 CPR 25.1(1)(g). 
824 It might be used when a bank has engaged in wrongful acts for another party without 
knowing and the victim of a wrongful act urgently needs information from the bank when the 
option to use a witness summons does not provide adequate assistance. Norwich Pharmacal Co 
v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133.For the conditions of the order see Mitsui 
& Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] 3 All ER 511 at 19, 21, 24. For a discussion 
regarding the application of Norwich Pharmacal orders to banks, see Ellinger, Lomnicka and 
Hare (n 778) 181-84. 
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confidentiality and their public duty to conform to court orders.825 
 
Orders under the Evidence Act 1975 also give power to the English High Court to order 
disclosure to assist foreign courts.826 S 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986 establishes another 
disclosure channel. Banks may be under a duty to assist office0holders of insolvent 
corporate customers, and the courts may compel banks to produce evidence when 
necessary.827  
 
Disclosure to investigators (such as the FCA) is also possible under the Companies Act 
2006.828Additionally, Inspection orders under the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879829 
provide an alternative route for disclosure in legal proceedings. Finally, as Section 4.2 
will discuss, disclosure to HM Revenue and Customs for prevention of tax avoidance 
purposes is another disclosure channel, 830  together with a multitude of statutory 
disclosure requirements under criminal law statutes. 831  These will be paid specific 
attention in subsequent sections.  
 
It should be indicated that not every disclosure of information in order to satisfy 
government officials or authorities could be defended on the grounds of compulsion by 
                                               
825 By referencing Tournier, Lord Nolan acknowledged that banks are required to produce 
evidence for the courts. Robertson v Canadian Imperial Bank of England [1994] 1 WLR 1493. 
826 Malek & Odgers (n 793) 33.13. See X AG v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464. 
827 Insolvency Act 1986, s 236(2). 
828 Malek& Odgers (n 793) 33.15.	  
829 S 7, 10.	  
830 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. 
831 These can be grouped as: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 9; Criminal Justice Act 
1987, s 2, Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ss 15-18; Terrorism Act 2000 21A, 21B, 21CA-21CF; 
Crime Act 2003, ss 32-46; Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001; The Money 
Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds Regulations 2017, SI 2017/692. 
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law.832 This view suggests that banks should consider the confidentiality expectations of 
their customers and behave accordingly. In addition, implementation of judicial decisions 
or presentation of evidence in the course of civil, criminal or arbitral proceedings not 
involving the bank forms other grounds for compelling banks to release confidential 
information to the authorities. 
 
Perhaps the most debated point regarding disclosures made under compulsion of law has 
been the promulgation of a plethora of laws which allow judicial authorities to intrude on 
bank confidentiality, thereby adding new qualifications and limitations to the duty of 
confidentiality. Besides, the extra-territorial dimension of legal compulsion is of 
importance because of international procedures to request or obtain evidence, 
incompatibility of laws between jurisdictions and sovereignty issues. International comity 
principles as the basis for exchange of information between states, multi-lateral 
cooperation and the power of international mechanisms such the Hague Convention833 
are of importance to compel banks to make disclosures as neutral custodians of 
information and provide them with safe harbours to protect them from any breach of duty. 
Although the disclosure by legal compulsion discussed in Tournier did not cover an order 
or a subpoena produced by a foreign court, or in other words compulsion under a foreign 
law; foreign subpoenas or orders such as the ones calling for transfer of funds abroad 
might be countered with public interest reasons based on the idea that cooperation with a 
foreign court may serve the common public interest, ie investigating the fraud that is 
beyond mere allegation. As it will be addressed in part 6, together with other financial 
crimes, steadily increasing AML and CTF legislations requiring banks to follow certain 
                                               
832 Gibbs CJ’s comments on A & Ors v Hayden [1984]156 CLR 532 at 545-47. 
833 Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters. 
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procedures herald further ramifications with an effect on stability of the banks and the 
state. 
 
4.   Public Law Intervention in Bank Confidentiality  
Involvement of governments in the operation of the market economy is done to establish 
a safe system, to make markets operate efficiently and to reshape the market results to 
satisfy the demands and expectations which society values. As mentioned, in theory, all 
laws contribute to the interests of the public.834 However, in economic terms, the reason 
for regulation is explained by market inefficiencies where market failures and frictions 
that cause resource misallocation necessitate regulatory intervention of the state.835 This 
interference based on the public interest suggests that collective action is superior to 
individual action in order to achieve the public good.836  
 
The classic argument about public interest theory in designating the limits of intervention 
brings to the fore various theoretical discussions. First of all, the presumption that 
regulators are benevolent and purely concerned with the public interest might not always 
prove right.837 There is a possibility that regulators are captured by regulated interests, 
which means regulators can function according to their systemically biased views about 
private sector operation. Second, regulators forwardly carrying out their work to 
safeguard the public interests by ignoring private interests might be harmful for the public 
interest in the long run. Arguments about the nature and limits of regulation based on the 
                                               
834 Merryman and Perez-Perdomo (n 743). 
835 Schooner and Taylor (n 399) xi-xiii. 
836 Carlos M. Pelaez & Carlos A. Pelaez, Regulation of Bank and Finance (Palgrave Macmillan 
2009) 13-14. 
837 Johan Den Hertog,‘Review of Economic Theories of Regulation’(2010)Tjalling C. 
Koopmans Research Institute Discussion Paper Series 10-18 1,2. 
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formation and development of social/economic organisations and powers of the state is 
ongoing within the intellectual sphere.     
 
Looking through the lens of bank regulators/supervisors, theoretical discussions about 
how regulators see banks as private, self-interest motivated firms pursuing profit 
maximisation provide that banks are public-interest spurred institutions. 838  When 
deregulation began to happen from the 1970s, public interest in bank regulation was to 
leave banks to competitive forces so that well-organised groups pursuing private interests 
like banks could serve for the whole public by providing better services and goods;839 
while the classic public interest theory exerts that government intervention corrects 
failures and maximises social welfare.840  
 
Considering the government borrowing and private interests of some power groups, one 
may also think that the extent of regulations over FIs can be very related to the extent of 
political interference. In other words, political capture can be veiled by regulations. These 
public and private interest approaches can be polar extremes within the analysis of today’s 
financial systems and measures of democracy. However, exogenous variables, such as 
financial crises, might change the power that strikes a balance of public and private 
interests. The cost of the regulations should also be examined with information costs, 
                                               
838 Chapter 1. 
839 George J. Stigler,‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2(1) Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3. 
840 Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan,‘The Political Economy of Deregulation: 
Evidence from the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions in the US’ (1997) FRBNY 
Research Paper No.9720 (accessed March 2,2016) 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9720.p
df.  
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which creates concomitant monitoring, supervising and enforcement costs charged to the 
taxpayers.841 It also determines the level of interference in banks. 
 
So, the research agenda has discussed the regulatory policies, their enforcement and post-
effects on the development and role of private firms in different theoretical settings that 
position boundaries of state and market in different scenarios. Intervention in the private 
sphere of persons for market failure reasons in economic terms or public interest reasons 
in the context of public policy objectives has implications for bank regulation, and the 
paradigm-shift in bank information disclosure exemplifies this approach.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, bank disclosures in financial markets are of significance since 
disclosures allow bank stakeholders to make a better assessment of the bank and its risks 
by providing a clearer picture of its financial situation. The discussion conducted in this 
section so far is a snapshot of the previous chapters. On the other hand, disclosures made 
about the customers form another pillar of regulations based on public good. Criminal 
law, by its very nature, has been qualified as a mechanism for achieving the public good 
where the state establishes measures to protect all citizens of the state and prevent the 
occurrence of crimes. Due to the destabilizing outcomes of the crimes on society, the state 
is driven to intervene in the organizations when it sees it necessary to protect its own 
existence and its citizens as well. The level of intervention of the states in banks has 
increased through the internationalization of crimes and the interconnectedness of the 
financial markets via innovation in technology and information systems.  
 
                                               
841 Chapter 2. 
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Recognized principles of contract law that apply to banks and their customers have been 
superseded by superior laws which means private law protections pertaining to the 
information held by banks have been overridden by public law measures on both national 
and international levels to prevent and combat crimes.842  Accordingly, the climate within 
which the bank-customer relation operates is subject to a continuing turnabout. 
 
The overuse of the power of the state within confiscation, recovery and criminal 
investigations might end up with complete submission of banks to the state at the expense 
of balancing the public good. Superimposed disclosure obligations of banks through 
criminal law objectives can be analysed within AML, TF and tax evasion laws on the one 
hand, and through securities regulation, as discussed in Chapter 4, on the other. Policies 
to fight against crimes including but not limited to illegal narcotics trafficking, illegal 
sales of weapons, child pornography, human smuggling, financing of illegal activities, 
fraud or political corruption drag banks into a regulatory landscape where they are obliged 
to disclose information by law.843  
 
The international focus of the fight against financial crimes exerts pressure over the 
countries’ so-called offshore jurisdictions. Moving capital to such fiscal paradises is not 
just related to pure criminal law policies but also to unfair competition and distortions 
within the market. 844  Substantive policy and regulatory differences between the 
jurisdictions may channel the capital of people and businesses to those with more secrecy. 
The transparency of banks may also be gauged according to the state’s commitment to 
                                               
842 Section 3.2.4. 
843 Schott (n 715). 
844 Richard Gordon and Andrew P. Morriss,‘Moving Money: International Financial Flows, 
Taxes and Money Laundering’(2014) Hastings International&Comparative Law Review 1,2. 
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automatic exchange of information with other states. Preventive measures for national 
security, public safety or fair allocations of wealth through fair taxation are evidently not 
bad things. There might be cases where the moving of funds between banks can be the 
result of illegal or corrupt actions like counterfeiting or smuggling or where the source of 
funds is legal, but their transfer is not permitted by law such as in cases of tax evasion.  
 
Given the ordinary banking relationship with customers established under of private law 
and the challenges arising out of the elusiveness and complexity of the concept of those 
crimes and their ever-expanding requirements over banks, a problem might appear as 
laws may treat banks as nothing more than information suppliers. This issue involves 
concomitant problems such as conflicts of law or other related issues pertaining to 
balancing the measures of counterterrorism or other criminal activities and civil liberties. 
The structuring of a regulatory web and the enforcement system underpinning bank 
disclosures can be symptoms of a new type of political control.845  
  
The extent of the social responsibility of banks is another contentious issue questioning 
whether the measures taken to protect investors and others residing in criminal law to 
prevent and combat crimes assign banks moral or ethical responsibilities beyond their 
profit maximisation objective due to their importance to the socio-economic system.846 
This line of thought implies that banks should go beyond mere compliance with the rules 
and willingly take on the responsibility to contribute to the integrity and stability of 
                                               
845 Sanaa Ahmed,‘The Politics of Financial Regulation’ (2015) 11(1) Socio-Legal Review 61. 
846 For a discussion about the societal responsibility of banks, see Indira Carr and Robert Jago, 
‘Corruption, Money Laundering, Secrecy and Societal Responsibility of Banks’ in Nicholas 
Ryder, Umut Turksen and Sabine Hassler (eds), Fighting Financial Crime in the Global 
Economic Crisis (Routledge 2015) 144-67. 
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markets, and they should have a societal responsibility to abdicate their commitment to 
bank confidentiality to a certain extent. 
 
Overall, there has been a great effort by governments and law enforcement agencies to 
combat financial crime as these crimes have a high political profile, especially after the 
GFC, when integrity of the financial system has become so paramount. This was maybe 
because banks were seen as imprudent in their business conduct to maximise their 
financial profits and a great deal of regulatory investigations of banks reduced confidence 
in banks in general. In this respect, banks receive most of the pressure for their 
commercial activities. It has been a difficult task to establish a balance between providing 
services in existent and new markets, fulfilling their private law contractual duties to their 
customers and increasing its financial welfare and market stability whilst exercising their 
duties emanating from criminal law and other regulations.847 Loss of public confidence 
based on public awareness about the involvement of banks in facilitating financial crime, 
regardless of whether it is done knowingly or unintentionally, motivates further 
exploration about whether there is a potential for systemic risk similar to ones discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
 
4.1.Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Laws 
ML is a special type of crime that has effects on the global level and it involves the 
proceeds of many criminal activities such as smuggling, drug trade and trafficking, insider 
                                               
847 Alan Bacarese, Kenneth Levy and Hari Mulukutla,‘The Management of Information in the 
Context of Suspected Money Laundering Cases’ in Barry Rider(ed), Research Handbook on 
Financial Crime (Edward Elgar 2015) 507. 
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trading, embezzlement, bribery, arms trafficking and fraud.848 Criminalization of ML is 
relatively new849 and it has been advanced by the advent of global integration where the 
sovereign preserve of individual states in the establishment and enforcement of criminal 
law measures have been substantially challenged by international characteristics and 
globally accepted detrimental effects of this crime.850  
 
Illicit financial flows from developing countries can result in a decrease in domestic 
expenditures and investments through creating social and financial fragmentation in the 
country by damaging public confidence in banks and the financial system as a whole. The 
movement of funds can be related to diversification of the portfolio and spreading risk; it 
can be a result of unfavourable changes in political, economic and social circumstances 
in the state including ‘financial instability, weak currency and runaway inflation rates’851 
or simply it may be related to potential benefits from tax competitions between the states.  
 
Its negative impacts on the systemic stability of banking systems,852 which place unjust 
economic burdens on the ones behaving within the legal economy, corruption and 
                                               
848 Jayesh D’Souza, Terrorism Financing, Money Laundering and Tax Evasion (CRC Press 
2012) 39. 
849 Emmanuel Ioannides, Fundamental Principles of EU Law Against Money Laundering 
(Ashgate 2014) 2.  
850 Robin Booth and others, Money Laundering Law and Regulation (OUP 2011) 2. 
851 E.U Savona, Responding to Money Laundering: International Perspectives (Harwood 
Academic Publishers 1997) 185. 
852 Banks can cause liquidity risk in the financial system due to their affiliation with ML 
activities. Banks viewed as related to ML activities are exposed to reputational, concentration or 
operational risk, which have repercussions on the country’s financial and monetary stability. In 
and out money flows of a financial system, confidence loss and concentration risks emanating 
from ML threaten the systemic stability. Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale,John Eatwell, Global 
Governance of Financial Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk (OUP 2006) 
31-32. 
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accompanying side concerns about civil liberties have remained on the global agenda and 
it still creates tension among the global initiatives battling with ML and the states 
following their best national welfare policies.853 However, the tension that emanates from 
the heterogeneity of AML regulations might not necessarily be a result of welfare policies 
of the states; it can be related to their cultural and social values and traditions which are 
deeply rooted in their law.  
 
Competition for illegal money and its links with countries with strict bank confidentiality 
laws is not new. As mentioned, though variances within AML rules remain between states, 
there is a great global effort to develop international standards. Such standards are not 
mere products of international public law measures but rather voluntary contributions 
from the private sector. This has provided great synergy in terms of the application of soft 
laws and non-binding measures.854 The Wolfsberg AML principles are good examples of 
the participation of the private sector to combat ML.855 At the same time, international 
soft law and convention-based measures have responded to the menace of ML by 
developing global standards and forming a minimum degree of disclosure regimes and 
exchange of information to combat ML. Mutual recognition of the self-interest of states 
and measures established by global initiatives (such as the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) 856, BCBS and OECD) create consultation and negotiations between the states 
                                               
853 M. Michelle Gallant, Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime (Edward Elgar 2005) 9-10. 
854 Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (Springer 2006) 
156. 
855 Mark Pieth&Gemma Aiolfi,‘The Private Sector Becomes Active: The Wolfsberg Process’ 
(2003) 10(4) Journal of Financial Crime 359. Also see the Wolfsberg Group (accessed March 
4,2016) http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com. 
856 The main focus of FATF was to fight against misuse of financial systems through ML in 
1990, the time when the FATF Forty Recommendations were set out. With advent of changing 
methods of money laundering, the FATF reconsidered the Recommendations in 1996 and 
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and they set out the collective intent in establishing common standards to combat ML.857 
Voluntary adoption of international soft laws, treaties and conventions starting from the 
1988 United Nations Vienna Convention858 to the present have far-reaching effects on 
the mechanisms to combat ML. 859  National AML laws together with international 
agencies such as FATF put particular emphasis on the control of information related to 
capital movements and identification of persons and institutions with suspicious 
transactions. FATF, FATF-style regional bodies 860  and its observer organizations, 
including the IMF, World Bank and the UN have provided strict standards on jurisdictions 
including prevention, detection and punishment of ML.  
 
Preventive measures are interwoven with the FI secrecy laws and customer due diligence 
and record-keeping requirements imposed on them. Recommendation 9 provides a very 
clear reference to secrecy laws and establishes that ‘countries should ensure that FI 
secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation of the FATF Recommendations’.861 Along 
                                               
gradually broadened its scope to include thwarting of TF, financing of proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, corruption and financial crimes. FATF (accessed Nov 22, 2018) 
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/. 
857 As mentioned at Section 4.1, there could be a tension between national laws or standards 
countries adopted (ie FATCA’s effects on Swiss bank secrecy). 
858 The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances Article 3(1)(b). 
859 Kern Alexander,‘The Legalization of the International Anti-Money Laundering Regime:The 





(accessed March 27, 2016). 
861 FATF,‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism&Proliferation’ (Oct 2018)(accessed Nov 23,2018)http://www.fatf-
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the same lines, Recommendations 10 and 11 accommodate customer due diligence and 
record keeping as preventive policies.862 Under those measures, on-going tracking of 
transactions and business relationships, collection of data and identification of the 
beneficial owner require active participation of FIs. 
  
The term ML has been used interchangeably with other types of financial crimes such as 
TF.863 In the case of TF, funds can come from both legal and illegal sources.864 The fight 
against TF is a non-military element of the war on terror and banks surely do not want to 
find themselves in a situation that requires them to protect their reputation and auditability. 
Though ML and TF are different activities, linking them has provided a wider framework 
of measures to combat those crimes.865 Prevention of the misuse of financial markets does 
not only cover TF, it includes other types of acts such as drug trafficking, insider trading 
and fraud. 
 
4.1.1.   Bank Reporting Requirements under Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter Terrorism Financing Regimes  
Banks have a role in mitigating financial crimes through their intelligence units that 
oversee suspicious activities which must then report these to the authorities. 866 




863 See the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism 1999. 
864 Stephen Dawe,‘Conducting National Money Laundering or Financing of Terrorism Risk 
Assessment’ in Brigitte Unger and Daan van der Linde (eds), Research Handbook on Money 
Laundering (Edward Elgar 2013) 111. 
865 For example, the FATF also engages in the war on terror.  
866 In the US this requirement comes from the USA Patriot Act and the Bank Secrecy Act(BSA) 
1970. See 31 CFR§103.18(a). BSA provides a safe harbour provision for banks, which protects 
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Information is of significance to understand and mitigate the risk of ML and TF and 
analysed information is valuable as actionable intelligence both for banks and law 
enforcement. This means that banks are required to participate in information sharing to 
mitigate the risk of financial crimes and work like a law enforcement agency. Suspicion-
based reporting therefore overrides the bank’s duty of confidentiality, with banks being 
required to establish adequate and effective measures to protect themselves from the risk 
of facilitating crimes. What is noticeable is that banks are required to make difficult 
judgment calls and bear heavy administrative burdens in fulfilling their obligations.867 
Banks undertake costly screening, monitoring and reporting due to the threat of sanctions. 
 
The role and effectiveness of banks in lessening the vulnerability of markets to attempts 
at ML or TF can be analysed under two subheadings: information and incentive. Such 
crimes are conducted in markets in which information asymmetries are inherent and 
banks play a role in lessening them.868 This means that banks have the information capital 
and authorities do not. Therefore, banks are delegated as agents by the state to identify 
and report anomalies for the state in order to underpin its financial stability and its 
efficient, uncorrupted financial system efforts.869 This analytical framework sets out that 
AML or CTF laws should be tailored to the distinct behaviours of at least two agents, one 
of them is a bank and the other is a regulator/supervisor.870    
                                               
banks from civil liability related to sharing suspicious activity and related account information 
with the relevant authorities. 31 USC§5318(g)(3). For the UK see Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, 
s 330-33. Also see Crime and Courts Act 2013,s 7 and Money Laundering Regulations SI 
2007/2157. For the CTF, see Terrorism Act 2000,s 21A. 
867 Bacarese, Levy and Mulukutla (n 847) 510. 
868 Chapter 1. 
869 Donato Masciandaro,Elod Takats and Brigitte Unger, Black Finance: The Economics of 
Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 2007) 35. 
870 And law enforcement and government agencies. 
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As the regulators are unable to control all information collected by banks, they give this 
task to banks and force them to report abnormal situations. This responsibility comes with 
the incentive problem of producing necessary information and actively collaborating with 
the regulators because it brings extra administrative costs and prevents them pursuing 
other objectives like confidentiality. A cost-benefit analysis of regulation is therefore 
crucial as the regulation should consider anticipated costs and gains and discourage 
distortions and disincentives in the system to prevent the risk of deviant conduct.871 As 
such, a balance is required to be struck between different tasks.  
 
The process started with the Vienna Convention’s requirement to criminalise ML and 
developed through establishment of suspicion-based reporting by the FATF’s 40 
Recommendations.872 This concluded that a bank’s traditional duty of confidentiality 
should have exemptions for confidentiality breaches and for international demands for 
mutual assistance.873 This indicates that the private law duty is not solely a domestic 
matter where it is required to be interpreted with global measures regarding CTF, 
suspicious transactions, anti-corruption and anti-sanctions avoidance. This means there 
has been a new reworking of the bank’s duty of confidentiality which can possibly go 
beyond the AML-CTF framework. It also implies that this duty is shaped by global 
concerns.  
                                               
871 Donato Masciandaro and Umberto Filetto,‘Money Laundering Regulation and Bank 
Compliance Costs: What Do Your Customers Know?’(2001) 5(2) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 133,135. 




873 Graham Greenleaf and Alan Tyree,‘Banker’s Duties and Data Privacy Principles’ in Sandra 
Booysen and Dora Neo (eds), Can Banks Still Keep a Secret? (CUP 2017) 31. 
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Know-your-customer and reporting requirements bring about two distinct costs to banks. 
The first one is tangible compliance costs and the other an intangible cost that 
encompasses customer trust and reputation. Suspicious activity report (SAR) is an 
integral part of AML reporting regimes and each bank decides whether there is suspicious 
activity or not. SARs link the suspected crime with the client/customer’s identifiable 
information. Reporting requirements for transactions over a relatively low prescribed 
amount or suspicious transactions necessitate active monitoring. This turns banks into 
informers and detectives.  
 
The threat of heavy sanctions and reputation loss plays an important role in making banks 
share information but the problem of overcompliance to avoid potential fines might occur 
and damages the efficiency of AML and CTF regimes.874 The opposing view is that the 
disincentive problem does not emanate from convictions or fines but is related to the 
customer base of banks in that the bank deposits mostly come from a large number of 
small customers. 875 Thus, the incentive problem is mostly an economic one. In this regard, 
sharing information with authorities becomes more pertinent when it relates to a small 
number of high-wealth customers. 
 
In addition to the issues discussed above, there is another challenge for banks when they 
seek to comply with ML and TF legislation. The conflict between the requirement to 
                                               
874 This is the ‘crying wolf’ problem which is when there is too much reporting and fewer 
convictions; and it should be solved by lessening the fines. E Takats,‘A Theory of Crying Wolf: 
The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement’(2011) 27(1)The Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organisation 32. 
875 Valpy FitzGerald,‘Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist 
Funding’ (2004) 20 European Journal of Political Economy 387,399. 
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report suspicions and the bankers’ duty of confidentiality is already addressed in law.876 
Yet, banks face a dilemma between tipping-off their customers about an operation 
launched against them and facing a potential liability as constructive trustees for the funds 
they hold.877 When a bank becomes suspicious about a customer’s account and allows the 
customer access to that account without reporting its suspicions, it might be criminally 
liable for allowing the offence.878 So, failure to report is an offence. In addition to criminal 
liability, banks may face a civil liability when it allows the payment of funds because this 
might mean liability as an accessory.879 In this scheme, when banks need to wait for 
appropriate consent from the crime agency and then freeze an account, what happens if 
the customer wants to access his/her funds? The customer is likely to understand that 
there is a criminal investigation if they cannot use their account and here the bank faces 
the risk of tipping the customer off. If the bank allows the customer to use their account, 
it might be held liable for knowingly assisting a breach of trust.880  
 
This conundrum was discussed in Governor & Company of The Bank of Scotland v. A 
Ltd,881 where the Court of Appeal provided limited guidance about future dilemmas as its 
advice appears to be general, in that cooperation between the authorities (it was the 
Serious Fraud Office in this case) and the bank should take place prior to any court 
                                               
876 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 337 and 338(4). 
877 Michael Isaacs, ‘Money Laundering Dilemmas for Banks’ (2004) 19 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 284. For a discussion of use of the term ‘constructive trustee’, see 
Ellinger, Lomnicka and Hare (n 778) 273-91. 
878 Ibid. 112. 
879 Norman Mugarura, ‘The Jeopardy of the Bank in Enforcement of Normative Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Regimes’ (2015) 18(3) JMLC 352, 355. 
880 Isaacs (n 877) 8. 
881 [2001] EWCA Civ. 52, [2001] 1 WLR 751, [2001] All ER(D) 81. 
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applications and injunctions, rather than an interim declaration being sought.882  The 
difficult position of banks was later revisited in Squirrell v National Westminster Bank 
Plc and Her Majesty Customs and Excise,883 and it was accepted that the bank had 
followed the correct procedure in freezing the account and not explaining the reasons why 
it did so. The decision provides comfort to banks that freeze accounts on relevant 
suspicion when their actions are brought before the court. 
 
4.2.Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes  
Another statutory inroad to bank confidentiality where public policy overrides the need 
to preserve bank confidence and where banks are required to reconcile a number of 
different rights and obligations is tax regulatory and legal requirements. International 
efforts to tackle revenue losses, to fight harmful tax competition and to spot tax fraud and 
evasion have led to international tax cooperation on the global level to the point that there 
has been a considerable move from a bilateral to multilateral approach and from an 
‘exchange upon request’ to ‘automatic exchange of information’.884   
                                               
882 Michael Chan, ‘Banks Caught in the Middle’ (2001) 22(8) Company Lawyer 1, 4. For a recent 
case about the tension between a bank and its customer, see Shah v HSBC [2012] EWHC 
1283(QB), where it is held that the bank does not have an obligation to explain the reasons for its 
inability to act. 
883[2005] EWCH 664 (Ch).  
884 Since 1998, the OECD includes tax cooperation and further transparency in its agenda. See 
Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Also, the G8, G20, EU and the UN 
(Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters) have supported globally 
coordinated tax cooperation and exchange of information. See OECD, ‘Multilateral Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and the Multilateral Competent Authority 
Agreement’ (Accessed May 14, 2015) http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-
exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/multilateral-competent-authority-agreement.pdf. 
See Carlos de Almeida,‘International Tax Cooperation, Taxpayers’ Rights and Bank Secrecy’ 
(2015) 21 Law and Business Review of the Americas 217. 
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The international agenda on fiscal transparency and information exchange puts an 
emphasis on timely accessibility to reliable information, specifically bank information.885 
For example, the OECD report established as far back as 2001 that ‘governmental 
authorities should have access … to bank information that may be relevant to criminal 
and civil tax matters. This information should also be available when requested via the 
exchange of information mechanism’.886 Information disclosure and sharing mechanisms 
established for AML and CTF are linked to tax evasion since it is seen as one of the 
predicate offences of ML.887 Overall, it is possible to mention a globally ever-expanding 
expectation from banks to share information with authorities.  
 
In the UK, HM Revenue & Customs has extensive investigatory powers including to 
compel banks to share information.888 Greater access to information between authorities 
is also borne out by the recent development of the HMRC working in collaboration with 
the National Crime Agency and accessing SAR data for tax evasion purposes.889 A bank 
                                               
885 Alicja Brodzka,‘The Future of Automatic Tax Information Exchange in EU Countries’(2015) 
12 US-China Law Review 352. 
886 OECD,‘The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices’ (2001) at 11(accessed May 13,2015) 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/2664450.pdf.  
887 Chizu Nakajima,‘The International Pressures on Banks to Disclose Information’ in Booysen 
and Neo (n 873) 115. 
888 Finance Act 2011, schedule 23; Reporting of Savings Income Information Regulations 2003 
SI 2003/3297(as of December 2017). 
889 NCA,‘SARs Annual Report 2014’ at 24 (accessed March 26,2016) 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/464-2014-sars-annual-report/file. 
However, information disclosed under a tax information exchange agreement is not disclosed 
by the HMRC to other regulators other than tax purposes. It was proved in the infamous HSBC 
tax evasion case where the HMRC did not share information that it received from French tax 
authority with the FCA.Financial Times, ‘UK Government Closes Ranks on HSBC Tax 
Issue’(accessed Oct 27,2016) https://www.ft.com/content/673c33c6-b12f-11e4-831b-
00144feab7de.   
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has to provide information or produce a document if the HMRC requests it as a result of 
any reasonable potential liability at any time to UK tax or to tax payable in an EU member 
state or another state with which the UK has a tax information exchange agreement.890 In 
the US, the law forces banks to collaborate in reporting and producing information. This 
has a high level of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings891 as well as in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities.892 
FATCA, as one of the most controversial pieces of US legislation which requires foreign 
FIs to disclose information about their US citizen-account holders, has opened a new 
phase in the information sharing era by acting as a catalyst for the move towards lifting 
up bank secrecy requirements in different jurisdictions. The OECD sees the FATCA as a 
positive step for the furtherance of automatic exchange of information in a multilateral 
context. International pressures on banks to disclose information has therefore gone one-
step further.893  
 
As in the case of AML or CTF regulations, most of the discussion on disclosure of 
information for tax purposes revolves around the legal sphere of data protection and the 
right to privacy. The big data that tax authorities receive create data profiling concerns 
                                               
890 Keith Stanton,‘The United Kingdom’in Booysen and Neo (n 873) 356-57. Also see article 8 
and 9 of the Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on Taxations of Saving Income in the Form 
of Interest Payments where banks, as paying agents, are required to inform the competent 
authorities about the transfer of interest payments under its own initiative.(emphasis added) 
891 31 USC§5311. 
892 12 USC§1829b(a). 
893 OECD,‘Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters’ 
(2014) at 326 (accessed Oct 26, 2016)http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/standard-f or-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-
in-tax-matters-second-edition_9789264267992-en#page326.  
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linked to privacy issues about personal and business data.894 Considering that bilateral 
and multilateral tax agreements require transmission of information between states, the 
right of privacy of taxpayers in relation to the state comes into question.  
 
However, the emphasis is on the source of information, namely persons, and not on the 
banks. This is seen in the difference between ‘data of being’ and ‘data of having’. While 
data of having, such as information held by banks, is available for authorities, data of 
being is seen as a personal asset.895 Undue access to personal assets by tax authorities is 
something related to public standards of privacy protection. Under the ever-growing 
transparency initiatives, protection of ‘data of having’ under bank confidentiality laws 
cannot seem to stand up to the contemporary approach.  
 
4.3.Effects of Compliance-Specific Disclosures on Financial Stability  
Economic, cultural and political consequences of ML and its detrimental effects on 
financial stability are well-known.896 Substantial transmission of responsibility to the 
financial industry has already been accomplished and therefore basic elements such as 
KYC rules, monitoring client and customer activity, understanding the key risks about 
products and clients/customers, embracing controls appropriately and maintaining and 
developing the internal system to avoid enforcement actions, fines and concomitant 
reputational and other losses is now part of the everyday business of banks. 
 
                                               
894 Filip Debelva & Irma Mosquera,‘Privacy and Confidentiality in Exchange of Information 
Procedures’ (2017) 45(5) Intertax 362, 364. 
895 This is the classification made by the Brazilian court. Almeida (n 884) 231. 
896 Mahmood Bagheri and Ayodeji Aluko,‘The Impact of Money Laundering on Economic and 
Financial Stability and on Political Development in Developing Countries’(2012) 15(4) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 442. 
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It is not only ML activities that contribute to financial instability and economic imbalance 
but also pursuance of charges for large and connected banks’ involvement in financial 
crimes.897 For example, the case involving HSBC shows that regulators still believe that 
a single institution can damage the economy. This incident created the term ‘too big to 
indict/jail’.898 This is one side of the coin that addresses a dilemma about the criminal 
charges against a bank and its impact on financial stability and systemic fragility. Surely, 
it also creates a confidence problem for the public, while protecting the trust of HSBC’s 
counterparties in maintaining their business with the bank. This dilemma is interesting in 
terms of the trade-off between maintaining stability and sanctioning the crime nexus.899 
This argument would provide important feedback for maintenance of public confidence 
and understanding the limits of macroprudential objectives in protecting the financial 
stability. 
 
Leaving this line of questioning aside, another issue is the potential effect of banks’ 
AML/CTF related disclosures in contributing to instability. AML, CTF and other 
measures are designed to preserve the reputation, integrity and stability of the bank and 
                                               
897 For example, HSBC’s poor AML checks prosecuted by the US Department of Justice in 
2012 led to a behind the scenes discussions between authorities about the stability-destructive 
effects of criminal indictment against so large and interconnected banks. The FSA claimed that 
criminal proceedings against a systemically important bank, such as HSBC, would ultimately 
lead to financial contagion with further implications on economic and financial stability and 
even destabilise the whole global financial system. US House of Representatives,‘Too Big to 
Jail:Inside the Obama Justice Department’s Decision not to Hold Wall Street Accountable’ 
114th Congress,2nd Season(July 11,2016)  at 14 (accessed Oct 21, 2016) 
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/07072016_oi_tbtj_sr.pdf.  
898 Patrick Hardouin,‘Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Jail’ (2017) 24(4) Journal of Financial Crime 
513.   
899 Hannes Koster and Matthias Pelster,‘Financial Penalties and the Systemic Risk of Banks’ 
(2018) 19(2) The Journal of Risk Finance 154. 
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financial system. Disclosures, in this respect, might have a bearing on reputation and 
therefore public confidence that reflects itself in financial stability.  As Harvey and 
Bosworth-Davies put: 
 
 …[T]oo great a level of public knowledge of financial crime, somewhat perversely, can 
undermine public confidence. Conscious of the imperative to maintain confidence, 
regulators find themselves facing a moral dilemma whereby they may play down 
evidence of potential criminal activity to underpin integrity.900  
 
Though they see the tension from a moral perspective, not a financial stability one; they 
imply the importance of the arrangement of the regulatory chairs. Yet, their critique is 
about an ethical challenge that a single authority, which is charged with reduction of 
financial crime and maintenance of market confidence responsibilities, faces in fulfilling 
its objectives. So, it recalls a similar discussion made in Chapter 2 about institutional 
structure of regulatory/supervisory authorities and in Chapter 4 about the pursuance of 
different regulatory objectives that are likely to create tension between authorities.  
 
If one takes reputation as a synonym for being worthy of trust, then general arguments 
related to trust and public confidence are also applicable to cases where banks and the 
banking sector’s reputation is at stake.901 As Greenspan puts it: ‘Service providers … 
usually can offer only their reputations’.902 Banks are risk-oriented institutions903 and 
                                               
900 Jackie Harvey and Rowan Bosworth-Davies,‘Drawing the Line in the Sand: Trust, Integrity 
and Regulatory Misdemeanour’ (2016) 29(3) Security Journal 367, 373.  
901 Chapter 2. 
902 Alan Greenspan, Commencement Address (June 10,1999)(Accessed March 19,2017) 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/199906102.htm.   
903 Chapter 1. 
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direct and joint effects of risk management policies can be seen in banks’ reputational 
standing that is related to their confidence production roles. Reputational risk is:  
 
…[T]he risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, 
shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or regulators that can 
adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new business relationships and 
continued access to sources of funding.904  
 
Therefore, reputation is part of confidence and it has economic value. Reputation risk is 
generally positioned as the frontrunner in the explanations why reporting firms like banks 
should welcome AML and CTF measures. It is not only related to the reputation of the 
state as being a clean financial market for investments but also of the institutions and the 
way they maintain their business in it. Given this framework, what is the potential for 
bank disclosures to have a substantial impact on the safety and soundness of banks or 
even on the financial stability of the system?  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, trust is a matter of perception and mostly subjective. This 
means that disclosure about a bank’s involvement in AML or related crimes (intentionally 
or not) is likely to result in decreasing business due to clients, shareholders, bank 
counterparties and other stakeholders’ incentives to withdraw their support from the bank 
and to move their funds to a clean bank that is not under the risk of paying heavy penalties 
or losing its charter. This might especially be the case for investors as adverse information 
reflects itself in stock prices. Such market reaction is even more visible for large banks.905  
                                               
904 BCBS,Consultative Document (17 March 2016) at 2.2(accessed March 30, 2017) 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d349.pdf.  
905 Franco Fiordelisi, Maria-Gaia Soana, Paola Schwizer,‘The Determinants of Reputational 
Risk in the Banking Sector’ (2013) 37 Journal of Banking&Finance 1359,1369. 
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Having said that, there are arguments about the real value of reputation in cases of bank 
involvement in misconduct, ML or TF or when information about a major customer being 
engaged in illegal activities becomes known to the public. However, within the financial 
crime concept, loss of public confidence and the triggering of a systemic move similar to 
the case discussed in Chapter 4 might not necessarily happen. Maybe it is because people 
do not want their banks to engage in criminal activities but at the same time they are not 
interested in moving their funds or making it a public issue unless there is a real threat to 
their money because of that activity.906 Yet, the information about charter cancellation 
due to a bank’s inefficient compliance with AML or CTF rules or large amounts of money 
flowing out of the banking system, with concomitant changes to market prices of bank 
stocks, have a big negative impact on public perception and therefore public confidence. 
As such, it is in bank’s interest to secure its reputation so that it can continue to produce 
confidence. This also means banks are expected to have a proactive approach rather than 
a reactive one in establishing effective controls to avoid fines (deficit model of 
compliance) and to maintain its reputation (enhancement model of compliance).907 This 
implies a further problem with the results of fear-driven compliance in the form of bank 
de-risking strategies. 
 
Drivers of de-risking include a bank’s reaction to civil, criminal or regulatory actions 
based on compliance failures; the re-evaluation of its business plans; the desire to prevent 
higher costs of compliance due to higher-risk customers; or the bank choosing to de-risk 
                                               
906 Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman,‘Anti-Money Laundering Overkill?’ [2005] The 
International Economy 56. 
907 ‘There is little to suggest that compliance is linked to reputation.’ Harvey and Lau (n 721) 
70. 
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itself simply because of the reputational risk of working with higher-risk customers.908 
Embracing a broad-based de-risking approach rather than evaluating the relationship risk 
on a case-by-case basis might exclude some businesses and persons from the global 
regulated financial system and affect local economies.909 
 
5.   Final Observations  
Starting with a conceptual and theoretical analysis, this chapter establishes that there is a 
tension between the public, societal function of banks and their profit-seeking nature. It 
discusses this tension through the lens of banks’ private law duty of confidentiality and 
their disclosures to public authorities, also referred to as tension on a private law-public 
law level. 
 
Bank confidentiality, as discussed here, has long been seen as one of the constitutional 
legal constructions in bank-customer relationships. It has traditionally appeared as a 
private law institution in different jurisdictions910 and the recent global emphasis on bank 
transparency value attributed to bank secrecy has been associated with concealment of 
crimes and the vessel or facilitator role of banks in wrongdoings.   
 
                                               
908  Guy Wilkes and David Harrison,‘Do FCA De-Risking Warnings Raise More Questions 
Than They Answer?’ [2016] Compliance Monitor 1. 
909 James A. Haley,‘De-Risking Effects,Drivers and Mitigation’ (2017)CIGI Papers No.137 
(accessed Aug 21, 
2017)https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.137web.pdf.  
910 Even in Switzerland, the bank’s duty of confidentiality is a private law institution, which is 
developed out of an implied contract between the bank-customer and later established as a 
statutory rule with the protection of criminal sanctions.  
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Yet, legal scholarship argues that a bank’s duty of confidentiality in a traditional sense is 
almost extinct due to the increasing number of bodies having access to bank information 
and the banks’ obligation to report their customers to the authorities without any 
request.911 This heralds the changing role of banks and the state in the way that reporting 
requirements give a task to banks to decide, for example, whether to report and exclude 
some customers from the financial system.912 This role of banks in the AML/CTF drive 
means private economic actors like banks share state sovereignty on a theoretical level.  
 
The global move towards more transparency comes with concerns regarding 
independence from interference and secrecy in banking, which in turn leaves room for 
the legal scholarship to respond to the fear of a seemingly unending trend towards open 
access to personal account, transaction and identification information. Yet, most of the 
discussions revolve around the one-sided approach to bank confidentiality which assumes 
that it is the information that persons provide to banks under contract law (or agency) 
provisions, and therefore the concept is generally discussed as information that belongs 
to customers. This means that banks’ position in information disclosure is generally 
overlooked in the face of the enshrined concept of right to privacy and data protection of 
legal entities. 
 
From a positivistic legal theory, it is true that the private law duty of bank confidentiality 
has been altered by public law penetration and its limits have changed compared to the 
past. However, from a different perspective, it might represent the new optimal balance 
                                               
911 Levi (n 727). 
912 Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Thierry Godefroy, Pierre Lascoumes, ‘Reluctant Partners? Banks 
in the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in France’ (2011) 42(2) 
Security Dialogue 179. 
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between private and public interests where, as public interest theory suggests, the law, as 
a living and reflecting body, adapts and calibrates itself to this new need for transparency. 
In so doing, it treats banks as semi-public institutions in the sense that they serve wider 
public goals such as prevention of ML, TF and tax evasion.  
 
Banks, like other private firms with a profit maximisation objective, lack private interests 
in sharing bank customer information with the authorities. Intrusion of public mandatory 
rules into bank secrecy, therefore, appears to be a necessary tool for authorities that 
otherwise would not obtain the same information from somewhere else or have access to 
the same information by devoting extra time and funds. This comes with a cost. 
 
In the wider context of regulatory missions, bank confidentiality as a private law 
institution and the public interest disturbed by this institution brings to the fore questions 
about whether the banks’ private interests in information and the public’s confidence in 
banks are balanced against public law interests and whether the changing boundaries of 
bank confidentiality are a product of the banks’ forcible alignment with the public interest 
as a result of growing bank transparency demands. Such questions also appear to imply 
that bank confidentiality mostly serves private interests as value for the customer only, 
not the banks.913 As such, modern transparency initiatives directed towards banks and 
their reflection in the law need to establish a balance between public and private interests 
not only from a customer point of view but also from a bank point of view. Private and 
public law aspects of bank secrecy in the future might necessitate a step back from where 
the modern transparency-driven financial world stands and a change to the one-sided 
approach, either via a customer-based or state-based approach.  
                                               
913 Alexander Vishnevskiy, ‘Bank Secrecy: A Look at Modern Trends from a Theoretical 
Standpoint’ (2015) 4 Journal of Higher School of Economics 140, 145. 
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Overall, the gap between transparency in the domestic and international spheres has been 
reduced by global initiatives and it is likely that the bank’s duty of confidentiality will 
evolve over time. The current larger picture provides that the private law duty of 
confidentiality gives way to the superior concern of fighting crime. This duty still survives, 
but global movements for the prevention of and combatting crimes and technological 
advances in the transmission of funds and information herald a new relationship between 
banks and regulators/ criminal law enforcement agencies. Increasing legislation is making 
inroads into this duty in more expansive ways, as it is an area heavily influenced by the 
public interest. So, this chapter acknowledges this tension, yet accepts that any solution 
to it is necessarily tentative because, from a pragmatic point of view, a worldwide trend 
towards more transparency places pressure on the banks to disclose information and it is 
not possible to pinpoint a direct and precise level of optimal bank information disclosure 
that satisfies the banks, customers and law enforcement agencies/ regulators. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: BALANCING AND RECONCILING 
CONFLICTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
A normative investigation of ‘what financial regulation aims to accomplish’ is generally 
discussed under the headings of financial stability, market efficiency, competition and 
consumer protection; yet, as this thesis argues, concurrent attainment of some these 
objectives can cause conflict. This potential conflict is generally a logical by-product of 
differences in regulatory bodies/ agencies’ assigned duties. The policies and regulations 
adopted by one regulator intended to achieve a particular objective might have unintended 
outcomes for another body and interfere with its regulatory objective. Following this line 
of thought, this thesis exemplifies this position by examining the simultaneous 
application of the maximum transparency objective of capital markets regulators and the 
micro- and macro- stability focused approach of stability regulators by placing banks and 
their disclosures at the centre of the argument. It argues that bank information disclosure 
creates tensions in both the relationship between the banks and the regulators and in the 
interactions between the regulators that simultaneously regulate the banks.   
 
Under the lens of the market discipline approach, what makes bank information cardinal 
is related to the systemic approach to financial stability which requires an abundant and 
continuous flow of market and institutional knowledge. The conclusions that see market 
discipline as complementary to bank capital requirements and supervision have merits as 
bank transparency is a value not only for those who have a financial interest in the safety 
and soundness of the bank but also for the general public. An optimistic view of bank 
transparency approach banks as passive agents that share the information for scrutiny by 
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external stakeholders including governments, investors, depositors, employees, 
competitors and general public. It also sees banks as active agents that disclose 
information because they have financial and reputational interests in voluntarily sharing 
information. Yet, the GFC revealed that market discipline is not a cure-all and besides it 
has limitations. Further, among other things, the very nature of banking business (that 
builds upon the opaque nature of contracting process and of the quality of loans) and its 
systemic place in the socio-economic and financial system might be a limitation in itself. 
Also, explicit and implicit protection of creditors and compensation schemes implies that 
banks’ incentives for transparency are largely motivated by private interests.  
 
In this financial regulatory environment where market discipline and maximum bank 
transparency are highly valued, banks have provided well-established and fertile ground 
to reappraise or at least be more sceptical about the goal of achieving a maximum level 
of bank transparency. This questioning, however, should be interpreted beyond pro- and 
anti-bank transparency positions. It is more about compromising and the need for balance. 
The first point is that the aim of greater transparency, with regulations requiring more 
detailed and outnumbering disclosures, might not necessarily deliver their ultimate 
objective of more efficient, productive, resilient and stable banks and markets. It is part 
of the general discussion about the efficiency of disclosure rules. The second is that banks 
are confidence-driven FIs and disclosure of adverse information during a time of crisis 
does not necessarily produce the expected beneficial results from bank transparency. In 
fact, it can be the sole or complementary factor in financial or systemic instability. Based 
on these arguments, this thesis started from the basic premise that banks are informational 
intermediaries and quasi-public FIs. This should be simply interpreted by the fact that 
they run on information. Therefore, its disclosure matters.  
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Banks are ‘at the centre of the process of financing capital accumulation’914 which makes 
them vital players in analysing economic growth and fluctuations. This means that banks 
are providers of liquidity and confidence which have feedback effects on the real 
economy. They also operate on confidence and reputation. Aside from the sophistication 
and complexity of the financial machinery that underlies banks’ involvement in financial 
markets, the simple reality is that there is a social and psychological aspect of banking 
business. As this thesis discussed, if the public perception about the liquidity position of 
banks changes negatively, the potential for an unstable chain reaction of withdrawals 
increases. The role of the deposit insurance scheme is important here. Although it is 
criticised as serving the private interests of the bank and disadvantageous to the public 
interest, it is a fundamental tool for alleviating systemic risk in the financial system by 
reducting the liquidity risk; and therefore, as a confidence-bolstering measure, it serves 
the public interest by mitigating the concerns of depositors. Yet, the design of bank 
liability insurance915 and its effectiveness916 are also crucial, due to the cognitive aspect 
of creditor behaviour. As the case of NR exemplifies, it can tend to undermine trust.  
 
So, lack of confidence about a bank’s safety and soundness might eventually turn into a 
systemic crisis due to the connectedness of banks and bank counterparties, including peer-
banks, other FIs and non-financial firms. If the spillover effect or contagion is strong 
                                               
914 Jan Kregel,‘Political Economy Approaches to Financial Crisis:Hyman Minsky’s Financial 
Fragility Hypothesis’ in Martin H. Wolfson and Gerald A. Epstein(eds),The Handbook of the 
Political Economy of Financial Crises (OUP 2013) 163. 
915 Such as whether it provides full coverage up to a certain amount or if it endorses a co-
insurance system. 
916 Whether the system ensures depositors receive the protected amount without any disruption 
and on time.  
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enough, the whole system might be destabilised. That was the case during the GFC which 
meant that governments had to make numerous interventions.  
 
This short summary of banking business highlights the links between public confidence, 
financial stability, systemic risk and the maturity transformation function of banks. Yet, 
as this thesis discussed, bank information is vital in establishing this link. There is a 
multidimensional side of bank information. Regulators need information to regulate the 
financial system. Investor and other creditor protection requires disclosure of a sufficient 
degree of information. The market itself and financial gatekeepers (such as CRAs, 
auditors and financial analysts) need information to function. Further, banks need 
information about their counterparties (including other banks, FIs and firms). Finally, on 
the broader context, the public needs information to continue to trust the system and 
regulators. Thus, bank information, which includes various kinds of information with 
different rulings and treatments, is much needed for different reasons. Yet, underlying 
economic and informational conditions also link bank information disclosure with the 
risk of contagion. Network approaches submit a comprehensive framework for explaining 
the dynamics of contagion processes. For example, an idiosyncratic or aggregate shock 
can be transmitted through counterparty defaults in a credit relationship, liquidity 
hoarding behaviour or via commonalities or specific characteristics of risk portfolios of 
financial agents (such as holding correlated assets). Lack of confidence, in this frame, can 
be the main reason or a catalyser of furtherance of the shocks. It might happen in the form 
of a bank run that is expedited by behavioural motives of depositors or interbank freeze 
or counterparty defaults. This is what happened during the GFC and this thesis therefore 
examines the disclosure-mandating environment surrounding banks by attempting to shed 
light on several contemporary legal and theoretical issues.   
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The run on NR illustrated that there is an interesting interaction between transparency 
and public provision of liquidity to the banking system. It is a dilemma that regulators 
experience in allowing the disclosure of particular information that has an impact on the 
magnitude of the turbulence. There is no capital markets law term equivalent to safety 
and soundness, which is the main concept of banking regulation.  
 
As detailed in the thesis, banks and capital markets process information in different ways. 
Capital markets aggregate public and private information and transform it into market 
prices and therefore create liquidity. This ability of price formation is a product of 
disclosure practices and competition between expert traders where in theory information 
asymmetry between economic agents is ameliorated between all agents. Yet, as 
mentioned, banks engage in bilateral transactions of which outsiders cannot know the 
underlying information establishing the transaction in the first place, which means there 
is no aggregate information available as capital markets produce.917 This informational 
inefficiency and opacity is inherent and also somehow valuable in banking. From the 
theoretical point of view, the basic idea suggests that banks subject to capital markets 
transparency rules are not as information-revealing as other firms due to ex ante natural 
restrictions to their asset structures. This is simply because of the characteristics of their 
business. Yet, ‘opacity to some degree is inherent to the banking business’ approach is 
about the ability of disclosure regimes in capturing this informational challenge and it is 
not about potential negative post-effects of disclosure. As discussed in the different parts 
of the thesis, there is a strong case for bank transparency and this thesis does not attempt 
to challenge all grounds underpinning the transparency-stability view. Rather, it submits 
                                               
917 Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton, Bengt Holmstrom and Guillermo Ordonez,‘Banks as Secret 
Keepers’ (2017) 107(4) American Economic Review 1005. 
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that the problem arises during the financial turbulence and it addresses the optimality 
problem about bank information disclosures. 
 
In tailoring regulatory responses to the inherent conflict highlighted in the thesis, the aim 
should always be to strike a reasonable balance and there is a challenge to develop 
optimality without sacrificing the benefits and reputation-boosting externality of bank 
transparency. Designing an effective mechanism that satisfies regulatory agencies 
pursuing diversified regulatory objectives for banks is not an easy task. The GFC has 
revealed a weakness regarding in the double aim of financial regulation in a way that the 
absence of a clear hierarchy between regulatory objectives in protecting financial stability 
and ensuring consumer protection (together with other goals in pursuing market 
transparency) has addressed an inherent institutional tension between bank prudential 
regulators and securities markets regulators.  
 
Authorities’ policies in managing and resolving bank problems are also an important part 
of the transparency initiatives. Economic agents expect authorities to be more transparent 
by making their interventions public. At present, strong governance and accountability 
mechanisms ensure ex ante safeguards with ex post transparency for authorities. The 
function of ex post transparency was revisited after the GFC and the regulators’ 
disclosures about the sanctions, enforcement orders or other decisions given for the bank, 
even if they do not signal a drastic downturn regarding the financial standing of the bank, 
stand as either confidence-production or confidence-destruction factors depending on the 
circumstances. For example, what can be more material than information showing that a 
bank needs urgent liquidity help? NR is a clear example of how unplanned disclosure of 
adverse information is inimical to public confidence. Information management, in this 
respect, should be a part of the bank prudential regulation tool to deal with potential 
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negative reactions ex ante. If the laws provide the stability regulator space to solve the 
bank problems discreetly and accept that it is the regulator that produces the bank-related 
information and owns and controls the flow of information, then one can assert that other 
laws forcing banks to disclose the same information should accordingly be tailored for 
the banks as well.  
 
At present, the methods used within securities regulation and management of the risks in 
the banking system do not seem to be conflicting. Both bank regulators and securities 
markets regulators rely on public disclosures to achieve their goals. So, disclosure is a 
well-acknowledged regulatory tool for bank prudential and securities regulators. A bridge 
between the two regulatory philosophies, as one represents the stability/ safety and 
soundness of banks and another transparency, has started to be established, and rules 
underpinning market transparency and competitive equality in securities regulation have 
also been transferred to bank prudential regulation. Accordingly, there is an undeniable 
impression that most of the discussion about bank regulation approves the premise that 
bank transparency is crucial to forestall the recurrence of the banking crisis. In this sense, 
philosophical divergence between banking and securities regulation seems to be 
narrowed by the rising importance of market discipline approach. This means that it is 
likely that there will be more demand for bank information in the future as the institutional 
conflict between prudential regulation and capital markets regulation mentioned here 
appears in difficult times.  
 
In examining how financial regulation should address the conflict discussed in this thesis, 
one must consider what financial regulation seeks to achieve. Characterisation of the 
regulatory objectives under different bodies should not be understood in isolation but 
should be comprehended in context. It means that the overarching goals of financial 
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regulation should contribute to the efficient functioning of the financial system. These 
objectives might overlap to some extent; they might complement to each other; or as this 
thesis establishes through examining different philosophies between bank prudential 
regulation and capital markets regulation, they might even conflict with each other during 
unexpected events such as financial crises. How to rank these goals in case of conflict is 
a difficult task that is bound to value judgment and societal inclinations of each specific 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this thesis discusses that the static nature of regulatory regimes 
framed with pre-defined and limited mandates might not fully align with the dynamic 
character of financial markets. It is because unforeseen circumstances might alter the 
value attributed to particular regulatory imperative and call for a more accommodative 
and flexible approach in the pursuance of different mandates. The law and regulation 
should respond to these unexpected cases and establish accommodative and reconciling 
mechanisms to forestall negative consequences arising out of the simultaneous 
application of competing regulatory objectives.   
 
The regulatory structure for the optimal resolution of conflicts is related to a choice of 
priorities between conflicting goals. Preference for the institutional design of regulatory 
chairs and conflict resolution is jurisdiction-bound and it varies. For example, it can be 
done externally or internally; or similarly, formulation of a horizontal or vertical 
organisational system can be one of the options. 
 
A straightforward solution would be to have a single/ unified regulator to avoid tension 
and solve a short-term conflict away from the public gaze.  This type of internal decision-
making through a single agency was the case in the UK. Yet, as Chapter 2 discusses, the 
FSA was unsuccessful in delivering a good balance of conduct and prudential regulation, 
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and the internal resolution of the disclosure problem of NR under the FSA was also part 
of the discussion about the application of the MAD.  
 
Another approach to resolve tension through organisational structure would require the 
(i) establishment of an external committee/ body which sets priorities (horizontal 
organisational structure/ external resolution of conflicts), or (ii) the creation of a 
hierarchical structure that facilitates and orchestrates interactions between agencies 
(vertical organisational structure).  
 
The former is about the delegation of conflict to a super committee specifically created 
for resolving conflicts. Such a coordinating board would only operate on an ad hoc basis 
when conflicts arise. As this thesis reveals, conflict between the securities markets 
regulator and the stability regulator only manifests itself in truly rare circumstances, such 
as a financial crisis; therefore, an independent coordinating board that takes rapid 
decisions during a crisis by assessing the public interest in the trade-offs involved in the 
pursuance of different regulatory missions by different agencies would be one of the 
options. Nevertheless, such external resolution also creates further complexity. Questions 
about who should be on the board, how this committee would operate, its technical 
capacity, decision-making process and accountability should be answered. Also, it should 
be noted that it is the disclosure laws that raise such tensions in the first place, so unless 
the disclosure laws applicable to banks are not tailored to permit the operation of such a 
problem-solving body, then the organisational structure has no meaning.  
 
The latter hinges on the cooperation and responsiveness of agencies to resolve conflicts, 
not under a single agency like the FSA or a separate temporary problem-solving body. 
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 Rather, this approach reflects system coordination, creates a communication channel and 
attempts to find a compromise between the divergent regulatory objectives of 
autonomous bodies simultaneously regulating the banks. This line of thought is a macro-
approach to financial regulation and it means that goals of financial regulation should not 
be deemed as stand-alone but rather as an integrated system.  
 
A macro approach to financial regulation accommodates smooth operation of competing 
imperatives and respond to pluralistic interests of different regulatory bodies. It is related 
to the fact that regulatory bodies that rule different universes, even if they embrace 
divergent regulatory goals in their technical capacity, are in connection with each other 
not through a process of linear arrangement, but through a transformative and reflexive 
dynamic. As Chapter 2 discussed, the normative reasoning of financial regulation is to 
ensure both the financial system itself and components of the financial system, i.e. firms 
and markets, operate efficiently without disruption. Motivated by the overarching 
normative reasoning of financial regulation, one must consider how the conflicts between 
differing regulatory universes should operate in diverse contexts and what the long-term 
effects of competing imperatives are. In this thesis, these competing imperatives are 
formulated as long-term financial stability and short-term market inefficiency (and other 
attendant benefits of market transparency). These competing constituencies of financial 
regulation should be aligned in a way that conservative and clear-cut demarcation of 
regulatory goals (such as the divergence between bank prudential regulation and capital 
markets regulation) should transform into a more flexible and accommodative system that 
is transformative, cooperative and sustainable in the long term.  
 
It is difficult to define what the best regulatory policy is; but considering the wider social  
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and economic welfare implications of macrostability, a macro approach to regulation 
through prioritisation of goals in certain circumstances could be a solution. So, this thesis 
acknowledges that a broader goal of financial stability should be given priority in certain 
circumstances. Nevertheless, prioritization should not mean ignoring the secondary 
regulator for the sake of macrostability because such a system would undermine one of 
the reasons for establishing that regulatory agency in the first place. So, the regulatory 
architecture should be designed to allow the securities markets regulator and the bank 
prudential regulator to operate in harmony and to contribute to the broader purposes of 
financial regulation.  
 
Cross-fertilisation and synergy between regulatory institutions have a bearing on the 
structuring of the regulatory/ supervisory architecture. As Chapter 2 discussed, 
institutional arrangements (such as twin peaks, the single agency model or formalised 
cooperation via umbrella bodies) are very much an accident of history that reflect 
considerations about more effective and responsive supervision, rule- and decision-
making and problem-solving. What needs to be asked is whether, if pursuance of financial 
stability, laudable as this might be, assuages concurrent fulfilment of other goals such as 
investor protection or ensuring competition, this might create highly powerful and 
perhaps unnecessarily political stability-seeking bodies, since the value attributed to 
systemic and financial stability has overly increased. As discussed, it is another 
dimension of the discussion related to stability-regulator accountability and therefore, the 
institutional segregation of agencies, such as in the case of bank prudential and capital 
markets regulators, should be a result of a thoughtful combination of both regulatory areas.  
 
Even if the separation of bank regulators and securities regulators might be an abstraction  
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considering the regulatory ends of each regulatory zones in the long-term, in the short-
term the objectives might necessitate more prudent and covert collaboration between the 
regulators. Therefore, this thesis finds that there is no perfect organisational structure that 
fully eliminates conflicts. Nevertheless, the ideal solution for disclosure about a troubled 
bank could be prioritisation. This means that stakeholder behaviours in minimising their 
losses on the revelation of negative news or noisy signals implying an adverse situation 
can be controlled without disturbing the market. However, such a system based on 
prioritisation implies that it is not only the bank problem that should be kept secret but 
also discussions or signals concerning the solution. Macro approach to bank regulation 
and regulatory regimes is a necessity in establishing a solution to the concerns about 
negative externalities derived from immediate bank transparency. As incompatibility of 
regulatory philosophies shows itself during the crisis times, regulatory regimes should be 
seen in context, not in isolation and independent from each other. Rather, there should be 
regulatory arrangements to prevent regulatory underlaps or overlaps, reduce the 
complexity in handling bank information disclosure and to accommodate coordinative 
and communicative bridge between these two regulatory turfs. Strategic bank 
transparency, as the MAR s 17(5) exemplifies, identifies stability as a macro objective 
and refers that regulation should be taken together as a whole, not separately within its 
bounded regulatory turfs.  
 
It should also be considered that regulatory bodies, which are responsible for taking the 
action, should be accountable to the public so that overly discretionary or political 
decisions can be prevented. Any public impression that the government withholds 
politically inconvenient information might do more harm to markets as it might 
undermine public confidence, dissuade investors from participating in the allocation of  
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resources and provide uncertainty about future developments. It might also give an 
impression of regulatory favouritism or regulatory capture. So, a delicate balance is 
necessary to ensure governments are held accountable for their decisions with better 
sunshine policies. After the necessary measures are taken, the facts should be open to 
public scrutiny. This requires ex-post transparency of utilised measures by the regulators. 
 
However, prioritisation suggested here should not be understood as the stability regulator 
installed as the king regulator due to its objective of greater public interest (maintaining 
overall stability) in the short-term. It is not a competition to designate which interests are 
more important on the scale of determining public interest. However, it is the ability of 
taking of urgent actions for preventing a possible wider breakdown which might give 
birth to more detrimental effects than delayed transparency in capital markets in the long 
term. As such, the term ‘collaboration’ and ‘strategic transparency’ rather than ‘real time 
transparency’ might be more accurate in setting a course for managing bank information 
flow to the outside.  
 
At the heart of the prudential regulation of banks is an endeavour to make banks safe and 
sound for the purpose of overall stability. There is an inherent complication within the 
relationship of the regulator and the bank due to the fact that reputation and private 
information are the major assets of a bank in a market with information asymmetries. 
Therefore, the prudential regulator/supervisor is required to consider this aspect in 
pursuing transparency. Yet, one can say that a going-public decision is a financing 
decision made of the bank’s own accord and so, as a private firm, it has to bear the 
outcome of maximum transparency in capital markets like any other firms. Even if this 
assertion might be true in terms of equality, efficiency is accomplished by responding to  
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the different needs of the players at the optimal level within the system. Private 
information embedded in balance sheets and other reports are parts of the trust placed in 
banks and its management and use should be efficient and economical. In terms of the 
present regulatory environment, the private law framework of bank transparency is driven 
by greater public interest needs. Even in rigorous bank secrecy jurisdictions there have 
been substantial steps taken to elasticise the bank’s private duty of confidentiality. 
Moreover, global pressures on bank information are heading towards more revelation and 
sharing of information to attain higher public goals. So, while banks’ authority over the 
information they hold under the private law framework is restricted by public law 
requirements for the sake of the greater public interest, banks’ authority over the 
information that they have to disclose as a result of being publicly-quoted firms becomes 
relevant to the financial stability of the state during times of financial distress. Lack of 
confidence and its volatile emotional consequences and ambiguous nature (extrinsic and 
intrinsic confidence produced by banks and by the financial system as a whole) within 
the financial system suggests that the confidence element cannot be detached and 
abstracted from actual socio-economic life. The change in economic culture that has 
occurred from seeing banks as conservative, prudence-displaying firms (whose 
disclosures are approached with suspicion for systemic reasons) to profit-maximising 
oriented ordinary firms in the face of deregulation and shadow banking has meant that 
bank disclosures are more necessary than before due to the complexity of the financial 
engineering and surrounding opacity. Yet, elements of confidence and trust in the fragile 
nature of the banking system and the difficulty of handling its sudden disappearance in a 
crisis reminds us of the popular saying ‘ignorance is bliss’.  
 
Instead of putting regulators into a position that requires them not to apply existing  
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regulations too strictly on banks, necessary legal arrangements should be made to enable 
the smooth functioning of the laws by responding to emergency circumstances with legal 
certainty. Any implication of forbearance towards banks emanating from the pressure of 
bank regulator over the securities regulator has the potential to undermine the regulators’ 
credibility and authority, and also it carries the risk of sending the wrong signals to the 
market.  
 
In this respect, post-crisis measures that have been applied differ and the EU and the US 
have experienced different recoveries. Models of regulation and structures of financial 
regulation and supervision bear the stamp of the economic, political and cultural 
characteristics of each jurisdiction, and the judicious mixture of transparency and 
prudential regulation changes depending on the regulatory and political agendas. 
 
S 17(5) of MAR, even if it can be criticised for being drafted very broadly and vaguely 
by some, acknowledges the optimality problem on the disclosure of bank information and 
establishes the controlled disclosure of bank information. Such an overarching provision 
surely gives what banks and regulators need and paves the way for a smooth resolution 
for future tensions that might appear. It therefore helps to protect the resilience of the 
financial system in the long-term. Even the wording of the relevant provision is debatable, 
this thesis agrees with the EU approach in broad strokes.  
 
The US, as the epicentre of the GFC, has not responded in a similar way to the EU with 
its MAR. Instead, it has strengthened macro-prudential measures and created new 
authorities to monitor SIFIs and develop policies for TBTF institutions. It should be noted 
that it is US laws (1933 and 1934 Acts) that accommodate specific provisions for bank- 
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issued securities. Yet, as Chapter 4 examined, the dilemma experienced involved a BHC, 
which was both a TBTF and SIFI whose failure was likely to have detrimental effects on 
the whole economy. Therefore, considering the dispersed banking system in the US, for 
banking companies whose failure is likely to disturb the financial stability (ie TBTF and 
SIFI-class banking firms), there should be a specific law similar to MAR or a specific 
exemption provided for financial stability purposes so that the cases similar to the AIG 
Bailout or merger of BoA and ML would not happen. Adoption of a statutory resolution 
in the US would be a prudent approach to prevent a similar case to NR.  
 
As MAR shows, post hoc transparency is advised for banks during times of financial 
difficulty and the maximum transparency goal embedded in the MD system in securities 
laws should accommodate an exemption or a safe harbour which responds to the need of 
both the banks and the financial system on non-disclosure. However, as addressed in 
Chapter 2, pinpointing the right criteria for interference in markets (such as in the form 
of a ban on short sales or LoLR) in order to enhance total welfare and maximise socio-
economic benefits of markets is difficult. Paternalistically justified measures to protect 
financial stability and control systemic risk are consequentialist in the way they are based 
on the production of more good than harm, and from a more lenient point of view 
paternalism does not necessarily have to take place against the regulated’s will and 
override its choices. Though it does not seem like politically correct language, MAR’s 
delay provision for FIs has a paternalistic pattern as it protects bank stakeholders by 
imposing a delay in gaining access to bank information while protecting other bank 
stakeholders (such as depositors, peer banks and the public in general) as well.  
 
There are indirect costs of intervention such as externalities. Limiting bank disclosures  
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can weaken market competitiveness, cause loss of reputation and aggravate information 
asymmetries yet the collective good produced by financial stability as it is reflected in the 
MAR is also a compelling rationale. Financial stability is an overriding objective for 
regulators and it is an official acknowledgement that greater gains can be achieved by a 
synergistic relationship between securities regulators and bank and stability regulators.  
 
So, in this thesis, praise of timely bank transparency is balanced with biting critique. Bank 
transparency should be balanced with appropriate secrecy so that both the government 
and the banking system can function. This view is based on the premise that trust and 
confidence is a very important lubricant of a social and financial system that has economic 
value, and as social capital it contributes to the efficient functioning of society. Analysing 
the implications of bank information interpretation in confidence production entails a 
challenge here in that there is a subjective and objective perception of information that 
challenges the very simplistic approach to information. Given the trust and confidence 
which comes from a sheer presumption, any adverse information could have multiple and 
magnified effects. Banks, compared to the extent that they create credit and confidence 
in the market, destroy the same confidence in a way that its effects follow a sequence in 
the system and create wider and more extensive damage to the whole system. The 
continuous tightening of rules or the maximisation of quantity and frequency of disclosed 
information does not necessarily and always ensure public confidence; rather, constant 
and open communication among regulators and banks is one of the pillars underpinning 
public confidence. So, rather than disclosing the information to the public immediately, 
it is necessary to fill knowledge gaps between the banks and regulators and build a better 
strategic approach such as developing an aggregated regulatory policy instead of a 
fragmented one. Yet, it is a big challenge because an optimal level of transparency is  
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contingent on the culture and state of the financial system. This is where government 
accountability comes into play. Recommendations of delayed bank transparency for 
‘overall financial stability of the state’ reasons for those states that are already well-
known for corruption and low levels of accountability, does not seem efficient and 
advisable. These are interesting avenues for future research on how to build a more stable 
financial system. 
 
While this thesis addresses the potential for a negative correlation between bank 
transparency and stability during a crisis by presenting a challenge within the realms of 
public law, a side but also related aspect of bank information disclosure is also explored 
in order to set the scene for how bank information disclosure creates a tension between 
the bank and its customers, and also between the bank and law enforcement agencies. 
This auxiliary challenge, as presented in Chapter 5, deals with the private law framework 
of bank confidentiality. The erosion of the bank’s duty of confidentiality shows that there 
is an increasing public law penetration into this private law duty. The new global order 
for the sharing of bank information suggests that the tension between these domains is 
not as high as in the past because banks prefer to de-risk themselves and share customer 
information at the expense of losing the traditional concept of a bank’s duty of 
confidentiality. The tension between private rights and public interest in the context of 
bank secrecy and confidential bank information indicates another paradigm albeit a 
similar dilemma. As it is established in Chapter 5, AML, tax evasion and CTF measures 
require banks to share information which signals the changing roles of banks and the state. 
An optimal level of information here, within the context of conflicting requirements 
residing in private and public laws, seems to be established on behalf of the state for 
public policy goals. The tension discussed in Chapter 5 is not as apparent as the one  
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between bank prudential regulator and securities markets regulator. Yet, confidence is 
not an absolute concept that can be inculcated via laws, it is, rather, relative. Reputational 
loss, for example high profile losses due to non-compliance or links with disreputable 
persons or firms, might provoke a loss of confidence. These are areas for future research 
if such disclosures have a systemic risk or financial stability dimension. Similarly, it is 
not possible to offer a definite solution due to the growing interest in bank information.   
 
To conclude, how best to deal with the conflict is the fundamental challenge for financial 
regulation, supervision and resolution. Once a crisis has emerged, it becomes more 
difficult to reestablish the macrostability and curb the adverse effects of the crisis. So, the 
solution to conflict should be based on prevention of the problem, regardless of how the 
regulatory chairs are organised, and bank information management during financial 
turbulence should be seen as part of macroprudential regulation. 
 
1.   Directions for Future Research  
The overall argument of this thesis opens up discussions for further research. The 
principle of transparency necessitates that the decisions and actions of governments and 
regulatory /supervisory agencies should be open to public scrutiny, which addresses 
governmental legitimacy and accountability. Not all countries share the same level of 
accountability and values attributed to transparency. While pointing out the institutional 
dialectic between two regulatory areas by placing banks at the centre of questioning, a 
balance should be struck in such a way that black-and-white or binary thinking is avoided. 
The support for the EU solution to the tension highlighted here does not mean that the 
same solution is recommended and advisable under all jurisdictions. Sceptical thinking 
about maximum bank transparency should not offer a mask for corruption, inefficiency, 
	   362	  
fraud or political gains, and it should not give a public image about regulatory capture. 
Additionally, this thesis addresses the differences between normal times and times of 
financial stress, turbulence and crisis, and concludes that tension appears during difficult 
times. States have different interpretations regarding what difficult times means or what 
can be a threat to financial or systemic stability. So, the application of solutions should 
be tailored to each jurisdiction and what requires further research is if, for example, MAR 
s 17(5)’s application in practice will cause any challenges in different countries that have 
different economies, values, political and legal traditions and cultures.  
 
Additionally, there is a psychological aspect of financial markets, behaviours of economic 
agents and the financial and economic system in general. It means that behavioural 
determinants of bank runs and failures and their ensuing results on public confidence 
require further exploration as collective memories of past crises can be lost or cognitive 
components triggering a self-fulfilling phenomenon of en masse depositor withdrawals 
and an inter-bank freeze might change. Behavioural finance still examines the behaviour 
of economic agents and produces feedback for the information paradigm in financial 
markets. As trust and confidence are one of the main pillars of economic decision-making, 
this needs to be addressed through further behavioural explanations. 
 
Besides, as a post-crisis product, too much concentration on systemic and financial 
stability might lead to highly powerful agencies charged with the preservation of stability. 
Economic and political coalitions running financial industry policies and reforms bear the 
stamp of past experiences or anticipated threats to stability. So, the responses and 
precautions taken for more efficient financial and regulatory systems and structures take 
different forms in different times. As there is no standing best practice that pinpoints the  
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most optimal regulatory structure or legal framework for crisis management and 
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